Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. J42417
Duffy, J.
R. C., Sr., appeals from the juvenile court’s order ruling that his son, 13-year-old R. C., Jr., would not be sent to live with him in Ohio. He claims on appeal that there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s underlying finding that it would be detrimental to R. C., Jr., to live with him. The Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services (hereafter the department) agrees with R. C., Sr., and urges that we reverse the order. For his part, R. C., Jr., urges that we affirm it.
We agree with R. C., Sr., and the department that the juvenile court erred. By statute, its order rested on an underlying finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be detrimental to R. C., Jr., to be placed with his father. In our view, the evidence to support that finding falls short of substantial, the standard we apply on review.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background of Department Interventions Regarding R. C., Jr.’s Family
R. C., Jr. was detained on August 15, 2007, along with two half-siblings, after the department filed a petition under the juvenile dependency law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300) alleging failure to protect (id., subd. (b)) and incarcerated parent unable to arrange care (id., subd. (g)).
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On August 15, 2007, R. C., Jr.’s mother, A. B., was arrested for the alleged physical abuse of M. W., a half-sister of R. C., Jr. A. B. admitted hitting M. W. in the face, claiming that she was uncontrollable. Accordingly, and as alluded to, the section 300, subdivision (g) filing alleged that A. B. was in jail and unable to care for her children.
The petition also alleged that A. B. had a substance abuse problem and a criminal history that impaired her ability to care for her children.
The petition further alleged that since 1998 the family had been referred to the department for investigation ten times. A. B. agreed to voluntary family maintenance services, but failed to attend two appointments.
The petition also alleged that on August 13, 2007, A. B.’s one-year-old grandchild ingested phencyclidine in A. B.’s home, while under A. B.’s supervision.
One of the prior referrals, according to the petition’s allegations, concerned an investigation into whether A. B. physically abused R. C., Jr., in December of 2006. R. C., Jr., went to school with swelling and a cut below an eye, which he said his mother caused by throwing a bottle at him the night before. When the social worker interviewed him, he said A. B. accidentally hit him by throwing the bottle toward a garbage can. The case was closed.
The petition further alleged that in 2001 A. B. hit R. C., Jr.’s half-sister A. W., resulting in visible injuries.
In a jurisdiction-disposition report, a department social worker stated that A. B. had a criminal history dating to 1986. She reportedly was sentenced to two prison terms, one for two years and the other for 16 months.
Regarding R. C., Sr.: in the same jurisdiction-disposition report the social worker stated that he had been convicted in 1988 of vandalism, in about 1995 of uttering checks with insufficient funds, and in 1998 of vehicle theft. He also had a number of arrests that did not result in convictions. They included arrests in 1995 and 1996 on charges of violating a domestic violence restraining order. In addition, according to the jurisdiction-disposition report and a family mental health assessment, A. B. reported that domestic violence and physical and sexual abuse regularly occurred between her and R. C., Sr., when they were together in California. R. C., Sr., testified at the contested placement hearing that eventually the couple initiated divorce proceedings, which were never finalized, and in 1999 R. C., Sr., moved to Ohio.
The family mental health assessment also reported that R. C., Jr., is close to the brothers and sisters with whom he resided before entering dependency proceedings. The children “appear to be bonded and affectionate with each other. . . . The family strongly desires to reunite and resume living together.”
II. Proceedings at the Contested Placement Hearing
At the contested placement hearing, the juvenile court began by stating that it had read certain court filings and on the basis of them expected to rule against R. C., Sr.’s request to have R. C., Jr., live with him in Ohio. “[R. C.] Sr. has lived in Ohio for quite some time. And it . . . seems to me that out of the clear blue, here’s this request to just have [R. C., Jr.]’s care taken over by his father. [¶] And I know that nonoffending parents are entitled to have their children live with them, but usually that context comes up and I have ordered, at least I know it happens in cases where either parent lives either in the same state or in many cases here in Monterey County. It seems to me that if I were to grant this request at this point, I would in essence be denying [the mother] the right to reunify with [R. C.,] Jr.”
Counsel for the department explained that under the juvenile dependency law “when the Court removes the child from one parent, . . . the first question that has to be addressed is whether or not the child can be returned to the other parent.” (See § 361.2, subd. (a).) Counsel also stated that after an investigation of R. C., Sr.’s living situation “what we wanted to do was to place with [him] and probably dismiss.” The department still held that view. “At this point there’s nothing we can find that would enable [us] to recommend not placing with [the father].”
The juvenile court asked, “Do you agree or disagree that . . . if [R. C., Jr.] moves to Ohio, at least in one respect, it clearly would be detrimental to his mother’s attempt to reunify . . . ?” Counsel for the department again replied that the first question the law requires addressing, before taking up the question of reunification with an offending custodial parent, is the possibility of placing a dependent minor with a noncustodial but nonoffending parent. “[I]f the findings are that it would not be detrimental to the physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being of the child, then I think that’s what has to be done and the issue of reunification services falls by the wayside[;] it’s no longer an issue.”
At this juncture counsel for R. C., Jr., said: “I thought we were on for a contested hearing putting on evidence. I didn’t know this was going to be strictly argument. . . . [T]hat’s why [R. C., Sr.,] came out.”
The juvenile court permitted R. C., Sr., to state his case in an informal manner. R. C., Sr., told the court that R. C., Jr., had told him that he wanted to live with him in Ohio. R. C., Sr., continued a narrative argument in favor of bringing his son back to Ohio until the court stopped him, telling him “you’re actually getting into an evidentiary hearing. I can tell you right now, I’m not going to decide this issue today.” The court then asked counsel for R. C., Sr., “any comments you want to make on your client’s behalf without turning this into an evidentiary hearing?”
Counsel for R. C., Sr., responded: “He has done everything the Department has asked him to do. He’s kept in touch with me. He’s come here, flew to California from Ohio to show that he does have a commitment to his son. He does have a relationship . . . with [R. C., Jr.] and . . . easygoing conversation[;] . . . it doesn’t sound like a stranger, a 12-year-old stranger to an older man. . . . Sounds to me like it’s a very comfortable, close relationship already. [¶] And I think that’s important to what [R. C., Sr.,] said about him being in contact with [R. C.,] Jr. He’s provided money, he’s provided [R. C., Jr.] with clothes. When [R. C., Sr.,] was asked for help, he sent it.”
Counsel for R. C., Sr., then turned to the applicable law. “[T]he standard is by clear and convincing evidence the Court has to find, based on the facts, that there would be detriment to the child if he’d be placed with his father, a previously noncustodial, nonoffending parent. [¶] There isn’t anything in the reports or what’s been said today that would sustain a factual finding sufficient for the Court to say by clear and convincing evidence it would be detrimental for [R. C.,] Jr. to be placed with his father. I think it comes down to that, it’s as a matter of law, [R. C., Sr.,] is entitled to have his son placed with him.”
The juvenile court said, “There are a lot of things I don’t know and that’s why I’m not going to grant this request. [¶] I apologize to your client . . . because he’s gone to the trouble and expense to come all the way out here with somehow the idea being that the Court was going to grant this order and turn his son over to him at this point, but I don’t feel comfortable doing it.”
At that point, however, the juvenile court appeared to retreat from making a final ruling on custody. It ruled that for the time being “[r]eunification services will continue to be provided to both parents. I would ask [the department’s social worker] to contact Ohio and tell them it’s very, very important they expedite [a] report. . . . [W]hat I need is an independent view of what the situation is really like in Ohio.”
After further discussion, the juvenile court agreed to hear R. C., Sr., testify. “[T]hat way he wouldn’t necessarily have to” return for another contested hearing, which he could not easily afford financially.
R. C., Sr., testified that he moved to Ohio to “make a better life for me and my family.” He was stably employed as a truck driver. He had raised other children successfully to adulthood in Ohio and was currently raising a two-year-old there with his fiancée. A social worker, Heather Molitor, testified that R. C., Sr., had been in a stable relationship with his fiancée for at least six years.
R. C., Sr., also testified that he and R. C., Jr., talked on the phone at regular intervals ranging from twice a week to biweekly. He would send R. C., Jr., money to buy necessities but the mother would intercept and misappropriate the money, so R. C., Sr., began to send the items directly to R. C., Jr.
On cross-examination, R. C., Sr., acknowledged that he was behind on his child support payments for R. C., Jr. He was aware of his obligation to make those payments and was fulfilling it “[a]s much as I possibly can.”
R. C., Sr., further testified that he was a baseball coach for five- to nine-year-olds, has a lifetime membership in the Young Men’s Christian Association, and would enroll R. C., Jr., in sports. He would take R. C., Jr., to the church he attends regularly. Counsel noted that the church pastor had written a character reference for R. C., Sr. The juvenile court implicitly overruled an objection on grounds of inadmissible hearsay and character evidence regarding the letter’s contents.
R. C., Sr., also testified that the department had asked him to arrange family counseling in Ohio and he had done so, albeit tentatively because R. C., Jr., remained in California. He would accept A. B.’s visits with R. C., Jr., in Ohio as long as they were supervised and would not stop R. C., Jr., from communicating with her in California.
At a subsequent session of the contested hearing, held two months later and without R. C., Sr., being present, the social worker, Heather Molitor, testified that she had no reason to believe it would be detrimental to R. C., Jr., physically or emotionally, to be placed with his father in Ohio. She also testified that Ohio had approved, under the rules of an interstate compact, permitting the Monterey County Juvenile Court to retain jurisdiction over the case if R. C., Jr., were sent to live with his father, subject to the condition that the family would undergo counseling, a condition that R. C., Sr., and his fiancée had accepted. The Ohio child welfare authorities did not discern that R. C., Sr., had any mental health issues that would require a psychological evaluation before those authorities would agree to the jurisdictional arrangement.
The juvenile court and parties reviewed R. C., Sr.’s criminal record during this proceeding. The court characterized his convictions as “few” and “fairly remote” in time.
There was evidence that R. C., Jr., was a troubled youth. He had been suspended from school multiple times for behavioral problems.
R. C., Jr., testified at the contested hearing. His father did provide him with necessities but did not acknowledge his birthday or Christmas. He had never asked to see R. C., Jr.’s report card.
R. C., Jr., did not want to go to Ohio. “I never . . . got to know my dad, and . . . when I talk to him over the phone, like he says, ‘All you need is a good A-S-S whipping.’ ” Furthermore, “when I was little, one time he hit my mom and then he—he hit my sister. And like one time like I was using my mom’s phone . . . and . . . they were arguing, and . . . he hit her and tried to take the phone away from me[, s]o I—I bit him, and then he threw me on the floor, and I hit my head on the table.” These events had occurred six or seven years ago, when R. C., Jr., was in the first grade and R. C., Sr., lived in the home.
Proceedings resumed about two weeks later with the testimony of Earlene McClair, the supervisor of social worker Heather Molitor, who had testified previously.
Counsel asked McClair if she was “aware of any circumstances that would, in your mind, make it detrimental to [R. C., Jr.]’s welfare to send him to live in Ohio?” She replied, “At this time I do not see any detriment to [R. C., Jr.]. I certainly see challenges that need to be met, but not in terms of detriment, no.” Counsel asked, “And with those challenges that you see, would they occur for anybody who happened to have [R. C., Jr.,] in their care?” McClair replied, “I think they would. [R. C., Jr.,] will bring with him certain strengths of course, as well as certain challenges.”
McClair testified that R. C., Sr.’s fiancée also wanted to raise R. C., Jr. “She states that she is willing to have [R. C., Jr.,] there. She states that she’s excited—that was the word she used—about him coming to her home. [¶] . . . She has never, in the two times I’ve talked with her, . . . expressed anything but a strong desire to have [R. C., Jr.,] there.”
Heather Molitor told the juvenile court that R. C., Jr.’s two half-siblings were in one or more separate placements in California and there was no immediate prospect that the three would be able to live together if R. C., Jr., stayed in Monterey County.
III. The Juvenile Court Rules Against Placing R. C., Jr., With His Father
The juvenile court acknowledged that the “stable” living situation of R. C., Sr., would probably benefit R. C., Jr. “The other side of that is . . . I would be concerned about moving to Ohio myself just because it’s a different place. I can well imagine that a 13-year-old would be not only concerned but very worried about that, especially in light of the fact that, based on what I heard, the limited time that [R.C.,] Jr. has spent with his father. [¶] I considered that—and when I say that, I’m talking about [R. C., Jr.,] moving to Ohio and being with a family that he really doesn’t know, detrimental to him. [¶] So I’m not going to grant the request to modify the placement.”
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Before choosing not to place a dependent minor with a nonoffending noncustodial parent, the juvenile court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to do so. (In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569; cf. § 361.2, subd. (a).) “ ‘Under this burden of proof, “evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) On review, this court inquires whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision. (John M., supra, at p. 1569.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.)
When applying the substantial evidence test in a context such as this, in which the juvenile court was required to make its determination under the clear and convincing evidence standard, a reviewing court must bear in mind the stringency of the latter standard. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.)
II. The Relevant Law
R. C., Sr., has both a constitutional and a statutory right to raise his own child, even if R. C., Jr., is a ward of the juvenile court because of malfeasance by his mother, A. B. (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 525.)
The constitutional right is venerable. “The liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court. . . . [T]he ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and ‘to control the education of their own.’ . . . [T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.’ . . . ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ ” (Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.); accord, id. at pp. 77 (opn. of Souter, J., conc. in judg.), 80 (opn. of Thomas, J., conc. in judg.).)
That said, it must be observed that the fundamental premise of dependency law is to serve the best interests of the dependent child (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1424), and so not every parent enjoys to a full extent the constitutional right to raise one’s children. (See Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1103.) One who is dissolute, absconding, abusive, or absent from the child’s life may be precluded from enjoying that constitutional right to its maximum extent. (See Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 463 U.S. 248, 249-250; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [“Although a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect”]; cf. In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 228 [“As the plurality opinion in Troxel cautioned, we should be very careful in identifying the scope of the due process interest in parenting”].) But except for an arrearage of unknown extent in child support, there is no evidence that R. C., Sr., has been a deficient parent toward R. C., Jr.
The statutory right is found in section 361.2, subdivision (a), which provides: “When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361 [i.e., removal from the current residence for protective purposes], the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300 [i.e., to the attention of child welfare authorities], who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
Given the “[l]egislative preference for placement with [the nonoffending noncustodial] parent” (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132), and, we might add, given a nonoffending parent’s constitutional right to raise his or her children, it is “a last resort” (In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 525) not to place a dependent minor with a nonoffending noncustodial parent.
III. Application of the Law to the Facts
The juvenile court’s sole reason for ruling against R. C., Sr., was that it could see that a 13-year-old would not want to live with his father in Ohio after several years apart from him and become part of “a family that he really doesn’t know.”
As both R. C., Sr., and the department observe, there is no substantial evidence in the record to sustain the juvenile court’s decision on the court’s stated ground of detriment. Two social workers testified there would be no detriment to R. C., Jr., in being placed with his father. The only evidence in support of the ruling is that R. C., Jr., did not want to go to Ohio. That is insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of a detriment. At the age of 13 R. C., Jr., “was entitled to have his wishes considered, [but] he was not entitled to decide where he would be placed.” (In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570 [speaking of a 13-year-old about to turn 14].)
Recognizing that the juvenile court’s decision rests on a thin reed, R. C., Jr., only briefly attempts to defend it. In the main, he argues that other evidence, not cited by the court, nonetheless validates its decision. He invokes the principle that even if “ ‘the court may have [ruled] based upon an erroneous theory of the case, or upon an improper or unsound course of reasoning, [that] cannot determine the question of [the ruling’s] propriety. . . . [A] ruling or decision . . . will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law . . . , it must be sustained . . . .’ ” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19.)
Assuming for purposes of argument that the foregoing principle is workable in a case involving two levels of primarily fact-based inquiry (finding facts to reach a determination by clear and convincing evidence in the juvenile court and review for substantial evidence in this court), we cannot agree that other evidence in the record provides substantial evidence in support of the ruling.
R. C., Jr., argues that the following evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination: (1) he could not visit two half-siblings, one 15 years old and the other seven, who, though placed away from their mother, are detained in the Monterey County area; (2) he wished to reunify with his mother and was emotionally attached to her; and (3) R. C., Sr., posed a danger to him because he had told him a beating would be good for him, had beaten A. B. and R. C., Jr.’s half-sister when R. C., Jr., was young, and appears to have been the subject of a domestic violence restraining order in the mid-1990s.
We find the foregoing evidence insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s determination. To be sure, the record shows that R. C., Jr., experienced lost sleep and aches and pains after A. B. was jailed and was upset at their separation. At that time, however, R. C., Jr., did not have the benefit of living with either parent. The record also shows that R. C., Jr., is close to his two half-siblings. Given R. C., Sr.’s presumptive constitutional and statutory rights to raise his son, it would be unwarranted on this record to divest him of those rights. It is mere speculation that R. C., Jr.’s physical symptoms would continue in Ohio or that he would miss his half-siblings to an emotionally devastating extent (see In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570), especially inasmuch as it is questionable that he could be with them to a significant extent in Monterey County given their separate placements. In sum, there is insufficient evidence in the record that any increased difficulty that R. C., Jr., might experience in visiting his half-siblings or being with his mother would have such a “ ‘devastating emotional impact’ ” (ibid.) to result in a legal detriment under section 361.2, subdivision (a). It bears reiterating that R. C., Jr., would be living in a stable home environment with his father, whose testimony showed a strong interest in R. C., Jr.’s well-being, and with R. C., Sr.’s welcoming and enthusiastic fiancée.
Nor do we find the third consideration—evidence of a history of physical abuse by R. C., Sr.—substantial evidence of a detriment under section 361.2, subdivision (a). The testimony from R. C., Jr., that R. C., Sr., said he deserved a whipping is not well developed and, from the scanty description R. C., Jr., offered of its utterance, the father’s comment could consist of an ill-considered remark uttered in frustration—it occurred following a session in dependency court—but not a serious threat. R. C., Jr.’s testimony that R. C., Sr., physically abused other family members in prior incidents is troubling, but the incidents were remote in time and R. C., Jr.’s testimony about them consisted of three rambling sentences. Also troubling is certain evidence of a domestic violence restraining order against R. C., Sr., but the parties point us to no information in the record about the nature of the order or the underlying conduct that generated it. As noted, substantial evidence must be of solid value. (In re Jasmine C., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 75.) The foregoing evidence falls short of that standard.
The Court of Appeal in In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, reversed the lower court’s order denying a noncustodial parent custody of his child under facts similar to those of this case. There as here, the minor was a troubled 13-year-old who was a ward of the juvenile court because his mother was not raising him safely. His father, a nonoffending parent who lived in Tennessee, wished to bring him there, but the court ruled against him, in part because the minor did not want to go. (Id. at pp. 1567-1568, 1570.) Here, as was the case in John M., the record shows no evidence of a “ ‘devastating emotional impact’ ” (id. at p. 1570) on R. C., Jr., if he is sent to live with his father in Ohio. And here, as was found to be true in John M. (id. at p. 1571; see id. at p. 1568), the father’s lack of a continuous relationship with his son does not amount to a detriment, given that there is no evidence in the record that R. C., Sr., cannot meet the needs of his son (see id. at p. 1571).
R. C., Jr., notes that the father in In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, had no criminal record (id. at p. 1568), whereas R. C., Sr., does. The juvenile court accurately noted, however, that R. C., Sr.’s offenses had occurred long ago. And the offenses of which he was convicted were nonviolent.
R. C., Jr., relies on In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, in which the Court of Appeal turned aside a nonoffending father’s challenge under section 361.2, subdivision (a). He argues that Luke M. is closer to the facts of this case than is In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 1564.
To be sure, Luke M. is factually similar to this case in certain respects, including the presence of sibling relationships among the family in California, a dysfunctional mother, a reformed father who lived in Ohio but maintained telephone contact with his children, and children who did not want to move to Ohio. (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1417-1418.)
In Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, however, following visits by three of the four children to their father in Ohio, Luke M. would cry when the social worker brought up the subject of residing with his father and could not tolerate the idea of being separated from the other children or his mother (id. at pp. 1418, 1426), and another child sobbed at the prospect of moving to Ohio because she was “ ‘extremely bonded’ ” (id. at p. 1418) to an older child who wanted to stay in California (id. at pp. 1417, 1418). All of the children had asked repeatedly not to be separated from one another. (Id. at p. 1418; see id. at p. 1426.) When Luke M. testified, the juvenile court “observed ‘the raw emotions and true sense of fear [of] separation from his siblings’ ” (id. at p. 1419) that he displayed. The facts of this case are different. The record contains documentary evidence of close ties among family members, including R. C., Jr., but in response to an open-ended question at the contested hearing about where he would prefer to live and why, R. C., Jr. said nothing about missing his siblings if sent to Ohio, and we presume it was not uppermost in his mind. As relevant here, his testimony only evinced unease about the idea of living with his father because he viewed his father as menacing. Even in that respect, as far as we can tell from the record before us, R. C., Jr., was not terrified at the prospect of living in Ohio. (Cf. id. at pp. 1419, 1426-1427.) We are aware that “ ‘[w]e review a cold record and . . . have no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses’ ” (id. at p. 1427), but the record before us leaves us confident that if the juvenile court had perceived that R. C., Jr., was scared about the possibility of relocating to Ohio, it would have noted that fact. Unlike the court in Luke M., the court here observed only that R. C., Jr., did not want to go to that state.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order dated April 9, 2008, denying the application of R. C., Sr., to raise his son, R. C., Jr., in Ohio is reversed, and its finding that it would be detrimental to R. C., Sr.’s son to live in Ohio with his father is vacated. Any order of that date that necessarily depends on R. C., Jr., not being placed in the custody of R. C., Sr., also is reversed. In all other respects, the orders are affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to conduct new proceedings consistent with this opinion. At these proceedings, the juvenile court may, in the course of determining a proper placement for R. C., Jr., consider any evidence of new or changed circumstances in the family’s situation.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P. J., Premo, J.