Opinion
F054214
6-24-2008
In re MIGUEL L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL L., Defendant and Appellant.
Gillian Black, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, John G. McLean and Maggy Krell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
OPINION
THE COURT
In Miguel L.s (Miguel) second appearance before the juvenile court, the court found he had committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)). The court adjudged Miguel a ward of the court and ordered he be placed on probation and perform 80 hours of community service. On appeal, Miguel contends there is insufficient evidence identifying him as a perpetrator in the crime and there is insufficient evidence that a vandalism occurred. We find the evidence sufficient, and will affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On March 13, 2007, Pedro R. (Pedro) was at his house and was watching a car for a friend. At about 7:00 p.m. Pedro heard noises from the front of his house and went to a front window to investigate. From the window Pedro saw a group of youths outside and three of them were kicking his friends car. The kicking continued for about two minutes. Because there was a street light above and the individuals were 20 feet away, Pedro was able to see what the three youths were wearing. Pedro called the police, who arrived and transported him to a park one block from his house where they had detained four youths. Pedro identified three of the four detainees as the youths he saw kicking his friends car based on the clothing they were wearing. Pedro identified Miguel as one of the three youths who had kicked the car.
DISCUSSION
In considering Miguels claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631.)
I. Sufficient Evidence of Identification
Pedro was the only witness whose testimony related to the identification of Miguel as a perpetrator of the crime. Pedro stated that around 7:00 p.m. he saw several individuals outside his house, and three of those individuals were kicking a car owned by his friend that was parked outside in front of his house. The area was illuminated by a street lamp, and Pedro was able to see the perpetrators clothing and hair color and could identify their race. Pedro called the police, who arrived shortly after, and detained four individuals in a nearby park. Pedro identified three of the four detainees as the individuals he witnessed kicking the car based on their clothing. The record is not clear as to what Miguel was wearing, as Pedro was only able to recall the collective individuals were wearing "[b]lack pants, two white T-shirts, black T-shirt, shorts and blue pants." In court, however, Pedro was unable to identify Miguel as one of the perpetrators.
Miguel argues that Pedros pretrial identification of him as one of the perpetrators that was not reproduced in court is insufficient. In People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 263 (Cuevas), the court stated that a pretrial identification does not need to be corroborated by the identifying witness in court. The court set out four factors to consider when determining the probative value of a pretrial identification:
"... (1) the identifying witnesss prior familiarity with the defendant; (2) the witnesss opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the commission of the crime; (3) whether the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the defendant; and (4) the level of detail given by the witness in the out-of-court identification and any accompanying description of the crime." (Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 267.)
While the fact finder must consider these factors in determining the weight of the pretrial identification, they are not dispositive. The fundamental issue on appeal is whether, in light of these factors, the evidence identifying the defendant as a perpetrator is "reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
The fact finder could have reasonably relied on Pedros pretrial identification to find the allegation that Miguel committed vandalism true beyond a reasonable doubt. Pedro had a substantial opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the commission of the crime, as Pedro testified he observed the crime from a distance of 20 feet, and could clearly see the individuals in the light from a street lamp. Pedro had no motive to falsely implicate Miguel, as he had had no contact with him prior to the incident, and had nothing to gain by falsely identifying him to the police. When Pedro identified Miguel to Officer Fong, he did so by the type and color of Miguels clothing. Although Pedro had no prior familiarity with Miguel, the factors set forth in Cuevas are not dispositive, so not all of them must be met for the fact finder to reasonably rely on the witnesss pretrial identification of the perpetrator. While Pedro was not able to corroborate his pretrial identification in court, an in court corroboration is not required. (Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 263.) Therefore, there was substantial evidence to identify Miguel as a perpetrator of the crime.
Miguel also asserts that identification by a witness on the basis of clothing alone is insufficient evidence to find the allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a witness can make a reasonably sure identification without ever seeing the perpetrators face, and may rely on other peculiarities such as clothing or size. (People v. Lindsay (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 482, 495.) Because identification on the basis of clothing alone is sufficient, and Pedro identified Miguel as a perpetrator by his clothing, the fact finder could have reasonably relied on such evidence and found the allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, Miguel argues that since Sergeant Fong did not testify that Pedro identified Miguel as one of the detained youths who had kicked the car, there is insufficient evidence. Miguels argument ignores Pedros testimony that Miguel was one of the three individuals he saw kicking the car. Therefore, the instant case can be distinguished from In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, because there is direct evidence that Miguel vandalized the car.
II. Sufficient Evidence of Vandalism
At the adjudication hearing, the prosecution introduced two photographs of the side of the car, showing damage to the side panel and lower panel of one of the doors. The damage included shoe prints and scratches.
Miguel argues the evidence of damage to the car is insufficient to support a conviction of misdemeanor vandalism. He contends there was no evidence of the condition of the car before it was kicked so the fact finder could not reasonably infer he caused the damage seen in the photographs and described at the hearing by kicking the car.
Under Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(2)(A), a vandalism is a misdemeanor if it results in any amount of damage less than $400. Therefore, the prosecution only needs to demonstrate that the defendants act caused some amount of damage, but does not need to introduce evidence establishing a specific amount of damage. If the fact finder can reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendants acts caused some damage, then the element of damage is satisfied. (In re Nicholas Y. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 941, 943-944.)
The photographic evidence produced by the prosecution demonstrated that the car had received some damage to its side and lower panels. Additionally, Pedro testified he witnessed appellant vigorously kicking the car for about two minutes. Based on this evidence a reasonable fact finder was justified in finding Miguel damaged the car by kicking it.
Miguel further argues there was insufficient evidence to establish the element the property vandalized was not "his or her own." (Pen. Code, § 594.) We disagree. Pedro testified that the car belonged to a friend, and later testified he did not know Miguel. This uncontroverted testimony provided sufficient evidence for the fact finder to conclude that the element of lack of ownership was established beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. --------------- Notes: Before Ardaiz, P.J., Vartabedian, J. and Levy, J.