Opinion
No. 338109
11-21-2017
In re A. C. MEEK, JR., Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 13-514873-NA Before: JANSEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GADOLA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent father appeals as of right from an order terminating his parental rights to his son under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (deserted child for 91 or more days), MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). We affirm.
I. FACTS
On December 16, 2015, petitioner asked the court to remove the child from both parents' custody. Petitioner alleged that the child's mother was using cocaine, heroin, and methadone while pregnant, and that the child was born positive for those three drugs and suffered withdrawal symptoms. It was further alleged that respondent knew that the mother was using drugs, but did not know that she was pregnant. The petition also recited that respondent was a "former drug abuser," was diagnosed with schizophrenia and substance dependency, and was on probation for drug possession.
It was established that respondent had abstained from using heroin and had been participating in methadone treatment and substance abuse counseling for the previous two years, and that he had also been receiving treatment and medication for his schizophrenia until his case was closed in September 2015 because of noncompliance. However, he testified that he still took his schizophrenia medication because he had "old bottles" of it. Additionally, it was established that respondent had completed probation for a heroin possession offense.
Respondent testified that he had been living with his grandmother for the previous five years, that he was not living with the child's mother, and that he was not making a plan for the child with the mother. He advised that he would follow a treatment plan, attend parenting classes, and do "[w]hatever it took, anything" to be unified with his son. The court took jurisdiction over the child and ordered respondent to complete a Clinic for Child Study evaluation.
At a March 16, 2016 dispositional review hearing, a caseworker reported difficulty contacting respondent and noted that his visits with the child ended on January 26, 2016. He sometimes indicated that he was on his way to a parenting time session but then did not come. Respondent was ordered to complete a substance abuse assessment, undergo substance abuse treatment and weekly random drug screens, attend parenting classes, and participate in a psychological evaluation and mental health therapy. The court also ordered respondent to obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income, attend every court hearing, maintain weekly contact with the foster-care worker, and provide immediate notice of any change in his address or phone number. The court explained to respondent that it was his responsibility to stay in contact with the foster-care worker. The court also ordered respondent to provide a drug screen after the hearing, which revealed a positive reading for marijuana and cocaine.
The trial court held three subsequent review hearings that respondent did not attend. At the June 23, 2016 review hearing, respondent's counsel stated that respondent's phone was busy every time she called him. A caseworker testified that respondent had not visited his son since January and had "done nothing" for his treatment plan. At the September 30, 2016 review hearing, the caseworker testified that respondent's non-compliance with the treatment plan continued and that he had not communicated with petitioner since January 26, 2016. She further testified that she never received a response to letters that she sent to respondent's last known address. At the December 22, 2016 review hearing, respondent's counsel stated that respondent was not maintaining contact with her. A caseworker testified that respondent did not reply to letters sent in September and November, and that they were returned. Also, respondent's phone was apparently turned off and his whereabouts were unknown. The court changed the primary permanency plan to adoption, but kept reunification as the concurrent, secondary plan in case respondent availed himself of the ordered services.
Petitioner filed a supplemental petition asking the court to terminate respondent's parental rights. At a pretrial hearing, it was reported that attempts to contact respondent by phone and mail were unsuccessful. After determining that reasonable efforts had been made to locate respondent, the court ordered notice of the custody hearing by publication, personal service, and certified mail.
At the termination hearing, it was established that respondent had failed to complete his court-ordered services and had not made himself available. A caseworker opined that it would be in the best interests of the child to terminate respondent's parental rights because he had "not been in the child's life for more than 91 days." Respondent's counsel stated that respondent was not "in a position at this time to care for his child," but hoped that his cousin would be able to adopt the child.
The trial court held that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j). The court found that respondent had not made himself available for any services, was in "complete noncompliance" with his treatment plan, and failed to maintain contact with his foster-care worker. After determining that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate respondent's parental rights, the court ordered that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) because petitioner made insufficient efforts to locate him and provide him with reunification services. We disagree.
We review a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). The clear error standard applies both to the determination that a statutory ground has been established, as well as to the ruling that termination is in the child's best interests. Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). If a statutory ground for termination is established and the trial court finds "that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5).
MCL 712A.19b(3) authorizes the termination of parental rights under the following relevant circumstances:
(a) The child has been deserted under either of the following circumstances:
(i) The child's parent is unidentifiable . . .
(ii) The child's parent has deserted the child for 91 or more days and has not sought custody of the child during that period.
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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(a), (c)(i), (g), and (j).]
Here, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j). However, the only statutory grounds that respondent challenges on appeal are MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent does not challenge the trial court's holding that the statutory ground of MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) was established because respondent had not been in the child's life for more than 91 days. See In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 223-224; 469 NW2d 56 (1991). Because only a single statutory ground need be established in order to terminate a respondent's parental rights, we need not address respondent's challenges to the three remaining statutory grounds. See In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80; In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).
Nonetheless, respondent asserts that he "was given no opportunity to plan for the child despite his initial efforts and special needs," that he "should have been better assisted with his [t]reatment [p]lan by the workers assigned to the matter given his special needs as an individual with a mental illness," and that there was not "sufficient evidence indicating substantive effort by the workers to assist [respondent]." However, the record indicates that petitioner made services available to respondent. It was then respondent's responsibility to participate in those services, but he failed to do so. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012) (stating that while petitioner "has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered."). Further, both petitioner and respondent's attorney attempted to contact respondent by phone and mail numerous times to discuss his treatment plan, but respondent never responded—even though the court had ordered him to maintain contact with the foster-care worker—and his whereabouts became unknown. On this record, we conclude that petitioner made reasonable efforts to assist respondent with reunification services.
And although respondent claims that petitioner's efforts to provide him with reunification services were insufficient considering his schizophrenia, he fails to explain why the efforts were insufficient, fails to provide any suggestions as to what more could have been done by petitioner, and fails to provide any evidence to show that his schizophrenia caused barriers for his completion of the reunification services. "It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position." Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael F. Gadola