Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0241, SECTION "N"
January 22, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is LLOG Exploration Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2001, an inland drilling barge dubbed Falcon Rig No. 63 ("Rig 63") capsized in state waters, near the mouth of the Mississippi River. The rig capsized after being moved to a temporary location to allow for repair to the rock pad foundation that had been constructed beneath the rig. The mud line at the temporary location was allegedly 20 to 25 feet deep. It is disputed whether the rig began to list due to the mud conditions, due to improper de-ballasting by an RB employee, or both. The temporary location was approximately 200 feet from the drilling location.
On January 29, 2002, the rig's alleged owner, RB Falcon Drilling USA, Inc. ("RB"), initiated this action, alleging that two individuals (Gilbert Goldman and Fabian Dion) had filed state court suits related to the incident. In its complaint, RB sought: (1) limitation of and/or exoneration from liability; and (2) indemnification from two other companies connected to the rig's activities, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. ("Halliburton") and LLOG Exploration Company ("LLOG"). Goldman and Dion timely filed claims seeking damages for personal injuries. Halliburton and LLOG timely filed claims seeking indemnity from RB. Both Dion and Goldman later filed third-party complaints, adding claims against LLOG for their personal injuries. The claims relating to Fabian Dion have been settled. Goldman has settled his claim against RB, but not his claim against LLOG. It is this latter claim that is the subject of the instant motion.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
"Summary judgment is proper `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Kee v. City of Rowlett, Texas, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.), (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c))), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 892 (2001). "The moving party bears the burden of showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 210. If the moving party meets this burden, "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. "A dispute over a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a jury reasonably could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "The substantive law determines which facts are material." Id. at 211.
LLOG's primary argument is that it owed no duty to Goldman and, therefore, cannot be liable for negligence. It bases this argument on a provision of the LLOG Exploration Company Daywork Drilling Contract, entered into between LLOG and RB. The provision in question provides in pertinent part:
Operator [LLOG] will be responsible for selecting, marking, and clearing drilling locations within a 500' radius . . ., and for notifying Contractor [RB] of any impediments or hazards to operations at each drilling location within a 500' radius. Operator [LLOG] will also provide Contractor [RB] with soil and sea bottom condition surveys at each drilling location hereunder adequate to satisfy Contractor's Marine Surveyor.See LLOG Exh. A, § 606. LLOG argues that because RB never requested any surveys of the drilling location for Rig 63, the last sentence of this provision alleviates it of any duty it otherwise may have had to investigate the depth of the mud line surrounding the drilling location selected for Rig 63. The Court disagrees that LLOG is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
First, even if the contract would otherwise support the conclusions urged by LLOG (which is far from evident to the Court at this juncture), LLOG has not demonstrated to the Court that this as a matter of law would relieve LLOG of its duty of care vis à vis Goldman. The provision in question does not purport to absolve LLOG of the duty of care it otherwise would have owed to a worker such as Goldman — an employee of Halliburton who had been hired by LLOG to work as its mud engineer aboard Rig 63. See LLOG Memo at p. 3. On its face, it simply defines the obligations of LLOG vis à vis RB. Second, the Court is not convinced that the inferences drawn by LLOG from the contract are valid ones. The sentence immediately preceding the one relied upon by LLOG provides that it is LLOG who "will be responsible for selecting, marking, and clearing drilling locations within a 500' radius . . ., and for notifying [RB] of any impediments or hazards to operations at each drilling location within a 500' radius." See LLOG Exh. A, § 606. The following sentence — the one relied on by LLOG — adds that LLOG "will also provide" surveys as required to satisfy RB's marine surveyor. Id. (emphasis added). This language suggests an additional undertaking on LLOG's part, rather than a limitation on the obligation undertaken in the preceding sentence. For this reason also, the Court finds that LLOG has; failed at this juncture to establish as a matter of law that the day-work contract absolved it of the duty to exercise reasonable care with respect to the safety of workers such as Goldman. The materials submitted by Goldman demonstrate a genuine issue as to whether LLOG exercised reasonable care in selecting the drilling location for Rig 63, given the mud depth. They also demonstrate a genuine issue as to whether the mud depth constituted a hazard that should have been the subject of a notification by LLOG to RB.
LLOG argues alternatively that it is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Goldman's claims because, even if LLOG was negligent, improper de-ballasting (performed by RB's tool-pusher) was a superceding cause, which would serve to cut off liability. This argument too must fail. An intervening act is regarded as a "superceding cause" only if it "`was not foreseeable.'" Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996) (quoting I T. Schoenbaum, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 5-3, pp. 165-66 (2d ed. 1994); see also Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1992) (intervening act of third person is not a superceding cause if the original actor "should have realized that a third person might so act" or if a reasonable person knowing the situation would not regard the third person's act as "highly extraordinary"). Here, the record evidence demonstrates a genuine issue as to whether improper de-ballasting was unforeseeable and/or highly extraordinary. Indeed, the materials submitted by Goldman contain evidence that improper de-ballasting was a factor that contributed to the capsizing of Rig 55, an incident which allegedly occurred in the same vicinity, with LLOG as operator, just six months prior to the capsizing of Rig 63. See Goldman Exh. 9 at p. 94. Thus, LLOG has failed to establish as a matter of law that improper de-ballasting constituted a superseding cause.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that LLOG Exploration Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.