Opinion
No. F04-CP02-005358-A
August 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On January 9, 2004, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Tammie W. and Roger B. to their children, Meagan B. and Brandon B. Respondent mother failed to appear for trial and a default was entered against her. Respondent father contests termination of his parental rights. Trial of this matter took place before this court on June 2, July 13 and 15, 2005 and August 24, 2005 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
The court granted respondent father's motion to reopen the evidence and heard additional testimony on August 24, 2005.
The statutory grounds alleged against both respondents as to both children were (1) abandonment, in the sense that they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)); (2) that the children, Meagan and Brandon, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)); and (3) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)). As to respondent father, the petitioner alleged the additional ground as to Meagan only that she has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of commission or omission, including but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse by the father, the care, guidance or CT Page 11935-cf control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(C)).
On June 10, 2002 father brought Meagan and Brandon into the DCF office in Norwalk, CT and reported that he was homeless and unable to care for his two children. DCF invoked a 96-hour administrative hold. On June 13, 2002, DCF filed neglect petitions on behalf of Meagan and Brandon alleging that the children were abandoned, denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally and that they were uncared for in that they were homeless. On September 12, 2002, Meagan and Brandon were adjudicated uncared for and committed to the care and custody of DCF (Dennis, J.). On April 15, 2003, commitment was maintained until further order of the court and the court made a finding that further efforts to reunify with mother were no longer appropriate (Brenneman, J.). On January 9, 2004, the petition for termination of parental rights was filed.
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the CT Page 11935-cg issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
I. FACTS
At trial, the petitioner introduced the social studies, psychological evaluations, DCF narratives and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social workers Alexandra Chisholm and Shanda Roberts; Rudolfo J. Rosado, Ph.D., and Cathy Hayden, therapist. Respondent father, Roger B., called Detective Robert Kozlowsky of the Shelton Police Department and also testified on his own behalf. The child's attorney participated fully, but introduced no exhibits or testimony. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and CT Page 11935-ch convincing evidence.
On June 10, 2002 father brought Meagan and Brandon into the DCF office in Norwalk, CT and reported that he was homeless and unable to care for his two children. He stated that his children had been abandoned by their mother in Delaware and left with maternal grandparents there. Maternal grandparents called him and stated that they were unable to care for the children. Father went to Delaware to get them in September or October 2001. After he picked them up, father and the children lived from place to place without a consistent place to sleep at night. He reported that at times he and the children slept in his car. The children reported bathing in the ocean or in lakes and hanging their clothes on trees to dry.
A. Respondent Mother — Tammie W.
Respondent mother, Tammie W., was born in Pennsylvania on August 14, 1972. She has a serious substance abuse history dating back to the early 1990s. She maintained her sobriety for a period of two years but has relapsed on several occasions. In September 2001 when the children were seven and five years old, Roger B. returned home from work and found the house empty. Mother had left the home, taken all the furniture and both children, and moved to Delaware with her parents. She had previously left Roger B. on a number of occasions. A few weeks later, mother left the children with her parents and did not return. Tammie W. has had no contact with the children since December 2001. Mother has not sent any cards, gifts or letters to the children and has made no telephone calls to them. She has not maintained contact with DCF to find out how the children were doing or to ask how she could contact them. Since June 2002, mother has contacted DCF only once, shortly after the children were placed in DCF care, at which time she stated that she could not care for the children, she was going into treatment and had no family who could care for them. She did not leave a telephone number or an address where she could be contacted, but said that she would contact DCF. Since then, she has not called or contacted DCF in any way.
B. Respondent father — Roger B.
Respondent father, Roger B., was born in Norwalk, CT on July 13, 1964. He received his GED in 1982 from Norwalk High School. Father has never been married, but had a relationship with the children's mother on and off for twelve years. He also has four other children from another relationship who do not live with him. Father has a substantial criminal history including larceny in the first degree, failure to appear in the first and second degrees, assault in the third degree, threatening, CT Page 11935-ci disorderly conduct, larceny in the fifth and sixth degrees, burglary in the third degree, possession of marijuana, breach of peace, criminal impersonation, criminal mischief and criminal trespass.
Father has a history of substance abuse dating back to the age of sixteen when he was treated for substance abuse. He admitted to DCF that he used marijuana on a regular basis for twenty years and during a substance abuse evaluation, he admitted to using for thirty years (Ex. 26). Drug screens conducted in November 2002 and June 2004 in connection with substance abuse treatment programs were positive for cannabis. Father has had numerous occupations over the years including carpentry work and told DCF that he always had a hard time maintaining jobs. With regard to housing, father has had a transient lifestyle and has been unable to maintain housing appropriate for children, often living with friends.
C. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court and signed by father on June 19, 2002. Respondent father's specific steps required him to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; participate in parenting and family counseling to address treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF when a home is secured; submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations made regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing; cooperate with recommended service providers; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; consistently and timely meet and address the children's physical, educational, medical or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the children's appointments with their medical, psychological, psychiatric or educational providers; cooperate with the children's therapy if necessary; and visit with the children as often as DCF permits.
With regard to compliance with the specific steps, father has complied with some, but not all of the specific steps. Father has kept some appointments with DCF, but has missed others and has had periods where he has not been in contact with DCF. He has failed to successfully participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling. He has been resistant to substance abuse and mental health counseling and has been CT Page 11935-cj inconsistent in substance abuse evaluations and treatment. Father was referred to the NEON Family services for parenting classes and failed to complete those classes despite calls to his home and to his cell phone. Specifically with regard to substance abuse, father was referred to Connecticut Counseling Centers, Inc. for substance abuse services. Father attended some individual counseling sessions at Connecticut Counseling, but did not attend group sessions stating that the groups were composed of heroin addicts and he did not wish to discuss his personal business with them. On November 6, 2002, father told DCF that he was not going to return to Connecticut Counseling because he did not feel he had a drug problem and was not comfortable with the counselor. He stated that he had smoked marijuana for twenty years and did not think it affected his ability to care for his children. He stated that he uses marijuana to go to sleep and that it calms him down. In April 2003 father was re-referred to Connecticut Counseling for a dual diagnosis program. In May 2003, Connecticut Counseling informed DCF that father had missed two appointments to complete his intake and failed to give a urine sample. Connecticut Counseling reported that it did not appear that father was serious about his treatment and he did not want to be there. Father never completed the intake process or returned for treatment despite calls made to father from the program.
In June 2004, father was referred to Connecticut Counseling again. He attended an intake appointment June 15, 2004 and was referred for a psychiatric consult. At the appointment on June 15, father admitted that he used marijuana on a daily basis and had been a regular user of marijuana for thirty years. (Ex. 26.) He acknowledged that treatment would be important for his family problems. He also expressed a history of psychological problems including serious depression, anxiety, sleep disturbance, short temper, and problems with anger and mania. He reported chronic difficulty with attention and concentration, memory, mood and sleep disturbances. He indicated that he had been treated in the past and expressed a considerable need for treatment for these problems. A drug screen done at the intake appointment was positive for cannabis. Father was diagnosed on June 15, 2004 with Bipolar I Disorder and Cannabis Dependence, along with anti-social traits, and medical and social difficulties, including DCF involvement. The recommendation was for intensive out-patient treatment. According to the Connecticut Counseling records, father returned on July 15, 2004 and at that time refused intensive out-patient treatment, stating that he really just wanted a chance to take some mood stabilizing medication to see if it calmed him down and that he would attempt to seek treatment and a prescription elsewhere. He failed to return on July 30, 2004 for recommended treatment. CT Page 11935-ck
On December 2, 2004 father informed DCF that he was not in treatment and did not need any treatment. He stated again that he did not want to participate in group counseling "with a bunch of heroin addicts" because he only smokes marijuana. He stated that they wanted to put him on medication and that he was not in favor of that. Social worker Chisholm made another referral for evaluation and drug screen to Connecticut Renaissance, Inc. On May 31, 2005, Renaissance reported that father participated in an intake evaluation on December 10, 2004, and while refusing to see a psychiatrist as recommended, he was willing to attend individual counseling. An appointment was scheduled for December 16 which father rescheduled to December 17 and then failed to appear. Father did appear once on January 7, 2005 at which time he expressed anger and frustration regarding DCF and the inability to see his children. He did not return after January 7, 2005.
Father has not always kept his whereabouts known to DCF and at times has refused to provide his current address. As a result of allegations by both children of sexual abuse in October 2003, father was investigated and sexual abuse was substantiated, although no charges were filed. The children were interviewed at the Yale Sex Abuse Clinic. Detective Kozlowsky of the Shelton Police Department, who observed the interviews by two-way mirror, testified that and he and Detective Trabka did not believe there was sufficient probable cause to pursue charges against father following their investigation. The case was closed and no criminal charges were filed.
Father has had difficulty maintaining housing and employment. His employment has been sporadic and he was unable to work for some time due to a workplace injury. His housing has been transient and inappropriate for children, living with friends at different times. DCF was not in a position to offer father supportive housing assistance because the program required that he be engaged in substance abuse counseling and parenting and compliant with visitation. Since father was not compliant with services or visitation, no referral for supportive housing was made.
Father has not visited with the children regularly. Between June 10, 2002 and March 2003, father missed fourteen of eighteen scheduled visits. Although father visited initially with the children after June 10, 2002, he missed numerous visits and his last visit with Meagan took place on September 30, 2002. Father's last visit with Brandon took place in May 2003. Father provided numerous excuses for missing visitation throughout the time period the children were in DCF care. On July 9, 2002 having had only one visit with the children since leaving them in DCF care, father stated that he did not want to have a visit that week because he was currently looking for work and did not have any resources CT Page 11935-cl for his children. Again on July 16, 2002, father stated he could not have a visit as he had been in a car accident and was just released from the hospital. He stated that he would call the worker when he was ready to visit with the children. Although father stated that transportation was an issue for him in attending visitation, he refused assistance with transportation. Father told DCF that he could not sit for lengthy periods of time due to medical reasons. He was offered bus passes and train passes so he could stand up at times, but he refused this assistance. A visit took place on August 16, 2002 at which only Meagan was present because Brandon's foster mother forgot the visit was scheduled. Father had a telephone conversation with Brandon that evening. On September 12, 2002, father told the social worker that he could not make Friday afternoon visits because it interfered with his employment, and asked that the visits be scheduled every other week for two hours. Father canceled the visit on September 13, 2002 stating that he just started a new job and asked the children to telephone him instead. In October 2002, a therapeutic foster placement became available for Meagan and she was moved to a foster home which was over an hour away from father. On November 12, 2002, when the social worker called to confirm visitation, father initially stated that he did not have a way to get to Middletown where the visit would take place. When the worker offered to meet him in Milford and drive him to Middletown, father stated that he did not think he could do anything with the children for the next couple of weeks because Workers' Comp was giving him a hard time and he did not have any money to buy the children anything. When the social worker explained that DCF could provide money for food, father said he did not want to visit them empty-handed. Father said he might have a friend who could drive him to Middletown and the worker explained that the friend could not attend the visitation, but that there were other things to do in Middletown including shops and restaurants. Father stated that he would call the worker back, but felt that the children should be brought closer to him. Father did not call back to confirm visitation. On November 18, 2002, father declined a visit with no clear reason given. No further visits took place between Meagan and father even though the social worker called him every few months to offer visitation. In January 2003, the worker was able to reach father who stated that he had not been in contact because he had been depressed. In February 2003, father stated that he was having health problems and had four slipped discs in his back. A visit was scheduled for father on April 28, 2003 in Milford at father's request. Father cancelled the visit, informing DCF that he was unable to make the visit due to an appointment with Connecticut Counseling, but then failed to keep that appointment. Father last visited with Brandon in May 2003 prior to his placement with his sister at the current foster home. In October 2003, Meagan and Brandon made disclosures of sexual abuse by father. Following the disclosures, Meagan consistently expressed that she CT Page 11935-cm did not wish to have visitation with father. Father adamantly denied the allegations.
Father sought visitation in February 2005, and met with Meagan's therapist, Cathy Hayden, so that she could make a determination as to whether visitation was therapeutically appropriate. During the meeting, father demonstrated anger issues and stormed out of Hayden's office. In view of father's behaviors and because Meagan was deteriorating and regressing in her own behaviors, Meagan's therapist did not believe visitation would be appropriate and recommended against it.
Although requesting regular telephone contact with the children, father frequently was not home or did not answer his phone at the appointed time for the phone calls. In December 2002 Meagan stated that she did not want to call father and that she did not miss him. Meagan's therapist, Cathy Hayden, advised foster mother to encourage Meagan to call, but not to force her to do so.
D. The Children 1. Meagan B.
Meagan B. was born February 1, 1994. Her father was on the run from law enforcement authorities from the time she was born until he was arrested in 1997. In 1999, Meagan was sexually abused by her older half-brother when was she was five years old. She was abandoned by her mother in 2001. She has been in DCF care since June 2002 when her father placed her in DCF care with significant unmet emotional and educational needs. Meagan has resided at her current therapeutic foster placement since September 2002 and is strongly bonded with her foster parents and foster siblings. She has a very strong bond with Brandon.
Meagan has severe special needs: According to her therapist, Cathy Hayden, Meagan has been diagnosed with Pervasive Development Disorder (PDD) NOS, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder. She also has mild mental retardation which has required substantial involvement concerning her education. Meagan has substantial behavioral issues including aggression and impulsivity and she has struggled with encopresis. She was recently hospitalized in April 2005 as a result of a psychotic episode and incidents of auditory and visual hallucinations. Upon discharge, she participated in a partial hospitalization program and continued individual counseling through Middlesex Hospital in Middletown where she sees Cathy Hayden on a weekly basis for medication management and to address her emotional and psychiatric needs. Meagan has been on medication since coming into DCF CT Page 11935-cn care. She takes Risperdol, an anti-psychotic medication, and Wellbutrin for depression.
Meagan's foster parents are ably meeting all of Meagan's physical, medical, educational, and emotional needs. They have taken a very active role in her treatment, frequently seeking Hayden's advice and following through consistently with Hayden's recommendations. Meagan has a very positive bond with the foster parents, as well as with her foster siblings, as observed by Hayden. She will be entering sixth grade in the fall. Meagan is safe, secure and happy living at her foster home and has expressed a desire to remain there long-term. In view of the overwhelming extent of services Meagan now requires, as well as the financial burden of those services, foster parents are not currently willing to adopt Meagan, though they consider her part of the family and are committed to providing long-term foster care for her.
2. Brandon B.
Brandon B. was born September 15, 1996. He was abandoned by mother at the age of four and was five years old at the time father placed him in DCF care. He is strongly bonded with Meagan with whom he resided both before going into DCF care and at the foster home since June 2003. He is also strongly bonded with foster parents and siblings. There was a period of separation from Meagan, who required a higher level of care, which continued until Meagan had stabilized at the therapeutic foster home which was also willing to take Brandon. Brandon has been diagnosed with Attention Deficient Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and takes medication. Brandon is also in counseling with Cathy Hayden who characterized Brandon as a resilient child who will not need long-term treatment. In her opinion, Brandon is a sweet, happy, young boy who has adjusted very well within the foster family. He recently completed second grade and will be entering third grade in the fall. Brandon plays soccer and attends summer camp. The foster home has provided him with a sense of security and he would like to stay there. The foster parents are providing exemplary care and more than meeting all of Brandon's needs. Brandon calls foster parents Mom and Dad. He has not mentioned his biological mother in his meetings wit his therapist, and refers to his biological father as his "old dad." Foster parents have provided security, love, nurturing and a sense of permanency to Brandon. They have expressed their desire to adopt Brandon if he is available for adoption. In fact, his foster mother reported to his therapist that Brandon thinks he has already been adopted by the foster parents. In order to lessen the effect upon Meagan of adopting Brandon, but not Meagan, foster parents are considering not changing Brandon's name. CT Page 11935-co
E. Psychological Evaluations
Father and the two children were evaluated by Rudolfo J. Rosado, Ph.D., in October 2002 and again in May and June 2004. Rosado testified as an expert in the area of clinical forensic psychology and children's developmental psychology. With regard to Meagan, Rosado found that she had severe to profound deficits in functioning. He found Meagan to be very anxious, timid and suggestible and stated that he had difficulty obtaining reliable information from her. During the 2002 evaluation, Meagan had positive feelings toward father, missed him and wanted to live with her father and Brandon. By the time of the 2004 evaluation, however, Meagan's feelings had changed significantly. Meagan initially stated that she had no memory of her biological mother and she referred to her as Tammie. As the interview continued, she vaguely remembered going out to eat and playing with a puzzle. Meagan referred to her biological father as Roger and her "old, very mean" dad, and could not remember when she last saw him. She struggled to find positive memories of father, ultimately identifying eating at McDonald's with father as a positive memory. According to Rosado, "Meagan experienced significant trauma in her life as to adversely affect and poison her functioning, as well as threaten her ongoing psychological development." Ex. 25 at p. 17. Rosado testified that it was a profound disappointment to Meagan that the recommendations for reunification were not followed, and that she therefore adapted to the situation and bonded thoroughly with her foster family. She stated to Rosado that she wanted to live with her "new" parents.
Rosado found Brandon to be much more anxious and frightened in 2004 than he had been in 2002 and not a reliable informant. He believed Brandon demonstrated extreme suggestibilty and was afraid of saying something wrong. Brandon also had a lack of positive memories of his biological parents and was able to identify only going to McDonald's as a positive memory, although he could not provide details as to when it occurred or who was involved. Brandon stated that he had not seen or visited with his "real mom or dad" since the time he lived with them and that he did not want to visit with them. Based on his clinical evaluation of Brandon, Rosado found that even with necessary and consistent love and support, Brandon's prognosis was guarded to fair. Rosado found both children, who had been abandoned by their mother and turned over to DCF by their father, to be anxious, suggestible and psychologically fragile. He found that although there had been positive characteristics regarding the relationship of father and the children in 2002, by 2004 there were no indications to suggest positive father-children attachment relationships. He stated that attachment and permanency were profoundly important for the children's well being. Rosado believed that it was CT Page 11935-cp extremely important that the children continue to be placed together.
With regard to father, Rosado found that he suffered severe to extreme levels of emotional abuse as well as sexual abuse as a child and that as a result, as an adult, he had difficulty distinguishing between those who want to help and those who are dangerous to him. This led to an inability to benefit from therapy. Father was highly suspicious of DCF and was unable to trust the DCF workers. Rosado explained that this background was what led father to turn to substance abuse during his life and to use substances as a way of "self medicating." Father also suffered from severe levels of depression and anxiety. When Rosado conducted the evaluations in 2002, he concluded that although father was not in an immediate position to care for the children, with participation in services he believed father could gain sufficient stability to be able to have the children returned to him with reunification services. He believed that father was motivated to be a positive resource for the children and was motivated to change. Unfortunately, by the time Rosado conducted the second evaluation in 2004, father had been unable to benefit from the recommended services and had not followed Rosado's recommendations. He found that although father loved his children and wanted to be a good father, father had almost no contact with the children since the October 2002 evaluations and had "not served as a consistent constructive influence who has contributed positively to the lives of his children." Ex 25 at p. 22. Father had not "engaged, utilized, or demonstrated progress in recommended therapeutic services" casting doubt about father's ability eventually to serve as an appropriate parent. Id. Rosado stated that father did not dispute that the children would be better off with foster parents, and that he was willing to consent to termination if certain conditions were met.
Rosado testified that stability, permanency and security were necessary for every child, but that where a child has been traumatized, the need is especially significant. Rosado testified that there was a very low probability that father would comply with the recommendations made following the 2004 evaluation in view of the failure to comply with the recommendations made in 2002 and that the probability of future success was "guarded to poor." He indicated that the best predictor of future conduct was past and present conduct. He stated that as of 2004, father had not achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation to be able to parent the children. He had not demonstrated the degree of rehabilitation or organized structure in his own life to encourage the belief that he could responsibly parent the children. Rosado stated in order for father to achieve sufficient rehabilitation to create a belief that he could assume a responsible role with regard to the children in the future, father would need to complete his dual diagnosis treatment, maintain a CT Page 11935-cq job and a home appropriate for the children and become involved as a partner in the children's treatment. He testified that father would need to demonstrate stability in these areas for one and a half to two years. He testified that in view of the fact that father was highly motivated at the time of the first evaluation and still had not done what was required, the probability that he could do so in the future was extremely unlikely.
F. Testimony of Respondent Father
Respondent father testified on his own behalf. He stated that there were a number of reasons why he was unable to visit the children as scheduled including an accident at work during which a stack of table tops fell on him. He also testified that he wanted to visit with both children at the same time and not with one child at a time. He stated that he refused to participate in group substance abuse counseling because he did not want to tell a bunch of "heroin addicts" his business. Father was not satisfied with visitation and refused to comply with services until he could have contact with his children. Father stated that he believed all he needed was help with housing and individual counseling. Father stated that the parenting education class he attended turned into an AIDS awareness session and stated that he did not believe he needed parenting education because he had six children and "did a fine job with his kids." He also said he did not need substance abuse counseling, but could "use it if it's offered." Father admitted that after he was charged with conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree, he fled to Florida to avoid being incarcerated in Connecticut and that he was "on the run" when Meagan was born in February 1994. He was ultimately apprehended by U.S. Marshals in 1997 in Florida on the 1992 charges. Father testified that he did not want to remove the children from their current home and stated that the foster home "is the best they've had." He stated that he had no intention of attending the trial, but came because he wanted visitation.
II. ADJUDICATION
The grounds alleged in the petition as to both respondent mother and father are (1) abandonment, in the sense that they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the children C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)); (2) that the children, Meagan and Brandon, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of CT Page 11935-cr the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)); and (3) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)). As to respondent father, petitioner alleged the additional ground as to Meagan only that she has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of commission or omission, including but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse by the father, the care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(C)). The petitioner is required to prove these grounds by clear and convincing evidence. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1):
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).
With regard to respondent mother, DCF made reasonable efforts to locate her. She was whereabouts unknown after abandoning the children in Delaware and neither mother's parents nor father knew where she was. DCF also contacted mother's sister who told DCF that mother had a severe drug problem and was not doing well. Mother did call DCF on one occasion, but refused to give an address or telephone number where she could be reached. On April 15, 2003, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother, who was whereabouts unknown, were no longer appropriate. (Brenneman, J.) Under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001). CT Page 11935-cs
DCF made substantial efforts to reunify with father in this case. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help respondent father address substance abuse and mental health issues as well as parenting. Although father attempted to participate in a number of services, he was not able to continue his participation beyond intake and at most a few appointments and did not benefit from the services provided. Visitation was provided and continued to be offered even after father stopped attending. DCF offered rides as well as bus and train passes to father, who refused assistance with transportation.
With regard to housing, father argues that DCF failed to provide him with the housing assistance he needed. He also argues that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify because there were no shelter placements available for fathers with their children as there are for mothers and children. While DCF acknowledged that no shelter was available for father and the children, DCF was willing to provide a referral for supportive housing once father met the criteria, i.e., that he was in substance abuse treatment and was complying with visitation. Since father was not in compliance with services and was not attending visitation regularly, DCF could not offer supportive housing.
Father also claimed that DCF failed to pursue a possible relative placement when it did not pursue a call to the DCF hotline from a relative in Delaware. DCF did, however, inform father that the relative had called and father identified the caller as mother's sister. At DCF's request, father signed a release so that information could be provided to maternal aunt. Ex. B. DCF spoke with mother's sister on June 21, 2002. Although DCF could have made additional efforts to contact the relative, she also never contacted DCF again and father never raised the issue again despite his knowledge of her call. Certainly, if placement were possible, father, mother or maternal aunt would have discussed the matter further with DCF. The court finds DCF's actions in notifying father of the call and seeking the release of information reasonable. While DCF could have done more, its actions do not reflect a failure to make reasonable efforts to reunify.
Father has not played an active role in the lives of the children during the time they have been in DCF care and although initially he visited with them on occasion, he stopped visiting them, was not available consistently for telephone contact, and has not put himself in a position to have the children placed with him. He has not taken advantage of the services offered and has been unable or unwilling to benefit from them. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify in CT Page 11935-ct this case.
B. Abandonment: C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
Petitioner has alleged as to both respondent mother and father that they have abandoned Meagan and Brandon.
"Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare. In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 14, 438 A.2d 801 (1981)." In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993); In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 394, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112. Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).
With regard to respondent mother, she initially left father and took the children with her to her parents' house in Delaware. Shortly thereafter she left the home, leaving her children with their grandparents who informed father that if he did not pick them up, the children would be placed in foster care in Delaware. Respondent mother never sought visitation or contact of any kind with the children and neither child has seen their mother since she left them with their grandparents. See In re Deana E. et al., 61 Conn.App. at 185. Respondent mother has not sent any cards, letters or gifts to or for the children and has only contacted DCF on one occasion. At that time, mother did not request any contact with the children or their care-givers or provide any information as to how DCF could contact her.
Respondent mother has made no effort at any time to contact her children. She has not maintained any interest in her children, let alone a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the CT Page 11935-cu welfare of her children. The court therefore concludes that this ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence as to respondent mother.
With regard to respondent father, he failed to maintain regular visitation with his children. During the first nine months they were in DCF care, he missed fourteen of eighteen scheduled visits. He routinely provided DCF with excuses for not visiting with the children. His excuses included that he was depressed, that he was looking for work, that the visit interfered with work he had obtained, that he had no money to bring them anything and did not want to visit empty-handed. He also stated that he was physically unable to attend due to a car accident and a work place accident, but nevertheless refused DCF's offers to assist with transportation. He was frequently unavailable for the scheduled telephone contacts. Long before Meagan made the disclosure concerning sexual abuse by father, and visitation was not recommended by Meagan's therapist, father had ceased visiting with her. He even missed visitation with Brandon after seeking visitation during court proceedings. Father's efforts to maintain contact with his children, therefore, cannot be viewed as anything other than sporadic. Such efforts, as set forth above, are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. at 53. Certainly father has shown "some interest" in his children and their welfare, but the degree of interest shown by father was not reasonable under the circumstances. As set forth above, indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. at 129. The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. at 36. Father failed to take advantage of the visitation when it was offered. After the allegations of sexual abuse arose and Meagan no longer wished visitation (not having seen her father in many months) father sought visitation through the court. Even when visitation with Brandon was then scheduled, father missed the visitation and did not reschedule. This conduct on father's part does not demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest. The court recognizes that father still wishes to have a visiting relationship with his children. A desire for occasional visiting contact, however, is not a "reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the children's welfare." The court therefore concludes that this ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence as to respondent father. CT Page 11935-cv
C. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent mother and father's parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Meagan and Brandon were found to be neglected on September 12, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the children. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to he neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). CT Page 11935-cw The psychological evidence in this case clearly establishes that father has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. Dr. Rosado was unequivocal in his opinion that little if any progress was made. As to respondent father, he found that father had not engaged, utilized, or demonstrated progress in recommended therapeutic services casting doubt about father's ability eventually to serve as an appropriate parent. As to respondent father in 2004, Dr. Rosado concluded:
Unfortunately, Mr. [B.] has still not been able to demonstrate an ability to care for his children. This is related to severe clinical conditions, which include continued substance abuse and severe untreated psychological deficits. Although Mr. [B.'s] past trauma and emotional difficulties are important, and it is believed that the most absolutely tragic aspect of Mr. [B.'s] circumstances involve an inability to engage and utilize treatment services that could have alleviated his emotional pain, improved his life, and helped him actually become the good father he desperately desires to be. Ex. 25 at p. 20.
Although specific steps were issued to assist respondent father in achieving rehabilitation, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that father failed to fulfill them in a number of significant measures. As described above, respondent father had not successfully completed any substance abuse program despite a lengthy period of time in which to do so and despite trying a number of times. The children were placed in DCF care by father on June 10, 2002. Father was referred to Connecticut Counseling Centers, Inc. for substance abuse services and although he attended some individual counseling sessions at Connecticut Counseling, he did not attend group sessions stating that the groups were composed of heroin and crack addicts and he did not wish to discuss his personal business with them. On November 6, 2002, father told DCF that he was not going to return to Connecticut Counseling because he did not feel he had a drug problem and did not believe that his twenty-year history of regular marijuana use affected his ability to care for his children. In spring of 2003 after father was CT Page 11935-cx re-referred to Connecticut Counseling for a dual diagnosis program, Connecticut Counseling informed DCF that father never completed the intake process or returned for treatment.
The following year in June 2004, father was referred to Connecticut Counseling again. He attended an intake appointment June 15, 2004 and was referred for a psychiatric consult. He was diagnosed with Bipolar I Disorder and Cannabis Dependence along with anti-social traits, and medical and social difficulties, including DCF involvement. After admitting that he used marijuana on a daily basis and had been a regular user of marijuana for thirty years, and acknowledging that treatment would be important for his family problems, father refused intensive out-patient treatment, stating that he really just wanted a chance to take some mood stabilizing medication to see if it calmed him down. He failed to return on July 30, 2004 for recommended treatment.
Five months later, on December 2, 2004, father informed DCF that he was not in treatment and did not need any treatment. He reiterated that he did not want to participate in group counseling "with a bunch of heroin addicts" because he only smoked marijuana. He also stated that they wanted to put him on medication and that he was not in favor of that. Despite father's statements, DCF made yet another referral for evaluation and drug screen to Connecticut Renaissance, Inc. On May 31, 2005, Renaissance reported that although father participated in an intake evaluation on December 10, 2004, and appeared once on January 7, 2005, he expressed anger and frustration regarding DCF and the inability to see his children and he did not return after that date.
Mother has contacted DCF on only one occasion and has never expressed a desire to have the children placed with her. Mother has a history of severe substance abuse and she continues to be whereabouts unknown despite DCF's efforts to locate her.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of January 9, 2004, respondents had not brought themselves into a position CT Page 11935-cy in which they could provide adequate care for the children. Mother continued to be whereabouts unknown. Father continued to refuse substance abuse and mental health counseling and treatment, did not benefit from services, did not have appropriate housing for himself and the children and failed to maintain even a visiting relationship with the children. Thus father demonstrated neither the ability nor the desire to provide day-to-day care for the children.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). There was no change in mother's circumstances after the adjudicatory date and she continued to be whereabouts unknown. Father's conduct after the adjudicatory date does not show improvement. He continued to refuse services despite additional referrals. While he sought visitation by court order, he then did not follow through when visitation was scheduled with Brandon.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Dr. Rosado testified that father would need approximately one and a half to two years of demonstrated stability in housing, employment and mental health and substance abuse treatment before he would be in a position to provide responsible day-to-day care for the children. Meagan and Brandon have been in DCF care for over three years. Here, for children who now have the stability of a wonderful foster home and foster parents who would like to adopt Brandon and provide CT Page 11935-dz long-term care for Meagan, the time needed for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable. And in this case, rehabilitation itself remains contingent on numerous factors, including continued counseling and substance abuse treatment. Further, father's denial of the need for continued substance abuse treatment renders the likelihood of his actually receiving and benefitting from additional treatment extremely remote. Moreover, respondent father has had several years to accomplish such rehabilitation while the children remained in DCF care.
Father has been able to manage his own life only to the extent that he has remained employed, albeit sporadically, and has been able to reside with friends. He did not, however, have appropriate housing for the children and had not completed a parenting course or successfully participated in substance abuse or mental health counseling. The court finds that neither father nor mother is in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children or to assume a useful role in their lives and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the children.
The court is mindful that parents are not required to be "able to assume full responsibility for a child, without the use of available support programs." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984); In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986). The fact that father requires continued counseling and treatment is not the basis of the court's determination that he has not sufficiently achieved rehabilitation. See In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 564, 718 A.2d 997 (1998) (trial court's finding that respondent had failed to achieve rehabilitation was properly based on her inability to meet court-approved expectations, and not on her mental retardation); In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 672-74, 723 A.2d 356 CT Page 11935-da (1999) (trial court properly found a failure to rehabilitate); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. at 606 (trial court terminated parental rights not because of mental condition, but because of an inability to function as a parent). At the time of trial, father was still not in a position to begin reunification, even with supports in place.
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. at 292; In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondent has improved his ability to manage his own life, but rather whether he has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. Meagan and Brandon both have specialized needs. Meagan has serious behavioral difficulties including aggressive and oppositional behavior and serious psychological issues which have required hospitalization as well as regular treatment including medication and therapy. Meagan also has special educational needs in view of her mental retardation and pervasive development disorder. Brandon requires therapy and medication for his ADHD. Both children desperately need and deserve a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time. The children now have a foster family with whom they have thoroughly CT Page 11935-db bonded. The family is committed to the children and would like to adopt Brandon and provide long-term care for Meagan. Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and father remain unable to successfully parent the children and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in the children's lives within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has provens respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
D. No Ongoing Parent-child Relationship — § 17A-112(j)(3)(D)
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. at 22. In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative. In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 CT Page 11935-dc (2000).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to both respondents (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the children Meagan and Brandon and respondent parents. Neither child has seen their mother since fall 2001 when mother left them with her parents. Mother has not provided day-to-day care for the children or even contacted them in any way in over three and a half years. Neither child speaks of respondent mother during therapy sessions with Cathy Hayden. Both children struggled to recall memories of mother during their psychological evaluations. Thus, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship.
With regard to respondent father, although he did attempt to care for the children to the extent possible after picking them up from their grandparents, he was unable to provide adequate care for them and placed them in DCF care. Since the time they were placed in care, father has not made sufficient efforts to maintain a parent-child relationship with the children. Respondent father missed fourteen of eighteen visits in the children's first nine months in DCF care. He also did not make himself available consistently for telephone contact. Although the children recognize father as their biological father, they would not seek comfort from him or go to him to have their needs met. Additionally, Dr. Rosado testified that although positive characteristics in the relationship of father and the children existed in 2002, by the time of the 2004 evaluation, there were no longer any indications to suggest positive father-children attachment relationships. The children do not express a desire to see father and struggled to recall positive memories of him during their psychological evaluations. Although respondent father is well-intentioned to the extent that he expresses his CT Page 11935-dd love for his children and a desire to visit them, the fact remains that he has not been in a position to care for them for over three years. When he had the responsibility of caring for them on a daily basis, he was unable to do so. As a result of his own conduct, including failure to participate in services designed to address his substance abuse and mental health issues, father has rendered himself unavailable to serve as a parent for Meagan and Brandon. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. at 241. Respondent father has not been able to to meet on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of his children in over three years. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 525.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow respondents further time for the reestablishment of a parent-child relationship with children who are in a stable, nurturing foster home would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. Meagan and Brandon are now eleven and eight years old. They have been in a therapeutic foster home together since June 2003. According to the testimony of Dr. Rosado, father will be unable to assume a responsible parental role for the children for at least another year and a half to two years, under the best of circumstances. In view of the children's needs, it would be detrimental to them to allow this substantial amount of time in which respondent father could attempt to reestablish a parent-child relationship.
Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground for termination as to respondents Roger B. and Tammi W. by clear and convincing evidence.
E. Act of Commission or Omission: C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(C)
The petition with regard to Meagan also alleges as to father that Meagan has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, including but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control, necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. C.G.S. § CT Page 11935-de 17a-112(j)(3)(C). The summary of facts in support of the petition references only the allegations of sexual abuse of Meagan by father and thus the court considers whether the facts in connection with the sexual abuse allegations are sufficient to sustain a finding that petitioner has established this ground by clear and convincing evidence.The allegations of sexual abuse by father were made in October 2003 and subsequently thoroughly investigated. The children were interviewed at the Yale Sex Abuse Clinic. Detective Kozlowsky testified that the Shelton police department closed its file after finding that there was not probable cause to pursue criminal charges against father. Additionally, Rosado testified that Meagan, who had severe to profound deficits in functioning, was very anxious, timid, suggestible and desperate to please. He stated that he had difficulty obtaining reliable information from her. Although a failure to pursue criminal charges does not compel the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient for the purposes of this case, that fact, together with Meagan's unreliability, does compel the court to conclude that the petitioner has not established this ground by clear and convincing evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including July 15, 2005, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The CT Page 11935-df seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered many services to address substance abuse, mental health and parenting issues. Respondent father, for the most part, did not avail himself of these services, although he participated in some visitation. Mother, whereabouts unknown, has not participated in services.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondents. As set forth above, there was compliance by respondent father as to some steps, but failure to comply with many others. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do not have a bond with their biological mother whom they have not seen since fall 2001. They do not have a strong emotional bond with father with whom they have not visited in well over two years. The children do have a strong emotional bond with CT Page 11935-dg each other and with the foster parents and siblings with whom Meagan has lived since October 2002 and with whom Brandon has lived since June 2003. The children have adjusted very well in their foster family and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the children need. The foster parents are committed to the children and would like to adopt Brandon and provide long-term care for Meagan.
(5) As to the ages of the children, the court finds that Meagan B., born February 1, 1994, is eleven years old and Brandon B., born September 15, 1996, is now eight. The court further finds that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney recommends termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that respondent mother has not maintained any contact with the children or DCF or attended visitation and father has not maintained regular and consistent contact with the children. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the children's lives. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of CT Page 11935-dh any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. DCF took many steps to facilitate reunification. Further, while the respondents' financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Tammi W. and Roger B. to the children Meagan B. and Brandon B. is in the best interest of the children. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Meagan and Brandon. Meagan and Brandon have already endured many difficulties in their lives, including the trauma of being abandoned by their mother and then placed in DCF care by their father. They are now in a foster home where they are very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to them. Father acknowledged that the children are well cared for in stating that their current home is "the best they've had." While respondent father loves his children and states that he desires to care for them, he and mother have been consistently unable to assume a responsible parental role. Neither parent has achieved rehabilitation or made sufficient improvements in their ability to care for the children, and are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children. Throughout the children's long stay in foster care, parents have not modified their behavior to make it appropriate for the children to be reunified with them. Although father loves his children and would like to visit with them, he has not put himself in a position to be able to care for them. Given father's failed attempts in services and at treatment programs, there is little, if any, likelihood of his improving to the point where he could be a responsible parent in the future. The testimony established that father did not believe he needed substance abuse treatment even though he has used marijuana daily for at least a twenty-year period. He continued to admit to using marijuana daily as recently as January 2005. And father testified that he had no intention of attending the trial, but came because he CT Page 11935-di wanted visitation.
In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the children's best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers the testimony that the foster parents are committed to adopting Brandon, but are not currently in a position to adopt Meagan. Although as Dr. Rosado testified, adopting one but not the other poses a risk of rejection and devastation to the child not adopted, here the unique circumstances explain foster parents' current position. Understandably, foster parents are extremely concerned about the level of services that will be necessary for Meagan. She has already undergone one psychiatric hospitalization at the age of eleven and is struggling with visual and auditory hallucinations. In view of her limitations and severe special needs, extensive services will be necessary on a long-term basis. Foster parents are currently not in a position to take on the financial burden of those services, but are, however, completely committed to providing long-term care for Meagan. Meagan and Brandon are entitled to a resolution, without CT Page 11935-dj delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as their parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the children recommends termination.
After considering the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and father is in the children's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Tammi W. and Roger B. are hereby terminated as to the children Meagan and Brandon B. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the visitation requested by father, in view of the court's orders terminating parental rights, visitation is not appropriate with the children and they have not expressed a desire for visitation. Nevertheless, the court encourages DCF to consider whether a final visit with father would be in the children's best interest at this time.
With regard to the permanency plans for the children, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as to each child and finds that such plans are in the best interest of the children. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans. Permanency plans shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.
Jongbloed, J.