Opinion
No. 05-17-00768-CV
05-14-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.C. AND Z.C.C., MINOR CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 470th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 470-54259-2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Fillmore, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
Through Mother, J.A.C. and Z.C.C. (collectively, the twins) filed a petition to adjudicate parentage, seeking to terminate the parent-child relationship between them and their adjudicated father (N.C.) and to establish a parent-child relationship between them and another man (W.M.). Mother filed a cross-claim against W.M., requesting that, if the trial court adjudicated W.M. to be the twins' father, it also enter orders relating to conservatorship, possession of or access to the twins, and current and retroactive child support. W.M. moved for traditional summary judgment on Mother's cross-claim on grounds the claim was barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata because Mother was a party to two prior divorce proceedings in which N.C. was adjudicated to be the twins' father. The trial court granted W.M.'s motion for summary judgment and, after a bench trial on the twins' petition, adjudicated W.M. to be the twins' father.
Mother brought this appeal, alleging in two issues that the trial court erred by granting W.M.'s motion for summary judgment and by failing to adjudicate N.C. as not being the twins' father. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Mother and N.C. were married on November 15, 1997. Prior to the marriage, Mother had begun a sexual relationship with W.M. and continued that relationship after she married N.C. The twins were born in May 2001.
In 2003, Mother filed a petition for divorce in the Family Court for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit Court in South Carolina. On April 23, 2004, the South Carolina court rendered a Final Decree of Divorce dissolving Mother and N.C.'s marriage. Although N.C. did not attend the hearing on Mother's petition for divorce, Mother attended and presented evidence. As relevant to this case, the South Carolina court found the twins and two other children were born of Mother and N.C.'s marriage, N.C. and Mother agreed that Mother would retain custody of the "parties' children," and Mother waived court-ordered child support "at this time." The decree stated Mother and N.C. would "work out" visitation with the children. The South Carolina Court ordered that the divorce decree constituted a "settlement of all matters pertaining to the custody, visitation and support of the minor children."
Mother and N.C. re-married on June 15, 2004. In 2008, Mother filed a petition for divorce in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. On June 25, 2008, the Georgia court rendered a Final Judgment and Decree dissolving Mother and N.C.'s second marriage. Attached to the divorce decree was Mother and N.C.'s settlement agreement, which provided that four children, including the twins, were "born as issue of this marriage." Mother and N.C. settled all debts and claims "arising from the marital relationship," including child custody and child support. Both Mother and N.C. "express[ed] their love and affection for the minor children born of this marriage" and specifically referenced the twins. Mother and N.C. agreed that Mother would have primary physical custody of the children and N.C. would have secondary physical custody. Mother and N.C. also agreed to a visitation schedule for the children and to discuss all major decisions concerning the children. N.C. agreed to pay monthly child support in the amount of $2,500, and was given the right to claim the tax "dependency deduction" for the children. The Georgia court incorporated Mother and N.C.'s settlement agreement into the divorce decree, ordered Mother and N.C. to comply with the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, and ordered N.C. to pay monthly child support of $2,500 to Mother.
Mother's relationship with W.M. ended in early 2013. In 2014, the twins, through Mother, sued W.M. and N.C., requesting that the trial court adjudicate W.M. to be their father and adjudicate N.C. to not be their father. Mother filed a petition in intervention requesting that, if the trial court terminated the parent-child relationship between N.C. and the twins and established a parent-child relationship between W.M. and the twins, she be appointed the sole managing conservator of the twins and W.M. be required to pay child support. N.C. signed an Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights.
W.M. filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because N.C. was the acknowledged and adjudicated father of the twins and the twins did not have standing to challenge paternity. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the twins' petition and Mother's intervention. The twins appealed the trial court's order. We reversed the trial court's dismissal of the twins' petition, concluding they had standing under section 160.637(b) of the family code to seek an adjudication of parentage. See In re J.A.C., No. 05-15-00554-CV, 2016 WL 3854215, at *1-3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Pursuant to section 160.637(b), a child is not bound by a determination of parentage under chapter 160 of the family code unless:
(1) the determination was based on an unrescinded acknowledgment of paternity and the acknowledgment is consistent with the results of genetic testing;TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.637(b) (West 2014).
(2) the adjudication of parentage was based on a finding consistent with the results of genetic testing and the consistency is declared in the determination or is otherwise shown; or
(3) the child was a party or was represented in the proceeding determining parentage by an attorney ad litem.
After remand, Mother filed a cross-claim in the twins' suit to adjudicate parentage. Mother alleged she had a justiciable interest in the lawsuit because the twins' request that W.M. be adjudicated as their father would affect her "legal interests in her children." Mother requested "court orders relating to conservatorship, possession of or access to the children, and child support" if W.M. was adjudicated as the twins' father. Mother specifically sought to be named the twins' sole managing conservator, an award of an equitable portion of her and the twins' prenatal and postnatal health care expenses, an award of current child support and medical support, and retroactive child support dating to the twins' birth. The trial court appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the twins in connection with their "parentage case."
W.M. filed a motion for traditional summary judgment on grounds Mother's cross-claim was barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata because Mother had participated in the two prior divorce proceedings in which N.C. was adjudicated to be the twins' father. As summary judgment evidence, W.M. relied on the two divorce decrees and N.C.'s and Mother's deposition testimony. Mother responded to W.M.'s motion for summary judgment, but did not attach any additional summary judgment evidence. The trial court issued a "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment," finding as a matter of law that both the South Carolina and Georgia divorce decrees constituted an adjudication of the twins' parentage; pursuant to section 160.637(a) of the family code, the determinations of parentage were binding on Mother; and Mother's claims against W.M. relating to the parentage of the twins were barred by collateral estoppel. The trial court ruled that W.M.'s motion for summary judgment was granted "as to the claims set forth in [Mother's] Original Cross-Claim in Petition to Adjudicate Parentage[.]" The trial court subsequently signed an order granting W.M.'s traditional motion for summary judgment as to all claims asserted by Mother without stating the basis for the ruling.
As relevant to this case, section 160.637(a) of the family code provides that, except in circumstances not relevant here, a determination of parentage is binding on "all parties to an adjudication by a court acting under circumstances that satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Section 159.201." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.637(a)(2) (West 2014). Section 159.201 of the family code sets out the bases for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual in a proceeding to establish or enforce a child support order or to determine parentage of a child. Id. § 159.201 (West Supp. 2017).
After a bench trial of the twins' claims, the trial court found the results of genetic testing excluded N.C. as the twins' biological father and showed W.M. was the twins' biological father. The trial court adjudicated W.M. to be a parent of the twins, established a parent-child relationship between W.M. and the twins, and ordered the twins' birth certificates be amended to add W.M. as a parent. At Mother's request, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mother then brought this appeal.
We do not have a reporter's record from the trial.
Summary Judgment
In her first issue, Mother argues the trial court erred by granting W.M.'s traditional motion for summary judgment because she did not seek an adjudication that W.M. was the twins' father and the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not bar her from seeking conservatorship, support, and possession orders involving W.M.
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., No. 16-0588, 2018 WL 1974473, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 27, 2018). To be entitled to a traditional summary judgment, the movant must show no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan, 2018 WL 1974473, at *3. If the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant must then raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Lujan, 2018 WL 1974473, at *3.
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we consider the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion." Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, No. 17-0231, 2018 WL 1770298, at *2 (Tex. Apr. 13, 2018) (per curiam) (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if a reasonable factfinder could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. 2017). A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment must either conclusively negate at least one essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010).
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "prevents relitigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit." Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992); see also Haddock v. Gruber, No. 05-16-01113-CV, 2018 WL 1417453, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). It is designed to "promote judicial efficiency, protect parties from multiple lawsuits, and prevent inconsistent judgments by precluding the relitigation of issues." Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994); see also BP Auto. LP v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, LLC, 517 S.W.3d 186, 199 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.). The party asserting the bar of collateral estoppel must establish that (1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the first action. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 801; Haddock, 2018 WL 1417453, at *5. "If a cause of action in the second lawsuit involves an element already decided in the first lawsuit, that cause of action is barred" if the identical issue was actually litigated and essential to the first lawsuit's judgment. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 521 (Tex. 1998); see also Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hamel, 525 S.W.3d 655, 669 n.10 (Tex. 2017) (Under doctrine of collateral estoppel, "prior adjudication of an issue will be given estoppel effect . . . if it was adequately deliberated and firm." (quoting Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1991))). Whether collateral estoppel applies in a particular case is a question of law. Rangel v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 821 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied); BP Auto., LP, 517 S.W.3d at 200.
Section 160.637(c) of the family code provides that, in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the court is considered to have made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if the court has personal jurisdiction over the parties and the final order:
(1) expressly identifies the child as "a child of the marriage" or "issue of the marriage" or uses similar words indicating that the husband is the father of the child; orTEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.637(c) (West 2014). All parties to an adjudication under section 160.637(c) are bound by the determination of parentage. See id. § 160.637(a)(2); see also In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 651 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) ("Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination that because of a person's conduct, that person, regardless of biological status, will not be permitted to litigate parentage."). Mother does not dispute that she was a party to both the South Carolina and Georgia divorce proceedings, N.C. was adjudicated to be the twins' father in both actions, and she is precluded from bringing an action to have W.M. adjudicated to be the twins' parent. She argues, however, that her cross-claim against W.M. for orders relating to conservatorship and custody of the twins and child support were not litigated in the prior divorce proceedings, and were not essential to either divorce decree, and W.M. was not a party to either divorce decree or in privity with a party.
(2) provides for the payment of child support for the child by the husband unless paternity is specifically disclaimed in the order.
As relevant here, the issues litigated in the South Carolina and Georgia divorce proceedings included not only whether N.C. was the twins' father but also whether, as their father, N.C. should be required to pay child support for the twins, be named a conservator of the twins, or have possession of the twins. Mother and N.C. fully and fairly litigated these issues. See McCray v McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam) (An agreed order "is accorded the same degree of finality and binding force as a final judgment rendered at the conclusion of an adversary proceeding."); In re R.J.P., 179 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (plurality op.) (concluding finding within agreed order that husband was biological parent of child was an adjudication husband was parent and had "binding effect of a final judgment rendered at the conclusion of an adversary proceeding"). Mother now seeks to litigate the same issues of child support, conservatorship, and custody in this case.
We next consider whether the issues tried in the South Carolina and Georgia proceedings were essential to the judgments. In conducting this analysis, we look to the factual determinations made by the trier of fact that are "necessary to form the basis of a judgment." Tarter v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 744 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1988). The issues of conservatorship, custody, and child support are intertwined with the issue of paternity. See In re J.K.B., 439 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ("Matters of conservatorship, possession, and support are matters adjudicated as a suit affecting the parent-child relationship[.]"); In re R.J.P., 179 S.W.3d at 185 (concluding man adjudicated as father in agreed child support order was barred from contesting paternity in response to motion to increase amount of child support). The South Carolina divorce decree adjudicated N.C. to be the twins' father, provided he would have possession of the twins on a schedule to be "worked out" with Mother, and ordered that Mother waived court-ordered child support "at this time." The Georgia divorce decree not only adjudicated N.C. as the twins' father, but determined he should be a secondary conservator of the twins, have possession of the twins on an established schedule, have a right to participate in major decisions regarding the twins, and pay child support to Mother for the twins. Accordingly, the issues of conservatorship, custody, and child support that Mother seeks to litigate in this case were essential to the prior judgments.
Finally, for parties to be cast as adversaries in the first suit, "it is only necessary that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the first action." Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 801-02; see also BP Auto. LP, 517 S.W.3d at 200. A party in a subsequent suit may invoke collateral estopped even if he did not participate in the first suit, as long as the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was either a party or in privity with a party in the earlier litigation. Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1991); Haddock, 2018 WL 1417453, at *7, n.2. Mother, the party against whom W.M. is asserting collateral estoppel, was a party to both the South Carolina and Georgia divorce proceedings.
We conclude W.M. conclusively established the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Mother's cross-claim. Accordingly, the trial court did not err granting W.M.'s traditional motion for summary judgment. We resolve Mother's first issue against her.
Because the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground Mother's cross-claim is barred by collateral estoppel, we need not address whether the cross-claim was also barred by res judicata. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
N.C.'s Parental Rights
In her second issue, Mother complains the trial court erred by failing to adjudicate N.C. as not being the twins' father. "Texas courts have long held that an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others." Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000). Only an aggrieved party has a right to appeal. Ghaffari v. Empire Petroleum Partners LLC, No. 02-17-00164-CV, 2018 WL 1005237, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1973) ("A petitioner may not complain of errors which do not injuriously affect him or which merely affect the rights of others."). "An aggrieved party is one who has a justiciable interest recognized by law which is injuriously affected by the trial court's judgment." Ghaffari, 2018 WL 1005237, at *3 (quoting Hanna v. Godwin, 876 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ)). A party who is not personally aggrieved lacks standing to appeal. Austin Nursing Ctr. Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848-49 (Tex. 2005); Brauss v. Triple M. Holding GmbH, 411 S.W.3d 614, 625 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied); Ghaffari, 2018 WL 1005237, at *3.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that, because the twins were not bound by the prior adjudications of N.C. as their father, "they were not required to terminate [N.C.'s] parental rights before pursuing their parentage claim."
The twins, not Mother, requested the trial court terminate the parent-child relationship between them and N.C. and have not appealed the trial court's failure to grant that request. Further, Mother admits N.C. was adjudicated to be the twins' father in both the South Carolina and Georgia divorce proceedings and that she is precluded from attacking those findings of paternity. Under these circumstances, we conclude Mother has failed to show she is personally aggrieved by the trial court's failure to grant the twins' request that the trial court terminate the parent-child relationship between them and N.C. See In R.R., Jr., No. 11-15-00041-CV, 2015 WL 5234141, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding mother failed to demonstrate she had justiciable interest in termination of father's parental rights and could not complain on appeal about portion of judgment terminating father's parental rights); In re L.K., No. 12-11-00169-CV, 2012 WL 6674417, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 20, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("As parties to the trial court's judgment, the intervenors could have perfected their own appeal, but they did not do so. Appellants may not raise [the issue of conservatorship of the children] when the intervenors have not raised the complaint themselves."). Therefore, Mother lacks standing to complain the trial court erred by failing to adjudicate N.C. as not being the twins' father. See Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 843; In re I.A.B., No. 05-17-00497-CV, 2017 WL 5197105, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding grandmother lacked standing to appeal termination of unknown father's parental rights). We resolve Mother's second issue against her.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE 170768F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 470th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas,
Trial Court Cause No. 470-54259-2014.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Lang and Schenck participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Wayne Massey recover his costs of this appeal from appellant Lisa Benn. Judgment entered this 14th day of May, 2018.