Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
LAURA S. TAYLOR, JUDGE United States Bankruptcy Court
In a successful construction project, the construction financiers are paid in full, the various parties who perform labor and provide materials in connection with the project are adequately and appropriately compensated for their efforts, and the owner rejoices in a successfully completed project that achieves a reasonable, if not robust, return on investment. In the case of an unsuccessful construction project, however, some or all of the above referenced outcomes remain unachieved. The Mi Arbolito construction project was, through no fault of those who owned, built, and financed the project, rather spectacularly unsuccessful.
Environmental litigation hampered the Mi Arbolito project within months of its initiation. Likely in large measure due to this litigation, the initial construction funding failed to materialize. The parties disagree as to the legal impact of the resultant "slow down" in the construction effort, but there is no question that there was no construction financing for approximately two years and that the forward momentum of the project halted during this time period.
Eventually, Mi Arbolito prevailed in the environmental litigation, obtained construction financing, and recommenced active construction. But the Mi Arbolito project's ill fortune continued. Problems arose in connection with the new financing. Cost overruns and the ultimate failure of funding resulted in unpaid bills for construction services and materials and an unfinished building. And then the economy slowed to a near halt.
Unable to obtain new financing, pay its bills, complete the construction project, or otherwise to solve its problems, Mi Arbolito filed a chapter 11 case. Mi Arbolito ultimately confirmed a chapter 11 plan, but neither the Debtor's equity, unsecured creditors, nor junior trust deed holder, Del Toro Holdings, will receive any payment. Instead, the Plan provides for the Court's resolution of a priority dispute between mechanics' lien claimants and certain trust deed secured lenders and for a distribution of assets consistent with the Court's decision as to priority.
In order to resolve these priority disputes, the Court must consider the following questions:
1. Are all or any portion of the amounts secured by the allegedly senior trust deed junior to mechanics' liens either: (a) because the note, deed of trust, and/or other operative loan documents are void and/or unenforceable; or (b) because all or any portion of the amounts advanced are "optional" advances not subject to priority pursuant to California Civil Code section 3136.
Hereinafter, the California Civil Code will be referred to as "Section___." References to the transcript of the trial in this matter will be referenced as "Vol.__;__:__."
2. Is the allegedly senior deed of trust junior to the claims of mechanics' lien claimants because the construction of the relevant work of improvement commenced prior to the recordation of this deed of trust either: (a) because such construction commenced in 2004 and did not cease at any point in time; or (b) because, even though there was an interim cessation, a new work of improvement commenced in 2006 prior to recordation of this trust deed?
3. Notwithstanding the answers to the questions above, does the allegedly senior trust deed enjoy a priority position, in part, by virtue of equitable subrogation?
The Court here determines that equitable subrogation provides the lenders with a priority position as to a small portion of their loans, that the various loan documents are valid, and that mechanics' lien priority does not relate back to 2004. Having said this, however, the Court also concludes that all loans after the initial funding were optional, that construction on the new work of improvement commenced prior to recordation of the lenders' trust deed, and that mechanics' liens have priority over the lenders' trust deed as a result.
The Court incorporates herein all uncontested and material facts referenced in Section III of the Joint Pretrial Statement dated January 5, 2010, but for ease of reference repeats here only certain facts, sometimes in simplified form, as appropriate for ease of presentation.
1. Mi Arbolito, LLC ("Debtor") was organized as a Delaware limited liability company. The Debtor initiated this chapter 11 bankruptcy case on May 27, 2008 (the "Petition Date").
For ease of reference, this Memorandum Opinion will refer to Mi Arbolito, LLC hereinafter as "Debtor" during the discussion of both the pre- and post-bankruptcy time periods.
2. Debtor's most substantial asset was real property located in San Diego at 3415 6th Avenue (the "Site"). The current disputes arise from the construction on the Site of a 14-unit condominium with underground parking (the "Project").
The Debtor Commenced Pre-construction Planning For The Project In 2003, And Active Construction Commenced In Early 2004.
3. On or about September 24, 2003, Debtor obtained full funding for the land acquisition phase of the Project from private investor funding and a loan from Security Business Bank ("SBB"). SBB secured the note evidencing its loan with a deed of trust recorded with the San Diego County Recorder on October 6, 2003 as Document No. 2003-1228226 (the "Senior Encumbrance"). The parties agree that the Senior Encumbrance created a lien with priority over mechanics' liens arising from the Project. Debtor anticipated that SBB also would provide a construction loan for the Project.
4. In 2003 or early 2004, the Debtor conducted other preconstruction Project activities, including the following:
a. On September 11, 2003, Debtor and Landmark Hospitality Contracting, Inc. ("Landmark") entered into a construction management agreement (the "Construction Management Agreement") that defined the scope of work for the Project. The Construction Management Agreement provided that Landmark would defer all fees until the end of construction and after receipt of the certificate of occupancy, except that Landmark would bill the Debtor monthly on account of reimbursable costs. The Construction Management Agreement did not contain an expiration date. While Landmark was not a general contractor under the Construction Management Agreement, the City of San Diego ("City") ultimately required that it be listed as the general contractor on the City permits;
b. Landmark retained Henry Gonzales to supervise the Project and placed him in charge of the Project's day-to-day activities;
c. Landmark set up an official field office adjacent to the Site;
d. The City issued permits that included:
(i) a shoring and grading permit for the Project that authorized Debtor to begin work on the Project, including excavation for the Project's parking garage;
(ii) a building permit for the condominium tower footings and for the underground parking; and
(iii) an encroachment permit allowing building under a public right of way, because the configuration of the Project required encroachment under the sidewalks adjacent to the Site as a portion of the shoring and excavation occurred partially under the public right of way;
e. The Debtor obtained an engineering performance bond and entered into a storm water management and discharge control maintenance agreement and an encroachment and removal agreement; and
f. The Debtor obtained a $2,000,000 wrap policy providing Builder's Risk Insurance that protected all trades, Landmark, and the Debtor.
5. The permits, insurance, agreements, and engineering bonds ran continuously from the pre-construction phase of the Project through all time periods relevant to this dispute.
6. In January of 2004, construction on the Project commenced. Early work included:
a. Work required to make the Site construction ready, such as fencing and the installation of temporary power by Dynalectric. The Dynalectric equipment that provided the temporary power was large and located adjacent to a temporary walkway. It made a humming noise that was audible if someone passed nearby. It also bore a 3" x 4" Dynalectric stencil;
Dynalectric provided temporary power pursuant to a Letter of Intent, which it did not replace with a more formal contract until after 2006.
b. Work required to deal with traffic safety issues including the creation of barricades, the re-alignment of 6th Avenue, the completion of a pedestrian walkway with lighting, and the relocation of traffic and pedestrian control lights;
c. Certain underground utility work;
d. The placement of a permanent precast concrete sump pit;
e. Extensive excavation; and
f. The construction of a shoring system designed to maintain the integrity of the excavation. The Project's shoring was engineered to handle stress on the Project's excavation caused by the encroachment discussed in subparagraph 4(d)(iii) above and the close proximity of an adjacent high-rise building. While the parties frequently referred to the shoring as temporary, with the exception of certain midline pipes, the mid-span supports for those pipes, and the corner braces on each comer of the excavation, the shoring became part of the permanent structure and was never removed. Instead, at a later point in the construction, a spray hopper sprayed concrete on the shoring to an appropriate depth and created the underground garage walls. Thus, it was temporary in most respects only in the sense that it was never intended to be the only support for the building and the excavation.
7. From January 2004 through the beginning of May 2004, continuous work proceeded on the Project.
The CEQA Litigation Commences; The Defendants Ultimately Prevail After Two Years of Effort.
8. On or about January 6, 2004, the Bankers Hill, Hillcrest, Park West Community Preservation Group (the "CEQA Plaintiff) initiated state court litigation (the "CEQA Lawsuit") against Debtor, the City, and others. The CEQA Lawsuit sought, inter alia, a determination as to whether the City properly determined that the Project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act.
9. In March of 2004, the Superior Court denied the CEQA Plaintiffs application for preliminary injunctive relief. Notwithstanding this determination, the CEQA Plaintiff continued the case. Finally, on or about February 28, 2005, the Superior Court found for the defendants in the CEQA Lawsuit. The CEQA Plaintiff then filed a timely appeal, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's judgment on May 8, 2006 and denied the CEQA Plaintiffs request for hearing on May 25, 2006.
The Debtor Cannot Obtain Construction Financing And Progress Towards Completion Of The Project Halts.
10. The CEQA Lawsuit placed extraordinary stress on the Debtor and the Project. While the evidence on this point is not entirely clear, the inference is that the CEQA Lawsuit was a significant factor (if not the only factor) in the Debtor's inability to obtain anticipated financing after the initial SBB funding. Thus, by May of 2004 or shortly thereafter, the Debtor had no construction financing and no ability to pay the costs of continued construction. As of this time, given the extensive prior excavation work, the Project consisted of a hole that was 25 to 30 feet deep. In addition, shoring, underground utilities, and concrete foundations were in place, public encroachment work was underway, and the parties working on the Project were ready to place the deep foundations and move forward.
11. In May of 2004, certain contractors removed equipment from the excavation. Further, and among other things, Bison Construction, the concrete contractor, filled in the then-existing ditches intended to receive the drainpipe that ultimately would run the perimeter of the Project.
12. Consistent with the cessation of active construction:
a. Landmark filed its last daily report until July of 2006 on May 24, 2004; b. Western Foundation and Shoring recorded a mechanics' lien on August 18, 2004; c. Landmark closed its field office in October of 2004 and secured the Site; d. Landmark reassigned Mr. Gonzales primarily to other projects; and e. Willert Contracting recorded a mechanics' lien on November 19, 2004.
Landmark And Dynalectric Provided Maintenance And Safety Related Services During The Slowdown Period.
13. After mid-2004 and until 2006 (the "Slowdown Period"), and despite the pendency of the CEQA Litigation and the lack of ongoing funding for the Project, limited activities continued in connection with the Project. Landmark, using its own forces and supervision, continued to perform maintenance on the Site and the excavation and ensured that all appurtenances placed on the Site for the preservation of public safety were in good and safe working order. The evidence established that Landmark's efforts consisted of general maintenance and protection of the Project and safety checks and included, without limitation, the following:
a. Robert Petrossian, President of Landmark, and/or Mr. Gonzales visited and inspected the Site and, among other things, evaluated the shoring and the basement of the adjacent high rise building where the Project's shoring system supported a basement wall;
b. Landmark, using its own forces and vendors, performed regular maintenance activities that occasionally included pumping out excess rain and ground water;
c. Landmark also regularly maintained the safety features required by the City including the fencing, pedestrian walkway, lighting, and traffic barriers/bollards; and
d. Landmark regularly painted over graffiti on the pedestrian walkway. (Landmark's efforts to make the Site attractive were limited, however, and it allowed garbage to accumulate on the Site and did not remove vegetation growing behind the pedestrian walkway.)
14. Dynalectric's temporary power equipment remained at the Project, and its personnel also regularly visited the Project to check on the integrity of the temporary power system.
15. During the Slowdown Period, the City did not pull its then-existing permits and took no action to recover on the bond Debtor posted.
16. Further during the Slowdown Period, the Debtor never sought to terminate the Construction Management Agreement, never notified Landmark that the Project was suspended, continuously maintained the wrap insurance for the Project, did not file a notice of completion, and did not file a notice of cessation.
17. As the months went by without payment or a source of new funding, Mr. Petrossian, on behalf of Landmark, requested a release from the Construction Management Agreement, requested payment, and used language consistent with a shut down of the Project. He neither then nor at trial made any secret of the fact that he was: ".. .desperately seeking to be let out of the [Construction Management Agreement]." Vol.7; 13:4-6. Having said this, however, Landmark's ability to walk away from the Project was limited. Landmark's contract presented an obstacle, but of perhaps equal or greater significance was the fact that its name was on the Project from the perspective of the City, and given the state of construction, a 25 to 30-foot hole in an urban environment, the damage to Landmark's reputation with the City if it abandoned the Project could have been significant.
Mr. Petrossian stated in a September 17, 2004 email that: "I know we are getting close to starting up again." Ex. K. In a November 10, 2004 email, he stated: "Now that the Project is officially shut down." Ex. L. Landmark also hired counsel who made demand for payment in 2005 and referred to the Project in a manner suggesting a shut down. Ex. N. In late May of 2006, Mr. Petrossian sent an email that contained a timeline and referenced that it was ambitious: "both in the start up and the completion." Ex. 155. Similarly, Debtor's principals used similar language in initial discussions with Mr. Neptune of Point Center.
18. Further, during the Slowdown Period, neither Landmark nor the Debtor ever considered the Project abandoned. And the Debtor representative, Mr. Cutri, made clear that he did not agree that all trades were off the Site during this period or that the Project was officially shut down. Mr. Cutri, however, also testified that the trades on the Site were doing work necessary for maintenance, security, and investment protection as opposed to new construction.
The Debtor Ultimately Obtains New Financing.
19. Debtor continuously sought Project financing after the SBB construction financing failed to materialize. And by early 2006, and given the resolution of the CEQA Lawsuit, the Debtor was optimistic that new financing would soon be available. In particular, the Debtor approached Point Center Financial, Inc. ("Point Center") and received a positive reception.
20. The Debtor and Point Center entered into a Loan Placement and Fee Agreement dated February 16, 2006 (the "Loan Placement Agreement") that, among other things, provided that:
a. Point Center is in the business of arranging and making real property secured loans;
b. Point Center may be a lender (but does not commit to make a loan); and
c. Point Center is the agent of the "Intended Lender(s)", will submit Debtor's loan application for approval, but: "... has no authority to make promises, representations or warranties for its principals, the intended lender(s), unless the same are set forth in writing and signed by the lender(s)." Ex. B-2. The Debtor, thereafter, completed a Point Center loan application dated March 20, 2006.
21. As part of its due diligence, Point Center inspected the Project in late April or early May of 2006 and documented the Project's condition at that time through a photograph introduced into evidence at trial (the "Due Diligence Photo"). The Due Diligence Photo shows standing water and is consistent with video footage (and still images from such video) created in March of 2006 during an investigative news report related to the Site's condition and also introduced into evidence without audio (collectively, the "March 2006 Photos"). The March 2006 Photos also show standing water and, in addition, document the abundant garbage then present on the Site.
22. Mr. Livingston, a senior credit officer of Point Center, testified that one purpose of the Site visit was in regard to the need to determine whether priority of a trust deed was endangered because someone had turned a shovel of dirt. Mr. Livingston indicated that if the Site visit identified ongoing construction, then Point Center would involve a title company to conduct further due diligence. Mr. Livingston also stated that an operating compressor or the presence of a tool box or a ladder would cause him to involve the title company or to question the borrower. Mr. Livingston confirmed that he did not see the Dynalectric equipment, a ladder, or a toolbox on the Site when he conducted the Site visit. The Court notes that the Dynalectric equipment is visible in the Due Diligence Photo.Point Center did not conduct a further Site inspection.
The Due Diligence Photo came into evidence in two forms. The Dynalectric equipment can be seen more clearly in the version of this photo introduced by the Committee (Exhibit 115.) The Point Center exhibit (Exhibit EE) shows a view that is less complete, but the Court does not find this to be an attempt to confuse the issue.
23. Also, as part of its underwriting, Point Center obtained an appraisal which is documented by a report dated May 1, 2006. The appraisal report acknowledges that the Project is under construction, but the Court cannot conclude that this statement evidences anything other than the obvious existence of the excavation and the shoring.
24. Point Center ultimately arranged for construction loans (the "Loans") that are evidenced by documents that include the following:
a. A Promissory Note Secured by Deed of Trust dated June 1, 2006 (the "Note") as supplemented by an Addendum to Promissory Note Secured by Deed of Trust dated June 1, 2006 (the "Addendum" and, collectively with the Note, the "2006 Note"). Exhibit A to the 2006 Note lists the private party lenders who advanced funds as part of the initial funding discussed in Paragraph 30 below. This form of Exhibit A was not attached to the 2006 Note when executed by the Debtor, but a placeholder Exhibit A was attached and the completed Exhibit A was later attached.
b. A Construction Loan Agreement dated June 1, 2006 (the "2006 Loan Agreement"). The 2006 Loan Agreement conditioned standard agreement language with a qualification negotiated and/or drafted by Debtor's attorney providing that Debtor would not allow any work or materials in connection with the Project: "except for existing excavation and shoring work." Ex. AAA. The 2006 Loan Agreement also contained a representation from Debtor that construction had not recommenced. Point Center, however, never obtained any such representation from Landmark and, in fact, never held any preloan closing discussions with Landmark or any of the other parties carrying out construction of the Project. The Construction Loan Agreement required that construction commence before July 1, 2006; and
Landmark may have received a copy of the draft 2006 Loan Agreement on February 28, 2006, as there is evidence that Mr. Petrossian got some loan agreement on that date. But there is no evidence that Landmark was aware of the Addendum until after the initial funding of the Loans.
c. A Construction Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated June 1, 2006 and recorded on June 30, 2006 (the "Recordation Date") at 11:22 a.m. as Document No. 2006-0464947 (the "2006 Trust Deed"). The 2006 Trust Deed secures Debtor's obligations under the 2006 Note and the 2006 Loan Agreement.
25. The 2006 Loan Agreement provided for a loan or loans in the maximum principal amount of $13,625,000 (the "Maximum Loan Amount"). Pursuant to the Addendum, however, the parties acknowledged and agreed that Point Center was not a lender, but instead acted as the designated agent for the private party lenders listed in Exhibit A to the 2006 Note. The Addendum also made clear that:
a. Phased funding of the Loans was anticipated such that the Debtor did not anticipate full funding at initiation of the Loans;
b. Point Center did not have commitments from lenders equal to the entire Maximum Loan Amount;
c. Notwithstanding the above, the transaction would close and the 2006 Trust Deed would record; and
d. Point Center would make a good faith effort to obtain loans cumulatively equal to the Maximum Loan Amount and to arrange for disbursement of such funds upon receipt. The Addendum clearly stated that Point Center had no obligation to fund all or any portion of the Maximum Loan Amount.
Point Center itself did make another relatively small one month loan in the summer of 2006. The Debtor properly repaid this loan, Point Center apparently reconveyed the second trust deed securing this loan, and it is not relevant to the issues here.
26. There is no evidence that Landmark or the other contractors were aware of the lack of committed lenders. Landmark, and presumably all contractors, assumed more conventional construction financing with a commitment to lend the entire Maximum Loan Amount, albeit subject to reasonable conditions precedent.
27. Point Center and the Debtor executed and delivered the documents related to the Loans on June 12, 2006.
28. On June 14, 2006, Point Center began receiving money from the private party lenders who agreed to make the initial loans (the "Initial Lenders"). Previously, Point Center supplied each such lender with information regarding the Project and the Loans. Lenders who desired to participate in the Loans ultimately became what Point Center described as a documented lender. Mr. Esparza, a representative of Point Center, described a documented lender as one who: "... actually sent the fully executed documents back, subscription agreement, offer and circular as well as their check." Vol.6; 24:23-25. He acknowledged, as well, that until a party becomes a documented lender, they are only a potential lender.
29. One of the documents executed by a documented lender was a Loan Servicing Agreement that designated Point Center as the lender's agent. Point Center also provided documented lenders with a Corporate Assignment of Construction Deed of Trust (the "Assignment") and copies of certain loan documents. Finally, documented lenders executed and delivered a subscription agreement. The evidence establishes that Point Center provided all such documents to the Initial Lenders and to all private party lenders who made subsequent loans ("Subsequent Lenders" and, together with the Initial Lenders, the "Private Party Lenders").
30. Consistent with the above, Point Center ultimately arranged for initial loans totaling $2,827,821 (the "Initial Loans").
31. Thus, as of the Recordation Date, $10,797,179 of the Maximum Loan Amount (79.25%) remained unfunded (the "Unfunded Portion"). The 2006 Note references Point Center as holding this interest in the 2006 Note, but the evidence is clear that this was merely another place holder designation for future lenders who were not then identified and might never materialize. The evidence makes clear that while Point Center agreed to use its best efforts to raise the Unfunded Portion as soon as possible, Point Center had no documented lenders at that time other than those committed only to make the Initial Loans and did not guarantee that any such future funding would occur.
32. Notwithstanding the Addendum, and likely based on Exhibit A to the 2006 Note which shows Point Center as holding the 79.25% interest in the 2006 Note, Debtor believed that Point Center was responsible for funding 79.25% of the Loans. Ultimately, Debtor filed a lawsuit alleging fraud in regard to this issue. The Debtor resolved this litigation through its Plan.
33. Point Center directed that the proceeds of the Initial Loans be utilized as an appropriate interest reserve and then advanced to the following:
a. First American Title Company. The 2006 Loan Agreement required that the 2006 Trust Deed constitute a first priority lien against the Site. Thus, the title company utilized $813,034.30 of the Initial Loans to pay the debt owed to SBB in full;
b. Escrow Professionals. The escrow paid transactional fees and costs; and
c. Builders Disbursements, Inc. ("BDI"). BDI was the entity acting as fund control for all aspects of construction financing, and BDI, thus, received the portion of the Initial Loans designated for payment of construction costs. While BDI did not receive these funds on the Recordation Date, they were in the Point Center General Funding Account and earmarked for this transaction on the Recordation Date.
34. In connection with the closing, Landmark loaned funds to Debtor to allow Debtor to meet its monetary obligations related to the closing.
From Approximately January 2006 Through June 2006, Landmark And The Debtor Take Actions In Connection With The Resumption Of Active Construction Of The Project.
35. In early 2006, the Debtor advised Mr. Petrossian that construction funding was finally imminent. Mr. Petrossian had heard this story on numerous occasions since 2004, but he determined that this time new funding was probable. In particular, Mr. Cutri sent him a copy of a loan agreement on February 28, 2006 and advised that:"We need to move. We should be 30 days in front of funding." Ex. S. Mr. Cutri testified that his intention at this time was to start re-mobilization and that he did not expect active construction until after the Loans closed. Mr. Petrossian took the request for rapid action seriously.
36. Landmark took an initial step to protect itself in March of 2006. The Debtor and Landmark, at Landmark's request, affirmed the continuation of the original Construction Management Agreement by adding a notation stating "Agreement Originally Made as of the Eleventh Day of September in the Year of 2003 and Redone on Eighth Day of March in 2006." In particular, to affirm the continuation of the Construction Management Agreement, Landmark and the Debtor drew additional signature lines on the original document, and added a second signature for each party.
37. Many of Landmark's efforts prior to the Recordation Date were purely organizational. Landmark obtained new bids from contractors, communicated with suppliers, and created construction schedules. But again, while the evidence does not suggest that Mr. Cutri advocated active construction in a manner directly contrary to the Debtor's obligations under the 2006 Loan Agreement, the record makes clear that Landmark was not unreasonable in also beginning construction efforts in connection with the Project that were different in quality and character from those undertaken during the Slowdown Period. In particular, in addition to Mr. Cutri's initial statements, upon receipt of a proposed schedule in late May, he advised Mr. Petrossian that:
Our financing is for 16 months from June 15, 2006. We cannot go any longer than that or it costs us a huge premium. So we must be completed (close on condo sales - move in condition) no later than October 15, 2007. There is no flexibility to that, so we need to do everything we can to make that schedule. Ex. 155.
38. Thus, Landmark began to take steps to return the Project to a state of active construction well prior to the Recordation Date. Mr. Petrossian first called Mr. Gonzales, who was heavily, if not exclusively, involved in other construction projects and advised him to prepare for a return to full-time employment in connection with the Project.
39. Mr. Gonzales promptly returned in the spring of 2006, but found that active construction could not recommence as quickly as he originally envisioned. Nonetheless, he was directly involved in a series of activities designed to move the Project forward.
a. Landmark removed accumulated trash from the Site. To aid in trash removal given the depth of the excavation, Landmark workers built a plywood deck on the northeast corner of the excavation to allow staged trash removal; workers moved the trash up to the deck and from there lifted it out of the excavation. Waste Management delivered dumpsters, and on June 26, 2006 it hauled away the trash.
b. Landmark dried out the Site. At some points in time during the Slowdown Period, the standing water at the Site pooled to a depth of two feet. Thus, while Landmark used pumps to remove as much standing water as possible, the Site remained muddy as the soil had reached a point of saturation where it could no longer absorb water. As a result, Landmark workers physically mucked out the Site by removing wet dirt by hand with buckets. The next step was to expose the soil to air to allow moisture to be wicked up from below the soil's surface. The entire process of drying out the Site involved well more than a week.
c. Landmark also used decomposed granite as a blotter to conclude the drying-out effort and to raise the soil level of the Site. A supplier delivered thirteen yards of decomposed granite prior to May and delivered a dump truck and dump trailer load more shortly after Landmark reopened its construction office on June 20, 2006. Landmark built a deck on the northwest corner of the excavation to hold the decomposed granite upon delivery. Landmark workers spread the decomposed granite by hand on the north side of the Site as it could not be handled with equipment due to a five-foot drop. Equipment spread the remainder of the decomposed granite after the Recordation Date. The decomposed granite served two purposes. First, it assisted in drying out the Site to the point where the soil could be compacted sufficiently for load bearing. Second, it built up the level of the excavation to the point needed for final construction of the below-ground garage. This was necessary because although in 2004, the Site has been cut to the appropriate level, after the removal of wet mud the ground level was too low. T.M. Structural, the concrete foundation work contractor, proposed to solve the problem with additional concrete, but this involved a cost deemed excessive. So Landmark decided to use sand.
d. Landmark conducted activities in connection with the waterproofing for the underground garage. The Project's initial design did not contemplate that the shoring would be exposed to the elements for two years. While the evidence is not clear as to how the issue arose, it is clear that Mr. Gonzales determined that there was a risk that the manufacturer's guarantee in relation to the waterproofing was in peril as a result of the condition of the shoring. Hence, numerous meetings occurred. Originally, the manufacturer conditioned the guarantee on the requirement that the Debtor close all gaps that now existed in the shoring. Given the two years of weather exposure, the shoring was covered with gaps as a result of shrinkage of the weather exposed wood. Ultimately, the manufacturer slightly reduced this requirement and, instead, required closure or coverage of all gaps over one inch and other steps. Thus, Landmark workers closed all gaps over one inch in the shoring with sheet metal. Landmark also repaired damaged areas of the shoring. This was a laborious process conducted over an approximately two-week period by Gustavo Jimenez and under the supervision of Mr. Gonzales. Time records show that Mr. Jimenez worked over forty hours prior to the Recordation Date. As a final step in the water-proofing process, Landmark or the water-proofing contractor, Applied Waterproofing Technology, covered a portion of the shoring with water-proof sheeting and a weep system. Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Petrossian both testified that this work occurred prior to July 1, 2006, but neither could supply documentary evidence supporting this claim. Mr. Petrossian also admitted that he had no firsthand knowledge that this was the case.
e. Landmark also did hand-digging prior to the Recordation Date. In particular, Landmark workers installed a drainpipe by hand. The Project's drainage system runs the entire perimeter of the Site. The weep system placed on the shoring to take moisture out of the garage walls tied to this drainage system which channeled this moisture to the sump and from there to the storm drain system. At the commencement of the Slowdown Period, Bison Construction filled in the ditches intended for this drainpipe. Thus, Landmark had to re-dig the one-foot by one-foot trenches and install the drainpipe. This handwork had to be done before T.M. Structural came onto the Site to do foundation work, as it wanted the Landmark workers out of the way. Mr. Gonzales testified that this hand-digging occurred over two weeks, and Mr. Riel, a representative of Dynalectric, testified that he personally observed trenching prior to the Recordation Date.
40. Landmark had to complete some or all of the work discussed above prior to the construction of the foundation for the tower crane. The tower crane foundation was to abut the southwest corner of the shoring and would eliminate or limit access to the southwest perimeter of the Site. Thus, prior to pouring the pad, trash and water had to be removed, the soil had to be dried, all shoring repair and work related to waterproofing on the southwest perimeter, including the hanging of waterproof sheeting, had to be done, and the perimeter drain system had to be in place in that area.
41. Landmark also called for various City inspections in March, May, and June of 2006. These inspections occurred on March 24, 2006, May 17, 2006, May 18, 2006, and June 12, 2006, and, at least in part, related to the garage and the foundation for the Project.
42. In addition to the work discussed above, Mr. Gonzales oversaw the reopening of a construction office for the Project in an adjacent apartment building on June 20, 2006. The computer was not immediately available thereafter, as it was necessary both to purchase equipment and then to retain a computer expert. Landmark also caused delivery of Porta-Potties' prior to the Recordation Date.
43. Bees were a problem at the Project, and in 2006, as Landmark workers returned to the Site, the problem proved serious due to a major infestation behind the shoring near the pedestrian walkway. Apparently, the banging on the shoring as part of the waterproofing-related work disturbed the bees and caused them to swarm. Finally, it became clear that eradication was necessary. After trying various methods, Mr. Gonzales finally obtained complete eradication around June 23, 2006. The bee problem delayed work on the western side of the shoring. As Mr. Gonzales testified, however, Landmark was able to work on other areas of the shoring as they started as close as they could to the bees and then worked out from that point to other areas of the shoring until they eradicated the bees.
44. On July 3, 2006, the first workday after the Recordation Date, T.M. Structural arrived at the Project. It continued to do prepatory work on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of July.
45. All parties agree that on July 10, 2006, construction work on the Project was in full force. And on this date, Landmark prepared the first daily report for the Project since 2004 (the "First 2006 Daily"). The First 2006 Daily states that a crane lowered a backhoe and mini-excavator into the hole to clean up and dig ditches for the tower crane footing and separator and that T.M. Structural worked on physically laying out the Site, building forms for the tower crane, and digging column footings. Mr. Petrossian testified that it was impossible for T.M. Structural to complete all work described on the First 2006 Daily in a single day, particularly with only three workers. Consistent with this observation, it is clear that T.M. Structural did at least the lay out work prior to July 10th.
46. As a photograph taken on July 14, 2006 (the "July 14 Photo") establishes, the Site was a swarm of Project-related activity on July 14th. Both Mr. Petrossian and Mr. Gonzales question whether the Project could achieve the July 14 Photo condition during the period from the Recordation Date to July 14, 2006 - a mere nine working days. For example, the July 14 Photo shows concrete pads in position and rebar in place. The evidence fails to establish, however, that the wooden forms and rebar were on the Site prior to the Recordation Date.
Two weekends and the Fourth of July occur between the Recordation Date and July 14th.
47. Thus, the photographic evidence shows a transformation of the Site from the condition documented in the March 2006 Photos and the Due Diligence Photo to the condition seen in the July 14 Photo. Mr. Gonzales testified that the change took weeks. Mr. Petrossian testified that this dramatic change took six to eight weeks.
Although Completion Of The Project Took Longer Than Originally Anticipated, There Was Little Deviation In The Design Or Scope Of The Project.
48. The Debtor maintained and updated certain permits, including the structural permit for the underground garage, continuously from the commencement of the Project. These permits refer to a single, unitary construction project and when the Debtor obtained the Certificate of Occupancy it related back to the foundation permit and structural permit issued in 2003. Having said this, however, the building permit related to the superstructure of the building, everything from the ground-level up, was not pulled (nor was the $370,000 fee paid) until July 3, 2006. And further, certain permits expired prior to June 2006, but were extended.
49. Contracts for construction were not continuous throughout the 2004-2008 period with the exception of the Construction Management Agreement. In particular, Landmark and the Debtor obtained new bids in the spring of 2006 from all trades with work remaining on the Project. The Debtor entered into a contract for concrete foundation work with Bison Construction in 2004, but contracted for such work with T.M. Structural in 2006.
And, as discussed above, even that contract was re-executed.
Point Center Failed To Obtain Loans In An Amount Equal To The Maximum Loan Amount.
50. Construction on the Project ceased in early 2008 when the Debtor no longer had sufficient funds to pay contractors and suppliers. Point Center's inability to obtain funding in the Maximum Loan Amount was not explained precisely at trial and a determination of the related facts is not required for the Court's decisions here, but it appears clear that the problems arose, in large measure, as a result of cost over-runs (primarily related to the need to change the design to include a half-bath for each unit), related delays, and the negative changes in the economy. There was no evidence presented that indicates that Point Center violated its admitted obligation to use its best efforts to obtain financing of the full Maximum Loan Amount. The last Loans under the 2006 Note occurred in October of 2007, and the total amount loaned pursuant to the 2006 Loan Agreement was $12,000,000.
The Debtor Initiates A Chapter 11 Case, The Committee Is Formed, And This Litigation Commences.
51. The Debtor ultimately initiated the bankruptcy case. The Office of the United States Trustee appointed the Official Mechanics Lienholders' Committee (the "Committee") pursuant to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code and in order to represent the interests of creditors of Debtor who carried out the work of improvement on the Project and/or supplied labor and/or materials to the Project. Parties asserting mechanics' liens recorded liens of more than $5.8 million and also filed proofs of claim against the estate totaling more than $4 million.
52. Point Center filed a proof of claim asserting a secured claim against the estate in the amount of $13,261,915.76. Point Center currently is an authorized agent for the Private Party Lenders.
53. On November 6, 2009, the Committee initiated this litigation and filed its Complaint for Declaratory Relief. On November 18, 2009, the Committee filed its First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief (the "First Amended Complaint") which names Point Center in both its individual capacity and as authorized agent for the Private Party Lenders as a defendant. The Court conducted trial on eight non-consecutive days spanning a 23-day period, received and reviewed post-trial briefing, and thereafter heard closing argument.
The Court acknowledges that Point Center expressly reserved the right to contest the validity and amount of any mechanics' lien claim. Thus, this decision decides only the priority of a properly asserted mechanics' lien and leaves the determination of the amount and validity of mechanics' liens to another court.
DISCUSSION
In order to succeed on the priority issue, Point Center must prevail in several areas. First, the Court must find that the 2006 Trust Deed constitutes a valid and enforceable lien against the Site and that one or more of the obligations secured thereby are valid. The Committee has the burden of proof as it contests the validity of these documents.
Assuming that a valid lien exists, the Court must then find that the various Loans secured thereby all constitute obligatory advances subject to protection under Section 3136, as Point Center admits that the majority of such amounts were loaned after the commencement of construction on the Project. The Committee has the burden of proof as the party asserting priority pursuant to a mechanics' lien.
If Point Center prevails on the above issues, the Committee can still prevail if the 2006 Trust Deed was recorded after the relevant commencement of construction. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3134. The Project clearly commenced prior to recordation of the 2006 Trust Deed. Thus, if the Project consists of one continuous work of improvement that commenced in 2004, mechanics' liens have priority over the 2006 Trust Deed. Id. Point Center bears the burden of proving that there was a cessation in the Project such that there was a deemed completion under Section 3086(c) at a point prior to the Recordation Date. If Point Center so establishes, then the Committee has a final line of attack and bears the burden of proving that, even if a cessation occurred such that the Project consists of two separate works of improvement, the second work of improvement commenced prior to the Recordation Date.
If Point Center loses on any or all of the above, then Point Center has a final opportunity to protect the priority of a relatively small portion of the 2006 Trust Deed's lien by establishing that equitable subrogation is appropriate by virtue of payment in full of the Senior Encumbrance.
The Court having carefully considered the evidence, oral and documentary, and the arguments of the parties both in briefing and during the course of trial, concludes as indicated earlier and as discussed in more detail below.
A. The 2006 Note Represents An Enforceable Obligation Against The Debtor And Is Properly Secured By The 2006 Trust Deed.
The Committee argues that the 2006 Note is not an enforceable obligation based on several grounds and that the 2006 Trust Deed is similarly void. This Court disagrees.
1. The Lender(s) Are Appropriately Identified To The Loan Transaction.
The Committee emphasized throughout this case that Point Center is not a lender with respect to the Loans. This is true. Point Center made no commitment to lend and in fact clearly stated in the Addendum and in the Placement Agreement that it was not committing to lend. At trial, Point Center relied on its agreement to use best efforts to obtain the Maximum Loan Amount in an attempt to justify its alleged "retention" of the 79.25% interest in the 2006 Note. Point Center admittedly, however, did not itself provide any portion of the Loans and the 79.25% allegedly retained interest represented only a placeholder, to be occupied at a later date by Subsequent Lenders.
The lenders here, as clearly contemplated under the 2006 Note, consist of the Private Party Lenders; and do not include Point Center. Point Center was, and is, the agent for the Initial Lenders and, in accordance with basic agency law became the agent for the Subsequent Lenders as and when they were identified and documented. Van't Rood v. County of Santa Clara, 113 Cal.App.4th 549, 571 (2003) (creation of agency relationship requires that the "principal must in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for him").
The Committee asks the Court to go further and argues that not only is Point Center not a lender, but because there were no lenders identified as of June 12, 2006 when the Debtor executed the loan documents, no enforceable obligation was created thereby. The Court disagrees.
As is typical of real estate lending transactions, Debtor executed most of the loan documents several days in advance of loan closing. Debtor executed the Note, the I 2006 Trust Deed and the 2006 Loan Agreement (among other documents) on June 12, 2006 (the "Execution Date"). The Note attached a placeholder Exhibit A, in anticipation of its replacement with an Exhibit A listing the Initial Lenders prior to closing; and the 2006 Loan Agreement specified certain terms and conditions for the Loans, including, without limitation, conditions precedent to funding. The 2006 Loan Agreement clearly established that it would be effective as of the date of the recording of the 2006 Trust Deed. Sometime after the Execution Date, but again in advance of the Recordation Date, Debtor executed the Addendum. By its terms, the Addendum modifies the Note to provide, in part, for closing of the loan, recordation of the 2006 Trust Deed, and commencement of disbursements of proceeds of the Loans despite the fact that Point Center had obtained documented lenders for only $2,827,821 of the Maximum Loan Amount.
The Committee argues that the lack of identified lender(s) as of the Execution Date renders the executed documents unenforceable because they lack an essential element of the contract. The Committee's argument misconstrues the process and timing here and ignores the clear intent of the parties.
The Court construes and considers the Note, Addendum, 2006 Trust Deed, and 2006 Loan Agreement (as well as the Placement Agreement) together as separately executed instruments or documents made as part of a single transaction. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1642; see also Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank, 233 Cal.App.3d 103, 113 (1991). The Execution Date is not the relevant date to determine whether an enforceable obligation was created between Debtor and any Iender(s). Rather, the relevant date is the Recordation Date - the effective date of most of the related documents governing the transaction. As of the Recordation Date, Exhibit A was completed, as contemplated and intended by the parties (neither of which has argued to the contrary), and identified the Initial Lenders. It is not disputed that Exhibit A was attached to the 2006 Trust Deed, as recorded. Although this Court also finds that the completed Exhibit A was attached to the 2006 Note at some point, the fact that it was attached to the 2006 Trust Deed at recordation is sufficient evidence of identification of the Initial Lenders. Therefore, the Committee's argument that Debtor's obligations under the relevant documents were unenforceable because of the lack of identified lenders must fail.
2. Most Of The Committee's Other Challenges To The Enforceability Of The Loan Transaction Involve Exhibit A -And Are Not Well-Taken.
In addition to challenging the timely identification of any lender by pre-recordation attachment of the completed Exhibit A, the Committee argues that other alleged flaws associated with Exhibit A render the loan transaction, and therefore the lien of the 2006 Trust Deed, unenforceable. The Committee argues the following:
-As to the 2006 Note ~ attachment of the completed Exhibit A to the executed 2006 Note constitutes a material, improper amendment, subject to a statute of frauds defense;
-As to the 2006 Trust Deed ~ attachment of completed Exhibit A to the 2006 Trust Deed by an allegedly unauthorized person at the title company and without re-notarization of Debtor's signature constitutes an improper amendment subject to a statute of frauds defense; and
-As to the 2006 Loan Agreement - failure to attach Exhibit A renders the 2006 Loan Agreement "inchoate" and, thus, unenforceable.
The Court again disagrees.
a. As to the 2006 Note.
At trial, a major point of dispute concerned the correct form of the 2006 Note. At some point after the Execution Date, the 2006 Note was completed by the addition of the completed Exhibit A. The Committee argues that for the 2006 Note to be enforceable the Debtor was required to provide a specific written authorization of such an amendment. The Court disagrees with the Committee's characterization of the completed Exhibit A as an amendment to the 2006 Note. As discussed above, the 2006 Note did not become effective until the Recordation Date, and it is clear from the Court's review of the transaction documents that the parties intended, and Debtor impliedly consented to, replacement of the placeholder Exhibit A with the completed Exhibit A prior to the Recordation Date, in order to complete the 2006 Note. See Fitch v. Pacific Fid. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal.App. 3d 140, 145 (1975) (consent to insertion of an exact date was implied where the date was necessarily unknown when the agreement was signed). No party to the loan transaction quarrels with this clear interpretation of the agreed procedure, and the Committee has offered no convincing evidence to the contrary. Amendment is not required under the circumstances here where the document was incomplete until the Initial Lenders were identified and was not effective until delivery, the recordation of the 2006 Trust Deed, and the initial funding of the Loans.
Nor is the statute of frauds implicated. The Court recognizes that modification of a contract that is subject to the statute of frauds is also subject to the statute of frauds. Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2, 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 547-48 (2008). There is no question that the 2006 Note was executed in an incomplete form because of the yet-to-be completed Exhibit A and that the Debtor understood that the 2006 Note was to be completed later, pre-delivery, to identify the Initial Lenders. Cal. Com. Code § 3115. The Committee bears the burden to show that completion was done without authority. Cal. Com. Code § 3115(d). It has not done so. It is clear to the Court that the completed Exhibit A was added to the 2006 Note, completing the 2006 Note, with Debtor's implicit consent and authorization and, therefore, is not an alteration that would be subject to the statute of frauds. See Jay v. Dollarhide, 3 Cal.App.3d 1001, 1021 (1970) overruled on other grounds by Morris v. Thogmartin, 29 Cal.App.3d 922 (1973). While there is a suggestion of significant sloppiness in the maintenance of the completed 2006 Note, the Debtor admits that at some point it received a copy of the 2006 Note with completed Exhibit A. And the Debtor further admits that it received this document prior to the initiation of this litigation. It is possible, given the various circumstances in this case, that Exhibit A was not firmly attached to the original 2006 Note itself, but there is nothing to suggest that Exhibit A was not attached to the 2006 Note concurrently with attachment to the 2006 Trust Deed at recordation and there is also no question that the Exhibit A before the Court correctly identifies the Initial Lenders. After reviewing all the facts, the Court concludes that Exhibit A was appropriately attached to the 2006 Note in a timely fashion and that such attachment after execution does not invalidate the transaction.
b. As to the 2006 Trust Deed.
There is no question that prior to recordation, the 2006 Trust Deed was completed with an attachment of the completed Exhibit A. The Committee argues that attachment of Exhibit A to a recorded trust deed by an unauthorized person at the title company was not a valid amendment under the statute of frauds. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Exhibit A was attached before recordation not thereafter. Second, the evidence shows that First American Title Company acted as a sub-escrow agent and was empowered to attach the completed Exhibit A as an authorized agent of the parties to the transaction. The statute of frauds was not implicated and there was no amendment.
The Committee then argues that because the 2006 Trust Deed was not re-notarized when Exhibit A was added, it was fatally flawed. The Committee misunderstands the notarization process. Notarization is an acknowledgment of the signer's identity and is not essential to a document's validity. Osterberg v. Osterberg, 68 Cal.App.2d 254, 262 (1945). In California, notarization is evidentiary in nature and required to entitle a document to be recorded. Id. Where, as here, the Debtor consented to the addition of the completed Exhibit A after execution and acknowledgment, re-notarization is not required and the lack of re-acknowledgment does not render the 2006 Trust Deed invalid.
c. As to the 2006 Loan Agreement.
The Committee argues that the 2006 Loan Agreement itself is inchoate because Exhibit A was not attached, lender(s) were not identified, and therefore the provisions contained in the 2006 Loan Agreement could not be enforced. As discussed earlier in this Memorandum Decision, the multiple documents executed by the Debtor in connection with the loan transaction here are taken by the Court as one transaction. The attachment of the completed Exhibit A to both the 2006 Note and the 2006 Trust Deed, although not to the 2006 Loan Agreement, but including the explicit reference in the 2006 Loan Agreement to the same Exhibit A (identifying the Initial Lenders) enables the Court to interpret (and enforce) the terms of the 2006 Loan Agreement without violating the intention of the parties, as favored under basic contract interpretation principles. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1643.
d. Other Committee Arguments.
The Committee correctly states that Point Center did not execute the Addendum. The Court disagrees, however, with the Committee's conclusion that such failure renders the Addendum wholly illusory. The Addendum, viewed as one part of the loan transaction, is consistent with the staged funding arrangement and a necessary and integral part of the 2006 Note and Debtor's obligations thereunder. Execution by the Debtor is sufficient for the purposes here. The Court agrees with the Committee, however, that Point Center itself is not a party to the Addendum. Whether any obligations by Point Center arise under the Addendum is not a determination that this Court must make to resolve the issues here in light of the conclusion that Point Center itself is not a lender (as discussed more fully above and in connection with obligatory versus optional advances later in this Memorandum Decision).
The Committee also factually challenges the date of the first disbursement from the Initial Loans, to support the argument that the lien created by a duly executed, delivered, and recorded deed of trust does not attach and gain priority over other liens until the date of such first disbursement. In particular, it argues that the Initial Loans were not really "funded" until Debtor had absolute control over the funds and that the Debtor never had such control because it pledged the account into which the funds were paid as security. This argument boarders on the frivolous. The Debtor had sufficient control over the account to pledge it as security. And the ability to grant a security interest connotes control rather than a lack thereof. Given that such funding is not at all unusual in construction cases, and given that lenders frequently make advances only into accounts that are pledged as collateral or otherwise subject to the control by the lender or its agent, the Committee suggests an argument that would make financing unnecessarily difficult in a. multitude of scenarios. The Court is unaware of any rule that requires that the Debtor have completely unfettered access or that requires that the Debtor not have pledged a security interest in the funds in question. As a result, the Court disregards this argument.
B. California Mechanics' Lien Law Dictates The Outcome Of The Priority Disputes.
A mechanics' lien is a lien placed on real property by a person who, through work or the provision of materials, improved that property. The lien is a procedural device for obtaining payment on a debt owed by the property owner to an individual as a result of the performance of labor or the furnishing of materials. Section 3 of Article XIV of the California Constitution grants a secured encumbrance right to contractors and also requires that the Legislature provide for the enforcement of such liens. The mechanics' lien statutes, thus, are the only California creditor remedy stemming from Constitutional command, and, hence, they constitute remedial legislation that must be liberally construed for the protection of laborers and materialmen. Solit v. Tokai Bank, 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1441-1442 (1999). As a result, ambiguities in the interpretation of the mechanics' lien statutes must be resolved in favor of the mechanics' lien claimant. Id; Fontana Paving, Inc. v. Hedley Bros., Inc., 38 Cal.App.4th 146, 153-154 (1995) (mechanics' lien statutes must be liberally construed to effectuate purposes of the law).
All persons and laborers of every class who perform labor or bestow skill, or services, or furnish materials to a work of improvement are eligible to place a mechanics' lien upon the property on which they worked. Cal. Civ. Code § 3110. A work of improvement includes, but is not restricted to, construction of a building such as the Project.
1. Point Center Was Not A Lender And All Loans After The Initial Loans Were Optional.
Mechanics' liens are preferred to liens, mortgages, deeds of trust, and other encumbrances upon the work of improvement which attach after the commencement of the work. Cal. Civ. Code § 3134. The Civil Code, however, also makes a distinction between payments that are obligatory and those that are voluntarily made pursuant to a construction loan agreement. Cal. Civ. Code § 3136. Generally, where a construction loan agreement requires that the lender make obligatory payments, and the trust deed was recorded prior to the commencement of the work of improvement, then all obligatory payments are also considered superior to the mechanics' liens. Coast Central Credit Union v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 703, 712 (1989). However, where the lender makes non-obligatory disbursements after the filing of the mechanics' liens, those disbursements are considered junior to that lien. Id.
As discussed above, Point Center is not a lender and the 79.25% interest identified with Point Center in the 2006 Note and 2006 Trust Deed is not evidence that Point Center loaned anything to Debtor. Notwithstanding, Point Center attempts to support its retained interest under the 2006 Trust Deed by citing legal authority for the proposition that a deed of trust may secure non-financial obligations. The Court concedes the accuracy of this bare legal proposition, but finds it not applicable to the facts here, as Point Center does not allege, much less prove, any non-financial obligation owed to it by the Debtor. The 2006 Trust Deed secured Debtor's obligations under the 2006 Note and 2006 Loan Agreement to the Lender, a term defined therein as the Private Party Lenders, whose designated agent is Point Center. The relevant documents contain no obligations owed by Debtor to Point Center, and clearly Point Center's own obligation to use best efforts to obtain the Maximum Loan Amount, if that is the non-financial obligation to which Point Center refers, could not be secured by the 2006 Trust Deed given by Debtor to the Lender.
In the Addendum to the 2006 Note, Point Center requires the Debtor to acknowledge that the Unfunded Portion will not be advanced at the Recordation Date and, indeed, has not even been committed as of that date. Point Center agrees in the Addendum to use its best efforts to obtain this additional funding, but as the Addendum states: "...neither [Point Center] nor the Lender have guaranteed or do guarantee or commit that the Unfunded Portion, or any part of it will ever be funded." Ex. UU (emphasis in original). Thus, Point Center's role in this transaction was that of an arranger and broker.
Point Center negotiated for an agreement that Debtor would accept a loan or loans up to the Maximum Loan Amount on terms Point Center believed to be marketable. Point Center agreed to use its best efforts to find lenders to provide these loans to the Debtor and marketed the opportunity to potential lenders. Thus, Point Center acted as a conduit through which the Private Party Lenders provided loans to Debtor and as an arranger of the related loan it conducted and/or prepared due diligence, marketing, and documentation. But Point Center never committed to advance a dime of its own money and never held an ownership interest in the Loans, the 2006 Note, the 2006 Trust Deed, or any other relevant aspect of the Loans.
It ultimately became a servicer of the Loans. At multiple points, it earned fees.
Point Center argues that this transaction is nothing more than a typical phased funding arrangement that benefits the borrower as it obtains funds and the interest obligation related thereto only when needed to pay construction costs. The Court acknowledges that there is nothing improper in this arrangement and agrees that it has benefits from the perspective of the Debtor. But here the priority battle involves mechanics' liens. And as a result, the Subsequent Loans have priority over mechanics' liens only if they are obligatory advances within the meaning of Section 3136. The Court here concludes that they were not.
Generally, an optional advance is an advance where the lender is not obligated by the loan documents in question to make the advance. Section 3136 provides as follows:
A mortgage or deed of trust which would be prior to the liens provided for in this chapter to the extent of obligatory advances made thereunder in accordance with the commitment of the lender shall also be prior to the liens provided for in this chapter as to any other advances, secured by such mortgage or deed of trust, which are used in payment of any claim of lien which is recorded at the date or dates of such other advances and thereafter in payment of costs of the work of improvement. Such priority shall not, however, exceed the original obligatory commitment of the lender as shown in such mortgage or deed of trust.
Thus, the plain language of the statute requires that an obligatory advance be made pursuant to a commitment by a lender. And California law requires that there be a legally enforceable obligation to make the advance. W.P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal.App. 185, 191-192 (1920); Dockrey v. Gray, 172 Cal.App.2d 388, 390 (1959). Further, this commitment must be made prior to the time mechanics' lien rights arise. Lumber & Builders Supply Co. v. Ritz, 134 Cal.App. 607 (1933) (mechanics' liens junior to trust deed where oral agreement to additional loan pre-dated attachment of such liens and trust deed secures future advances); E.K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 118 Cal.App. 475, 478 (1931) (mechanics' lien junior to trust deed where commitment to lend firm and only timing of loans subject to lender's option).
Mr. Bergfeld, general counsel and a senior vice president of Point Center, admitted that as of the closing neither Point Center nor the Initial Lenders had any obligation to loan additional dollars. Vol.3; 154:10-24. The Addendum underscores this point as it emphasizes that there is no guarantee that the Unfunded Portion will be funded. The Subsequent Lenders never made any commitment to Debtor. Instead, they made voluntary loans after the Recordation Date. Indeed, there is no evidence that Debtor ever knew who these lenders were, and, again as the Addendum makes clear, Debtor had no right to require a loan of any or all of the Unfunded Portion even if Debtor fully complied with all funding requirements in the 2006 Loan Agreement.
Point Center argues that it had an obligation to find these lenders, that its obligation was binding, and that this creates the necessary obligation. But, the statute requires that the obligation be that of a lender who has committed to lend - not the commitment of a third party to attempt to find a lender. Thus, under the plain language of the statute, an obligation by a non-lender can never satisfy the statutory requirements. And even if one finds the statute less than crystal clear, the Court must resolve this ambiguity in favor of the Committee. Solit, 68 Cal.App.4th at 1441-1442.
Point Center apparently provided Subsequent Lenders with an assignment document and further argues that this is supportive of the obligatory nature of the Subsequent Loans. Unfortunately, Point Center had nothing to assign. The Initial Lenders, who had enforceable interests in the .2006 Note, did not assign any of their position. Instead, Point Center made an opportunity available to the Subsequent Lenders and, as they were identified and advanced money, Point Center provided documentation sufficient and appropriate for them to exercise rights under the 2006 Note and 2006 Trust Deed. Placing an assignment label on a document does not create a property interest where none previously existed.
Further, in making the representation and in acting as a "place holder" in the 2006 Trust Deed and 2006 Note, Point Center could not act as an agent of possible, unknown, future lenders. It is axiomatic that in order for an agency to exist there must be a principal. Here, Point Center attempted to blur the issue by listing itself as holding a 79.25% interest in the 2006 Trust Deed. But in closing argument, Point Center conceded that this is not the case. The Court inquired as to what Point Center would have received on account of this "interest" in the 2006 Note if a foreclosure occurred immediately after the original funding. The response given was, in essence: "nothing." In other words, on the Recordation Date, Point Center did not have a 79.25% interest in the 2006 Note, the Initial Lenders held a 100% interest in the then-existing balance evidenced by the 2006 Note.
Here, Point Center has no individual enforcement rights, but currently acts as an agent of the Private Party Lenders. And there is no evidence that Point Center had a right to enforce the 2006 Note and 2006 Trust Deed for the benefit of Subsequent Lenders on the Recordation Date. As a result, under the plain language of the statute, all Subsequent Lenders made advances that were optional.
2. The Project Was Not A Continuous Work Of Improvement Commencing In 2004.
The Committee asserts priority based on the argument that the Project commenced as a work of improvement within the meaning of Section 3134 on or about January of 2004 and continued without any interruption of 60 days or more until 2008. They, thus, claim priority based on the assertion that the work of all mechanics' lien claimants relates back to this date of commencement and pre-dates the Recordation Date. Point Center argues that a cessation occurred such that the Project was deemed completed under Section 3086(c) and that, as a result, the Project consists of two works of improvement and mechanics' lien priority only relates back to the 2006 initiation of work on the second work of improvement. Point Center bears the burden of proof on the issue of cessation. Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsburg Hotel Co., 96 Cal. 332, 336 (1892).
In order to procure a lien, an original or primary contractor must record his claim of lien within a specific window of time. The time limits vary based on the facts of a specific case, but among other situations, the Civil Code requires filing within a specified time after completion. If an owner files a notice of completion or notice of cessation, a contractor must record his claim of lien within 60 days of the notice. Cal. Civ. Code § 3115. If an owner fails to file a notice, but the work of improvement is otherwise completed, the contractor must record his claim of lien within 90 days of the completion of the work of improvement. Id.
Under Section 3086, the term completion expressly anticipates a situation where a work of improvement concludes before construction is finalized and provides as follows:
"Completion" means, in the case of any work of improvement other than a public work, actual completion of the work of improvement. Any of the following shall be deemed equivalent to a completion:
(c) After the commencement of a work of improvement, a cessation of labor thereon for a continuous period of 60 days, or a cessation of labor thereon for a continuous period of 30 days or more if the owner files for record a notice of cessation.
Thus, the cessation of labor for sixty days is tantamount to actual completion of a work of improvement. See Hogan Lumber Co. v. Boyle, 177 Cal. 477, 479 (1918); see also M. Arthur Gensler, Jr. & Associates, Inc. v. Larry Barrett, Inc., 7 Cal.3d 695, 705 (1972); Remington v. Mulholland, 118 Cal.App. 479, 481 (1931). Further, it is immaterial whether a project is later completed after a cessation, as a subsequent completion of the building does not operate as an extension of time for the filing of mechanics' liens claimed under and created by the original contract. Stanislaus Lumber Co. v. Pike, 51 Cal.App.2d 54, 58-60 (1942).
In short, when a cessation occurs, the work of improvement concludes and cannot be resurrected. Thus:
[W]hen work ceases completely on an uncompleted project for sixty days but resumes thereafter, a new date for priorities also begins with the commencement of the new work. In other words, the off-record priority of the mechanic's lien will relate back only to the re-commencement of work.
Showplace Square Loft Co., LLC v. Primecore Mortg. Trust, Inc. (In re Showplace Square Loft Co., LLC), 289 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
A cessation must be: "of such character as to carry some charge of notice to a careful person." Marble Lime Co., 96 Cal. at 337. Thus, a cessation occurs when all activity ceases on an uncompleted project for sixty days. Showplace Square, 289 B.R. at 407. It is equally clear that a cessation occurs when work by all trades ceases. W.F. Hayward Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 16 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1110 (1993). What is less clear is whether a cessation occurs where, as here, a project slows down significantly and where the character of the limited continuing activity changes from forward progress on construction to status quo maintenance.
Point Center suggests that the emphasis should not be on the continuity of or complete lack of continuance of work, but on whether this work actually advances the construction project. Consistent with this view, Point Center characterizes this case as one where construction ceased for purposes of the statute, notwithstanding that neither party abandoned the Project. The Committee, in contrast, argues that even efforts to protect and preserve the status quo suffice. The Court finds Point Center's view to be the most correct interpretation of the law and, thus, finds that a cessation occurred here.
First, the parties agree that there was a significant slowdown and change. Mr. Petrossian, as well as Mr. Gonzales, admit that this is the case. At various points in time, Mr. Petrossian refers to the Project as shut down and/or suggests that the Project is on the point of "restarting." The Court emphasizes that these statements are not dispositive and accepts Mr. Petrossian's characterization of his statements as more appropriately understood as reflecting his very reasonable focus on when financing for the Project would recommence. Having said this, however, they are wholly consistent with the Court's view that a cessation occurred even though the Project was never abandoned.
The Committee provided the expert testimony of John Hardesty in support of its position that a cessation did not occur as a matter of fact. Point Center argued that Mr. Hardesty's testimony was irrelevant to the cessation dispute. The Court disagrees. Mr. Hardesty evaluated voluminous documentary evidence and, based thereon, identified specific ongoing activity and facts that, in his opinion, indicated that a cessation of the Project did not occur. While this testimony was not irrelevant, its utility to the Court in determining whether a cessation occurred within the meaning of the relevant statute was limited. It is most accurate to say that Mr. Hardesty identified certain factors that make it possible that a cessation did not occur. In particular, he pointed out the continuity of permits and insurance for the Project. Had these lapsed, the Committee's argument would be rendered difficult if not impossible. In addition, he provided a detailed timeline that showed that during the Slowdown Period neither the Debtor nor certain of its contractors completely abandoned the Project. Finally, he testified that the construction industry would not view the Project as having concluded. Unfortunately, however, this testimony does not establish that a cessation within the meaning of the relevant statute did not occur.
And to the extent Mr. Hardesty's testimony suggested how the construction industry would view this Project, his testimony was countered by the testimony of Point Center's expert, Laura Parker. Ms. Parker's review of the evidence led her to the opinion that the Project ceased during the Slowdown Period. She relied, among other things, on the various statements referenced in footnote 5 above, the re-signing of the Construction Management Agreement, the rebidding of contracts in 2006, information on the daily reports, and photographic evidence. She also relied on the absence of evidence of ongoing work such as invoices. She emphasized that, in her experience, maintenance work is required even if a site is shut down.
The Court concludes that in determining whether a cessation occurred the quality and quantity of activity on the site of a work of improvement must be considered carefully. Thus, where construction advances, albeit in small increments, a cessation does not occur. Similarly, where a sixty-day delay in construction progress occurs as a result of a delay in the arrival of materials, equipment, or a trade or other similar factor, such delay is not reasonably viewed as indefinite, and contractors maintain the status quo during the delay, a cessation likely does not occur. But where there is no forward progress in the construction effort for more than sixty days, the only construction efforts maintain the status quo, and the delay to ongoing construction progress is indefinite, a cessation is probable.
Here the evidence establishes that only status quo maintenance took place during most of the Slowdown Period. Mr. Hardesty's testimony, as well as that of Mr. Petrossian and to some extent Mr. Gonzales, makes clear that while, there was some level of sporadic activity relevant to the Project from the agreed commencement of construction in early 2004 through the Recordation Date, the character of this activity changed dramatically after May of 2004. Those contractors providing services designed exclusively to advance the Project left the Site completely and two filed mechanics' liens.
Mr. Hardesty admitted that: "... this wasn't a project that had a flurry of activity with all the going on. It was a project that was, at this point, proceeding very slowly." Vol.2;8:l-4. But while Mr. Hardesty used the verb "was proceeding", what he describes is not new construction, but preservation. For example, his direct in this area continues:
While Landmark remained tied to the Project by virtue of contract and practical necessity, and while Dynalectric's temporary power equipment remained on the Site, the efforts shifted from construction and advancement of the Project to maintenance of the status quo. For example, Landmark replaced batteries in traffic warning indicators, painted over graffiti, repaired the temporary pedestrian walkway (repeatedly), and otherwise maintained the Project. Again, the Project was not abandoned. Clearly, the Debtor and Landmark hoped and intended to recommence active construction and progress towards Project completion. But given the lack of funds the Debtor and Landmark were constrained in what they could do. Indeed, during a more than 80-day period from March 8, 2005 to June of 2005 the evidence establishes that the only contractor activity is a March 8 purchase of materials used on March 15 to install screening at the Site to block bees, undocumented, but probable, inspection(s) by Mr. Petrossian, Mr. Gonzales, and/or Dynalectric personnel, and the always humming presence of the temporary power. Ongoing construction and an ongoing work of improvement, this is not.
The Committee also argues that a cessation cannot be found because the status quo maintenance work was critical given the allegedly extraordinary need to protect the Site's shoring. After considering all the testimony, the Court concludes that while there was a reasonable concern regarding the shoring and the other construction in place in May of 2004, this fact does not change the analysis. The shoring held up well. Thus, while it was important to monitor status, the evidence is clear that at no point after late 2004 was there any time and effort invested in activities that were more than purely maintenance until 2006. And even these maintenance activities were somewhat limited. The Site was not regularly cleaned. The Site was not completely cleared of water at all times. The exposed metal elements of the shoring were allowed to rust. There was no effort to replace damaged portions of the shoring until 2006. The Court emphasizes that its conclusion might well be different in a situation where regular ongoing replacement of the shoring or other more significant construction activities in connection with a permanent work of improvement occurred during a slowdown period, but this was not the case here.
Finally, the Committee argues that the presence of the Dynalectric temporary power on the Site is dispositive. The Court disagrees. First, it is questionable whether the existence of the temporary power equipment represented a trade on the construction site within the meaning of California case law. While the provision of power could be the provision of goods in connection with the Project, it was provided and used only in connection with the maintenance effort and the Court determines that Dynalectric's involvement was not sufficient to change the result.
Here the change in activity was such that a careful person would assume cessation of the construction effort for the required sixty-day period. A careful person could also assume that Debtor intended to recommence construction in the future, but this does not change the Court's conclusions on this topic.
The Court is aware of the requirement that it interpret mechanics' lien statutes in a manner favorable to mechanics' lien claimants. And here its determination on the cessation issue is consistent with this standard. While its decision is disfavorable to the claimants here, it is decidedly favorable to mechanics' lien claimants generally who should not be delayed for years in their pursuit of lien rights because an owner does nothing but the minimum necessary to avert problems while it rolls the dice to see if future funding is possible.
3. A Second Work Of Improvement Commenced Prior To The Recordation Date.
If work on a construction project recommences after a sixty-day cessation, it relates to a new work of improvement, and liens relate back only to the commencement of the new phase of the project. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate § 11:140 (Third Edition 2009); Showplace Square, 289 B.R. at 407. Thus, the Court now must determine when the second phase of the Project commenced. If this commencement occurred prior to the Recordation Date, then mechanics' liens have priority. The Committee bears the burden of proof on this issue. See e.g. Pellerito v. Dragna, 41 Cal.App.2d 85, 91 (1940). The Court carefully reviewed the evidence, and, in particular, the testimony of the Committee witnesses, and concludes that a second work of improvement arising in connection with the Project commenced prior to Recordation Date.
A mechanics' lien does not attach unless and until some mechanics' lien claimant does actual and visible work of a permanent nature in connection with the work of improvement or construction materials are delivered. Showplace Square, 289 B.R. at 407; Walker v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Assn., 2 Cal.3d 152, 156-157 (1970); D'Orsay Int'l Partners v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 (2004). Visible work on the work of improvement notifies potential lenders that mechanics' lien rights have arisen. D'Orsay, 123 Cal.App.4th at 842. The delivery of construction materials provides the same notice.
The problem in this case is obvious. Far more than a shovel full of dirt was taken out of the Site in the pre-cessation phase of the Project. When Point Center examined the Site it found a large excavation with a depth of 25 to 30 feet. Shoring was in place, and, while Point Center failed to ascertain this fact, temporary power had been provided. Similarly, construction fencing, a temporary walkway, and traffic control were already in place. Point Center suggests that under these facts the standard for determining whether a commencement occurred must be higher and that there must be some obviousness to the commencement that goes beyond that which would suffice if a lender was evaluating raw land. The Committee takes exactly the opposite view and argues that the standard should be lower given the state of construction. The Court concludes that neither party is correct and that the standard remains the same as would be the case with the commencement of a project where there was no prior construction effort: the first reasonably obvious effort towards construction that is part of the permanent structure or new construction material delivery suffices. The Court notes, however, that even under the higher standard suggested by Point Center, a commencement occurred prior to the Recordation Date.
In evaluating post-cessation commencement, the Court has several points in time which clearly establish the state of the Project. The Court has photographic evidence from both March and late April or early May of 2006. This evidence shows the Site in its Slowdown Period state. The photographs show pools of standing water and debris.
In contrast to these pictures which evidence stasis, the Court also has the July 14 Photo. In this picture, the change to the Site is dramatic and construction is clearly in process. The question then becomes, could the Project have reached this state during the period from the Recordation Date to July 14, 2006? It is worth noting that while this is a 14-day period, there were four weekend days during that period as well as the Fourth of July - a date when one would reasonably assume that construction activity did not occur. As a result, the time period in question is nine days.
The Court heard testimony from Mr. Petrossian and Mr. Gonzales that the Site could not have reached this state in that time period. Point Center offers no testimony to the contrary. The Court finds such testimony credible and concludes that some efforts to prepare the Site must have occurred prior to the Recordation Date. This determination, however, is not dispositive, as such efforts may not have been of a quality sufficient to constitute a commencement of the new work of improvement. Thus, a more detailed review of the evidence before the Court must occur.
Based on the testimony, the Court concludes that the standing water on the Site was removed and the Site dried out well prior to the Recordation Date. Both Mr. Petrossian and Mr. Gonzales emphasized the need to remove water and to dry out the Site prior to the recommencement of construction and, in particular, the pouring of concrete. It is well evident in the July 14 Photo that concrete had been poured. As a result, and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the Court determines that this work occurred prior to the Recordation Date.
Similarly, all testimony indicates and the photographic evidence confirms that the Site was full of trash. Mr. Gonzales testified that dumpsters were delivered to the Site, that workers removed trash from the Site in early June, and that Waste Management hauled away the trash prior to the Recordation Date. Point Center supplies no contrary evidence. The Court concludes, as a result, that trash removal occurred prior to the Recordation Date.
Another important element of the recommencement was the need to confirm that the waterproofing system for the garage would be warrantied by the waterproofing company. This entailed numerous conversations with the company and ultimately resulted in a plan. The Court concludes based on the testimony of Mr. Gonzales that these conversations occurred well prior to the Recordation Date. The Court also concludes based on Mr. Gonzales' testimony, supportive testimony from Mr. Petrossian, and supportive documentary evidence, that certain efforts required by the waterproofing company also occurred prior to the Recordation Date. These included the placement of metal plates covering existing gaps of more than one inch in the shoring and, repairs to damaged areas of the shoring. The installation of the weep system and the protective sheeting for this system also may have occurred prior to the Recordation Date.
As part of the effort to dry out the Site and to level the Site, Landmark built temporary structures to receive truckloads of decomposed granite and began spreading this granite prior to the Recordation Date. The Court concludes that some of, and probably the majority of, the decomposed granite was not spread until after the Recordation Date as it was necessary to use equipment to spread it and that equipment did not arrive on the Site until July. The Court determines based on the testimony of Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Petrossian, however, that some decomposed granite was delivered to the Site prior to the Recordation Date. This decomposed granite was incorporated into the work of improvement and became part of the Project as there is no evidence that it was ever removed from the Site.
Finally, the Court concludes based on the testimony of Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Riel and supportive, if not conclusive, documentary evidence, that Landmark dug trenches by hand and installed a perimeter drainpipe prior to the Recordation Date.
Evidence supporting the above conclusions comes in several forms. First, is the testimony of witnesses regarding 2006 construction. The Court found Mr. Gonzales, in particular, to be a helpful witness regarding the construction itself. Mr. Petrossian supported Mr. Gonzales' testimony and also provided testimony explaining the reason Landmark moved immediately; Landmark believed a loan was probable, and Landmark knew the schedule was very tight. Finally, Mr. Riel provided a critical piece of supportive testimony; he personally saw trenching on the Site. His testimony supports the Court's conclusion that the perimeter drainpipe work occurred prior to the Recordation Date.
Indeed, the 2006 Loan Agreement actually required that Debtor commence construction on the Project no later than July 1,2006, but there is no evidence that Landmark knew this fact.
Second, is documentary evidence that directly supports the timeline established by the Committee's witnesses. Not all testimony can be paired with a supporting document, but the date of bee eradication, trash removal, and the pre-Recordation Date time records of Landmark workers provide such direct support.
Third, is documentary evidence that provides slightly indirect support for the Committee's position, but is nonetheless consistent with the Committee's assertion of fact and the Court's conclusion here. First, the photographic evidence establishes the dramatic change seen in the July 14th Photo and supports the suggestion that pre-Recordation Date work occurred. Second, the July 14th Photo evidences that the waterproofing, drainpipe installation, and other shoring-related work were physically impossible after work on the crane footing commenced. While this physical impossibility may not have arisen until July 10, 2006, the quantum of work required prior to the loss of access supports the Court's determination that Landmark commenced such work prior to the Recordation Date. The Best Bee invoice evidences bee eradication prior to the Recordation Date and supports Mr. Gonzales' testimony regarding the timing of work on the shoring. Finally, Mr. Gonzales' testimony that the work described above was done prior to the Recordation Date is supported by the time records that show T.M. Structural on the Site almost immediately post-Recordation Date, when this testimony is coupled with his testimony that Landmark needed to be off the Site when T.M. Structural arrived.
Point Center has no evidence directly contrary to any of the above. Its only photographic evidence or witness testimony as to condition comes from its only Site visit, an event occurring approximately sixty days before the Recordation Date. Its attacks on the credibility of the Committee's witnesses were not successful. The Court carefully assessed the demeanor of Mr. Petrossian, Mr. Riel, and Mr. Gonzales; these witnesses told the truth to the best of their ability. Point Center's attacks on memory were more successful, but the Court's determinations here are very conservative. It is highly possible that additional work occurred prior to the Recordation Date.
Point Center makes much of the fact that Mr. Gonzales did not start daily reports until after the Recordation Date. The Court does not find this evidence sufficient to change its opinion regarding recommencement. First, it is clear that Mr. Gonzales began his daily reports when trades other than Landmark came on Site. This use of daily reports is consistent with testimony of Mr. Petrossian that:
... in the case of [the Debtor], the Daily Reports weren't necessarily intended to keep the owner informed of what was going on, more to, you know, record this major activity that was going on and how many people were there doing what kind of thing.
Vol.4; 54:6-10.
It is, thus, not unreasonable to assume that Mr. Gonzales assumed that he did not need daily reports until trades other than Landmark came on Site with multiple employees.
As Mr. Petrossian put it, the economics did not support daily reports until: "... large numbers of people doing large quantities of work and activity, a beehive of activity [occurred]." Vol.4; 54:25-28;55:l.
Also, the Court received testimony that Mr. Gonzales was required to use a computer to do daily reports and that a computer was not immediately available when he set up the office on June 20, 2006. His testimony adequately explains that the failure to do earlier daily reports does not conclusively establish that work first began on July 10th.
There is no requirement of quantity or quality in the statute or in the California case law interpreting the statute as regards commencement. Any obvious effort towards the work of permanent improvement is sufficient. Indeed, Mr. Livingston stated that as little as a ladder, toolbox, generator, or shovel full of dirt would put him on notice that further inquiry was needed. California case law agrees with his view. Walker, 2 Cal.3d at 150-157 (delivery of construction materials suffices); Nolte v. Smith, 189 Cal.App.2d 140, 147-148 (1961) (placement of below ground level metal pipes suffices as commencement where the work of improvement is a land subdivision); Bank of Italy v. MacGill, 93 Cal.App. 228, 235-236 (1928) (delivery of building materials and placement on adjacent lot in urban setting suffices); Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel, 72 Cal.App. 1 (1925) (sixty foot trench that is three or four feet in depth suffices).
While the Court concludes that the above-referenced activities all occurred prior to the Recordation Date, not all of these efforts are sufficient to establish a commencement. In particular, it is not clear to the Court that clearing out garbage, removing standing water and otherwise "drying out" the Site, and receiving dumpsters or Porta-Potties' individually suffice for a commencement. But hand trenching, drainpipe installation, work on the shoring, and the use of decomposed granite to level the Site are each sufficient for this purpose. These efforts were necessary to the commencement of the work of improvement and were incorporated into the existing structure.
The question then becomes whether these activities which, admittedly, lack the obviousness of cement forms, rebar construction, and moving backhoes, were sufficient to put a party on notice that construction had commenced. Point Center suggests, albeit indirectly, that they do not. The Court disagrees. First, while the actions to dry out the Site and to remove trash may not constitute a recommencement themselves, they resulted in a dramatic change to the physical condition and appearance of the Site. Similarly, the delivery of Porta-Potties' and dumpsters is suggestive of a change to active construction status. The Site has no space for these items. As a result, dumpsters and Porta-Potties' could not have been directly on the Site itself. The Court notes, however, that they must have been closely adjacent to the Site, probably in an alley area. A prudent lender who visited the Site immediately prior to the Recordation Date would also have been alerted to the presence of these items. In addition, the shoring work, including the application of sheet metal to cover gaps, and the drainpipe work would be visible and obvious. Finally, the delivery of decomposed granite would constitute a delivery of building materials and could justify commencement. The Court concludes that the combination of these factors require the determination that the second work of improvement included in the Project commenced prior to the Recordation Date.
C. Equitable Subrogation Provides Limited Priority To The 2006 Trust Deed.
A lender is entitled to priority by virtue of equitable subrogation when: (a) it pays off a senior lien where the lender is not a volunteer; (b) the debt is not an obligation for which the lender was primarily liable; (c) the entire debt is satisfied; and (d) equitable subrogation will not work any injustice to the rights of third parties. Caito v. United California Bank, 20 Cal.3d 694, 704 (1978); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Feldsher, 42 Cal.App.4th 41, 48 (1996).
Here, it is undisputed that SBB held a first priority lien against the Property by virtue of the Senior Encumbrance. It is also clear that the Initial Lenders repaid this lien in full and that it secured an obligation in the amount of $813,034.30 at the time of repayment. While the Committee suggested through various witnesses that a source of funds other than the Loans may have been used, in part, to satisfy this claim, the Court's review of the evidence indicates that this is not true. In short, while Landmark made certain funds available as necessary to obtain the Loans, there is insufficient evidence for this Court to conclude that these funds, in whole or in part, were used to satisfy the Senior Encumbrance.
The Initial Lenders were not volunteers as to this repayment and had no obligation to pay the Senior Encumbrance. Instead, the evidence and common sense indicate that the payoff occurred only as a result of their desire that they hold a trust deed position that was not junior to the Senior Encumbrance.
The Committee principally argues that it would be an injustice to allow any equitable subrogation rights here. The Court disagrees. First, the Committee argues in a generalized way that Point Center is a bad company and/or actor and/or that it is unfair to provide Point Center with equitable subrogation rights. The Court would find this argument to be unavailing even if Point Center was the payor of the Senior Encumbrance; but it was not. The Committee appears to forget that it argued, successfully, that Point Center is not a lender. Here, the Initial Lenders advanced the money necessary to repay the Senior Encumbrance. Equitable subrogation is not remotely inequitable when provided to them -and the Committee does not so argue directly.
Next, as discussed below, the 2006 Note and 2006 Trust Deed are not, as the Committee argues, void ab initio. Even if they were, it is not clear how this would work an injustice as to mechanics' lienholders whose liens were unquestionably junior to the Senior Encumbrance.
Finally, the Committee suggests that Point Center should be denied equitable subrogation status because it was not sufficiently diligent in protecting its rights. The Committee cites to cases for support, but the Court finds this case law distinguishable. And while the 2006 Trust Deed may not otherwise enjoy priority, Point Center's acts of alleged negligence were not so significant as to forfeit a right to equitable subrogation. And again, it is the alleged negligence of the Initial Lenders that would really be at issue; and there is no evidence of negligence on their parts. As a result, the 2006 Trust Deed is a first priority lien to the extent of the amount paid in connection with the Senior Encumbrance.
The Court finds herein that only the Initial Lenders made loans that were not optional and subject to a loss of priority. The Court also finds herein that the entire 2006 Trust Deed, to the extent not protected by principals of equitable subrogation, is junior to mechanics' liens. In rendering this decision, the Court notes the possibility that there may be disagreements among the Private Party Lenders as to whether all benefit from equitable subrogation. The Court was not presented with any evidence in this regard, believes that such determinations are outside the scope of this litigation and likely beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, and expressly makes no finding on this point as a result.
CONCLUSION
The Court having rendered its decision as discussed above requires that the Committee submit a Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision within fourteen days.
But, nevertheless, the work that was being done was for the preservation of all of the structures and the surrounding property owners and the structural integrity of your soldier beams, your lagging, the whole system, and traffic and sidewalk of all of the party (sic) had been installed. That's essentially, the work that was going on, you know, until somewhere in June, you know, June of'06, when the project sped up again, and they continued construction .. . This is, basically, you know, just it's on idle now with just the minimum amount of things being done on a weekly, daily, monthly basis.
Vol. 2;8:4-l 1,15-17.