Summary
approving the resubmitted plan because it incorporated all of the court's requested changes except for the division of Pitkin County, which was found constitutional because the Commission provided the court with "a sufficient basis for judicial review of its actions and reasons for the necessity that Pitkin County be divided."
Summary of this case from In re Reapportionment, Colo. Gen. AssemOpinion
No. 92SA19
Decided March 30, 1992.
Original Proceeding Pursuant to the Rules Regarding Reapportionment.
Holme, Roberts Owen, Daniel S. Hoffman, Daniel J. Dunn, Stephen P. Ward; Colorado Reapportionment Commission, Rebecca C. Lennahan, for the Colorado Reapportionment Commission.
Charles H. Richardson, Christopher K. Daly, for the City of Aurora, Colorado.
Luis A. Corchado; Manuel I. Lopez; Motz, Gonzales and Martinez, Martin A. Gonzales, for the Hispanic League.
Holland and Hart, John C. Barajas, for the Colorado Hispanic Bar Association.
Steven R. Ruddick, Amicus Curiae.
Schmidt and Schmidt, Mark H. Schmidt, for Board of County Commissioners of Baca County, Colorado.
Steven G. Keppers, for Columbine Knolls South Homeowners' Association.
Menola N. Upshaw, for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Denver Branch.
Dr. Lawrence E. Lewis, for the Colorado-Wyoming State Conference Branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Rev. Oscar S. Tillman, for the Legal Redress Staff.
Harden, Schmidt, Hass Haag, P.C., George H. Hass, Assistant Larimer County Attorney, for the Board of County Commissioners, Larimer County and Larimer County Clerk and Recorder.
Gerie Grimes, for the Colorado Black Roundtable, Inc.
Charles R. Duke, State Representative, for House District 20.
Jeanne M. Adkins, State Representative, for House District 40.
John M. Ely, Assistant Pitkin County Attorney, for Pitkin County Board of County Commissioners.
Fossum, Hatter Green, P.C., James Hatter, for Bipartisan Committee to Keep Montezuma County Whole.
Robert Sack, Clerk and Recorder of Adams County, James D. Robinson, for the Adams County Clerk and Recorder.
Zak, Fox, Pehr and Fuller, P.C., Richard L. Fuller, David W. Pehr, for Joan M. Johnson, Sheryl L. Pehr, and Amanda S. Pehr.
Rick DeWitt, Englewood City Attorney, for the City of Englewood.
Grant, Bernard, Lyons Gaddis, P.C., Daniel F. Bernard, Suzan D. Fritchel, for the Arapahoe County School District No. 1.
Martin R. McCullough, Westminster City Attorney, for the City of Westminster.
Davis, Graham Stubbs, Gale T. Miller, Richard A. Westfall; Pryor, Carney and Johnson, Pamela J. Fair, for Jennie Sanchez, Adeline Sanchez Esther Grant.
Wilma M. Taylor, for the Colorado Black Women for Political Action.
Peter Lawrence Vana, Arapahoe County Attorney, Darrel L. Matteson, Assistant County Attorney, Robert Lembke, Special Assistant County Attorney, for the Arapahoe County Commissioner.
Trimble, Tate and Nulan, P.C., Penfield W. Tate III, Penfield W. Tate II, Bernard L. Black, Jr., for the Blacks for Fair Reapportionment.
Hayes, Phillips Maloney, P.C., John E. Hays, for the City of Sheridan, Colorado and the Individually Named Registered Electors and Elected Officials.
Miller Delay, P.C., Reese Miller, for the Sheridan School District.
Davis, Graham Stubbs, Stephen H. Kaplan, Dan Friesen, for Michael Henry, Selma Lock, Bob Dean, Fern Osborne, Doug Franssen, Maureen H. Loyacono, Pat Sullivan, Alvin J. Koops, Richard Newlon, Denver Democratic Party, Warren Weston, Helen C. Shreves, Jane Werner, Art Binkley, Joann Ortega, Gail Glover, Jane Craft, Betty Spindler, Bob Goss, Cecily Jones, Judy Mays, Mary Gibson, June Leonard Hurst.
H. Lawrence Hoyt, Boulder County Attorney, for Boulder County Clerk and Recorder.
Reta A. Crain, for Douglas County Clerk and Recorder.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Michael Savislan, Assistant Attorney General, for Natalie Meyer, Secretary of State of Colorado.
In In re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly, No. 92SA19 (Colo. Mar. 13, 1992), we disapproved the Final Plan of the Colorado Reapportionment Commission and returned the plan to the Commission for revision, modification, and resubmission. Colo. Const. art. V, § 48(1)(e). We disapproved that part of the Final Plan which divided Pitkin County and the City of Aspen into House Districts 57 and 61, and the Commission was directed to consider alternative ways of achieving equality of population while minimizing county and city splits, and preserving compactness and communities of interest where possible. In re Reapportionment, No. 92SA19, slip op. at 23-24. Moreover, the Perry Park portion of the Final Plan was to be corrected and the boundaries of House Districts 20 and 64 were to be redrawn to conform with article V, section 47(3). In re Reapportionment, No. 91SA19, slip op. at 20. The Commission was also directed to incorporate the technical changes requested by Larimer and Boulder Counties. Id. at 36.
The Commission has now submitted a revised plan for the reapportionment of the general assembly. We conclude that the revised plan conforms with our directions and satisfies the constitutional criteria of sections 46 and 47 of article V. Accordingly, we approve the revised Final Plan.
I
The original plan submitted to this court divided Pitkin County and the City of Aspen into House Districts 57 and 61. We found that
"the Commission's explanation for dividing Pitkin County and the City of Aspen, and for the further division of Snowmass Village from Aspen, does not rise to the level of an adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement of the Colorado Constitution. Furthermore, the explanation does not provide a basis for meaningful judicial review of the Commission's decision. We, therefore, disapprove that part of the Final Plan which divides Pitkin County and the City of Aspen into House Districts 57 and 61. We return that part of the plan for reconsideration, revision, modification, and resubmission. If, after considering alternatives, the Commission concludes that the present Final Plan for Districts 57 and 61 is still constitutionally preferable to the alternatives, it may resubmit the present plan. In that case, the Commission should provide the court with additional information detailing the alternatives considered and the reasons for their rejection."
In re Reapportionment, No. 92SA19, slip op. at 23-24. Upon remand, the Commission considered eight alternate plans for the boundaries of House Districts 57 and 61, and adjacent house districts. The alternative ultimately selected by the Commission (VIA) still splits Pitkin County into Districts 57 and 61, but the City of Aspen remains intact in District 61. Thus, the advantage of the revised plan for Pitkin County over the plan we rejected is that it eliminates one city split.
In addition to the revised plan, the Commission considered but rejected seven other possible plans. Alternative I kept all of Pitkin County in District 57 and split Eagle County. To maintain equality of population, the Town of Vail was included in District 57, but Glenwood Springs was divided. The Commission rejected this alternative because it split a city and offered no net improvement with respect to preservation of communities of interest. Alternative II was similar to the first, but did not split Glenwood Springs. It was rejected because of no net improvement in preservation of communities of interest and because Glenwood Springs, the county seat of Garfield County, was placed in a district separate from the rest of the county.
Alternative III retained all of Pitkin County in District 57 and made compensating adjustments in boundaries of districts to the west. The Commission discarded this alternative because it split both Garfield and Delta Counties three ways rather than two, as in both the original and revised plans for Pitkin County. Alternative IV, which kept Pitkin County whole in District 57 and Glenwood Springs whole in District 56, made up the population loss by including a part of Summit County in District 61. This plan was unsatisfactory because it split more counties than the original Final Plan. Similarly, Alternative V, which made population adjustments to the east and then north, was eliminated because it caused more counties to be split than the Final Plan.
Alternative VII placed all of Pitkin County in District 61. The Commission concluded that this alternative would split a community of interest in Lake County. In addition, this alternative would not address the concerns of limited access between parts of Pitkin County and the rest of District 61. See In re Reapportionment, No. 92SA19, slip op. at 22. The final alternative, Alternative VIII, placed all of Pitkin County in House District 56. The Commission rejected it because it involved the same split of Eagle County and of communities of interest that led the Commission to reject the Alternatives I, II, IV, and V.
The Commission's revised plan for Pitkin County and Aspen is similar to the plan we disapproved except the new plan does not split Aspen. For the first time, however, the Commission has provided us with a sufficient basis for judicial review of its actions and reasons for the necessity that Pitkin County be divided. We conclude that the Commission's revised plan (VIA) for Pitkin County satisfies constitutional requirements. Colo. Const. art. V, §§ 46, 47.
II
In accordance with our directions on remand, the Commission has redrawn the boundaries of House Districts 20 and 64 to place all of Perry Park in District 20. In addition, the Commission has incorporated all but one of the technical modifications to the plan requested by Boulder and Larimer Counties. The Commission has determined that one of the Boulder County technical requests can not be incorporated in the Final Plan without upsetting the equality of population requirements of article V, § 46. We therefore approve the Commission's revised and modified Final Plan which was submitted to this court on March 19, 1992, and we order that the Commission file the approved plan with the Secretary of State no later than March 30, 1992.
JUSTICE QUINN dissents, and JUSTICE MULLARKEY joins in the dissent.