Opinion
No. CP98-002221-A
May 8, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This memorandum of decision addresses a petition brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Marguerite P., the biological mother of Peter M., born October 14, 1990; Marguerite M., born November 11, 1991; and Rebecca M., born May 5, 1993. The Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) filed the TPR petition on May 14, 2002, alleging the grounds of failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation and lack of an ongoing parent-children relationship. For the reasons stated below, the court finds these matters in favor of the petitioner, and terminates the respondent's parental rights.
The parental rights of Garmould M., the children's father, were terminated by the court (N. Rubinow, J.) on January 7, 2003. Because one of the children at issue has the same first name as her mother, and because the children's biological father's parental rights have already been terminated, the court herein refers to Marguerite P. as "the respondent."
Trial of this highly contested matter took place on January 7, 8 and 9, 2003. The petitioner, the respondent mother and the children were vigorously represented throughout the proceedings. The Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of Peter, Marguerite or Rebecca.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petitions, the TPR social study and the multiple other documents submitted in evidence which included court records, hospital reports, records from mental health care providers, reports from CT Page 6050-b a visitation agency and records of the Department of Public Safety. The court utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses, who included DCF social workers, the court-appointed psychological evaluator, the children's therapists, a family therapist, a foster home placement worker, and the respondent's therapist. The court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.
The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 3. Practice Book § 33-5. A Summary of Adjudicatory Facts for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 2.
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
As was her right, the respondent mother did not personally testify before the court. See Practice Book § 34-1.
Additional facts will be referenced as necessary.
I.A. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The respondent and her family have a long, complicated history of involvement with DCF, reflecting commitments, revocations of commitment, and attempted responses to the respondent's unresolved mental health issues and parenting deficits. In August 1991, when she already had three young children and was pregnant with Marguerite, the department provided appropriate services to the respondent in response to problems with physical and medical neglect, inadequate supervision and housing. (Exhibit 3.) In June of 1995, Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca were first subject to an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) (Clark, J.) based upon a referral from the local police department concerning the lack of food, clothing and sanitation at their home. (Testimony of Gerald K.) The children were placed in DCF foster care. That order was confirmed in July 1995 (Clark, J.) at the agreement of the parties, and the children were committed to DCF (Santos, J.) in November 1995. The children were transferred back and forth between DCF and the respondent during the ensuing months. The commitment was revoked by the court (McLachlan, J.) in November 1996 and the children were returned to the respondent's care with a period of protective supervision.
Exhibit 3 indicates that the family has been involved with DCF since 1986, predating the birth of the children at issue in this case.
The children were again the subject of DCF's attention in April of 1997 when the respondent's son Joseph threw young Peter through a window. (Testimony of Gerald K.).
In December 1998, the court issued a second ex parte OTC, vesting DCF with the responsibility for the children's care, upon another local police department referral indicating the presence of garbage and cat droppings in all the rooms of the homes, and inadequate attention to the children. (Exhibit 4; Testimony of Gerald K.) The OTC was timely confirmed and the children were again committed to DCF in May 1999. They have remained committed and the TPR petition was filed three years later. (Court Exhibit 1.)
In response to this incident, the respondent mother was charged with multiple counts of Risk of Injury to a Minor. (Exhibits 6, 7, 8.) The court considered this evidence not for the purpose of discrediting the respondent or to establish her reputation in the community. However, such evidence is relevant where, as here, "the [respondent's] habits and misconduct . . . CT Page 6050-ac disrespect for the law and for the [children's] need for a safe and secure home has been a continuing course of conduct throughout the [children's lives]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 830, 719 A.2d 907 (1998).
I.B. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE NEGLECT ADJUDICATION OF MAY 19, 1999 CT Page 6050-c
The respondent was born on September 17, 1963. She is a high school graduate who has worked in manufacturing, food service, as a certified nurse's aide and peer companion; however, she also had long periods of unemployment since 1984. (Exhibits 13, 16, 17, 19, 20.)
The respondent reports a history of adult-onset depression which has waxed and waned during the past decade. Her depressive symptoms include loss of interest in pleasurable things, difficulty maintaining a healthy body weight, difficulty with sleep, poor concentration, low self-esteem, guilt and anxiety. (Exhibits 16, 17.)
The respondent has self-reported a history of suicidal thoughts. (Exhibits 16, 17.)
The respondent married Garmould M. when she was twenty years old. They are the biological parents of six children: Garmould III was born November 29, 1984; Anita was born December 29, 1986; Joseph was born March 29, 1989; Peter was born October 14, 1990; Marguerite was born November 11, 1991; and Rebecca was born May 5, 1993. All six children have special needs: Garmould and Anita are followed by DMR, and Joseph is hearing impaired. The marriage was marked by verbal and emotional abuse, and Garmould M.'s addiction to pain medication. The respondent and Garmould M. separated in the summer of 1998 and he did not thereafter provide any care for the children. (Exhibits 6, 14, 16, 19, 20.)
The respondent's oldest child, Garmould, has in the past received treatment at a residential facility to address his behavioral needs. (Exhibit 16.)
The respondent describes Brian H., her live-in boyfriend, as being "disabled due to recurrent depression." (Exhibits 13, 17, 19, 20.)
DCF's second round of involvement with the respondent's family began when OTCs were ordered during the summer of 1995. Court-ordered psychological evaluations of the respondents and their six children were performed by David Mantell, Ph.D. during the fall of 1995. (Exhibits 14, 15.) The court (McLachlan, J.) ordered expectations for the respondent in November 1996, when the children were returned to her care. Those expectations required, among other things, that the respondent visit the children as often as DCF permits; abstain from substance abuse; participate in parenting counseling at and accept parenting assistance from a local children's services agency; refrain from involvement with the criminal justice system; and participate in family therapy at a facility dedicated to children with special needs. (Exhibit 11e.)
In his November 1995 report to the court, Dr. Mantell cautioned that it would "be severely detrimental to the children's best interests for them to be exposed to the depressed, chaotic, deprivation with which their home environment was previously afflicted." (Exhibit 15.)
The court (Holden, J.) entered OTCs for Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca on December 18, 1998 and confirmed those orders on December 24, 1998. (Exhibit 4; Court Exhibit 1.) The CT Page 6050-d court issued specific steps which substantially mirrored the 1996 expectations and further required her to participate in individual counseling; submit to substance abuse assessment, testing, and treatment; secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income: and follow recommendations of service providers. (Exhibit 11a.)
The OTCs were entered upon the court's finding that the children were in immediate physical danger from their surroundings and that immediate removal from the respondent's care was necessary to ensure the their safety. (Exhibit 4.)
In February of 1999, DCF arranged for the respondent to visit with Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca at a local family visitation center (FSGW), where she could receive assistance in increasing her ability to provide structure and supervision for the children and herself. Initially, the respondent consistently attended, although her frequent tardiness interfered with the visits. (Exhibits 7, 18.)
Garmould, Anita and Joseph also attended some of the forty-seven visits that took place from June 23, 1999 through May 17, 2000. As found in Part I.C., despite the respondent's initial enthusiasm, FSGW then determined that visits should be suspended due to her overall lack of cooperation. (Exhibits 8, 18.)
In February 1999, the respondent presented herself to a local crisis center (WHHC), requesting "some help with my depression" and reporting symptoms of depression, anxiety, poor appetite, sleep problems, and labile mood swings. (Exhibit 16.) On March 10, 1999, the respondent underwent an outpatient psychiatric evaluation at WHHC. The examining physician diagnosed her with "Major Depression recurrent, moderate [without] psychosis," noting that she was under severe stress due to separation from her partner, financial problems, and loss of custody of her children. (Exhibit 16.) The respondent was referred for group therapy; antidepressant medication was prescribed; and "ongoing medical management" was recommended. (Exhibit 16.)
Initially, the respondent complied with the recommendations of her counselor and attended therapy sessions. (Exhibit 7.) However, by early January 2001, the respondent decided to discontinue therapy at WHHC, although she continued to receive antidepressant medication through that facility. (Exhibit 8.)
On May 19, 1999 the court (Lopez, J.) adjudicated Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca to be neglected children, and committed them to the custody of DCF. (Exhibit 5.) The court imposed another set of specific steps upon the respondent, largely identical to the 1998 steps and the 1996 expectations, but further requiring her to "make appropriate decisions for children, family and with regard to household management; participate in parenting, individual and family counseling through FSGW; follow recommendations made by service providers including WHHC, FSGW (therapeutically supervised visitation), FSC (a counseling center), and NOW (a family preservation and reunification program). In addition, the court expressly ordered the respondent to "follow through on appropriate mental health treatment for yourself." (Exhibit 11 c.)
The neglect findings were entered upon allegations that the children were being denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and they were being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or CT Page 6050-ad associations that were injurious to their well-being. (Exhibits 3, 5.)
I.C. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE NEGLECT ADJUDICATION OF MAY 19, 1999 CT Page 6050-e
As found in Part I.B., the respondent often arrived late for visits with her children at FSGW's visitation center, despite the provider's earnest efforts to improve her level of cooperation. In May 2000, when the respondent arrived so late for a visit that the children had already been sent back to their foster homes, the respondent became very agitated; yelled and cursed at her son Garmould, the visitation supervisor, and the receptionist; and left the facility in an abrupt fashion. FSGW determined that visits should be suspended, and terminated its services in June 2000 because the respondent "was unable to work within agency policy, guidelines and procedures." (Exhibit 18.)
In June 2000, the respondent underwent a court-ordered psychological examination and interactional evaluations with the children, conducted by Julia Ramos-Grenier, Ph.D. While the respondent appropriately engaged with the children in play activities, she demonstrated some disturbing histrionic traits and borderline personality traits. Dr. Grenier determined that the respondent should continue with her mental health care for these emotional-behavioral concerns. (Exhibit 13; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.) As noted, however by January 2001 the respondent had unilaterally terminated counseling at WHHC, although she continued to access her medications at that facility. (Exhibit 8.)
Dr Grenier defined "histrionic personality traits" as indications of a psychiatric condition featuring emotional lability and naivete. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
Dr Grenier defined "borderline personality traits" as indications of a psychiatric condition featuring emotional lability; difficulty establishing secure relationships with others; feelings of rejection; over-intrusiveness resulting from a poor understanding of social boundaries; and limited ability to accurately perceive reality. People with borderline personality traits can become depressed when they find themselves unable to reasonably cope with life's stressors, so that if untreated, depression will coexist along with the personality issues. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
In May 2001, at DCF's referral, the respondent was assigned a parent aide through a social service department at another local hospital (FLS). The FLS parent aide provided seven hours of services through home visits to assist with the direct care of Garmould, who remained at home with the respondent, and also to improve the respondent's general parenting, teach child development and basic living skills, increase the respondent's knowledge of and use of community resources, to promote her mental health and to promote a violence-free living environment. FLS terminated its services on July 31, 2001; the agency's case closing summary states that the respondent's level of cooperation with services was "Unacceptable." (Exhibit 19.)
DCF made the referral for the parent aide services in January 2001. (Exhibit 19.)
On April 26, 2001, the respondent presented herself to a local mental health facility (WCMHN) again requesting a psychiatric evaluation. She reported "depression . . . diminished interest in activities, . . . weight loss, insomnia, loss of energy, recurrent thoughts of suicide and symptoms caus[ing] significant impairment in her social and occupational functioning." (Exhibit 17.) Her stressors included inadequate social support, CT Page 6050-f unemployment, history of physical and emotional abuse, and child care responsibilities. The WCMHN psychiatrist diagnosed the respondent with Major depressive disorder, moderate, in full remission and recommended continued receipt of psychiatric services and antidepressant medication. She was enrolled in weekly counseling at WCMHN to further meet her mental health needs. (Exhibit 17.)
On October 11, 2001, after consideration of the evidence presented and after the children had been in foster care for nearly three continuous years, the court (Reynolds, J.) found by clear and convincing evidence that it was not appropriate to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent. On that date, the court also approved the petitioner's plan to continue long-term foster care for Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca. (Exhibit 9.)
The court (Dewey, J.) had entered similar orders with regard to each of the three children on July 11, 2001. However, the evidentiary burden was not then identified. (Exhibit 8.)
In November 2001, the respondent again started taking medication for her mental health issues. In January 2002, the respondent re-engaged in mental health counseling, and started weekly therapy with Marie R., a licensed clinical social worker, through a local hospital. (Testimony of Jennifer L.)
In March 2002, DCF referred the respondent and her domestic partner for psychosocial evaluations and assessments at CCC, a mental health service center. The master's level evaluator diagnosed the respondent with Major Depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Anxiety Disorder. Stressors included DCF's involvement in the respondent's life and the placement of her children in foster care, a limited support system, unemployment, a boyfriend with a mental illness, and a desire to complete her education. The evaluator also observed that the respondent "is very engaged in her children's lives and she tried to seek services to help her children with their psychiatric needs . . . The patient also appears to need more support with her children (services)." (Exhibit 20.)
At the time of trial, the respondent was engaged to her partner, Brian H. The evidence clearly and consistently indicates that the children dislike Brian H. and that they wish to have no connection with him. (Exhibit 7; Testimony of Jennifer L., Kimberly W-R.)
The CCC evaluator also assessed Brian H., diagnosing him with Major Depression, Anxiety Disorder, and Rule Out PTSD. (Exhibit 20.)
I.D. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE FILING OF THE TPR PETITION OF MAY 14, 2002
DCF arranged for the respondent and the children to participate in family therapy at CGC, a mental health clinic. In June of 2002, the family therapist wrote to DCF explaining that the respondent was defensive and unresponsive to the children, so that the sessions were having an adverse effect upon Peter, CT Page 6050-g Marguerite and Rebecca. (Exhibit 23.) In response, on July 19, 2002 the court (Reynolds, J.) suspended the respondent's participation in any family therapy. (Exhibit 23; Court Exhibit 1.)
The respondent was often accompanied by Brian H. and Garmould at these sessions. Their presence "upsets the children greatly." (Exhibit 23.)
The TPR petition at issue was filed on May 14, 2002. (Exhibit 1.) On September 23, 2002, Dr. Grenier performed a second psychological evaluation of the respondent, and conducted individual psychological assessments of the children. Even though she had participated in nine months of weekly therapy with Marie R., the respondent's repeat testing and evaluation demonstrated a clear increase in her borderline traits, with emotional lability, impulsivity manifest through non-cooperative behavior, risk-taking, aggression, and anger. (Exhibit 12; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
By the time of the 2002 evaluation, while the respondent's histrionic traits were still evident, for diagnostic purposes they were subsumed by more obvious borderline personality traits. (Exhibit 12; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
I.E. THE CHILDREN
The three children at issue carry a history of abuse and neglect, multiple failed placements, and significant psychological special needs. During family therapy in the summer of 2002, the children reported their desire to remain in foster care with their present families and be adopted. Although the children had contributed to a "list of `issues' they have with her," the respondent was unable or unwilling to respond to these issues in a manner which was helpful to the children; instead, her communications with the children during the spring of 2002 were unresponsive and self-protective. (Exhibit 32; Testimony of Kim W-R.)
I.E.1. PETER
Peter, the eldest of the three children at issue in this matter, was born on October 14, 1990. He lived with the respondent for the first four and a half years of his life, but resided in foster care from the time he was four and a half until he was six years old. He remained in the respondent's care until he was eight, and thereafter came into DCF's custody again. Although his initial placement was disrupted, Peter has remained in the foster home where he was placed in January 1999. (Exhibit 6: Testimony of Gerald K.)
Peter has been diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. (Exhibit 24.) A psychiatric CT Page 6050-h examination has indicated that Peter suffers from Generalized Anxiety Disorder, as well. Peter had counseling to address his stressful status as a foster child, with individual therapy sessions at FSGW to deal with his immediate issues of impulsive, intrusive conduct at school and at his placement, where a foster sibling had just been adopted. (Exhibits 7, 24; Testimony of Jennifer L., Xhevrije K., Dr. Grenier.) Peter has steadfastly indicated that he wishes to remain in his current foster placement, where a foster sibling has already been adopted. His grades have improved in this foster care setting; he participates in after-school activities; and he has formed a strong bond with his foster parents, who reciprocate his love and wish to adopt him. (Exhibits 24, 25; Testimony of Gerald K., Jennifer L., Xhevrije K.)
Peter's therapist attributes his current anxiety to CT Page 6050-ae insecurity about his future status and his concerns that he may be returned to the respondent's care. (Testimony of Xhevrije K.)
I.E.2. MARGUERITE
Marguerite was born on November 11, 1991. She lived with the respondent for the first three and a half years of her life, and then was subject to foster care until she was five years old. She remained in the respondent's care until she was seven, and thereafter has been in DCF's custody.
Marguerite disrupted a number of her foster placements, due to behavioral issues; she has also resisted visitation with the respondent. DCF provided her with individual counseling at AFBC, but no progress was noted. In February 2000, Marguerite was placed in a residential therapeutic foster residence (KIC), where she continued to demonstrate severe problematic behaviors, poor social skills, inability to comply with rules, and a propensity to make cruel comments to others. Marguerite received individual therapy at KIC, and in early 2001 was transferred to reside with a therapeutic foster family. There, Marguerite has improved her behaviors to a "dramatic" degree, and she has developed a bond with her foster parents, Kim and Ron S. She continues to participate in individual therapy, but no longer meets the criteria for ODD with which she was originally diagnosed. (Exhibits 7, 22; Testimony of Dr. Grenier, Gerald K., Christy G-T.) Rebecca joined Marguerite at this foster home in August 2001. Marguerite has clearly expressed her desire to remain in her present placement. (Exhibit 22; Testimony of Gerald K., Christy G-T.)
This therapeutic foster home is affiliated with a mental health agency which provides a case-manager for the children, and assigns a behaviorist to work with the children and foster parents. Kim and Ron S. are adept at providing significant structure and other in-home services to assist the girls in their behaviors. (Testimony of Gerald K.)
I.E.3. REBECCA CT Page 6050-i
Rebecca was born on May 5, 1993 and is approaching her tenth birthday. She lived with the respondent for the first two years of her life, and then was subject to foster care until she was three and a half. She remained in the respondent's care until she was five and a half, and thereafter has been in DCF custody.
Rebecca has a history of inappropriate developmental behaviors, with impulsive, threatening and controlling conduct, difficulty sleeping, poor hygiene, expressional problems and stress. (Exhibits 21, 22; Testimony of Dr. Grenier, Lucy S.) She carries a provisional of ADHD and PTSD, manifests a developmental disorder associated with short-term memory deficits and processing problems; and she has received medication for her impulsivity and hyperactivity. On September 27, 2001, Rebecca was placed in the therapeutic foster home where Marguerite resides, in an effort to improve her behavioral health. (Exhibits 21, 22.)
See footnote 27.
Referred by DCF, Rebecca received counseling at individual counseling at IPP and at CGC. As a result, she has become able to better verbalize her needs, and her behaviors are becoming less disruptive and more appropriate for her age. Through the positive influence of her foster parents, she has learned to accept adult supervision, to increase her on-task performance at school, and to trust the adults around her. (Exhibits 22, 23; Testimony of Lucy S.)
II. ADJUDICATION
In addressing the adjudicatory issues, the court considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to May 14, 2002, the date upon which the TPR petition against the respondent was filed, insofar as the allegations pertaining to lack of ongoing parent-children relationships are concerned. With regard to the allegations of failure re to achieve rehabilitation, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial. Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to the respondent mother.
"Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).
Practice Book Sec. 33-3(a) generally provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment." However, the commentary to Practice Book Sec 35a-7, effective January 1, 2003, explicitly provides that "Post-adjudicatory date evidence may be considered in the adjudicatory phase in a termination of parental rights case alleging the grounds of no ongoing parent-child relationship or failure to rehabilitate. In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776 (2000); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224 (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742 (2002)." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the allegations that ongoing parent-child relationships are absent in this case necessarily require consideration of the children's best interests, clearly implicating their present status. Accordingly, insofar as that aspect of the allegation is concerned, the court has also considered all of the evidence related to circumstances and events following the filing of the TPR petition, as discussed in Part II.B.2.
"Despite Practice Book § 33-3 (a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under [§ CT Page 6050-af 17a-112(j)(3)(B)], the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, [ 763 A.2d 83] (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, [ 789 A.2d 1024] (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.
II.A. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
As a predicate to granting a petition to terminate parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that CT Page 6050-j "DCF has made reasonable efforts to . . . reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in [the TPR] proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); see also In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 386, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). As found in Part I.C., on October 11, 2001, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was not appropriate for DCF to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent, satisfying the essential prong of this element of the termination statute. The court further finds that the petitioner has met any burden she may have nonetheless, through the presentation of clear and convincing evidence that the reunification efforts made by DCF were reasonable given the respondent's lack of cooperation with service providers. In addition, based on the clear and convincing evidence introduced at trial, the court now finds that the respondent is unable or unwilling to benefit from the reasonable reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.
As the Appellate Court explained, "the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." (Emphasis added; citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).
"Although `[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).
DCF provided or attempted to provide the respondent with a number of reasonable opportunities to address her mental health status and her relationship with her children, as well as transportation to visits, all in an effort to promote reunification. The department extended opportunities for the respondent to receive outpatient psychiatric treatment, individual therapy and medication management through a local hospital; individual counseling services for her children with attention to enhancement of their relationship; intensive family preservation services through NOW; therapeutic visitation at FSGW and visitation supervised at the DCF offices; case management services; parenting education programs sponsored by a local youth service agency (WYS); mental health evaluations for the respondent and her fiancé at CCC; and family therapy at CGC. The respondent's services included one-on-one attention which did not require her to participate in group instructional classes. Recognizing that the respondent's cognitive limitations were "likely to interfere with the development of insight," these services represented a reasonable response both to the respondent's borderline-to-low-average range of intellectual functioning and to her personality style which could "often be contentious, argumentative, stubborn, irritable, tempermental, and possibly explosive." (Exhibits 2, 7, 12, 13; Testimony of CT Page 6050-k Gerald K.) As such, the clear and convincing evidence established that the department took the respondent's overall mental condition into consideration "when determining what `reasonable efforts' to make at reunification" as it is required to do in such cases. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 479.
In this case, however, DCF's efforts at promoting reunification were futile because the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from services. As found in Part I., the respondent obtained individual counseling at WHHC in early 1999, and at WCMHN in the spring of 2001. DCF emphasized the importance of cooperating with the therapeutic process during those administrative case review meetings at which the respondent was present. However, the respondent failed to consistently attend counseling at WHHC, and she unilaterally discontinued her treatment at that facility in January 2001, although she continued to obtain psychiatric medications there. The respondent spent only an insignificant time in therapy at WCMHN in 2001, despite the department's efforts at encouraging her to continue participation. (Exhibit 8; Testimony of Gerald K.) See In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 257-58, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001) (acknowledging that DCF must proffer of services, but parent bears the responsibility of participating in reunification efforts); In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 635, 749 A.2d 678 (2000). Following the court's October 2001 order extinguishing the department's obligation to provide reunification efforts, the respondent reinitiated mental health treatment. As found in Part I., she recommenced the use of antidepressant medication in December 2001, and again started counseling in February 2002. The respondent has remained relatively compliant in attending counseling with Marie R. (Exhibit 7; Testimony of Marie R.) As discussed in Part II.B.1, however, despite receiving this therapy over a period of months, the respondent remains unable or unwilling to effectively communicate with others during the family therapy DCF arranged to take place during June 2002. (Exhibit 23; Testimony Kim W-R.)
There is no basis, in law or reason, for requiring DCF to unduly burden respondents by duplicating counseling or rehabilitation services that are offered to them through other agencies or that are accessed by parents themselves. See In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998). See also State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 566, 577 (2003).
Besides counseling, DCF also provided the respondent and her partner with independent evaluations at CCC in March 2002, in effort to identify and respond to her mental health needs. There, the respondent was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and again with Major Depression. (Exhibits 17, 20.) The children's counseling is described in Parts I.E. and III.B.
In addition to counseling and mental health services, DCF CT Page 6050-l proffered therapeutic visitation through FSGW, where the respondent could interact with the children under the supervision of mental health workers. However, despite the agency's efforts to enhance the quality of the respondent's participation in visits, her behavior regressed, she missed appointments, and lost control of the children during their time together. In June 2000, FSGW terminated the respondent's therapeutic visitation services, citing her lack of progress. Thereafter, scheduled visits took place at the DCF offices; the respondent consistently and punctually attended visits there from May 2000 through March 2001. (Exhibit 8; Testimony of Gerald K.)
DCF also extended the services of an FLS parenting aide during the spring and early summer of 2001, in an effort to provide the respondent with individualized instruction in the development of workable parenting skills and to improve her home's sanitary status, as a supplement to the group instruction in parenting methods that the respondent had ostensibly completed at WYS in late 1999. However, as found in Part I.C., FLS discontinued its services after only a brief time, having concluded that the respondent was not demonstrating adequate cooperation with services. (Exhibit 19; Testimony of Gerald K.)
In a timely response to the court's order for yet another effort at reunifying the respondent with her children, after the children had participated in an appropriate period of individual counseling, DCF arranged for family therapy to take place during the spring of 2002. (Testimony of Jennifer L.) Commencing on June 4, 2002, the respondent was offered family counseling with Joseph, Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca in sessions with a senior, skilled and experienced social worker-therapist at CGC whose goal was to open the communication between the children and their biological mother. Only two sessions took place as the children's level of anxiety and discomfiture remained high while in the respondent's presence. The respondent proved unable or unwilling to respond to the children's inquiries in a satisfactory manner, avoiding important issues and raising disconcerting subjects such as her plans for moving to Maine. Concluding that the family therapy had little probability of succeeding, and that it was harmful to the children, CGC recommended that this counseling be suspended. As found in Part I.D., the court concurred, and during the summer of 2002 ordered cessation of the family therapy. (Exhibit 23; Court Exhibit 1, Testimony of Lucy S., Kimberly W-R.) CT Page 6050-m
The respondent brought teenaged Garmould to at least one of the sessions, which resulted in Rebecca feeling threatened, insecure, and afraid to be returned to the home where the respondent lived with her older son. (Testimony of Lucy S.)
Marguerite and Rebecca have refused to attend any visits since June of 2002. Peter attends sporadic visits for the sole purpose of seeing his brother Joseph. (Testimony of Jennifer L.)
Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted by Marguerite P.'s own behavior and personality issues, not by "the conduct of the department." In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350. The petitioner has met her burden on this element, as the respondent remains unable or unwilling to benefit from any reunification services contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385 (parent must respond to reunification efforts a timely way so as to assist the child).
The respondent may attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification under the analysis utilized by In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637 (2002). Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. Unlike the respondent., the respondent father in Vincent B. had successfully participated in "a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program to treat a lengthy alcohol addiction." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 642. He had apparently achieved functional recovery, as in that matter "[t]he record shows no evidence of relapses." Id., 644. Furthermore, the psychological expert in Vincent B. had formed her opinion concerning the respondent father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts based only upon an evaluation performed " prior to his successful completion of the treatment program." (Emphasis added.) Id., 646. In this ease, on the other hand, reliable evidence establishes that the respondent consistently demonstrated psychological symptoms that interfered with the maintenance of a relationship with her children, despite multiple efforts at counseling. Furthermore, the psychological evaluator in this matter had examined the respondent both before and after counseling treatment, and utilized the lack of change as a part of her conclusion that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from any services that were reasonable in the context of this case. See Part II.B.1.
II.B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION II.B.1. PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner first alleges that Marguerite P.'s parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). The respondent counters that she has attended to the pivotal elements of the specific steps, and has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in the lives of her three children. As Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca were found to be neglected on May 19, 1999, nearly four years ago, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards, and construing the statute in accordance with § 177a — 112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "(i) has been found by the Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as CT Page 6050-ah would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."
"`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., [ 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)] . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted), In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]." In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied 255 Conn. 250, 759 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85.
Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that the respondent has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to her underlying issues of personality dysfunction, anger and difficulty in maintaining relationships "as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the [children], such parent could assume a responsible position at some reasonable date in the future" in the lives of Peter, Marguerite or Rebecca. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. First, the psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. As found in CT Page 6050-n Parts I.C. and D., a court-appointed psychologist had performed serial evaluations of the respondent, once in June 2000 and again in September 2002. During the nine months prior to the second evaluation, the respondent was involved in individual mental health therapy with Marie R. on a weekly basis. Nonetheless, the respondent's ability to function as a parent had not improved, but had actually deteriorated over time. The court fully credits Dr. Grenier's well-founded, detailed and consistent testimony establishing the persistence of the respondent's primary borderline personality traits, which were evident through her emotional instability, impulsivity manifest through non-cooperative behavior, risk-taking, agression and anger. The court further credits Dr. Grenier's opinion that these traits, which have become more problematic over time despite therapeutic intervention, significantly impair the respondent's ability to form appropriate relationships and to perform childcare responsibilities.
"The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).
In her June 2000 report, Dr. Grenier indicated that the respondent's psychological testing establishes the presence of "[a] disjointed or unnatural style of interaction [which] may create barriers to establishing rapport and forming comfortable, rewarding attachments with others . . . In the area of personality functioning, antisocial characteristics represent a primary feature of [the respondent's] current psychological profile . . . The expectations of her family often seem at odds with her desires so that her family seems a negative and burdensome influence rather than beneficial to her interests." (Exhibit 13.) These characteristics and the respondent's CT Page 6050-ai borderline personality traits were still painfully evident during the summer of 2002, even after months of individual weekly counseling with Marie R., manifest in the clear and convincing evidence reflecting the respondent's inability or unwillingness to effectively communicate with the children during family therapy sessions, even though Marguerite had prepared an explicit list of questions concerning the circumstances of the children's upbringing. (See Exhibit 23; Testimony of Kimberly W-R.)
Dr. Grenier cogently opined that as of September 2002, as a result of the respondent's emotional status and discordant personality functioning, this parent remained unable to adequately serve as a responsible parenting resource for these three children. Furthermore, Dr. Grenier's fully credible testimony clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent's psychological condition is chronic in nature, requiring long-term psychological treatment that focuses upon completely restructuring the patient's personality. The personality aspects of the respondent's psycholocigal condition are not amenable to medication, and psychotherapeutic treatment can take years. Given the respondent's fundamentally limited ability to develop insight into her own problems and her inability or unwillingness to achieve a sufficient decree of psychological improvement despite nine months of therapy with Marie R. the court fully credits Dr. Grenier's testimony that the respondent will not regain the capacity to provide responsible care for her children in the foreseeable future, especially in view of their particular emotional and psychological needs. (Exhibit 12; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.) See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. It is the respondent's inability or unwillingness to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not her mental health status per se, that leads the court to find that she has failed to achieve rehabilitation. See In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 673, 793 A.2d 356 cert. CT Page 6050-o denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999).
As Dr. Grenier explained, even with treatment, the process of changing borderline personality traits is very slow. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
Dr. Grenier acknowledged that, in the past, the respondent was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depression. She frankly and credibly explained that from a psychological perspective, these previous diagnoses are not inconsistent with the respondent's personality traits. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
In stating her opinion at trial, Dr. Grenier candidly acknowledged that after her June 2000 evaluation, she had concluded that through treatment and support the family could achieve reunification. She modified her opinion based upon the respondent's failure to sufficiently benefit from therapy, and upon the children's increased estrangement and their feelings that they would not be safe in their mother's care which persisted notwithstanding their own individual counseling. (Testimony of Dr Grenier.)
In reaching her opinions concerning the respondent's inability to care for her children's particular needs, the court-appointed psychological evaluator fully considered the implications of her serial examinations, which indicated that the children's emotional needs require continuing therapeutic care, and a living environment which is structured, predictable and free from the chaos which has been repeatedly evident in the respondent's home. The court fully credits Dr. Grenier's testimony that the respondent is unable to provide the consistent, predictable and stable living environment which the children all require in order to enhance their opportunities to overcome their psychological difficulties, and to experience a healthy childhood. As previously discussed, the respondent will be unable to provide such a nurturing, secure environment for Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca in the foreseeable future. (Exhibit 12, Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)
Dr. Grenier's testimony concerning Rebecca's special emotional needs was consistent with that provided by her long-term therapist, Lucy S. This therapist continues to see Rebecca every two weeks for purposes of assisting her in maintaining better impulse control, and improving her ability to form relationships with others. The psychologist's testimony concerning Marguerite's steady improvement in her foster home's structured environment, and her continuing need for less intensive mental health services, was consistent with the evidence provided by the child's, therapist. Christy G-T. Similarly, Dr. Grenier's testimony concerning Peter's continued problems with self-confidence, self-esteem, and over-dependence, and his continued need for psychotherapy, was consistent with the testimony provided by his counselor, Xhevrije K.
In deciding to credit the psychological testing and opinions drawn by Dr. Grenier after evaluating the respondent, the court used the appropriate standards to assess and consider the opinions rendered in this matter by Marie R., social-worker therapist who has provided the respondent with one half-hour of treatment every week since since January 2002. Following this measure, the court declines to accept Marie R.'s opinion that the respondent mother has made positive changes that will render her able to serve as a responsible parent for the children at issue in this case within the foreseeable future. Dr. Grenier's thorough and deliberate process of testing and interviewing the respondent and the children over time; her education and experience in the diagnosis of psychological conditions; her review of the respondents relevant past mental health history; her detailed and comprehensive explication of the respondent's strengths and limitations; and her valid understanding of the children's special needs all lead the court to conclude that the court-appointed evaluator's opinions were worthy of greater weight in this matter. Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. Even if Marie R.'s opinion is found to be valid, and the respondent is found to have made a measurable improvement in her ability to manage her own life, the issue before the court is whether the respondent "has gained the ability to care for the particular needs" of the children at issue. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. CT Page 6050-p Marie R. has admitted that she has insufficient basis upon which she could ascertain whether the respondent could accomplish the task of dealing with three special needs children at any foreseeable time. By Marie R's own measure, even if the respondent commenced the type of counseling that could significantly improve her coping skills, it would take at least one year to complete the therapeutic process. For the children at issue in this case, who have twice required lengthy foster care placement and have already waited years for their mother to achieve the ability to serve as a reliable, responsible caretaker, one more year is simply too long to wait. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). Accordingly, any degree of rehabilitation which the respondent may be found to have achieved according to Marie R.'s testimony would fail to meet the test of parenting abilities contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
In evaluating their respective opinions, the court followed the applicable rules for assessing witness testimony. "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded their testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "Where testimony is conflicting the trier may choose to believe one version over the other . . . as the probative force of the evidence is for the trier to determine." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301, 318, 715 A.2d 1 (1998); see also State v. Vargas, 34 Conn.App. 492, 498, 642 A.2d 47, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 907, 644 A.2d 921 (1994). The trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. See Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123; see also State v. Vargas, supra, 34 Conn.App. 498; Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions, Credibility of Witnesses § 1.39.
The court appreciates Marie R.'s candid acknowledgment that she has never seen the respondent interact with her children, which would be a weighty aspect of determining the degree to which rehabilitation may have been achieved. The court further credits Marie R.'s forthright admission that she cannot ascertain whether or not the respondent has any skills that would enable her to cope with children who have special emotional needs, and who are approaching or experiencing adolescence, issues that were fully resolved through Dr. Grenier's assessment and evaluation. (Testimony of Marie R., Dr. Grenier.)
A second aspect of the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the respondent has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation. Although expectations and specific steps were assigned to assist the respondent in achieving rehabilitation, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that she only partially complied, without fulfilling a number of significant measures. (Exhibits 11a, 11c, 11e.) Although she completed parenting classes and from time to time cooperated with in-home support services, the respondent failed to comply with the steps' requirement that she timely and appropriately engage in counseling. The respondent's time in and attention to the therapy was insignificant prior to the court's October 2002 order discontinuing reunification efforts, especially when weighed against her manifest issues of anxiety and depression, and the underlying personality issues which interfered with her ability to maintain relationships with her children. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of Gerald K.) The respondent failed to comply with the steps' proscription of criminal activity, as she engaged in a Breach of the Peace on January 15, 2000, for which she received a six-month sentence, suspended, with one year of conditional discharge. (Exhibit 26.) The respondent failed to comply with the steps' condition that she maintain stable housing; instead, she lived with her mother from December 1999 through August 2000, in violation of the regulations affecting that residence, and thereafter the respondent was transient for several months. Although she obtained an apartment in January of 2001, over the course of the following months that residence devolved into disarray, becoming filled with bags of cloths, beds occupied by CT Page 6050-q multiple persons, garbage and cat excrement. (Testimony of Gerald K.) Although the respondent was sometimes able to maintain a sanitary living environment, conditions regularly deteriorated so that in March of 2002, the respondent's home was again strewn with garbage including food containers; permeated by offensive odors emanating from a litter box that was overflowing with cat excrement; and rendered impassable by the presence of clothing and storage containers throughout the home. (Testimony of Jennifer L.)
As described in Part I, expectations and/or steps were ordered for the respondent in November 1996, in December 1998 and again in May 1999. (Exhibits 11a, 11c, 11e.)
From August 2001 to the time of trial, the respondent had also failed to comply with the steps' requirement that she cooperate with DCF, as she allowed the agency to inspect her home on an unannounced basis on only one occasion, despite multiple attempts. (Testimony of Jennifer L.)
Third, the empirical evidence establishes that the respondent lacks the capacity to interact with her special needs children in a positive manner, rendering her functionally incapable of serving in a responsible parental role. The family therapy sessions attempted during the summer of 2002 did not succeed in bridging the gulf between mother and offspring, due to the respondent's maladaptive methods of communication. As described in Part II.A., no progress was made during the family meetings that were guided by an experienced mental-health professional. Although all three children and the respondent had received individual counseling by that time, the family therapy sessions were anxiety-provoking for the children; there is insufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that there was any ameliorative effect upon the respondent, either. In addition, the respondent continues to reside with her fiancé Brian H., whom the children neither like nor trust. Thus, if they were returned to the respondent's care, they would necessarily be exposed to the discomfiting influence of this adult male. The court accepts the family therapist's admonition that any further attempt at family therapy would expose the children to an unreasonably anxiety-ridden environment, without any reasonable expectation for improving the parent-children relationship. (Exhibit 23; Testimony of Kimberly W-R.)
For instance, as found in Part II.A., the respondent failed to appropriately respond to specific questions presented by the children, instead answering each question with another question, without divulging any information herself. The respondent also chose to bring her partner Brian H. to one of the family sessions, although the children made no secret of their CT Page 6050-ak dislike for him. (Testimony of Kimberly W-R.)
Even if Garmould did not reside with the respondent, as he has in the past, if the children lived with her, they also would likely be exposed to this older brother, who caused them notable emotional distress in the past. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kimberly W-R.)
In deciding that the respondent has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation, the court also considered the evidence indicating that, from time to time, the respondent was able to maintain a sanitary, serviceable home. The court also acknowledged that the respondent attended parenting classes; that she re-engaged in medication management during late 2001; and that he recommenced mental health counseling in January 2002, all on her own initiative. (Testimony of Gerald K., Jennifer L.)
The condition of the respondent's home appeared to have improved only in preparation for announced visits by DCF. (See Testimony of Jennifer L.)
However, even if it is found that the respondent has developed CT Page 6050-r the ability to improve the quality of her own life, through the reinstitution of mental health treatment and the emergence of a safe lifestyle, and even if she should continue to actively engage in rehabilitation, any result would simply be "too little and too late" for Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca. In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 481-82. As found in Part I.A., these children had been removed from their mother's care for approximately eighteen months commencing in 1995; they were next subject to a court order again removing them from the respondent's home in December 1998. During the ensuing lengthy period in foster care, the children have spent the years learning to socialize appropriately and to trust others, skills they were never permitted to develop when in the respondent's custody. Under the circumstances of this case, the children "should not be further burdened by having to wait for [their] mother to achieve the level of competency necessary to parent [them]. " In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.
Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court further finds that the respondent's rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed the respondent mother's relative lack of present rehabilitation as it relates to her children's particular needs for a responsible parent who can provide them with emotional stability, security, and consistency. In its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that despite some participation in a rehabilitation regimen, the respondent remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent the three children at issue in this case, and that she will not acquire the necessary capacity to do so within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved the respondent's failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
II.B.2. LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILDREN RELATIONSHIP — § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)
The petitioner next alleges that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists between the respondent and Peter, Marguerite or Rebecca, and that the children's best interests will not be served by allowing additional time for this relationship to be developed, so that the TPR petition should be granted pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). The respondent CT Page 6050-s argues that because she has had counseling, she is able and willing to maintain a relationship with the children. Applying the requisite legal standards, and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights "where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best-interest of the child."
Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D) "`. . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . .' In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999)." (Internal and external quotations omitted.) In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525.
The relevant legal algorithm first requires the court to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists between the respondent and any of the children at issue in this case. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. Although the children looked to the respondent as their psychological parent at the time of Dr. Grenier's evaluation in June of 2000, that relationship did not endure. (See Exhibit 13.) The disintegration of the respondent's connection to her children was clearly and convincingly established by the history of the respondent's failure to cooperate with the therapeutic visitation services provided at FSGW, as described in Parts II.A. and B. When she was unable or unwilling to attend visits at DCF, she often failed to advise the agency of this fact, leaving the children repeatedly disappointed. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of Jennifer L.) The absence of a present relationship is clearly and convincingly established by the failed efforts at family therapy that took place during the summer of 2002. As described in Parts I.C., D. and II.A., the absence of a valid relationship was so apparent at that time that the family therapist recommended, and the court ordered, suspension of the sessions, to protect the children from the anxiety that resulted from contact with the respondent. (Testimony of Kimberly W-R.)
In her report following the September 2002 evaluations, Dr. Grenier indicated the lack of an existing psychological connection between the respondent, Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca: "The children all refused to be seen with their mother, which indicates that there is no significant parent/child relationship between them and their mother at this time." (Exhibit 12.)
In discerning whether a parent-children relationship exists, the court must also determine whether Peter, Marguerite and/or Rebecca maintain any present feelings for their mother and, if so, whether those feelings are of a positive nature. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. The court finds that all three children know that the respondent is their biological mother. However, the clear and convincing evidence indicates that although the children have feelings for the respondent, they are based on loyalty, a biological connection, a sense of responsibility and a perceived need to protect her, rather than being founded on any discernable bond that would ordinarily reflect the affection and warmth a child has for a parent. Under these circumstances, it would be disingenuous, at best, to describe the children's feeling for the respondent as being "positive" in nature. In re Tabitha T., supra, 51 Conn.App. 602. CT Page 6050-t
Marguerite has explained that the children do not want to hurt the respondent's feelings by telling her directly that they CT Page 6050-al do not want her to serve as their parent. (Exhibit 22; Testimony of Christy G-T.)
A summary review of the exhaustive evidence relating to the children's feelings for the respondent impels the conclusion that while they indeed have present memories of her, they have no interest in reunification with their biological mother, and do not have any emotional attachment to her as a caregiver. Insofar as Peter is concerned, the fact that the respondent had agreed to the termination of her parental rights and subsequently changed her mind left him angry and uncertain about his future. Peter has written to advise the court that he does not want to return to the respondent's care, but that he looks forward to being adopted by his current foster family. Marguerite maintains some feelings for the respondent, but her anger and frustration predominate. She also feels guilt about loving her foster family, and engaged in family therapy only in an effort to have the respondent accept some responsibility for the painful circumstances in which all the children lived while in her care. Like Peter and Marguerite, young Rebecca does not want to return to the respondent's care. (Exhibits 13, 18, 22, 25; Testimony of Dr. Grenier; Xhevrije K., Lucy S., Jennifer L.)
Peter has told his therapist that he does not want to see the respondent because he believes that "she's a liar." (Testimony of Xhevrije K.)
In March 2001, in the course of her individual therapy, Marguerite "made it quite clear that she does not wish to return to her biological mother" and indicated that she did not want to see her, either, although she attends a majority of visits and has on occasion been even pressured by her brother Garmould into stating that she wished reunification. (Exhibit 22.)
Although she informed Dr. Grenier that she would like to see the respondent, the more reliable evidence clearly establishes that Marguerite remains angry with her. She has negative memories about having lived in the discomfort of a motel and having been evicted from other residences; having been exposed to domestic violence; having been hit by the respondent who blamed it on Garmould M. without taking responsibility for her actions; and having been the subject of broken promises from the respondent. (Exhibit 12; Testimony of Christy G-T.)
As it is thus apparent that no parent-children relationship exists between the respondent, Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca, the court is next called to assess whether it would be detrimental to the children's best interests to allow additional time for a parenting relationship to be developed. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. Under the circumstances of this case, as discussed again in Part III.B. of this opinion, the court is constrained to conclude that the children's best interests cannot be served by the expenditure of any further time for the purpose of promoting a relationship with the respondent. More than enough years have already been devoted to this futile effort, and the children are fast approaching young adulthood. As found in Part II.B.1., the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the respondent will not, in the foreseeable future, develop the ability to serve as a responsible parent for her children. After serial evaluations of the respondent and her offspring, the court-appointed evaluator reached the well-founded opinion that from a psychological perspective, no treatment is available to improve the children's ability to achieve a sufficient feeling of safety in their mother's care. Thus, while the children are demonstrating therapeutic improvement and stability in their current placements, "it does not appear that allowing for further time will lead to [the respondent] being able to resume a responsible position in the lives of these three CT Page 6050-u children." (Exhibit 12; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.) Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca need to feel safe and they require effective parenting now, without delay. After such a prolonged period of uncertainty as to the availability of their biological parents as responsible caretakers, they deserve the opportunity to enjoy what remains of their childhood in a nurturing, predictable, and permanently secure environment. In the context of determining best interests, it is appropriate for the court to consider the evidence relating to the suitability of the child's foster parent. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 666, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). As already noted, Peter has written to the court, expressing his sense of security and fulfillment in his current foster home, an opinion confirmed by his therapist. (Exhibit 25; Testimony of Xhevrije K.) Insofar as Marguerite's best interests are concerned, she has developed a firm attachment to her foster siblings as well as to her foster parents. She has told her therapist that she is "loving it at the [foster] home and doesn't want to leave." (Exhibit 22.) In her foster home, Marguerite receives close supervision by responsible adults at all times; in the structured, supportive and predictable environment of this placement, Marguerite has emerged as a happy, successful student who has close peer relationships. As noted in Part I.E.2., since entering her present foster home Marguerite has dramatically improved her conduct issues. The court finds adequate basis for accepting the child's therapist's opinion that "[t]his successful placement has elevated Marguerite's self esteem and improved her outlook on her past, present, and future." (Exhibit 22.) Perhaps most importantly, in her present environment Marguerite is able to function as a child, as she is relieved of physical and emotional caretaking responsibilities that were previously cast upon her young shoulders. (Exhibit 22.) Similarly, Rebecca is thriving in the organized, predictable environment provided by her current foster parents. Removed from chaos and exposed to order and structure, she has progressed in her emotional development, and has improved her ability to maintain healthy personal relationships, due to the environment in which she is living. (Testimony of Lucy S.) The children's best interests cannot be served by wresting them from the safe and stable environments in which they are now living, to place them with a caregiver who could not or would not provide them with even rudimentary sanitation or parenting, merely to honor their biological relationship with the respondent. Instead, "permanent placement or adoption by a family that understands and can accommodate their needs is the avenue most likely to accomplish permanency for them." (Internal CT Page 6050-v quotation marks omitted.) In re Sheena I., 63 Conn.App. 713, 725, 778 A.2d 997 (2001).
In part III.B., the court determined that it would not serve the children's best interest to permit further time for a relationship with their mother to develop.
While acknowledging their biological relationship to the respondent, the children all understand that they are entitled to receive the warm, nurturing, safe and consistent parenting that is delivered in their foster care settings, which they did not receive while under the respondent's care.
The court has assessed the attributes of the foster settings in which the children are now placed for best interest analysis only. In so doing the court has fully adhered to the principle that "a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable set of adoptive parents." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992), cited in In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 835, 733 A.2d 298 (1999).
"It is reasonable to read the language of no ongoing parent-child relationship to contemplate a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." (Citations omitted.) In re John G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 22. Such construction is applicable to the present case, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that any valid parenting relationship that the respondent may have developed with her children has been definitively lost due to her own failure to adequately respond to the specific steps, and to her fundamentally unchanged personality traits which have irreparably marred communication with Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca. As the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that no ongoing parent-children relationship exists between the respondent and the children, and that it is not in the children's best interests to allow more time for them to develop a relationship with their biological mother, the petitioner has met her burden of proof under § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525; In re John G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 22.
III. DISPOSITION
As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next must determine whether termination is in the best interests of Peter, Marguerite, and Rebecca under all the circumstances existing in this case. (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 103; see also In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511 and n. 15, 613 A.2d 478 (1992). In the dispositional phase, the court considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence.
The final element of the termination of parental rights CT Page 6050-am statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."
"[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).
III.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS
The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516. CT Page 6050-w
III.A.1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)
As found in Parts I. and II.B., multiple timely and appropriate services were provided for the respondent mother and her children. Moreover, on October 11, 2001, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was not appropriate to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the respondent.
III.A.2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, through the provision of timely reunification services, as described in Parts II.A. and III.A.1. DCF also made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children from their home, as contemplated by federal law.
III.A.3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)
A drug screen in March 2002 established that the respondent had complied with the court's order to abstain from use of illegal substances. However, despite the prohibition of such activity by the 1998 and 1999 specific steps, the respondent was arrested in January 2000 and subsequently convicted of Breach of the Peace. (Exhibit 26.) Her further compliance and noncompliance with the specific steps is set forth in Parts II.A and B.1.
III.A.4. THE CHILDREN'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)
In June of 2000, although the children viewed the respondent as their psychological mother, all three declined interest in reunification. While Peter tolerates the respondent's presence when he visits with his brother Joseph, all the children have indicated that they no longer wanted to even see their biological mother. By September 2002, the children no longer viewed the respondent as their psychological mother. They expressed a desire to remain with their foster families with whom they feel safe, secure; with whom they are happily placed together; whom they have grown to trust; and by whom they wish to be adopted. (Exhibits 12, 13, 25; Testimony of Dr. Grenier, Gerald K., CT Page 6050-x Jennifer L., Lucy S.)
III.A.5. AGES OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)(5)
Peter was born October 14, 1990, and is twelve and a half years old. Marguerite M. was born November 11, 1991 and is eleven and a half years old. Rebecca M. was born May 5, 1993 and is now ten.
III.A.6. PARENT'S EFFORTS TO ADJUST HER CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)
As found in Parts II.A. and B.1., the respondent has not made timely, realistic and sustained efforts to conform her conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards. She failed to cooperate with the therapeutic visitation services provided by FSGW, losing a valuable opportunity to improve her parenting capacity soon after the children were returned to DCF's care. She did not engage in a continuous course of individual therapy until December of 2001, rendering it less likely that she could have responded to mental health treatment within a period of time that was reasonable given the years her children had spent in foster care. She continues her relationship with Brian H., an adult male with whom the children do not have a positive relationship. She has not developed the ability to maintain, for any relevant period of time, a home that is even adequately sanitary. Giving the respondent additional time would not likely bring her performance, as a parent, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the children to be reunited with her.
III.A.7. EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARENT WAS PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)(7)
No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented the respondent from maintaining relationships with the children at issue in this case, nor did the economic circumstances of the parent prevent such relationships, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system were in effect. The evidence clearly and convincingly reveals that Marguerite and Rebecca elected to discontinue visits after attending family therapy sessions where they perceived the respondent to be untruthful and not following through with promises made to them. While the respondent may argue to the contrary, the children's decision did not prevent the development of the parent-child relationship, CT Page 6050-y within the meaning of § 17a-112(k)(7), as this decision was ratified by the court's summer 2002 order ending family therapy.
III.B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(j)(2)
In determining whether it would be in the children's best interests to terminate the respondent's parental rights, the court has applied the appropriate legal standards to the facts which are clearly and convincingly apparent in this case. Under such scrutiny, and based on the clear and convincing evidence presented, the court determines that it is not in the children's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with the respondent. Accordingly. the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
In determining whether termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the best interests of the children in this case, the court has examined the multiple relevant factors, including their interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with their foster parents and biological parent; and the degree of contact maintained with their biological parent. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). The court has also considered "the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, [which] although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
"Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents . . . Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action. In re Barbara J., CT Page 6050-an 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990)." (Quotation marks and internal citation omitted.) In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).
In reaching its determination, the court has considered the closing argument presented by counsel for the children's father, upon his request and without objection.
In Part II.B.2. of this opinion, the court fully addressed the best interest issues, finding that it would not serve the children to allow additional time for them to develop a relationship with their mother. The court adopts and incorporates those findings and determinations for application in the dispositional phase of the matter, in which termination of parental rights is clearly and convincingly found to be in the children's best interests. The court's determination, finding in favor of termination is fully consistent with the most recent recommendations made by the court-appointed evaluator, and is further consistent with the overwhelming relevant evidence. The children's attorney vigorously argued that it would be in the best interests of these children to terminate parental rights so they may remain with their current caretakers. The children's therapists and the family therapist uniformly recommended that the children be permitted to remain in their present placements on a permanent basis. From a therapeutic standpoint, it is clearly and convincingly evident that only termination of the respondent's parental rights will permit the children to continue to develop feelings of stability and security, alleviating any anxiety that is caused by the continuing uncertainty related to this litigation and caused by concerns that they may be returned to the respondent's care. (Exhibit 22; Testimony of Xhevrije K., Lucy S., Christy G-T.)
Moreover, the court's determination on the best interests issue is consistent with the reasonable and clearly stated desires of Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca, to which the court has given due consideration. In re Tabitha T., supra, 51 Conn.App. 602. Each of the children has indicated that he or she does not CT Page 6050-z want to return to the respondent's custody, instead requesting to remain permanently placed with the families who currently care for them. As found in Part II.B.2., Peter has emphatically indicated his preference in writing, expressing a mature understanding that he needs the emotional and physical security and support he can only find outside of his mother's care. (Exhibit 25.) Although Marguerite has improved her self-esteem and level of social skills, she perceives her mother as being untruthful and unreliable. She continues to receive counseling, albeit on a less frequent basis, for issues related to her underlying insecurity and ambivalent relationship with her mother. Rebecca continues to have mental health problems requiring treatment by her CGC therapist, Lucy S. On the other hand, from a psychological perspective, these children and their brother Peter are comfortable and secure in their stable, secure foster homes, where their environments are protective, not chaotic or unpredictable, and where their emotional needs are well met.
In TPR matters, it is appropriate for the trial court to consider an age-appropriate child's expressed desire to avoid reunification with a biological parent, "now or in the future." In re Tabitha T., supra, 51 Conn.App. 602.
In his letter to the court, Peter wrote: "I love it where I am right now because I am loved more than enough (sic) and I get three decent meals a day. I love school with the help of loving (sic) foster parents changed me from a boy with no respect or manners to a nice boy." (Exhibit 25.) Peter attended an administrative meeting held in November 2002, when he was twelve years old. At that meeting, the respondent confronted her son with the letter at issue, further illustrating her inappropriate judgment, lack of impulse control, and inability to effectively consider the emotional state of her valiant pre-adolescent son. (See Testimony of Jennifer L.)
As the result of her therapy, Marguerite has come to understand that she once advised the respondent that she desired reunification merely to placate her biological mother. The child, who has no interest in returning to the respondent's care, is still dealing with her feelings of guilt after misleading the respondent in this way. (Exhibit 22; Testimony of Christy G-T.)
The court credits Lucy S.'s testimony that while living in the structured, planned and predictable environment at her foster home, Rebecca has improved her ability to trust others, has increased her on-task performance at school, and has decreased her disruptive behaviors. Lucy S. holds the opinion that Rebecca should be allowed to continue to live in her current placement where she has developed an appropriate degree of respect for adult authority figures, while progressing in her overall, emotional health due to the environment in which she is living. (Testimony of Lucy S.)
See footnote 63. The girls' foster parents have graciously invited Peter to their home, so that the siblings may spend time CT Page 6050-ao together. (Exhibit 3.)
This court appreciates the respondent's sincere, but belated, efforts at rehabilitation through her attendance at counseling with Marie R. In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 667. The respondent loves her children, and wants to serve as their custodian and caretaker. However, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that a respondent cannot be a competent parent to the children because she cannot provide them with the nurturing, safe and structured environment warranted by their youth and their special needs, "[a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. From a psychological standpoint, these three children have a definite need for consistent attention, support and stability in their environment; as fully discussed in Part II.B.1., the respondent cannot meet these needs in a timely manner. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). In this particular matter, the court credits the cogent opinion of the court-appointed evaluator who succinctly stated that although CT Page 6050-aa the children "are all now showing more stability in their behavioral and emotional functioning . . . this stability is still fragile and could deteriorate if permanency is not provided to them." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 12.) Having balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with the respondent mother, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Peter, Marguerite and Rebecca are each entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the uncertainly of the issues raised through this litigation. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14. Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of the respondent is in the best interest of the children at issue in this case.
IV. ORDER OF TERMINATION
WHEREFORE, after due consideration of the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship they have with their foster parents, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the children's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS.
That the parental rights of the respondent are hereby terminated as to Peter M., Marguerite M. and Rebecca M.
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for these children for the purpose of securing adoptive families or other permanent placement for them.
That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of each child shall be offered to his or her current foster parents.
BY THE COURT, CT Page 6050-ab
N. Rubinow, J.