Opinion
No. COA15-983
04-05-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: M.B.B., A Minor Juvenile.
No brief filed on behalf of petitioner-appellee. Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant mother. David A. Perez for respondent-appellant father. No brief filed on behalf of guardian ad litem.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Wilkes County, No. 14 JT 130 Appeal by respondent parents from order entered 11 June 2015 by Judge Robert J. Crumpton in Wilkes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2016. No brief filed on behalf of petitioner-appellee. Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant mother. David A. Perez for respondent-appellant father. No brief filed on behalf of guardian ad litem. GEER, Judge.
Respondent mother and respondent father ("respondent parents") appeal from the trial court's order terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor child, M.B.B. ("Matthew"). The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate both respondent parents' parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- 1111(a)(1) (2015) (neglect), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (dependency), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (abandonment).
We use the pseudonym "Matthew" throughout this opinion for ease of reading and to protect the privacy of the juvenile.
On appeal, respondent parents challenge the portion of the trial court's order determining that these grounds for termination of parental rights existed and raise distinct issues with respect to the dispositional stage. We hold that competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, which in turn support the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) to terminate respondent parents' parental rights due to willful abandonment. Because we find respondent parents' remaining arguments also unpersuasive, we affirm the trial court's order as to both respondent parents.
Facts
Respondent parents are the biological parents of Matthew. Matthew was born 1 October 2008 in Alabama and was adjudicated as a dependent juvenile in an Alabama juvenile court order signed on 5 May 2010 and filed 8 September 2010. Matthew was then placed in the legal custody of petitioner, who is his maternal grandmother, and has been in petitioner's sole care since he was 18 months old. Subsequently, Matthew moved to North Carolina with petitioner, who filed a petition in Wilkes County District Court to terminate respondent parents' parental rights on 30 July 2014.
At the time the petition was filed, respondent mother was in prison in Virginia and respondent father resided in Ashe County, North Carolina. The petition stated that respondent parents had not been involved in Matthew's life "to any normal or reasonable extent" since Matthew had been in petitioner's sole care. Specifically, the petition alleged that respondent father had not seen the minor child in three years and had not provided any form of support, even though the Alabama courts had ordered him to do so. In addition, respondent mother had no contact with Matthew and had provided no support for the minor child since he began living with petitioner. The petition also noted that respondent parents had a history of illicit drug abuse and violence when in Matthew's presence, which initially was why Alabama Department of Social Services ("DSS") became involved. In addition, respondent mother was diagnosed as bipolar and has a history of multiple suicide attempts.
On 6 August 2014, in response to the termination petition, respondent mother sent a handwritten letter to the court stating that she "will not sign over any parental rights, or the right to retain custody to [petitioner]." Respondent mother contended that the contents of the petition were untrue and asked that a lawyer be appointed. Finally, respondent mother stated, "I do not want to lose any parental rights that I am allowed with my son. Especally [sic] the right to gain custody." Respondent mother sent another letter on 9 August 2014 to the court, expressing concern that petitioner was leaving the state with Matthew and claiming that "[s]he told nothing but lies on the petition." Respondent mother indicated that she was aware of who represented petitioner and that petitioner was receiving a check each month for Matthew for her disability. Respondent mother included with the letter a list of 19 statements clarifying or disputing the claims in the petition.
The petition was heard at a hearing on 23 April 2015. At the time of the hearing, respondent mother was still in prison in Virginia, with an expected release date in August 2015. Respondent father, however, was present and testified.
Following the hearing, the court issued an order on 11 June 2015 terminating the parental rights of both respondent mother and respondent father pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (6) and (7). In its order, the court made numerous findings of fact in support of its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent parents' parental rights. The court found petitioner has a loving and affectionate relationship with Matthew and provides a caring, suitable, and appropriate environment for him. It noted that Matthew appears to be thriving in petitioner's care and that petitioner indicated a desire to adopt Matthew as soon as possible.
In addition, the trial court noted that respondent mother was still residing in jail in Virginia and respondent father's last known mailing address was in Wilkes County, but the summons was returned unserved, so he was served by publication. Rather than submit to a deposition while incarcerated, respondent mother elected to present her testimony through a 12-page handwritten letter that the court accepted and the parties agreed would be admitted without objection into evidence. The trial court ruled, however, that it would not admit into evidence those portions of the letter making incriminating statements against respondent father.
The trial court found that petitioner has had sole legal and physical custody, care, and control of Matthew since 2010 and that respondent parents had not been involved in his life to any normal or reasonable extent since that time. Respondent father had not seen Matthew for three years and had not provided any form of support even though ordered to do so by Alabama courts. In addition, the court found that respondent mother has had no contact with Matthew in over a year and also has not provided any support for Matthew since he began living with petitioner over four years earlier. The court found that respondent parents knew petitioner's location and phone number but did not call or come by "as normal parents would" to check on Matthew. In addition, they had not sent Matthew any cards, letters, presents, or gifts during the prior four and a half years. The court also found that Matthew no longer had any attachment to respondents and did not ask for or about them.
In addition, the court made findings regarding respondent parents' history of illicit drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and violence when in Matthew's presence, referencing photographs introduced at the 23 April 2015 hearing that depicted Matthew's injuries after respondent mother had severely bitten him. Respondent mother has a history of mental disorders and suicide attempts and had to be committed to a mental institution for those attempts. The court found that in one incident, respondent father tried to strike respondent mother and missed, striking Matthew instead in the head. The court also found that on another occasion when both respondent parents were high, they allowed Matthew to fall and bust his nose, causing life-long breathing problems that recently required surgery. On another occasion, respondent parents burned Matthew's face with a cigarette.
The court also found that both respondent parents have been diagnosed as bipolar and are on medications. In addition, the court found that although Matthew showed early signs of diabetes, neither parent monitored him properly or made sure he ate the right foods when he was in their care. The court found that Alabama DSS removed Matthew from respondent parents' care in April 2010 for these reasons as well as respondent parents' drug use and placed him with petitioner "because of the danger they each presented to [Matthew]." The court also referenced the fact that both respondent parents have felony criminal records and noted that respondent mother was currently in prison and respondent father had only recently been released.
In addition, the court found that respondent parents had not paid child support and had willfully and without justification failed to pay for Matthew's care, support, and education as reasonable parents would do. Once again, the court pointed out that respondent father, despite being subject to a prior court order in Alabama requiring him to pay child support, had provided only $20.00 since 8 September 2010 toward the juvenile's care. Finally, the trial court found that Matthew's guardian ad litem concurred that the child would benefit from the termination of the parental rights of his natural parents.
Based on those findings, the trial court concluded that respondent parents (1) had willfully abandoned Matthew for at least six months immediately preceding the petition's filing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7); (2) had abused and neglected Matthew within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1); and (3) were incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of Matthew such that Matthew is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2015) and there is a reasonable probability such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). The court also found that it is in the best welfare and interests of the child that respondent parents' parental rights be terminated. Both respondent parents timely appealed the termination order to this Court.
Discussion
Termination of parental rights involves two stages. First, at the adjudicatory stage, the trial court "examines the evidence and determines whether sufficient grounds exist under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to warrant termination of parental rights." In re T.D.P., 164 N.C. App. 287, 288, 595 S.E.2d 735, 736 (2004), aff'd per curiam, 359 N.C. 405, 610 S.E.2d 199 (2005). "[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists." In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). Our review at the adjudication stage is limited to determining " 'whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings of fact support its conclusions of law.' " In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733, 735, 643 S.E.2d 77, 79 (2007) (quoting In re C.C., J.C., 173 N.C. App. 375, 380, 618 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2005)).
If the court determines that one or more grounds for terminating parental rights exist, it then proceeds to the second stage, the dispositional phase, and determines "whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2015). "This Court reviews that decision under an abuse of discretion standard." In re L.A.B., 178 N.C. App. 295, 299, 631 S.E.2d 61, 64 (2006).
I
Respondent mother first contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct any inquiry into her competency and whether she was entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Respondent mother argues that the trial court was placed on notice that her competency might be an issue by allegations in the petition that she is bipolar and had a history of suicide attempts, drug abuse, and imprisonment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2015) provides that in a juvenile proceeding "[o]n motion of any party or on the court's own motion, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent who is incompetent in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17." An " '[i]ncompetent adult' " is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7) (2015) as "an adult or emancipated minor who lacks sufficient capacity to manage the adult's own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning the adult's person, family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or condition."
Our Supreme Court has recently explained:
As the Court of Appeals has previously noted, "[a] trial judge has a duty to properly inquire into the competency of a litigant in a civil trial or proceeding when circumstances are brought to the judge's attention [that] raise a substantial question as to whether the litigant is non compos mentis." In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 72, 623 S.E.2d 45, 49 (2005) (citation omitted). A trial court's decision concerning whether to appoint a parental guardian ad litem based on the parent's incompetence is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See State v. Turner, 268 N.C. 225, 230, 150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1966) (observing that a trial court's competency determination "rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and observation of the particular [individual]"). A trial court's decision concerning whether to conduct an inquiry into a parent's competency is also
discretionary in nature. In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. at 72, 623 S.E.2d at 49.In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 106-07, 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015) (emphasis added).
Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in implicitly determining that no circumstances had been brought to the court's attention that raised a substantial question as to whether respondent mother was incompetent. In In re T.L.H., the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to conduct an inquiry into the respondent's competency when "[a] careful review of the record developed in the trial court compel[led] the conclusion that sufficient evidence tending to show that respondent was not incompetent existed to obviate the necessity for the trial court to conduct a competence inquiry before proceeding with the termination hearing." Id. at 109, 772 S.E.2d at 456. The Court pointed to evidence that (1) the respondent showed proper judgment in allowing DHHS to take custody of her child at birth, (2) she showed a reasonable understanding of the proceedings when she told DHHS that she wanted to preserve the right to be reunified with her child, (3) she testified regarding steps she had taken and needed to take to address concerns regarding her ability to care for her child, and (4) her testimony "was cogent and gave no indication that she failed to understand the nature of the proceedings in which she was participating or the consequences of the decisions that she was being called upon to make." Id.
In this case, the record is analogous to that in In re T.L.H. Although there is evidence that respondent mother has a history of mental illness and has been hospitalized in the past, nothing in the record suggests that respondent mother, at the time of the termination of parental rights proceedings, lacked sufficient capacity to manage her affairs or make and communicate important decisions during the course of the termination proceedings. To the contrary, the record contains handwritten letters by respondent mother demonstrating that she did have sufficient capacity.
In the first letter, dated 6 August 2014, respondent mother acknowledged that she had received the petition to terminate her parental rights and stated:
I will not sign over any parental rights, or the right to retain custody to [petitioner]. The things that she stated in this petition are not true. I would also like to be appointed a lawyer, please. I do not want to lose any parental rights that I am allowed with my son. Especally [sic] the right to gain custody.
Additionally, in a second letter, dated 9 August 2014, respondent mother relayed her concerns to the court that petitioner may have been planning to leave the state with Matthew, that she desired to press kidnapping charges if petitioner did leave the state, that she had two witnesses to prove that petitioner had made false statements, that she knew the name of petitioner's attorney, and that she knew that petitioner was receiving a disability check each month for Matthew. Respondent mother requested to be allowed "to legally take action before it is too late." Respondent mother attached to that letter a list of 19 statements in rebuttal or to clarify the allegations in the petition.
Respondent mother also wrote a 12-page statement that the court received into evidence in lieu of a deposition or live testimony at the termination hearing, which detailed various events in the history of the case, demonstrated an awareness of the legal proceedings both in North Carolina and Alabama, and articulated a desire to rebuild a relationship with her son.
All of these statements are evidence that respondent mother has had sufficient capacity throughout the termination proceedings to manage her own affairs and make and communicate important life decisions, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court acted within its discretion by choosing not to conduct further inquiry into respondent mother's competency or appoint a guardian ad litem on her behalf.
II
Next, we address respondent parents' arguments relating to the trial court's conclusion that grounds for termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). In order to terminate parental rights under this subsection, the court must conclude that "[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, since petitioner filed the petition for termination of parental rights in this action on 30 July 2014, the relevant minimum time period was from at least 30 January 2014 to 30 July 2014.
The trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to its determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent parents' parental rights based on willful abandonment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7):
6. The Petitioner has had sole legal and physical custody, care and control of the minor child since the prior custody litigation between the parties in the State of Alabama in 2010, wherein the petitioner was awarded sole custody of the minor child by the Court of that state in Case # JU 2010-61.02 in an Order signed on May 5, 2010, and filed on September 8, 2010. The minor child has been in the petitioner's sole care and control since age 18 months. The respondents have not been involved in the minor child's life to any normal or reasonable extent since that time. The respondent father has not even seen the minor child in 3 years, and he has not provided any form of support whatsoever during said time even though ordered to do so by the Alabama courts. The respondent-mother has had no contact with the minor child in over one year, and she is now in prison in Virginia and is not expected to be released from custody sooner than August, 2015. The respondent-mother has also never provided any support for the minor child since he has been living with the petitioner for the past 4 1/2 years. The respondents have shown no desire whatsoever for contact with the minor child because they have known the location and phone number of the petitioner, but they do not call or come by as normal parents would to check on the welfare of the child. The petitioner has offered to make the child available to the respondents for visitation, but the respondents have failed and refused to come visit the child. The Respondents also have not sent [Matthew] any cards, letters, presents or gifts during the past 4 1/2 years. The minor child no longer has any attachment to them and does not ask for them or
about them. The respondents have abandoned the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 7B-101.
This Court has held that " '[a]bandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.' " In re McLemore, 139 N.C. App. 426, 429, 533 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2000) (quoting In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997)). Additionally, " '[i]t has been held that if a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.' " In re J.D.L., 199 N.C. App. 182, 189-90, 681 S.E.2d 485, 491 (2009) (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962)). " 'Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.' " In re S.R.G., 195 N.C. App. 79, 84, 671 S.E.2d 47, 51 (2009) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 276, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986)).
Respondent mother first argues that the trial court improperly based its finding of abandonment on her incarceration. This Court has long held that " '[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of parental rights decision.' " In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 10, 618 S.E.2d 241, 247 (2005) (quoting In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 198, 207-08, 580 S.E.2d 399, 405, aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 568, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2003)), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006). As this Court noted when considering a respondent parent's incarceration with respect to another ground for termination (neglect), " '[a]lthough his options for showing affection are greatly limited, the respondent will not be excused from showing interest in his child's welfare by whatever means available.' " In re J.L.K., 165 N.C. App. 311, 318-19, 598 S.E.2d 387, 392 (2004) (quoting Whittington v. Hendren, 156 N.C. App. 364, 368, 576 S.E.2d 372, 376 (2003)). See also In re Graham, 63 N.C. App. 146, 151, 303 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983) (finding pattern of abandonment and neglect due to the respondent's lack of involvement with his children for more than two years and concluding that "[t]he fact that the respondent was incarcerated for a good portion of this period does not provide any justification for his all but total failure to communicate with or even inquire about his children for whom he professes such concern at this late date").
However, for a court to find that a parent willfully abandoned his or her child, "it is not necessary that a parent absent himself continuously from the child for the specified six months, nor even that he cease to feel any concern for its interest. If his conduct over the six months period evinces a settled purpose and a wilful intent to forego all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish all parental claims to the child there has been an abandonment within the meaning of the statute." Pratt, 257 N.C. at 503, 126 S.E.2d at 609.
Here, the record contains ample evidence beyond the fact that respondent mother was incarcerated to support the trial court's findings. Petitioner testified that Matthew has been in her sole custody and care since 2010, when the Alabama courts gave her custody. During that time, according to petitioner, respondent mother has provided no support, and she has not seen Matthew in person since prior to her incarceration, which began more than six months prior to the termination hearing. In addition, petitioner testified that neither respondent parent ever went with her to Matthew's doctor visits or participated in any of his school activities. In addition, the trial court found in an unchallenged finding of fact that respondents also had not sent Matthew any cards, letters, presents, or gifts over the prior four and a half years. Based on the evidence and the findings of fact, the trial court properly concluded that respondents willfully abandoned Matthew under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
Respondent father argues, however, that his lack of contact with Matthew was not willful, but rather was the result of petitioner's actions. He argues that petitioner did not notify him when she moved to Florida and North Carolina and that any time he tried to contact her, the police were called or he was "threatened or charged with criminal harassment."
The trial court, however, found otherwise, and its findings are adequately supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. We are not free to revisit the trial court's decisions regarding the weight and credibility to be afforded the evidence. "If there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the same are binding on appeal even in the presence of evidence to the contrary." In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397-98 (1996).
Petitioner testified that during the time she moved to North Carolina with Matthew, respondent father did not stay in contact with her. Moreover, other than $20.00 that was paid right after an Alabama judge ordered respondent father to pay child support for Matthew, respondent father has not provided any type of support for the child, even though he remained under court order to do so. Petitioner also testified that respondent father visited Matthew twice in the past three and a half years, and the second time "he was messed up," and she told him to leave. In addition to showing willful abandonment, this evidence also contradicts respondent father's contention that he was unaware of where petitioner and the child were located. Petitioner further testified that respondent father never offered to send a card to Matthew.
Respondent father's argument itself is a contradiction, as he claims that petitioner alienated him from the child and failed to notify him of how to reach her, but then asserts that he was able to reach petitioner and was threatened with police action if he continued to do so. Petitioner's testimony indicated that respondent father at most called only once during the relevant time period, and when he did so, it was not to ask about Matthew. Petitioner testified that she never tried to keep respondent father or respondent mother from having contact with Matthew, other than informing them that they could not come around if they were intoxicated or "messed up." All of this evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact, which in turn supported the conclusion that respondent father willfully abandoned Matthew pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
Respondent parents also challenge the court's adjudication of the existence of two other grounds for termination of parental rights, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (a)(6). Because we hold that the trial court properly found a sufficient basis for termination of respondent parents' parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7), we need not address respondent parents' arguments related to the other grounds the court found to exist. In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. at 13, 618 S.E.2d at 248-49 ("Since we have concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that father neglected [the juvenile], we need not address father's further arguments regarding termination pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (failure to make reasonable progress).").
III
Respondent mother contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a proper disposition hearing after the adjudication phase. Although termination of parental rights proceedings involve a two-stage process, the court is not required to hold two hearings at separate times, and the adjudication and disposition hearings may be consolidated. In re O.W., 164 N.C. App. 699, 701, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004). "[S]ince a proceeding to terminate parental rights is heard by the judge, sitting without a jury, it is presumed, in the absence of some affirmative indication to the contrary, that the judge, having knowledge of the law, is able to consider the evidence in light of the applicable legal standard and to determine whether grounds for termination exist before proceeding to consider evidence relevant only to the dispositional stage." In re White, 81 N.C. App. 82, 85, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1986).
Here, the trial court found multiple grounds for termination of parental rights. The court's order indicates that it went on to the dispositional stage and concluded that "[i]t is in the best welfare and interests of the minor child . . . that the parental rights of the Respondents . . . be terminated." The record contains no "affirmative indication" that the trial court did not properly consider the evidence under the applicable legal standard. Id. Since a judge is presumed capable of applying the correct legal standard and we have been presented with no evidence showing that the trial court here acted in any way contrary with its duties, we find no error.
Respondent father argues -- with respect to the disposition stage -- that the trial court failed to make findings of fact regarding all relevant factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) provides, in relevant part:
After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's rights exist, the court shall
determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest. The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
While consideration of the factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) is mandatory, the court is required to make written findings of fact only regarding those factors that are relevant. In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 221-22, 753 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014). A factor is "relevant" for this purpose if there is conflicting evidence concerning the factor such that it is placed in issue. In re H.D., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 768 S.E.2d 860, 866 (2015).
Here, respondent father argues that the court failed to make any findings regarding the likelihood of adoption and whether termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan. Respondent father acknowledges that the trial court found, in Finding of Fact No. 2, that petitioner desires to adopt Matthew as soon as possible, but argues that this finding is not equivalent to a finding that adoption is likely. We disagree. A district court is not required to parrot the language in the statute. When a statute requires the making of findings of fact regarding certain factors or criteria, the court's findings are adequate if they address the statute's concerns without using the exact statutory language. In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 168, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013) ("The trial court's written findings must address the statute's concerns, but need not quote its exact language."). Finding of Fact No. 2 adequately addresses the requirement that the trial court consider the likelihood of adoption.
Similarly, respondent father argues that although the court made a finding, in Finding of Fact No. 10, that Matthew's guardian ad litem had "investigated the matter and concurred that the minor child would benefit from the termination of the parental rights of the natural parents[,]" this finding is not equivalent to a finding that termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of a permanent plan. Since this case does not involve Social Services, no permanent plan exists and this factor is not relevant to this case.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court's findings of fact adequately address the factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). Moreover, respondents have failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that termination of respondents' parental rights is in Matthew's best interests. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's order.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and DIETZ concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).