Opinion
No. D03-CP11-002826-A
September 2, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nature of Proceedings
This is an appeal by the State of Connecticut from the decision of the Probate court in which the Probate court denied the state's motion to open the judgment terminating the parental rights of father due to lack of standing. The court finds that there is no material dispute as to the operative facts presented by the parties to this appeal in their memoranda of law filed on May 3 and 4, 2011. For the purpose of this decision those facts are restated below:
On or about October 2010, the State of Connecticut received notice of petitioner's Voluntary Application to Terminate the Parental Rights of Jeffrey A. the father of the subject child, Miriam A. (DOB 9/25/07) by consent. On said application, dated July 2010 the parties disclosed a simultaneously pending action for dissolution of marriage in Danbury Superior Court, for which the parties were scheduled to go to trial on January 7, 2011. Petitioner filed the dissolution action a year earlier on August 26, 2009. The Probate court scheduled the termination hearing for November 23, 2010.
Neither at the time of receipt of notice by the State for voluntary termination of parental rights, nor at the time of the scheduled probate termination hearing date, were any of the parties receiving public assistance benefits from the State of Connecticut. In reliance thereon, the State of Connecticut did not file an appearance in the matter, or take a formal position on the termination petition.
On November 23, 2010, petitioner's Voluntary Application to Terminate the Parental Rights of the child's father was heard by the probate court. According to the probate court's decree, petitioner represented to the Probate court that she was "financially sound and also has family resources." However, petitioner did not appear at the hearing and did not provide any proof to the probate court of income, assets or the nature and availability of the alleged family resources for the minor child, issue of her marriage to father. The Probate court accepted father's consent to termination and issued its ruling on December 13, 2010.
Prior to the hearing, pursuant to C.G.S. § 45a-717(e)(1) the Danbury probate court ordered the Connecticut Department of Children and Families to make an investigation and written report regarding the proposed termination of parental rights. Per C.G.S. § 45a-717(e)(1), this report was required to contain such "facts an may be relevant to the court's determination of whether the proposed termination of parental rights will be in the best interests of the child, including the physical, mental, social and financial condition of the biological parents, and any other factors which the commissioner or such child-placing agency finds relevant to the court's determination of whether the proposed termination will be in the best interest of the child." Based on the information available at that time, the Connecticut Department of Children and Families conducted the aforementioned investigation and filed a report supporting the termination and indicated that the termination was in the best interests of Miriam A.
At no time during the November 23, 2010, probate hearing did petitioner disclose to the probate court that she had completed and signed an application for a full range of welfare public assistance benefits on October 26, 2010, but had not yet submitted said welfare application to the State. Despite said omission and her affirmative representation made under oath to the contrary, approximately one week after said heating, petitioner submitted said welfare application to the State of Connecticut Department of Social Services (hereinafter the "Department"). On December 3, 2010, without advising either the Attorney General's Office or the probate court, petitioner submitted a mail-in application signed and dated October 26, 2010, to the Department for various public assistance benefits, including Temporary Family Assistance monthly cash grant, Husky medical insurance benefits, and food stamps for the support of herself and the subject minor child. The application for these benefits required petitioner to allege financial hardship. If granted, the benefits would be payable retroactively to the date of the application because petitioner asserted that the need existed as of the application date. On her public assistance applications, petitioner stated the subject minor child is "disabled" and/or is a special needs child, and that petitioner previously received public assistance benefits while residing in the State of Virginia for a period of 1996 through 1997.
On December 13, 2010, the probate court issued its decree granting petitioner's Voluntary Application to Terminate the Parental Rights of Jeffrey A. by consent of father. On or about December 23, 2010, the Connecticut Attorney General's Office, received a copy of said decree. As stated above, because the state had not been aware of a potential interest in the probate court termination hearing, it neither appeared nor objected in that action. But for a scrivener's error erroneously representing that the State of Connecticut had objected to petitioner's application the state would not have received notice of the probate court decree.
Upon receiving notice on the matter, the State of Connecticut conducted an investigation in which it discovered for the first time that on December 3, 2010, petitioner submitted the above October 26, 2010 welfare application for multiple forms of public assistance benefits to the Department after the November 23, 2010 probate termination hearing. As noted, petitioner's welfare application included a request for Temporary Family Assistance, an ongoing monthly cash grant, Husky medical insurance benefits for her and the subject child, and food stamps. Petitioner signed and dated her application for benefits October 26, 2010, well before the probate court termination hearing. Petitioner failed to inform the probate court, or the State of Connecticut, that she had completed a mail-in welfare application claiming that she was destitute and lacked financial means to provide for herself and Miriam A. and further that she intended to seek said public assistance benefits during the probate court termination hearing.
As a result of mother's action filing the above application for public benefits on December 3, 2010, the state maintains that it possessed an active interest in the termination proceedings. Therefore, on January 4, 2011, the State of Connecticut filed an appearance and a Motion To Open and Reargue the probate court decree dated December 13, 2010, granting petitioner's petition to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey A. who consented to the termination.
On January 20, 2011, the probate court heard the State of Connecticut's Motion to Open the December 13, 2010 Judgment. Pursuant to Gen. Stat. § 56a-716(b), the non-appearing petitioner acting through her attorney and the consenting father objected to the State's motion, alleging the State of Connecticut lacked the requisite standing to file said motion. Petitioner' counsel alleged she had withdrawn her pending public assistance application with the Department when the state filed its Motion to Open and that she had not received public assistance as of the original hearing date on November 23, 2010, nor as of the date of the State's filing its Motion to Open the probate judgment. Petitioner's decision not to appear precluded any direct inquiry by the probate court on the issue.
In this appeal petitioner now alleges the subject child is still entitled to be covered, and is currently still receiving medical benefits through father's medical insurance provided by his employer, the United States Navy. This statement is in direct contradiction to the representations which petitioner made to the probate court and the legal effect of the termination of father's parental rights by the probate court decree dated December 13, 2010. Petitioner failed to produce any documentation or legal authority to support such an assertion. The State suggests that the parties have failed to inform the father's employer that his parental rights have been terminated, and said employer believes the legal relationship and its obligation of the father to subject child still exists.
Whether the state as suggests, the parties have failed to inform the father's employer that his parental rights have been terminated and said employer believes the legal relationship and its obligation of the father to subject child still exists, this further supports the state's claim that justice requires it to be accorded standing under the particular facts of this case.
In response, the State of Connecticut maintained that it did have standing to file said motion because at the time of said filing of its Motion to Open, petitioner's full application for public assistance benefits was still pending, and further, the State was in possession of an active assignment of support rights from petitioner, to the State of Connecticut. The State argues that actual receipt of state assistance is not required to give the State an active interest and standing, because the mere submission of a signed welfare application triggers the assignment of rights to the State of Connecticut, and further still, even the mere possibility of interference with the state's right to future recovery/reimbursement is a sufficient interest to provide standing regardless of whether or not assistance was ever actually granted/received.
Contrary to the claim made by petitioner's counsel at the January 20, 2011 probate hearing, petitioner did not withdraw all forms of public assistance prior to the State's January 4, 2011, Motion to Open filing. As of January 4, 2011, petitioner had only withdrawn her request for Temporary Family Assistance ("TFA"), and still had a pending request for Husky medical insurance benefits and food stamps. Petitioner did not withdraw the remaining forms of welfare assistance until either just prior to or on the same day as the January 20, 2011, probate hearing on the State's Motion to Open Judgment. She herself created uncertainty as to the timing and type of public assistance and its timing, she affirmatively stated the need for her child and herself. Once the state became aware of these facts, it maintains that it had both a right and obligation to participate in the termination hearing.
On January 7, 2011, petitioner notified the Department to withdraw her application for the TFA monthly cash grant and expressed being upset with the Attorney General's office sudden involvement in her probate termination matter. Petitioner further informed the Department that she receives child support and is self-employed, but failed to provide any proof of the source or amount of such. Once again petitioner's own statement contradicts her previous representations to the probate court. If petitioner is receiving child support, the state would have further rights of reimbursement from a financially responsible parent in the event it becomes necessary to enforce child support payments. As of said date, petitioner's application for Husky medical insurance and food stamps for herself and Miriam were still pending. On January 20, 2010, the same date as the State's Motion to Open was scheduled to be heard in probate court, the Department received petitioner's letter requesting to withdraw all remaining forms of welfare assistance.
Miriam's biological father is employed by the United States Navy. As a naval employee he is entitled to medical benefits for his minor children. As his biological daughter Miriam has received such medical services since her birth in 2007. The present health benefit program provided to dependents of naval employees is through TRICARE. The parties acknowledge that she is a medically complex child. If Miriam's mother obtains an order terminating father's parental rights he will have no further obligation to provide for Miriam's care, including health care benefits provided through his employer to which she would otherwise be entitled. While adequate and appropriate medical coverage is an important aspect of the state's concern for the care and well being of all children, the state has an even greater interest where, as in this case, the child has previously been diagnosed as medically complex and will require extensive care and services in the future.
Issue Presented
Both sides have cited Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-716(b)(5) to the court for its decision.
Petitioner maintains that § 45a-716(b)(5) must be strictly applied to prohibit the Attorney General from appearing and remaining a party in this case because the child had not actually received benefits at the time of the hearing or decision terminating father's parental rights. The state argues that § 45a-716(b)(5) must be construed in the context of the intent of the legislature and their court's responsibility to consider the best interests of the child in termination of parental rights proceedings.
The court agrees with the parties that a plain reading of the statute provides the Attorney General with party status if the child is receiving or has received aid or care from the state or if the child is receiving child support enforcement services.
This case presents the following issue: whether the state has standing to appear and participate in probate court proceedings for voluntary termination of parental rights by opposing termination when subsequent to the hearing but prior to the probate court's decision it learns of facts which may establish that it has an interest at stake in the termination. The parties have stipulated that this is a case of first impression. It is also a case which is narrowly confined to the specific facts presented herein.
Standing to participate in probate court proceedings for termination of parental rights is conferred on the state by General Statute § 45a-716(b)(5) enacted as Public Act 06-149 The legislative intent of Public Act 06-149 was to permit the state to become a party and to ensure consideration by the probate court of the state and child's interests when it acts on a petition to terminate parental rights of a child. It was not intended to allow a party to avoid responsibility for a child's care by manipulating submission of applications for assistance to avoid providing notice to the state of its interest. Prior to filing her petition in the probate court, petitioner prepared and signed an application for public benefits for her minor child averring indigency as of October 26, 2010. She then withheld filing that application until a week after the probate court termination hearing on November 23, 2010. In so doing, petitioner knew that the state would not appear at the hearing because its investigation would not reflect her application. She also knew that, if the application was granted she would receive benefits based on the date she claimed indigency, October 26, 2010. Similarly, respondent father knew that by petitioner withholding the October 26, 2010 application until after the probate court hearing, he would not only avoid any obligation to provide financially for his biological child but the state would not be able to seek reimbursement from him for the benefits it paid on behalf of Miriam.
The petitioner argues that by virtue of the timing of her application the state did not have standing to assert its interest in the proceeding for termination of parental rights which she initiated in the probate court. If allowed to stand the decree terminating the respondent father's parental rights would completely sever the legal relationship between the respondent father and his child, including the rights and responsibilities he would have had relative to his biological child to provide child support and medical health care and any other benefits provided by his employer's insurance coverage. See General Statutes § 45a-707(8); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 214, 662 A.2d 107 (1995). It is important to emphasize that this is not a decision on the merits but rather on the threshold issue of standing and that the court's analysis is based on the application of this statute to the specific facts of this case.
In general, standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather, it is a practical concept designed to insure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjustifiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. Harris v. New Milford, 259 Conn. 402, 409-10, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002) (Citations omitted.) It is this latter aspect of the concept of standing which is of particular application under the facts of this case.
For purpose of consideration of standing the court refers to the analysis of the Appellate Court in In re Jessica M., 71 Conn.App. 417, 324-425 (2002) which states: ". . . it is axiomatic that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim." Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 346, 780 A.2d 98 (2001). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Zak, supra, 259 Conn. 774. Accordingly, "[o]ur standing jurisprudence consistently has embodied the notion that there must be a colorable claim of a direct injury to the [party] . . ." Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp., supra, 346.
The Appellate Court has ruled previously that the right to appeal from a probate court decree, or standing to do so, is statutorily conferred by General Statutes § 45a-186; which determines standing by whether a party is aggrieved by that decree. See Adolphson v. Weinstein, 66 Conn.App. 591, 595, 785 A.2d 275 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 921, 792 A.2d 853 (2002); see also In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 606, 756 A.2d 214 (2000) (appeal from probate is absolute right of aggrieved person). In support of its claim the state argues that although the concepts of standing and aggrievement are not legally identical, the question of aggrievement is in essence a question of standing. See. Gladysz v. Planning Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 249, 255, 773 A.2d 300 (2001). As to the present issue, therefore, if the commissioner was aggrieved by the decree of the probate court, then she has standing to mount an appeal of that decree, and the trial court may exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over that appeal.
Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory. Classical aggrievement requires a two-part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. Second, the party must also show that the agency's decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest. Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest. Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging aggrievement bears the burden of proving it. In Med-Trans of Connecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services, 242 Conn. 152, 158, 159, 699 A.2d 142 (1997), the court referred to precedent set forth in State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 524 A.2d 636 (1987). There we stated that fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision . . . Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 47, 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, [ supra, 193 Conn. 65] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected . . . Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, [ 219 Conn. 168, 173, 592 A.2d 386 (1991)]." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 234 Conn. 624, 637, 662 A.2d 1251 (1995).
Although statutory aggrievement does not require a party to establish the factual threshold required for classical aggrievement, the analysis of a party's rights and potential interest are essentially the same. Here, the state is asserting that it has the right to participate in the probate court hearing on the termination of Jeffrey A.'s parental rights to Miriam. As enacted Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-716(b)(5) presumes aggrievement, and therefore confers standing to the state where a child has received state benefits.
"[T]he absence of aggrievement, as required by that statute, is a defect that deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adolphson v. Weinstein, supra, 595. Section 45a-186(a) provides in relevant part: "Any person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court . . ." In relation to appeals from probate court decrees, we have ruled that "[a]ggrievement requires only the existence of a cause of action on which a party's plea for relief may rest . . . The concept of aggrievement turns on whether there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that the probate court's order or decree has adversely affected some legally protected interest that the [party] has in the subject matter of the decree or order or in the estate." (Citation omitted.) Id., 596.
The discreet issue of whether a state agency has standing to appeal from a decision of the probate court that has an impact on the state's right to reimbursement of assistance payments was addressed prior to enactment of Public Act 06-149 by the Supreme Court in Dept. of Income Maintenance v. Watts, 211 Conn. 323, 326-27, 558 A.2d 998 (1989). In Watts, the state agency that was the predecessor to the Department of Social Services appealed from a probate court decision approving "the disclaimer, by a conservator of an incapable person receiving state assistance, of his ward's interest in a testamentary trust, in view of the prohibition . . . against dispositions of the property of state aid recipients." Id., 324. Examining the state's financial interest, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that the legally protected interest affected by the probate court decision, "may be a direct pecuniary one, or it may consist of an injurious effect upon some legally protected right or status of the appellant." Id., 326. Citing General Statutes § 17-83e, the statutory predecessor to General Statutes § 17b-93, the court held that the state had standing to appeal because it had the right to reimbursement of assistance, and the Probate court decision could possibly adversely affect that right. Id., 326-27.
The issue in this case is whether the state has standing to appeal from the decision of the probate court terminating the parental rights of Miriam's father by consent upon learning for the first time upon notice of the probate court decision that petitioner had withheld her application for benefits until after the probate court conducted the hearing on the voluntary termination of parental rights of Miriam A.'s parents. General Statutes § 45-288 provides that any person aggrieved by any order or decree of a probate court may appeal therefrom to the Superior Court. See Lenge v. Goldfarb, 169 Conn. 218, 220, 363 A.2d 110 (1975). In determining whether a party is aggrieved, the test is whether there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest that he has in the estate has been adversely affected. Williams v. Houck, 143 Conn. 433, 123 A.2d 177 (1956); O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 83, 98 A.2d 660 (1953). The qualifying interest may be a direct pecuniary one, or it may consist of an injurious effect upon some legally protected right or status of the appellant. Maloney v. Taplin, 154 Conn. 247, 250, 224 A.2d 731 (1966). The interest of the state extends beyond any right to reimbursement of court ordered child support. The state has a fundamental responsibility to assure that children receive the benefits to which they are entitled from their parents. This assurance is an integral element of the consideration of the best interests of the child by the state as well as any court issuing orders relating to the child.
Petitioner relies on the case of In re Rylyn R., Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex Docket No. M08-CP07-010391-A (April 28, 2008) in support of her claim that the Attorney General does not have standing in this case pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-716(b)(5). In re Rylyn R. was an appeal of probate court termination of parental rights of a biological father in which the department appeared in opposition to granting the petition citing General Statutes § 45-717(f). The probate court granted the petition and the Attorney General filed an appeal to the superior court which conducted a trial de novo in which DSS argued as to why it would not be in the best interest of Rylyn to terminate the parental rights of her father.
In contrast to the subject voluntary termination of parental rights by consent of the married biological parents, Rylyn's mother pursued termination on the grounds of abandonment and no on-going parent-child relationship. The trial court in In re Rylyn, conducted a contested evidentiary hearing at which it considered evidence as to the claim of abandonment and the absence of an ongoing parent child relationship between Rylyn and her biological father. Rylyn was represented by counsel in the probate hearing. Christopher F., Rylyn's father had been a resident of Canada since the time of her birth. He did not appear at the trial. Through the time of trial, he had only had three brief visits with her and was unlikely to return to the United States. Rylyn's parents were not married and did not reside together for any time noted by the court. Christopher F. never provided any care or financial support to Rylyn, nor was there any reasonable prospect that he would ever be willing or able to do so. The evidence presented to the court was clear and convincing both as to abandonment and no ongoing parent child relationship. The court also considered evidence of Rylyn's medical needs, her emotional and developmental challenges including current and future daily care, and medical management. Rylyn's mother maintained that the reason she sought to terminate Christopher F.'s parental rights was to enable her to name her mother and father as Rylyn's guardians in her will. Finally, the court heard extensive evidence about Rylyn's maternal grandparents' role in her care and her bond with them. Based on the evidence presented at the trial, the court concluded, "This case does not present the situation where Christopher F. is seeking to terminate his parental rights to avoid his financial responsibilities." The same conclusion cannot be reached on the record as to the father of Miriam A. In contrast to Rylyn's father for whom the court found the chance of the state enforcing his child support obligations "slim to none," as Jeffrey A.'s child, Miriam has already received benefits for the first four years of her life and is entitled to continue to receive comprehensive medical and other benefits. She will be forever foreclosed from receiving these benefits if the state is not permitted to challenge termination of his parental rights. Furthermore, as noted above, the state will be foreclosed from any right of reimbursement for medical care and support which it provides for Miriam's benefit.
The court in In re Rylyn A. considered the issue of the department's standing in its analysis of the best interests of the child based on the statutory provisions of General Statutes § 45a-716 which confers statutory standing in a termination of parental rights action if the child is receiving or has received aid or care from the state. It also conducted a rigorous analysis of the facts as they related to the best interests of the child as expressed by the state through evidence at trial. The court in In re Rylyn A. had the full benefit of evidence of the nature and source of financial and emotional support from the grandparents. This evidence enabled the court to conclude "this case does not present the situation where Christopher F. is seeking to terminate his parental rights to avoid his financial responsibilities and that it was in Rylyn's best interest that her father's parental rights be terminated."
In stark contrast, the fact that petitioner withheld information from the department, the investigating agency and the probate court or the very least attempted to manipulate her benefits to circumvent notice to the state raises questions of "collusion" or sham which the Rylyn court dismissed in that case. Petitioners' conduct and her changing positions also present issues of fundamental fairness which are essential to the integrity of the judicial process. First, mother effectively precluded the state from participating in the probate court termination proceedings. As a result, the broad purpose of standing i.e., "to assure that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy" was thwarted by the department's absence not due to its fault. Next, after the state asserted its interest in the termination upon learning that she had filed the October 26, 2010 application on December 3, 2010, mother withdrew a portion of her application. The issue of the state's standing should not be decided without reliance on a full and fair evidentiary hearing in which stakeholders have an opportunity to participate and examine petitioner on her claims. Furthermore, it should not be subject to the whim or manipulation of a petitioner timing for benefits applications to prevent both the court and the state from appropriate inquiry relating to the best interests of the minor child.
In matters of statutory interpretation, the fundamental objective of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. "In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . Furthermore, [w]e presume that laws are enacted in view of existing relevant statutes . . . and that [s]tatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doucette v. Pomes, 247 Conn. 442, 455, 724 A.2d 481 (1999); In re Micheala Lee R., supra, 583.
The purpose of statutory standing in IV-D cases is to insure the state and the children's interests. General Statutes § 46(b)-231(b)(12) provides that "IV-D Agency means the bureau of child support enforcement within the department of social services created by General Statutes 17(b)-149 and authorized to administer the child support program mandated by Title IV of the Social Security Act. As noted by the court in In re Rylyn, the legislation making the Attorney General a party to a termination of parental rights case cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. It needs to be viewed in light of two important cases in this area that preceded this legislation.
In the first case, In re Bruce R., 34 Conn.App. 176, 640 A.2d 643 (1994), aff'd, 234 Conn. 194, 662 A.2d 107 (1995), the trial court granted the petitioner's request to terminate his own parental rights. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that when a parent whose rights are being terminated consents to the termination, General Statutes § 45a-715 "requires that the trial court consider, as one of the elements necessary to make the determination of what is in the best interests of the children, the financial condition of the natural parents." In re Bruce, supra, 34 Conn.App. 184-85. The Supreme Court later affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, favorably citing this language. In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
In the second case, In re Jessica M., 71 Conn.App. 417, 802 A.2d 197 (2002), the petitioner, likewise sought to terminate her own parental rights. The Appellate Court ruled that the Commissioner of Social Services had standing to challenge the termination of parental rights "because the decree [granting the termination of parental rights] adversely affects her statutory right to reimbursement from the petitioner of the state assistance social services formerly afforded to and currently provides for her children." In re Jessica M., supra, 71 Conn.App.423.
Though factually different from the case at bar, the above cases set forth a framework for this court's analysis. The purpose of permitting the state to appear where a parent seeks to terminate her own parental rights or as in this case where the parent who is financially capable of providing for the child's support and medical care is asking the court to accept his consent to termination, is directly related to the statutory obligation which requires the court under § 45a-715 to consider, as one of the elements necessary to make the determination of what is the best interests of the children, the financial condition of the "natural parents" In re Bruce, 34 Conn.App. 184-85, aff'd, In Re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
To summarize, the parents of Miriam A. (dob 9/25/07) were married at the time of her birth. Miriam's father is employed by the United States Navy. As his biological child she is entitled to and has received certain benefits, including comprehensive medical coverage. Miriam's mother and father were parties to marital dissolution case pending for over a year as of the subject probate hearing in which the respondent father consented to termination of his parental rights raises further concerns unique to this case. Prior to adjudication of the dissolution action, Miriam's mother filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Miriam's father in the probate court on the grounds of abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship. On October 26, 2010, mother signed an application for TANF funds, food stamps and Husky medical insurance for Miriam. Mother did not file this application until a week after the probate court hearing. The Attorney General did not appear at the hearing nor did Miriam's father. The only information which was provided to the probate court was from Miriam who stated that she was self-employed and that she had family resources to help provide for Miriam. Although father may not be interested in a parent-child relationship with Miriam that does not relieve him of his legal obligation to provide financial support for her. Nor does discord between Miriam's parents absolve father of his legal obligation to support Miriam. Section 45a-717e(1) provides authority for the court to require an investigation and report to the court of the physical, mental and emotional status of the child and any other factors relevant to the court's determination of whether the proposed termination will be in the best interests of the child. Had the state appeared, it would have had the right to examine mother regarding how the child's needs would be met post-termination. Petitioner's lack of aggrievement argument ignores the fact that the state has an interest in the welfare of the children who are its residents. Thus, the state as a matter of law has an interest where the welfare of such a child is at stake. Her analysis requires the court to ignore the fact that she already applied for public assistance after she petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights of Miriam's father and that she and Miriam's father were parties to the dissolution of marriage action which was also pending at the time of the termination hearing. The father was not obliged to disclose financial assets as a basis for a court order of child support in the probate court termination matter. He merely filed his consent to this petition for termination, effectively passing financial disclosure and any court orders for support.
The court in In re Rylyn A., conducted a full evidentiary hearing and concluded, "This case does not present the situation where Christopher F. is seeking to terminate his parental rights to avoid his financial responsibilities. Shannon R. initiated the termination petition and stated that the reason she is seeking to terminate Christopher F.'s parental rights is her desire to name her mother and father as Rylyn's guardians in her will. The reason General Statutes § 45a-716 was enacted was to address "some instances of termination of parental rights, that have sort of, I guess I'd have to call it collusion, where someone who intends an ongoing relationship with a child terminates their parental rights because that would absolve them of paying child support. Sort of getting around the system by using the termination of parental rights statutes." Conn. Joint Standing Committee hearings, supra, p. 3673.
In contrast to In re Rylyn A. this case is marked at the very least by petitioner's vague representations to the court of certain matters which were not true and withholding other information as to others. In both circumstances that information was relevant to the court's determination of the best interests of the child. Miriam's parents were married for several years prior to Miriam's birth. Her mother filed for dissolution of the marriage in 2009 when Miriam was two years old. A year later while that action was still pending she petitioned to terminate parental rights. Had Miriam's mother proceeded with the dissolution petition Miriam would have been entitled to support and medical coverage as a dependent. The parties would have been required to disclose their financial information to the court including tax returns, financial asset records, life insurance and medical benefit coverage, sworn affidavits of income, expenses, assets and liabilities, proposed orders for relief including, inter alia, child support, life insurance, and medical insurance. See Practice Book sections 25-32(a) and 25-30(b). Section (e) requires the child support and arrearage guidelines worksheets. Section CT Page 19651 25-32(b) makes this duty to disclose continuing during the pendency of the action.
The facts of this case construed most favorably to mother are that mother who has not shown any means of supporting herself or her medically complex child, sought an order from the probate court terminating the parental rights of her husband, the child's father by consent. She then filed an application for state benefits for herself and the child after the hearing but prior to the probate court decision. When the state became aware of these facts, she withdrew her application for Temporary Family Assistance only, leaving the request for Husky medical coverage and food stamps in place. The fact that mother later withdrew the remaining benefit applications is irrelevant to the court's consideration of the issue as framed alone. At any time mother can reinstate her petition for public assistance benefits which would be retroactive to the date of her original application.
The notice provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-716(b) are intended to serve a purpose to advise those who may have an interest in termination proceedings and provide them an opportunity to be heard. However, they fail to provide a vehicle for notice to the state under the facts of this case. Similarly, cases cited by the parties do not directly address the issue of standing of the department where it becomes aware following the court's decision that a party to a termination proceeding has filed for state assistance after the hearing but before the court had issued its decision. Applying the legislature's intent to the facts of this case, the state had a right to know and have the probate court consider that Carrie D. had prepared an application for periodic cash stipends, medical coverage and food stamps which would be effective, regardless of when she filed, as of the date of the application. In that October 26, 2010 application she swore she was unable to provide for herself or her daughter. A month later she testified to the probate court that she had "resources" to provide for their needs.
Mother's claim that she is self-employed and has "family resources available to help her to provide for Miriam's case including her special medical needs is inadequate. Without the presence of the state there was no party to question these claims. Mother offered no evidence that she had any form of financial support for herself or her child. Father was still married to mother at the time of the termination hearing, was employed by the United States Navy and received medical coverage for his dependants through that employment. The actions by the parents in this case give rise to concern that the one or both parties sought to use the termination proceedings if not as a ruse or a sham then at the least to circumvent financial disclosure and any orders which may properly have been issued by the family court in the dissolution action. On the other hand the petition may be valid. Once mother filed her December 3, 2010 application the state has a right to insist that such determination be made under the rigor of an evidentiary hearing in which it participates from its position of "best interests of the child." Mother and father argue that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-716 must be narrowly construed to confer standing to the state only where benefits have already been paid. Neither caselaw nor statutory analysis supports such a narrow construction. Both In re Bruce R. and In re Jessica M. stand for the proposition that a parent cannot seek to terminate his or her own parental rights so as to abandon his or her financial obligation to support his or her child. Neither prior to nor subsequent to enactment of General Statute § 45a-716 has the law of this state sanctioned termination of parental rights to avoid a parent's financial responsibilities. This has not been changed by the enactment or General Statutes § 45a-716(b)(5). That statute gives the Attorney General automatic standing if a child is receiving or has received aid or care from the state, or if the child is receiving child support enforcement services. However, the framework for analyzing why a parent is seeking to terminate parental rights vis-a-vis financial considerations and the best interest of the child is still the same.
The court agrees with the state that it cannot be the case, that the legislature ever intended to create a loophole allowing for parties to freely pursue voluntary termination applications in probate court, but prevent the Attorney General's Office from being a party to the action because the same parties waited to apply for public assistance welfare benefits until after the termination hearing. The state correctly argues that to allow the petitioner's objection to stand would essentially provide a "road map" for parties to commit a financial fraud upon the state and leave the state powerless to be able to appear and argue the state's position on the countless voluntary filings occurring annually in probate court, including applications for termination of parental rights, emancipations and paternity. The decision urged by petitioner and the father in this case would cause potential irreversible harm and prejudice to the state's interest as the state will have no idea of just how many of these types of filings have successfully gone to judgment.
This court's analysis should not be confused with factual findings. This is the prerogative of the probate court. However, in order for the probate court to satisfy its obligation to consider the best interests of the child, it must have the benefit of evidence tested by the rigors of trial. For this reason under the narrow and specific facts of this case, the court finds that the state has established the "possibility" that its interests may be affected and should be afforded standing.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby sustains the state's appeal and enters a finding that the state has standing to appear to assert any interest it may have in the probate court termination of parental rights of Miriam A.