Opinion
No. 07-20-00138-CV
11-06-2020
IN RE CASIE MULLER, RELATOR
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PIRTLE and PARKER and, DOSS, JJ.
Relator, Casie Muller, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order excluding the testimony of her expert witness. We deny Muller's petition.
Background
Muller and her newborn son received medical care from the Lubbock County Hospital District d/b/a University Medical Center ("UMC") on fourteen dates in 2017 and 2019. On some of her visits to UMC, Muller signed an agreement acknowledging that she was responsible for the charges made in connection with UMC's treatment; however, UMC and Muller did not have a contract establishing a price for the goods and services Muller received. Muller and her son were covered by an insurance plan, but UMC was not an in-network provider under the plan. UMC billed Muller $54,532.25 for her treatment, based on its chargemaster rates.
A "chargemaster" is a hospital's list reflecting the predetermined charge, akin to a "sticker price," for each service or product that it provides.
UMC received payments totaling $14,087.41. The hospital then filed suit against Muller for the remaining balance of $40,444.84. UMC alleged causes of action for suit on account, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. Muller contends that UMC has already been paid the reasonable value of the goods and services it provided and that the additional amounts UMC is attempting to collect are excessive and unreasonable.
Muller designated Mark A. Hall, a professor of law and public health at Wake Forest University, as an expert witness to testify to his opinions that the hospital's charges were unreasonable and that it has already been paid a reasonable amount. Muller's expert witness designation stated, "If called to testify, Mark Hall will testify regarding the reasonable value of the goods and services at issue, including, but not limited to, billing and charging practices in the hospital industry, financial characteristics of the hospital industry, and the hospital market."
UMC filed a motion challenging the admissibility of Hall's testimony in which it listed seventeen reasons why the testimony would be deficient and inadmissible. Among other things, UMC asserted that Hall is unqualified to serve as an expert in a dispute such as this one and that his expert report contained irrelevant and unreliable data and conclusions. The trial court conducted a hearing on UMC's motion, after which it signed an order that Hall "should not be permitted to provide expert testimony at the trial of this case." The trial court did not set forth the reasons for its decision. Muller then filed the instant petition for writ of mandamus.
Prerequisites to Mandamus
Mandamus is both an extraordinary remedy and a discretionary one. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Mandamus relief is warranted only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., 559 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding). The relator bears the burden of proving both of these requirements. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Appellate courts will not intervene to control incidental trial court rulings when an adequate remedy at law exists. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Delay, inconvenience, or expense of an appeal does not constitute the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal; rather, "the relator must establish the effective denial of a reasonable opportunity to develop the merits of his or her case, so that the trial would be a waste of judicial resources." Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Mandamus relief is most appropriate for those trial court errors that "elude [] answer by appeal" or "forever deprive a party of a right that cannot be restored by reversal on appeal." In re Casanova, No. 05-14-01166- CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12638, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 20, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 138).
Analysis
We begin our analysis with the question of whether Muller has demonstrated that she has no adequate remedy by appeal.
Generally, the exclusion of an expert is adequately reviewable via ordinary appeal. See, e.g., Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 151-54 (Tex. 1996) (reviewing trial court's ruling on admissibility of expert testimony on direct appeal). However, Muller argues that striking her expert severely compromises her ability to present her defense at trial, such that an appeal is an inadequate remedy. She asserts that Hall's opinions on the reasonableness of UMC's charges go to the heart of her case and are essential to rebut the expert testimony that will be offered by UMC.
We find that Muller has not clearly established the impossibility of defending the underlying suit to collect unpaid hospital bills, nor has she shown that the exclusion of this expert will cause a trial to be a waste of judicial resources. One key premise of Hall's expert report is that the chargemaster rates UMC charged Muller are unreasonable because the vast majority of UMC's patients do not pay and are not expected to pay chargemaster rates. Via discovery, Muller has obtained evidence of what patients covered by in-network insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare would have been charged for the goods and services she received. As Muller does not need expert testimony to develop these facts, this avenue of defense has not been foreclosed. In short, Muller's entire defense does not depend on Dr. Hall's opinions; therefore, she has not met the second requirement of Walker, to show a lack of adequate remedy by appeal. See, e.g., In re Thornton-Johnson, 65 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief as to an order striking expert testimony because the relator had an adequate remedy by appeal where not all of relator's claims or defenses were affected by the trial court's order).
We conclude that Muller's arguments are insufficient to meet her burden of proof on mandamus. Because we conclude that Muller has an adequate remedy by appeal, it is unnecessary for us to address whether the trial court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Judy C. Parker
Justice