Opinion
July 29, 1975.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 136
Epstein, Lozow & Preblud, P.C., Gary Lozow, Frederick Epstein, Denver, for petitioner-appellee.
Samuel Berman, Denver, for respondent-appellant.
ENOCH, Judge.
Respondent appeals from permanent orders entered pursuant to a decree of dissolution of marriage. We affirm.
On August 6, 1974, a decree of dissolution of marriage was granted to the parties and custody of their three children was awarded to petitioner. The district court ordered respondent to pay child support totalling $405 per month for the three minor children and maintenance of $225 per month for petitioner. Payment of maintenance was ordered to continue until the death of either party or the remarriage of petitioner, or until further court order.
The court further ordered that the family home become the property of petitioner, with respondent surrendering his interest by quit-claim deed in return for a non-interest bearing note in the amount of half the equity in the house secured by a deed of trust. The note is to be paid when petitioner decides to sell the house or no longer lives there, or a year after the youngest child of the couple reaches age 21. In addition the court order required respondent to assume certain outstanding debts, to pay attorneys' fees of petitioner amounting to $450, to maintain health insurance for the children, to pay half of any additional medical or dental expenses of the children, and to maintain two existing life insurance policies on his life for the benefit of the children until the end of the child support obligation.
On appeal respondent contends that taken as a whole the court's order is arbitrary and confiscatory. He claims that he lacks the income to meet the requirements of the order, and that the district court in granting maintenance failed to consider the guidelines established by the legislature.
The award of maintenance, child support and attorneys' fees as well as the disposition of property, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review except where that discretion has been abused. In Re Marriage of Davis, Colo.App., 534 P.2d 809.
Respondent introduced into evidence an affidavit which showed he is employed as the manager of the long distance sales office of a wholesale florist with a monthly gross income of $2,000, and a monthly net income of just under $1,200. Certain of the deductions from his gross income are premiums for insurance policies and repayment of debts which he was ordered by the court to assume. The three children for whom support was ordered ranged in age at the time of the hearing from 14 to 17 years. While respondent was ordered to assume certain debts of the marriage, once they are paid off his financial burden will be substantially decreased. He has been relieved of making mortgage payments on the family home, and at some point in the future will receive his share of the equity. In view of these considerations we are unable to conclude that the court's order was arbitrary or confiscatory.
In regard to respondent's contention that the district court failed to follow the legislative guidelines for awarding maintenance, we note that the court found, on supporting evidence, that petitioner was unable to support herself, and that, in setting the amount, it considered the duration of the marriage, petitioner's resources, her age and work experience, her standard of living, and respondents' ability to aid her. Should petitioner's ability to support herself improve, the award may be modified by further court order. The court's award was consistent with the legislative guidelines of s 14--10--114, C.R.S.1973.
Judgment affirmed.
COYTE and BERMAN, JJ., concur.