Summary
In Re Proposed Assessments v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App. 558, 560, 589 S.E.2d 179, 181 (2003) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 143 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 663-65, 548 S.E.2d 513, 516-18 (2001)).
Summary of this case from N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. WoodsOpinion
No. COA02-1591
Filed 16 December 2003
Taxation — use taxes — insurance company exemption
The trial court correctly ruled that Jefferson-Pilot is liable for a use tax, and reversed the Tax Review Board, where Jefferson-Pilot contended that N.C.G.S. § 105-228.10 prior to its 1998 amendment unambiguously forbade assessment of a local use tax against insurance companies. However, the construction given to this statute by the N.C. Supreme Court and the General Assembly supports a contrary view. Identical language was supported by the N.C. Supreme Court more than a century ago to make insurance companies liable for local use taxes, and legislative enactments since then have embraced that ruling. Moreover, the ruling urged by Jefferson-Pilot would produce an absurd result.
Judge TYSON dissenting.
Appeal by respondent from judgment entered 6 August 2002 by Judge Abraham Penn Jones in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 October 2003.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kay Linn Miller Hobart, for the State. C.B. McLean, Jr., for respondent-appellant.
Respondent appeals from a judgment reversing Administrative Decision No. 361 of the Tax Review Board and ruling that respondent is liable for the disputed local use tax. We affirm.
The relevant facts are not disputed, and may be briefly summarized as follows: Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Company is engaged in business as an insurance company and paid gross premiums tax pursuant to Article 8B of Chapter 105 of the North Carolina General Statutes between 1 January 1994 and 30 November 1996 ("the relevant period"). When Jefferson-Pilot made purchaseswithin this State, the company paid state and local sales tax on those purchases pursuant to Articles 5, 39, 40, and 42 of Chapter 105 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
During the relevant period, Jefferson-Pilot purchased tangible personal property outside of this State for storage, use, or consumption in this State. The company did not pay state or localuse tax with respect to these purchases. The Department of Revenue issued a proposed notice of tax assessment against Jefferson-Pilot for state and local use taxes for the period of 1 January 1994 through 30 November 1996. Jefferson-Pilot paid the State use tax, but contested liability for local use tax on the ground that N.C.G.S. § 105-228.10, as it existed at the time of the proposed assessment, prohibited the assessment of local use taxes against insurance companies. The Assistant Secretary sustained the proposed assessment. On appeal, the Tax Review Board reversed, ruling against the proposed assessment. The State petitioned for review in superior court; the trial court reversed the Tax Review Board and ruled that Jefferson-Pilot is liable for the proposed use tax.
Jefferson-Pilot now appeals, contending that the trial court misconstrued the following statutory provision:
No county, city, or town shall be allowed to impose any additional tax, license, or fee, other than ad valorem taxes, upon any insurance company or association paying the [gross premiums tax on insurers].
N.C.G.S. § 105-228.10 (1997) (amended 1998). Jefferson-Pilot insists that the plain language of this statute prohibited local use taxes from being assessed against insurance companies. Thus, the central issue in this case is the meaning of the pre-1998 version of G.S. § 105-228.10.
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Dare County Bd. of Educ. v. Sakaria, 127 N.C. App. 585, 588, 492 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1997). In conducting this review, we are guided by the following principles of statutory construction.
The paramount objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998). The primary indicator of legislative intent is statutory language; the judiciary must give "clear and unambiguous" language its "plain and definite meaning." Begley v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 50 N.C. App. 432, 436, 274 S.E.2d 370, 373 (1981). However, strict literalism will not be applied to the point of producing "absurd results." Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N.C. 488, 496, 212 S.E.2d 381, 386 (1975).
When the plain language of a statute proves unrevealing, a court may look to other indicia of legislative will, including: "the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means[.]" State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 596, 502 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1998) (citation omitted). The intent of the General Assembly may also be gleaned from legislative history. Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001). Likewise, "[l]ater statutory amendments provide useful evidence of the legislative intent guiding the prior version of the statute." Wells v. Consol. Judicial Ret. Sys., 354 N.C. 313, 318, 553 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2001).
Statutory provisions must be read in context: "Parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject matter must be considered and interpreted as a whole." State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. N.C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 66, 241 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1978). "Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, as together constituting one law, and harmonized to give effect to each." Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180-81, 261 S.E.2d 849, 844 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
Tax statutes "are to be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the taxpayer." Watson Industries, Inc. v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 203, 211, 69 S.E.2d 505, 511 (1952). In arriving at the true meaning of a taxation statute, the provision in question must be considered in its appropriate context within the Revenue Act. See Insurance Co. v. Stedman, 130 N.C. 221, 223, 41 S.E. 279, 280 (1902) ("Taking all the [relevant] sections of the Revenue Act of 1901 together" to arrive at an interpretation of a section of the act). The interpretation of a revenue law adopted by the agency charged with its enforcement is a significant aid to judicial interpretation of the same provision; however, "[u]nder no circumstances will the courts follow an administrative interpretation in direct conflict with the clear intent and purpose of the act under consideration." Watson Industries, Inc., 235 N.C. at 211, 69 S.E.2d at 511.
We turn now to application of these principles to the present case, which requires our examination of the statutory provisions governing the taxes at issue: (1) the local use tax, and (2) the gross premiums tax on insurance companies.
The use tax is an excise tax which is the counterpart of the sales tax. See Johnston v. Gill, 224 N.C. 638, 643-44, 32 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1944) (discussing the State use tax). N.C.G.S. § 105-467 (2003) authorizes local governments in this State to levy a sales tax on certain purchases. N.C.G.S. § 105-468 (2003) authorizes local governments to charge a use tax on "[an] item or article of tangible personal property that is not sold in the taxing county but is used, consumed, or stored for use or consumption in the taxing county." G.S. § 105-468 explicitly provides that "[t]he [use] tax applies to the same items that are subject to [sales] tax under G.S. [§] 105-467." The use tax is designed to prevent unfair competition, which may result where a purchaser can evade the local sales tax by purchasing in a locality which does not charge sales tax and then make use of the purchased property in a locality which does charge the sales tax. See Johnston, 224 N.C. at 644, 32 S.E.2d at 33. The sales and the use tax, "taken and applied together, provide a uniform tax upon either the sale or use of all tangible personal property irrespective of where it may be purchased. That is, the sales tax and the use tax are complementary and functional parts of one system of taxation." Id.
Where a locality chooses to assess local sales and use taxes, G.S. § 105-467(b) requires their assessment absent an exemption which the General Assembly has made applicable to State sales and use tax: "A taxing county may not allow an exemption, exclusion, or refund that is not allowed under the State sales and use tax." Jefferson-Pilot enjoys no exemption from the State use tax; therefore, absent some other controlling statute, it is liable for local use taxes.
Jefferson-Pilot contends that its exemption derives from the special system of taxation that applies to insurance companies: the gross premiums tax. N.C.G.S. § 105-228.5(b)(1) (2003) provides that "[t]he tax imposed . . . on an insurer . . . shall be measured by gross premiums from business done in this State during the preceding calendar year." Because they are subject to the gross premiums tax, subsection (a) exempts insurers from other types of taxes: "An insurer . . . that is subject to the [gross premiums tax] is not subject to franchise or income taxes imposed by Articles 3 and 4, respectively, of this Chapter [105]." It is clear that the gross premiums tax also restricts the imposition of some local taxes; for the purposes of the instant case, it is relevant that the pre-1998 version of G.S. § 105-228.10, titled "No additional local taxes," set forth the following prohibition:
No county, city, or town shall be allowed to impose any additional tax, license, or fee, other than ad valorem taxes, upon any insurance company or association paying the fees and taxes levied in this Article [governing taxes on insurers].
Jefferson-Pilot contends that the quoted version G.S. § 105-228.10, which was effective during the relevant period, unambiguously forbade the assessment of local use tax against insurance companies. After careful examination of the relevant statutes and cases, we do not agree. Though it is possible the pre-1998 version of G.S. § 105-228.10, read in isolation and out of context, seemingly shielded insurance companies from liability for local use taxes, the construction given to this statute by our General Assembly and Supreme Court supports a contrary view. To hold as Jefferson-Pilot urges would require us to ignore clear indicia of legislative intent and to adopt an interpretation of the statute which produces an absurd result.
The identical language at issue in the present case was interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court more than a century ago in such a way as to make insurance companies liable for local use taxes. In 1901, the predecessor of G.S. § 105-228.10 contained the following language: "Companies paying the taxes levied in this section shall not be liable for tax on their capital stock, and no county or corporation shall be allowed to impose any additional tax, license or fee." (emphasis added). The North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted that provision as follows:
The defendant insists that the proper construction of section 78, it being under Schedule B, is that all of the taxes mentioned therein constitute a privilege or license tax; that no tax can be collected or assessed against the capital stock of the company, because the section prohibits such a tax; and that no county or corporation can assess or collect any other privilege tax, but that the personal and real property of the company is taxable. We are of opinion that the defendant's position is the true one. Insurance Co., 130 N.C. at 222-23, 41 S.E. at 280 (emphasis added). Thus, the language at issue in this case has been held to prohibit only privilege taxes. Id.
Legislative enactments made in light of the holding in Insurance Co. have embraced the rule it established. In 1945, the words "other than ad valorem taxes" were added to the existing version of G.S. § 105-228.10. 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 752, § 2. Jefferson-Pilot alleges that the four words added in 1945 significantly altered the meaning of the statute. This proposition is dubious, however, in light of the change that was made. The legislature is presumed to act with full and complete knowledge of prior and existing law. State ex rel. Utilities Com. v. Thornburg, 84 N.C. App. 482, 485-86, 353 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1987). Therefore, we must assume that the legislature was aware that the predecessor to G.S. § 105-228.10 had been construed to forbid only privilege taxes. See id. By adding the phrase "other than ad valorem taxes" while making no other substantive changes, the legislature apparently wished to codify the rule set forth by the North Carolina Supreme Court that local governments could tax the property of insurance companies.
Subsequent action by the General Assembly reveals that it did not consider G.S. § 105-228.10 to be inconsistent with the assessment of the local use tax: the 1945 amendment co-existed for some period of time with a provision which expressly provided that insurance companies were subject to local sales and use taxes. In 1957, G.S. § 105-228.5 was amended to provide as follows:
The taxes levied herein measured by premiums shall be in lieu of all other taxes upon insurance companies except: . . . taxes imposed by Article 5 of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes of North Carolina as amended. . . .
1957 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1340, § 12. Article 5 of Chapter 105 governed State sales and use taxes in 1957. In 1969, Article 5 of Chapter 105 was amended to include the "Local Option Sales and Use Tax Act." 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 1228. At that time, G.S. § 105-228.5 still required insurance companies to pay the taxes levied in Article 5. Thus, in 1969, the General Assembly expressly made insurance companies subject to state and local use taxes. The subsequent removal of the local sales and use taxes from Article 5 have in no way affected the liability of insurance companies for local use taxes because those changes were unrelated to the taxation of insurance companies, and the parallel structure of the State and local sales and use tax schemes indicates that the legislature intended for insurance companies to pay local use taxes.
In 1971, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared the Local Option Sales and Use Tax Act to be unconstitutional. Hajoca Corp. v. Clayton, 277 N.C. 560, 178 S.E.2d 481 (1971). The General Assembly repealed that act and enacted the current local government sales and use taxes in Articles 39, 40 and 42. 1971 N.C. See. Laws, c. 77, s. 1 and s. 2. Insurance companies are not specifically exempted from the local use taxes in any of these articles. Moreover, exemptions from local use taxes are explicitly limited to and made dependent on the existence of codified exemptions from the State sales and use taxes. N.C.G.S. § 105-467 and 68 (2003). In N.C.G.S. § 105-164.13, the legislature has meticulously set forth approximately fifty exemptions and exclusions to the States sales and use taxes, many of which are sub-categorized by industry. Nowhere in G.S. § 105-164.13 are insurance companies exempted from State sales and use tax. Thus, local use taxes are generally applicable, and the General Assembly did not intend to make them inapplicable to insurance companies.
Recent amendments make it clear that insurance companies are currently responsible for local use taxes. See 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws. ch. 98, § 18. In 1998, G.S. § 105-228.10 was amended to provide:
No city or county may levy on a person subject to the tax levied in this Article [the gross premiums tax] a privilege tax or a tax computed on the basis of gross premiums.
"In construing a statute with reference to an amendment it is presumed that the legislature intended either (a) to change the substance of the original act, or (b) to clarify the meaning of it." Childers v. Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260, 162 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1968). In light of the following information, we conclude that the 1998 changes were made to clarify the law that existed prior to the amendments: (1) Senate Bill 1226, which proposed the 1998 changes, indicated that it was proposing "technical and conforming changes to the revenue laws," and (2) the 1998 amendment merely codified the common law interpretation which had been in existence for nearly a century.
Even if we were to ignore the strong evidence of legislative intent, we would still be compelled to read G.S. § 105-228.10 as we have because the reading urged by Jefferson-Pilot would produce an absurd result. See Taylor, 286 N.C. at 496, 212 S.E.2d at 386 (holding that statutes may not be read in such a way as to produce an absurd result). Under Jefferson-Pilot's proffered interpretation of G.S. § 105-228.10, it is still liable for local sales tax but not for local use tax. This result cannot obtain where the General Assembly has made local sales and use taxes companion parts of the same taxation scheme, and has made the local use tax applicable to the same category of items to which the sales tax applies. See G.S. § 105-467; Johnson, 224 N.C. at 644, 32 S.E.2d at 32 (discussing State sales tax).
The assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.
Affirmed.
Judge WYNN concurs.
Judge TYSON dissents.