Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ46954, Robert J. Totten, Commissioner.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Jonathan J. Kline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BOREN, P. J.
Oliver C., a minor, appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 by reason of his having possessed a short-barreled shotgun in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(1). The juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered appellant placed in the Camp Community Placement Program. Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the petition because (1) there is no evidence that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the shotgun, and (2) there is no evidence he knew of its illegal characteristics.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 23, 2010, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Stephen Slinsky and his partner stopped a black Chevrolet Cavalier that was swerving between lanes, near Las Palmas Avenue and Santa Monica Boulevard, in Los Angeles County, and was being driven by appellant. A female was in the front passenger seat, and Julian Abarca was in the backseat, behind the female.
Officer Slinsky approached the car on the driver’s side, and his partner approached on the passenger’s side. Officer Slinsky smelled alcohol on appellant’s breath as he spoke with him, and appellant showed signs of intoxication. Appellant denied drinking that night. The officer had appellant exit the car and blow into a P.A.S. device, a preliminary alcohol screening device. It indicated a blood alcohol of.03.
Appellant admitted that there was alcohol in the car and consented to Officer Slinsky searching it. The officer ordered Abarca and the female out. As he searched the car, he found a bulky object wrapped in a sweatshirt on the rear floorboard on the passenger side, where Abarca had been sitting. He determined that it was a loaded, 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun, that was 29 1/2 inches long, with a 17 3/4-inch barrel. The barrel was cut with a hacksaw and had a rough edge. The stock had been changed to a pistol grip and was wrapped with electrical tape. A roll of electrical tape was found next to the shotgun. When the officer asked who the shotgun belonged to, appellant raised his hand and said, “It’s mine.” Officer Slinsky then arrested appellant and Abarca and took them to the police station.
At the station, appellant and Abarca were placed in a room that was wired for sound and video. Abarca asked appellant to “take the rap” for the shotgun, saying that if Abarca were convicted of possessing it, he would do “serious time, ” whereas appellant would only do a few months in juvenile hall. Appellant appeared uncomfortable with the proposal. Abarca told him, “Don’t even think about turning on me because I’ll put a hit on you from the inside.” Appellant seemed scared and agreed to “take the fall” for Abarca.
When appellant was interviewed by Detective Rodriguez, he gave two versions of how he obtained the shotgun. First, he said that the shotgun was his and that he had purchased it for $150 from a Black man, to protect himself. Detective Rodriguez questioned the truthfulness of appellant’s story and said they were going to fingerprint the gun. Appellant began to cry and said that the story about buying the gun was a lie. It was not his, but it belonged to Abarca. Appellant said that Abarca had brought the gun to appellant’s house a few days earlier and asked him to keep it there. Appellant agreed and stored it under his bed. On the night of his arrest, appellant was going out with his girlfriend and asked Abarca to go with them. When Abarca arrived, appellant passed the shotgun to him through his bedroom window. They then put it in appellant’s car.
Based upon the foregoing facts, the district attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, charging appellant, then 17 years old, with possessing a sawed-off shotgun in violation of section 12020, subdivision (a)(1).
At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared the offense to be a felony, and adjudicated the minor a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. It expressly found that appellant had actual possession of the shotgun when he kept it under his bed and constructive possession when it was in the car appellant was driving. The juvenile court placed appellant in the Camp Community Placement Program for six months.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of evidence appellant knew and intended to possess the shotgun
Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the petition because there is no evidence that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the shotgun. He argues that his statement to police that he had actual possession of it in his home before his arrest was unreliable because it was made out of fear of Abarca and while impaired by alcohol, and no fingerprints or DNA were found on the shotgun. He further argues that there is no evidence of constructive possession of the shotgun in the car, as there were three people in the car, and the gun was concealed in a sweatshirt in the backseat area. This contention is without merit.
“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless ‘“upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, at p. 331.) The same principles apply with respect to juvenile proceedings under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (In re Jesse L. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 165.) “The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.)
Section 12020, as applicable here, provides in part: “(a) Any person in this state who does any of the following is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison: [¶] (1)... possesses... any short-barreled shotgun.... [¶]... [¶] (c)(1) As used in this section, a ‘short-barreled shotgun’ means any of the following: [¶] (A) A firearm which is designed or redesigned to fire a fixed shotgun shell and having a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length. [¶] (B) A firearm which has an overall length of less than 26 inches and which is designed or redesigned to fire a fixed shotgun shell. [¶] (C) Any weapon made from a shotgun (whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise) if that weapon, as modified, has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.”
“Possession may be actual or constructive. Actual possession means the object is in the defendant’s immediate possession or control. A defendant has actual possession when he himself has the weapon. Constructive possession means the object is not in the defendant’s physical possession, but the defendant knowingly exercises control or the right to control the object.” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 831; People v. Pena (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083-1084.)
The trial court found that appellant actually possessed the sawed-off shotgun at his home and constructively possessed it in the car. We conclude that the evidence supports the finding that appellant had actual possession of the shotgun. Appellant told Detective Rodriguez two versions of what occurred with the shotgun, either one of which supports the juvenile court’s finding that appellant had actual possession of it. In the first version, appellant claimed to have purchased the gun from a Black male for $150, for his own use in protecting himself when he occasionally went to Hollywood. In this scenario, he owned and possessed the shotgun when he purchased it. In the second version, appellant claimed that the shotgun belonged to Abarca and that appellant hid it under his bed for at least several days before his arrest, at Abarca’s request. On the day of his arrest, he took the shotgun from under his bed and passed it to Abarca through appellant’s window. The record suggests that appellant and Abarca placed the shotgun in appellant’s car. In this version, appellant admitted possessing it when it was given to him by Abarca and stored under his bed and passed through appellant’s window.
Appellant argues that his admission of possessing the sawed-off shotgun was unreliable and there was no corroborating evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA on the shotgun. However, this type of credibility assessment is precisely that which is for the trier of fact, not for us. As set forth above, our task is simply to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination, not whether that evidence was credible. The only exception to this principle is where the testimony is “physically impossible or inherently improbable.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181; People v. Headlee (1941) 18 Cal.2d 266, 267 [“[w]here... the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is so improbable as to be incredible, and amounts to no evidence, a question of law is presented which authorizes an appellate court to set aside a conviction”].) While one can question the credibility of appellant’s story that Abarca asked him to conceal the shotgun at appellant’s house, there is nothing so incredible or improbable about it so as to preclude its consideration.
Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence of appellant’s actual possession of the shotgun, we need not consider the closer question of whether he had constructive possession of it in his car.
II. Sufficiency of evidence appellant knew of the shotgun’s illegal characteristics
Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the petition because there is no evidence he knew of the shotgun’s illegal characteristics. He argues that because the size of the gun was so close to being outside of the prohibited range, it is unlikely that appellant could identify it as the prohibited weapon, there was no evidence appellant had experience with guns, appellant had no criminal record and there is no evidence about how he received the gun or if he actually saw it. This contention lacks merit.
Courts have traditionally interpreted crimes involving the possession of illegal weapons as requiring proof the defendant intended to possess the weapon, that is, the defendant knew he or she possessed it. (See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 332 (Rubalcava); People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922; People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592.) In People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 620 (King), our Supreme Court added that, despite the absence in section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) of an express culpable mental state, it is not a “‘public welfare offense’” justifying strict liability, and the prosecution must also prove the possessor’s knowledge of the weapon’s illegal characteristics. (See also, e.g., In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [prosecutor must prove defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the illegal character]; People v. Taylor (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 941 [cane sword]; Rubalcava, supra, at p. 332 [in prosecution for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, a defendant must know the weapon can be used as a stabbing weapon].)
“‘“[Public welfare] offenses, ”’” unlike the offense charged in this case, are purely regulatory, seek to protect the health and safety of the public, usually involve light penalties and carry with them no moral obloquy. They are not crimes in the orthodox sense. (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 623.)
A strict liability crime is one “which dispense[s] with any mens rea, scienter, or wrongful intent.” (People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519; People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 740.) Traffic violations are examples. (People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. 2; see also Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 331 [“[A] defendant may be guilty of a strict liability offense even if he does not know ‘the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.’ [Citation.]”].)
King controls the case now before us. In that case, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the offense of possessing a short-barreled rifle under section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) was a “public welfare” offense subject to strict liability, and, if not, the type of mens rea that was required. A short-barreled rifle, like the short-barreled shotgun involved in this case, is defined in section 12020, by the length of its barrel and/or its overall length. King concluded that the “Legislature intended a culpable mental state for a violation of section 12020, [subdivision] (a)(1)....” (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 626.) To establish a violation of possessing a short-barreled rifle under section 12020, subdivision (a)(1), the prosecution must prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of a short-barreled rifle’s illegal characteristics, which “will not be too difficult a task.” (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 627.) The prosecution “must prove that a defendant charged with possession of a short-barreled rifle knew the rifle was unusually short, but the defendant need not know the rifle’s actual dimensions.” (Ibid.) “The prosecution need not prove the defendant’s knowledge of the rifle’s precise length. Short-barreled rifles are illegal simply because they are short, which makes them ‘suitable for unlawful purposes because of their concealability and ease of handling.’ [Citations.] A person possessing a short-barreled rifle, and having actually observed the weapon, necessarily knows of its shortness, and thus knows its illegal characteristic, whether or not the person knows how many inches long the weapon is.... To require the prosecution to prove that a defendant knows the precise length of a rifle prohibited by section 12020(a) would make convictions for possessing such weapons virtually impossible to obtain, because few criminals would take the time to measure their rifles.” (King, supra, at pp. 627-628.) “Knowledge can, of course, be proved circumstantially. Further, the prosecution need not prove that the defendant knew there was a law against possessing the item, nor that the defendant intended to break or violate the law.” (Id. at p. 627.)
As in King, the short-barreled shotgun here is also defined in terms of its barrel and overall length and characterized primarily by its unusually short length. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that appellant knew the illegal characteristic of the short-barreled shotgun found in his car.
Under either version of events that appellant recounted to Detective Rodriguez, either one of which would support the adjudication, appellant had the opportunity to learn of the illegal characteristic of the short-barreled shotgun. Appellant admitted at the traffic stop that the shotgun was his. At the station, he initially explained that he purchased it for $150. While there was no explicit evidence that he knew its characteristics, this evidence made it reasonably inferable that he would have known and been mindful of its physical characteristics, including its short length, in deciding to purchase it. King makes clear that the defendant need not know the precise length of the shotgun or its barrel, but only that it is “unusually short.” (King, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 627.)
In the second version told to Detective Rodriguez, appellant claimed that the shotgun belonged to Abarca, who had brought it to appellant’s house a few days before their arrest and asked appellant to keep it there. Appellant never said that the shotgun was covered or wrapped when it was brought to him or that he did not know what it was. There was no evidence whether the shotgun was covered when brought to appellant’s home, whether it was covered when placed under his bed or whether appellant covered it. There was evidence, however, that when confiscated from appellant’s car, it was wrapped in a sweatshirt. Appellant said that he stored the shotgun under his bed, removed it from there and surreptitiously gave it to Abarca through appellant’s bedroom window. This handling suggests that appellant was likely aware that it was contraband. While there was no explicit evidence that appellant ever saw the shotgun unwrapped, there was substantial evidence that he handled it when he placed it under his bed, took it from that location and handed it to Abarca through appellant’s bedroom window and helped place it in his car. It is reasonably inferable that by reason of this physical handling, appellant was able to feel that the shotgun was larger than a handgun and smaller than a regular shotgun and was therefore “unusually short, ” whether or not it was covered. It was not a small item wrapped in a sweatshirt that might have been so concealed so as to hide its dimensions.
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.