Opinion
No. 343914 No. 343915
12-13-2018
In re PIGRAM-DAVISON/EDWARDS, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-520453-NA Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and METER and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 343914, respondent-mother appeals as of right the circuit court order terminating her parental rights to two minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm to the child). In Docket No. 343915, respondent-father appeals as of right the circuit court order terminating his parental rights to the children under the same grounds. We affirm.
I. FACTS
The older child was removed from respondent-mother's care in August 2015 as an infant because respondent-mother was homeless and lacked supplies to care for her. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleged that respondent-mother had a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, for which she was not taking medication, and that respondent-father lacked suitable housing. Respondents pleaded responsible to these allegations, and the child was placed in foster care. Respondent-mother gave birth to the second child during the first child's case, and the trial court took jurisdiction over him after respondents pleaded responsible to allegations that the older child had been removed from their care and they had not yet completed services.
At the time of the August 2015 petition, DHHS recognized that respondent-mother appeared to have cognitive impairments, though she lacked a formal diagnosis related to them. After disposition, DHHS referred respondent-mother to Infant Mental Health Services, which therapist Jane Reitman testified "is an intensive intervention with parents and children that focuses on the parent/child relationship . . . ." Caseworker Susan Mann responded affirmatively when asked whether respondent-mother's Infant Mental Health Services specialist was able to tailor the service to account for respondent-mother's low intellectual functioning. In December 2015, Mann also sought a parenting class that was specifically based on respondent-mother's low intellectual functioning.
In March 2016, respondent-mother was diagnosed with "borderline intellectual functioning" on the basis of a low IQ. In April 2016, staff at Southwest Solutions, a parenting agency, indicated to Mann that after respondent-mother completed a service with them, she would benefit from a developmental disability case manager. Mann indicated that she would refer respondent-mother to Neighborhood Service Organization (NSO), which workers described as a community mental health organization that had a program, Supporting Parents In Need (SPIN), that worked with parents who had a disability or mental illness and a low IQ. Kim Franklin, who was ultimately respondent-mother's NSO support coordinator, testified that her job was to link clients to other services or resources such as housing, food, Social Security benefits, and food stamps. Respondent-mother also received a therapist through SPIN.
Reitman testified that, after staff at Southwest Solutions recommended that respondent-mother receive a developmental disability case manager, respondent-mother had an intake appointment scheduled for September 13, 2016, but the appointment was canceled and NSO subsequently suffered from staffing difficulties. In October 2016, the trial court indicated that it would give respondent-mother an opportunity to participate in NSO services. In January 2017, Reitman testified that respondent-mother had had a SPIN therapist, Monica Grayson, for two weeks to a month. About nine months passed between the April 2016 referral by Southwest Solutions and when respondent-mother received a SPIN therapist in late 2016. However, throughout early 2017, Franklin and caseworker Breanna Ricky each asked the trial court for more time to allow respondent-mother to benefit from SPIN services.
In June 2017, DHHS petitioned to terminate respondents' parental rights under MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) on the basis that they were unable to meet the children's physical and emotional needs. DHHS alleged that neither parent was participating in mental health services and that their mental health conditions posed a risk to the children. Additionally, DHHS alleged that respondent-father had used marijuana throughout the case and that both parents lacked suitable, stable housing.
In December 2017, respondents each stipulated that the trial court had statutory grounds to terminate their parental rights under MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). DHHS called Ricky as a witness to substantiate the stipulations. Ricky testified in part that both parents' service plans required compliance with mental health treatment and medication, but she stated that the parents had not "completed any of the components of their treatment plan" and were not in compliance with medication reviews. Later testimony indicated that, while respondent-father was prescribed medications to address his mood swings, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, he had decided to use marijuana because he believed it helped him more than the medications.
Respondent-mother had bipolar disorder and respondent-father had schizoaffective disorder.
Respondent-father did not have a medical marijuana card.
The trial court subsequently held several hearings on the children's best interests. The older child had suffered from an anoxic brain injury during birth and had special needs. She was delayed in speech and gross and fine motor skills, and she had difficulties with self-regulation. Reitman testified that neither respondent was able to safely and effectively parent the children, neither was able to provide the permanence and stability the children required, and neither was able to provide for the older child's special needs.
Reitman detailed both parents' deficits in parenting, including respondent-mother's inability to emotionally engage with the children and both respondents' inability to provide the children with appropriate guidance or discipline. Reitman and caseworker Jamice Harris testified that respondent-father had missed parenting visits or attended them while high on marijuana. During the case, respondent-father refused to address his marijuana use or consistently take mental health medications, and at one point he attempted suicide. Respondent-father admitted that he had only "[k]ind of" worked on his service plan and testified, in April 2018, that he had begun "really actually trying to take care of my business."
While Harris described respondent-father's interaction with the children as very affectionate, she testified that he was unable to manage both children at once. Reitman testified that respondent-father loved the children and consistently picked them up, played with them, changed their diapers, and fed them. However, respondent-father would not discipline the children, such as with time-outs, during parenting time, and as a result, the children acted out. Reitman believed that respondent-father's mental health and substance use contributed to his being unable to take the point of view of the children or address their behavior.
Ultimately, the trial court found that DHHS had engaged in reasonable efforts to accommodate respondent-mother's disabilities. The trial court found that DHHS had recognized respondent-mother's cognitive disabilities early in the case and given her lengthy, individualized services to address them. The trial court also found that termination of respondents' parental rights was in the children's best interests. It noted that neither respondent could provide for the children's needs and that respondent-father had not engaged in mental health services and continued to use marijuana. The trial court acknowledged that respondent-father gave the children emotional support and had an attachment with them, but stated that he could not provide them with discipline or limitations, even when he was given coaching. The trial court found that the children's foster parents were willing to adopt them, and that adoption would provide the children with the permanence and stability they required. Ultimately it found that almost all pertinent best-interests factors favored termination. It ordered respondents' parental rights terminated.
II. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
In Docket No. 343914, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred when it found that DHHS engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children. We conclude that respondent-mother has not established any error.
This Court has stated that, to preserve a reasonable-efforts issue, a parent must object to a service plan when it is adopted or shortly thereafter. See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000) (discussing accommodations needed for disabilities). The Michigan Supreme Court expressed disapproval of this rule but declined to overturn it. In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 88-89; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). In this case, respondent-mother did not object to the service plan until the termination hearing that addressed the children's best interests. We conclude that respondent-mother did not preserve this issue by raising the sufficiency of her services in a timely fashion.
Generally, this Court reviews for clear error a trial court's decision whether reasonable efforts were made to reunify a child with his or her parent. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152, 166; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake. Id. at 152. However, this Court reviews unpreserved issues for plain error affecting a party's substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, and it affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id.
Respondent-mother argues that DHHS did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children because it failed to provide her with services to address her cognitive disabilities. We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that DHHS had engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-mother with the children because DHHS provided services tailored to address respondent-mother's specific disabilities and gave respondent-mother time to benefit from those services.
The purpose of a case-service plan is to facilitate returning children to their parents. MCL 712A.18f(3); Mason, 486 Mich at 156. DHHS "has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85. When a disabled parent is party to child-protective proceedings, DHHS must make special accommodations to address the parent's disability. Id. at 86. If DHHS does not do so, it "fail[s] in its duty to make reasonable efforts at reunification under MCL 712A.19a(2)." Id.
DHHS affirmatively recognized that respondent-mother had cognitive limitations—well before respondent-mother was diagnosed with those limitations—and it undertook efforts to accommodate respondent-mother's limitations both through specialized services and additional time to benefit from those services. The older child's case was immediately referred to Infant Mental Health Services, which was an intensive-intervention service. Mann testified that Infant Mental Health Services would be able to tailor its services to respondent-mother's low intellectual functioning. Reitman, respondent-mother's Infant Mental Health therapist, testified that respondent-mother received "a lot of" coaching and emotional support.
While it is undisputed that there was a delay between the recognition that respondent-mother would benefit from NSO's SPIN program and when respondent-mother received a SPIN therapist, that delay was not entirely attributable to a lack of effort on the part of DHHS. Indeed, part of the delay was attributable to NSO and respondent-mother, not DHHS. Regardless, the trial court indicated in October 2016 that it would give respondent-mother had an opportunity to participate in NSO services, and throughout early 2017, Franklin and caseworker Breanna Ricky each asked the trial court for more time to allow respondent-mother to benefit from SPIN services.
Franklin testified that when she was assigned to respondent-mother's case, Franklin "had to find her" and respondent-mother was initially reluctant to work with Franklin.
By January 2017, respondent-mother had had an NSO therapist for two to four weeks. In May 2017, Ricky asked the trial court to give respondent-mother more time to benefit from the service. DHHS petitioned to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights in June 2017, and respondents did not stipulate to the existence of statutory grounds until December 2017. At that point, respondent-mother had been participating with SPIN for about a year. At the termination hearing, Grayson testified that respondent-mother would make improvements and then regress. Grayson stated that she had observed parenting times, and respondent-mother did not appropriately apply the skills that Grayson attempted to teach. Grayson stated that respondent-mother responded at one point to direct coaching by saying, "it's not gonna work anyway." Respondent-mother's rights were not terminated until April 2018.
After reviewing the record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced that a delay in getting respondent-mother into SPIN services rendered DHHS's efforts to accommodate respondent-mother's disability unreasonable. Respondent-mother participated in tailored services before the SPIN recommendation, and she was given over a year to work with SPIN before the trial court determined that respondent-mother was not benefitting from the service.
Respondent-mother additionally argues that the services were unable to be tailored to her needs because the children were not placed with her. We disagree. While Franklin testified that NSO provided an additional service that could work with parents in the home for 8 to 16 hours a day, five to seven days a week, she also said that she was uncertain that NSO could provide enough services to address the issues in the present case such that in-home treatment would be appropriate. The children had been removed for good reason and it is not evident that DHHS erred by failing to put them into the home during the case, while respondent-mother worked on her issues. Ultimately, after reviewing the record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found that DHHS engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-mother with the children.
III. RESPONDENT-FATHER
In Docket No. 343915, respondent-father argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that statutory grounds supported terminating his parental rights and that termination of his rights was in the children's best interests.
First, we conclude that respondent-father has waived his argument concerning the statutory grounds because he stipulated, through his attorney, to this point before the trial court. A party may not harbor error as an appellate parachute. People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726; 790 NW2d 662 (2010).
We note that we have reviewed the record and, even in absence of respondent-father's waiver, respondent-father would not prevail on this issue. --------
Second, respondent-father argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children's best interests because he loved the children, was bonded with them, and demonstrated that he could care for them. We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that, despite the children's bond with respondent-father, termination was in their best interests.
After the establishment of statutory grounds for termination, the trial court must order the parent's rights terminated if it finds from a preponderance of evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 83; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's determination regarding the child's best interests. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), abrogated in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Moss, 301 Mich App at 83. To determine whether termination of a parent's parental rights is in a child's best interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). The trial court may also consider the possibility of adoption. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
The trial court found that respondent-father gave the children emotional support and had an attachment to them. However, it found that respondent-father's parenting ability was affected by his substance abuse and inability to provide the children with discipline or guidance. The trial court also found that the possibility of adoption and the older child's special needs supported termination. There was testimony that respondent-father was unable to set limits for the children. There was also testimony that the children were doing "amazingly well" in foster care. The foster parents in this case were willing to adopt the children, and Harris testified that adoption would provide the children with the stability they needed.
The bond between respondent-father and the children was only one factor for the trial court to consider when determining the children's best interests. In light of the factors the trial court considered, which were supported by the testimony in this case, we conclude that it did not clearly err by finding that termination was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien