Opinion
No. 349257
12-19-2019
In re MJM, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-000653-NA Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and JANSEN and STEPHENS, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, MJM, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified); (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody); and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to the parent). We affirm.
I. FACTS
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned for MJM's removal from respondent's home because respondent was incarcerated and MJM, whose birth was in Wayne County Jail, was born drug-positive and treated for drug-withdrawal symptoms. The DHHS alleged that respondent's substance-abuse issues and incarceration hindered her ability to provide adequate care and supervision of MJM. The trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction over MJM, and he was made a temporary court ward. After respondent was released from jail, the trial court ordered her to complete and demonstrate benefit from the following treatment plan services: Infant Mental Health services; a psychological evaluation; individual therapy with a substance-abuse component; and random drug screens. Respondent also was required to obtain and maintain suitable housing and income, communicate with the foster care worker, visit with MJM, and attend MJM's medical appointments. The DHHS provided respondent with numerous services, including counseling, treatment for substance abuse, and random drug screens.
Throughout pendency of the case, respondent was substantially noncompliant with the court-ordered services and continued to struggle with substance abuse. Respondent complied fully with her treatment plan for approximately two to three months, but then stopped participating in substance-abuse services and drug screens. In response, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent's parental rights. Following a termination hearing, the trial court concluded that respondent's untreated substance-abuse issues and failure to comply with the treatment plan supported the termination of her parental rights.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding a statutory ground for termination. We disagree.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's factual findings following a termination hearing. A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. However, this Court . . . reviews de novo whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied a statute. [In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 430-431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted; ellipsis in original).]
The trial court found that statutory grounds existed pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights where 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order and "[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) where "the totality of the evidence amply supports that [the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions" that led to the adjudication, In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009), and would not be able to rectify those conditions within a reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The determination of what is a reasonable time properly includes both how long it will take for the parent to improve conditions and how long the child can wait for the improvement. In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 647-648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991).
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that she could not maintain a sober lifestyle. Evidence shows that throughout the proceedings respondent failed to address her substance abuse, despite the DHHS's having offered her services to rectify that issue for approximately 22 months. Respondent participated in less than half of the random drug screens, and half of the drug screens that respondent did complete were positive for illicit substances. At one point, respondent's drug screener called respondent's caseworker because of the concerning level of fentanyl identified in respondent's screen. Respondent admitted to relapsing, but refused to participate in Narcotics Anonymous and inpatient treatment despite the DHHS's recommendation, and stopped attending drug screens and substance-abuse treatment during the pendency of this case. Respondent was unemployed for a period of time and struggled financially after being fired from her job and relapsing. The totality of the evidence demonstrates that respondent did not accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to the adjudication.
There was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify her substance-abuse and parenting barriers in the foreseeable future. Respondent, who was re-incarcerated subsequent to MJM's birth, argued that she was "likely to be incarcerated for only three months and could have continued working on her [t]reatment [p]lan," and that, "given her willingness to participate in boot-camp to abbreviate her sentence," termination of her rights was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, she had not been approved for the 90-day boot camp at the time of the trial. Respondent had been sentenced to serve a minimum of two years of imprisonment and that MJM had been in the care of others for nearly two years. "[T]he Legislature did not intend that children be left indefinitely in foster care[.]" In re Dahms, 187 Mich App at 647. See also In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 272-27 ("The circuit court correctly determined that the two years [the child] already had spent in foster care, her entire life, constituted too long a period to await the mere possibility of a radical change in respondent mother's life."). Despite the services provided by the DHHS, respondent made minimal progress in rectifying the conditions that led to adjudication. Thus, the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify the barriers to reunification within a reasonable time. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory ground for termination, we do not need to address any additional grounds. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). However, we note that the trial court properly found that statutory grounds for termination existed pursuant to MCL 7.12A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to the parent). Over the pendency of the case, respondent tested positive for illicit substances 14 times, relapsed numerous times, and stopped attending substance-abuse treatment and drug screenings. Respondent's continued drug use, and resulting employment and financial issues prevented her from providing proper care and custody and created a reasonable likelihood of harm to MJM if he was returned to respondent. Thus, termination was proper under these statutory grounds. --------
III. BEST INTERESTS
Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her rights was in MJM's best interests. We disagree.
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). When considering best interests, the trial court must focus on the child rather than the parent. Id. at 87. "The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the child's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In deciding a child's best interests, a court may consider the "child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home[.]" In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The trial court may also consider how long the child has lived in the present home, and the likelihood that the child "could be returned to [the] parent's home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Other factors the trial court may consider are "the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App at 714.
The trial court found that MJM, who had been in foster care since birth, was bonded to his foster parents and thriving in their home. The trial court determined that MJM needed the stability, permanency, and finality of adoption. Further, MJM's foster family was willing to adopt him. See In re Kaczkowski, 325 Mich App 69, 78-79; 924 NW2d 1 (2018) (holding that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that the termination of the respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests where the respondent made little progress in addressing the main reason for adjudication and the child, who had been in foster care for approximately 2½ years, was bonded to her foster parents, the foster parents were willing to adopt the child, and the case worker stated that termination would provide the child with permanency). Respondent had a history of failing to comply with her treatment plan, which indicated that respondent could not provide MJM with a permanent, safe, and stable home. Respondent had a bond with MJM but failed to exercise visitation with him more than 40 times, and it was unlikely that MJM could be returned to respondent's home within the foreseeable future in light of her incarceration. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 714 (holding that the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination was in the children's best interests where the trial court gave strong weight to the children's need for permanence, safety, and stability, and where, despite the respondent's strong bond with the children, she had a history of failing to comply with her case service plan). Termination of respondent's parental rights was in MJM's best interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens