Opinion
No. 350001 No. 350003
03-19-2020
In re MASON/LASOTA, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Midland Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-004805-NA Before: CAMERON, P.J., and SHAPIRO and LETICA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 350001, respondent-mother appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor children TM, KL1, LL, and KL2. In Docket No. 350003, respondent-father appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to the minor children KL1, LL, and KL2. Respondents' parental rights were terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We affirm in both dockets.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition requesting the removal of respondents' minor children after receiving a complaint that respondents had left the minor children with a relative and did not have a plan to return. The petition also alleged that the relative was no longer able to care for the minor children and that he was not able to contact respondents. It was further alleged that respondents were unemployed and had a long history of substance abuse and involvement with Child Protective Services (CPS). The petition alleged that CPS received complaints in 2015 and 2016 that respondent-mother tested had positive for benzodiazepines and methadone while she was pregnant with LL and that respondent-mother neglected the children due to her substance abuse. Specifically, the petition alleged that respondent-mother slept during the day and that the minor children had wet diapers, always cried, were filthy, and went outside without supervision. It was further alleged that respondent-mother's oldest child had reported seeing needles, crack pipes, and "packets with white/pink stuff in it" and hearing respondents argue about their respective drug use. TM reported seeing a needle on top of the refrigerator, and he indicated that respondent-mother told him that it belonged to respondent-father. The petition also alleged that respondent-mother's oldest child did not feel safe with respondents because he was afraid that they were going upset "the wrong person/drug dealer." It was further alleged that respondent-father had multiple convictions related to his substance abuse and that respondent-mother had sought treatment in the past.
Respondent-mother's oldest child was not subject to the termination proceedings because he reached the age of majority during the pendency of the case.
A preliminary hearing was held on July 6, 2017, and respondents were not present. Following the hearing, the trial court authorized the petition and ordered that the children would be placed under petitioner's care, custody, and supervision. Respondents were granted supervised parenting time.
After an adjudication trial, at which CPS investigator Brianna Filhart testified, the trial court concluded that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). At the initial dispositional hearing, the foster-care agency charged with respondents' case presented a case service plan that required respondents to (1) complete a psychiatric evaluation and comply with the recommendations of the psychiatric evaluation, (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation and participate in substance abuse treatment, as well as random drug screening, (3) maintain appropriate and adequate housing, (4) gain employment, and (5) participate in parenting classes. At that time, respondents indicated that they had reviewed the proposed case service plan and recommendations and had no objections.
Respondents showed progress during the first reporting period. Respondent-father established employment, respondents obtained housing, neither respondent tested positive for unprescribed substances, and both respondents were reported as being cooperative and engaged in the recommended services. However, by the next reporting period both respondents were missing parenting-time visits and drug screens. The drug screens that were completed revealed 18 positive drug screens for respondent-father and 16 positive drug screens for respondent-mother. Over time, respondents stopped complying with the case service plan and respondents continued to test positive for drugs. Ultimately, petitioner filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). The supplemental petition was authorized by the trial court, and termination proceedings commenced.
Neither respondent attended the termination hearing. The testimony of the foster-care worker, Erin Vedrode; her supervisor, Sara Dingman; and the parenting-time supervisor, Bridgette Hayes, supported that respondents had ceased all communication with the foster-care agency and had ceased attending parenting-time visits. Further, respondents' residence appeared to have been vacated, and respondents had not provided any updated contact information or employment information since respondent-father's layoff from his job in February 2019. Ultimately, the trial court found that statutory grounds for terminating respondents' parental rights had been established and that termination of their parental rights was in the children's best interests. These appeals followed.
II. HEARSAY EVIDENCE
In Docket No. 350001, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements and testimony from Filhart at the adjudication trial. Although we agree that the trial court plainly erred, we disagree that the error affected respondent-mother's substantial rights.
Claims of "adjudication errors raised after the trial court has terminated parental rights are reviewed for plain error." In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). Furthermore, the evidence was admitted without timely objection. A trial court is generally not obligated to strike testimony sua sponte in the absence of an objection or any other request from counsel to preclude that evidence. See People v Jones, 66 Mich App 223, 232-233; 238 NW2d 813 (1975). Thus, our review is limited to plain error affecting respondent-mother's substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). An error generally will not affect substantial rights if it did not affect the outcome of the proceedings. Id.
"In Michigan, child protective proceedings comprise two phases: the adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase." In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). During the adjudicative phase, the family court determines whether to take jurisdiction of the children. Id. "[T]he term 'jurisdiction' refers to the probate court's authority to hear and decide a case on the basis of a finding of fact that the child belongs to the class of children over whom the court has the power to act." In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 433; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). The "fact-finding adjudication of an authorized petition to determine if the minor comes within the jurisdiction of the court" is called a "trial." MCR 3.903(A)(27). During the adjudicative phase, the rules of evidence apply, and legally admissible evidence is required. In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 536-537; 711 NW2d 426 (2006). See also MCR 3.972(c)(1). Hearsay is inadmissible unless the rules of evidence provide otherwise. MRE 802. MRE 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
At the adjudication trial, Filhart testified that she received a complaint on July 3, 2017, that respondents had left the minor children with a relative "[a]bout 10 days" before "and that [respondents] were not coming back to pick them up." According to Filhart, "there were concerns" that respondents were in Flint and "were using substances." On July 3, 2017, Filhart went to the relative's home. The relative indicated that he intended to continue to care for the children because he was under the impression that respondents would return in two days. The relative further indicated that he was "okay to keep them until that point." Filhart testified that she agreed to allow the minor children to remain with the relative for "a couple more days." However, on July 5, 2017, Filhart received a telephone call from respondent-father's sister, informing Filhart that she did not believe that respondents planned to return. Respondent-father's sister indicated that she had offered to get respondents from Flint, but that they did not "want to come home." Filhart testified that she was informed by respondent-father's sister and the relative who was caring for the minor children that they did not have "proper legal authority to care for [the minor children] in the event that it was necessary[.]" At the time Filhart spoke to respondent-father's sister, two of the children had gone to stay with a different relative in Osceola County.
Filhart testified that her attempt to locate respondents at their home was unsuccessful and that respondents' relatives did not have a phone number for respondents. Filhart agreed that, because respondent-mother failed to provide a phone number, no one would be able to contact her in the event that one of the children had "gotten a severe illness or had to be hospitalized . . . ." Furthermore, according to Filhart, the children were interviewed by workers in Osceola County. Filhart testified that respondent-mother's two oldest children raised concerns with the Osceola County worker about respondents' drug use. Filhart also testified that other foster-care workers had informed her that, after the preliminary hearing, respondent-mother entirely failed to attend parenting time with the minor children despite multiple attempts to schedule visitation. According to Filhart, other caseworkers had attempted to contact respondents 14 times.
On appeal, respondent-mother argues that admissible evidence was not presented to support that respondents left the minor children with the relative for over 11 days and that, during that time, respondents did not provide proper care and custody for the minor children by providing the relative with a power of attorney and with respondents' contact information. We agree with respondent-mother that Filhart's testimony about the statements of the relative, respondent-father's sister, and the Osceola County case worker were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the trial court should exercise jurisdiction because respondent-mother failed to provide proper care and custody and because she could not provide a fit home because she was abusing illegal substances. We also agree that the trial court considered the evidence when deciding that a preponderance of the evidence supported exercising jurisdiction over the minor children.
Specifically, when determining that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children, the trial court held the following:
The Court would find that there is a preponderance to find that there has been abandonment. An abandonment that occurred for 11—12 days, is un—uncontested that is the case. Certainly, the attempt by the Department of Health and Human Services that 14 different phone calls were unreturned as to any type of contact with the children during the interim period here, is really pretty stunning.
There is—there was no Power of Attorney, and although the home was appropriate, certainly the Court would find that abandoning children for a length of time such as this, is absolutely inappropriate. The Court finds that jurisdiction as to all five children has been found and we will set this matter for disposition.
Although the trial court plainly erred by considering hearsay evidence when deciding whether it was appropriate to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children, we conclude that respondent-mother has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the error was outcome determinative. In relevant part, MCL 712A.2 provides the trial court with:
(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age found within the county:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship . . . .
* * *
(C) "Without proper custody or guardianship" does not mean a parent has placed the juvenile with another person who is legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile and who is able to and does provide the juvenile with proper care and maintenance.
At no point below did respondent-mother dispute that she left the minor children in the care of a relative for over 11 days without providing the relative with any way of contacting her or with a power of attorney in case of an emergency with the children. Respondent-mother never alleged to the trial court that the relative was "legally responsible" for the care and maintenance of the minor children, and the record does not support such a conclusion. Additionally, there are no arguments on appeal that the relative, respondent-father's sister, the other caseworkers, or respondent-mother's two oldest children would have testified in a manner that was inconsistent with Filhart's testimony if they had been called to testify at the adjudication trial.
More importantly, admissible evidence was introduced at the adjudication trial to support that respondent-mother had failed to provide proper and necessary care to the minor children. Specifically, Filhart testified that she has reason to believe that the respondents were not providing care to their children, and that she went to the relative's home on July 3, 2017. There she observed that respondents were gone and the relative was caring for the minor children. After speaking with the relative, Filhart decided to permit the minor children to remain in the relative's care. However, after receiving information from respondent-father's sister several days later, Filhart found that it was necessary to file the petition. Before the preliminary hearing was held, Filhart unsuccessfully attempted to locate respondents at their home, and she was also unable reach them by phone. Respondent-mother did not attend the preliminary hearing. Filhart testified that, on the day of the preliminary hearing, she spoke with respondent-father, who claimed that he was "stranded" in Flint because he and respondent-mother were having issues with their motor vehicle. Given the facts at issue in this case, we fail to see how respondent-mother's substantial rights were affected by the trial court considering hearsay evidence when determining that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children.
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that respondent-mother's substantial rights were affected, respondent-mother would not automatically be entitled to reversal. Rather, "[r]eversal is warranted . . . when the plain, forfeited error . . . seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). As already stated, respondent-mother does not argue that the relative, respondent-father's sister, her two oldest children, or the other caseworkers would have offered testimony that was inconsistent with Filhart's testimony. Additionally, throughout a majority of the proceeding, respondent-mother tested positive for cocaine and did not consistently attend visitation with the minor children. Importantly, it was not until after the minor children had been in care for over 20 months and after respondent-mother had failed to comply with and benefit from the case service plan that termination proceedings were initiated. As discussed later, overwhelming evidence supported termination of respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii) and that termination was in the minor children's best interests. Based on this record, we conclude that respondent-mother is not entitled to relief under plain-error review.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Docket No. 350001, respondent-mother also argues that her counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to object to Filhart's testimony, which was "obviously" hearsay. In termination cases, "this Court applies by analogy the principles of ineffective assistance of counsel as they have developed in the criminal law context." In re Simon, 171 Mich App 443, 447; 431 NW2d 71 (1988). Because respondent-mother's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unpreserved, this Court's review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent must show that: (1) counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced her. People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 290; 806 NW2d 676 (2011), quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
Although counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because counsel failed to object to portions of Filhart's testimony, we conclude that respondent-mother cannot establish that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's error. Indeed, the petition in this case outlined that respondent-mother had a history of drug use and CPS involvement, and respondent-mother never disputed that she left the minor children without proper care and custody for several days. Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, throughout this case, respondent-mother's own actions, including her drug use, absence from the children's lives, and other barriers were unresolved and eventually led to the termination of her parental rights. In whole, we are not persuaded that the outcome of these proceedings would have been different had respondent-mother's trial counsel raised objections to Filhart's testimony.
IV. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondents both argue that the trial court clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate their parental rights. We disagree.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). "We review the trial court's determination for clear error." Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made," with the reviewing court "defer[ring] to the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014) (citation omitted).
We find that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established, by clear and convincing evidence, a statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c) provides, in relevant part, that termination is proper when
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
In this case, the dispositional order regarding the children and respondents was entered on October 25, 2017. The termination hearing was held on May 15, 2019, thereby satisfying the requirement that 182 or more days had elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c). As noted above, jurisdiction was proper on the basis that respondents had failed to provide proper and necessary care to the minor children. Respondents' barriers at the beginning of the case were identified as substance abuse, lack of stable housing and employment, and allegations of neglect. At the initial disposition, the trial court adopted the case service plan, which required each respondent to (1) complete a psychiatric evaluation and comply with the recommendations of the psychiatric evaluation, (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation and participate in substance abuse treatment, as well as random drug screening, (3) maintain appropriate and adequate housing, (4) gain employment, and (5) participate in parenting classes. Further, as the case progressed, additional recommendations were adopted by the trial court, including:
1. Have parenting time supervised/unsupervised at the discretion of DHHS.
2. Complete and comply with all recommendations outlined in the psychological evaluation.
3. To actively take part in all needed services and work towards reunification. For example, scheduling and keeping appointments, and being truthful to staff working with the family.
4. Maintain safe and stable housing. This includes, but is not limited to paying household bills on time.
5. Obtain employment or be financially stable.
6. Maintain at least monthly contact with the caseworker.
7. Contact the Court's financial officer to determine appropriate support or community service.
8. Provide a written release of information for all service providers to share information regarding participation and progress in services.
9. Cooperate fully with the caseworker and treatment plan.
10. Report any changes in address, phone number, circumstance, or progress to the DHS [sic] Caseworker and to the Court in writing within three (3) days.
Respondents both completed their psychiatric evaluations, and received identical recommendations for participation in individual psychotherapy. However, at the termination hearing, both Vedrode's and Dingman's testimony indicated that neither respondent followed through with the recommendations for individual psychotherapy. During the proceedings, respondent-mother attended an assessment with Sacred Heart Rehabilitation for her substance abuse; it was reported that although she was scheduled to attend group sessions, she had not been attending and would not return phone calls from her therapist. Indeed, Vedrode's and Dingman's testimony at trial indicated that neither respondent followed through with appointments to create treatment plans following their substance abuse assessments. Further, Vedrode indicated that both respondents continued to have positive or missed drug screens each reporting period. Overall, respondent-mother had tested positive for cocaine in 36 of 100 drug screens, and respondent-father had tested positive for cocaine in 21 of 70 drug screens.
Respondent-mother asserts that the evidence of her substance use was contested and rebutted by respondents' expert. Likewise, respondent-father asserts that the trial court should have given greater consideration to his insistence of false positives given the conflicting expert testimony. However, this Court must give deference to the trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court concluded that respondents' substance use was adequately proven by the Forensic Fluid lab results, this Court will not second-guess that conclusion. Moreover, despite an increased cut-off level for positive screens proposed by Dr. Ted Simon, several of the random sampling drug test results at issue throughout this case were quantified at levels that would have exceeded even his proposed higher cut-off level.
Although respondents were able to maintain housing for most of the duration of the case, as of early April 2019, respondents had not been heard from, and the testimony during the termination hearing supported that respondents had vacated their residence without providing any updated contact information to the foster-care agency. Consequently, at the time of termination, there was no evidence that respondents had stable housing that was appropriate for the minor children. Furthermore, there was no evidence that either respondent was gainfully employed following respondent-father's layoff in February 2019. Throughout the pendency of the case, respondents missed many visitation opportunities with the minor children. Importantly, even when the visits were scheduled to occur in respondents' own home, respondents would cancel visitation. Visitations never progressed to unsupervised visits because of respondents' continued substance abuse issues, and all communication with the foster-care agency and visitations with the children had ceased by the beginning of April 2019. Consequently, at the time of the termination hearing, respondents had not seen the minor children in over 40 days.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that respondents would have been able to rectify these issues within a reasonable time given the ages of the minor children. Respondents demonstrated poor judgment and a lack of commitment to their sobriety and to regaining custody of the minor children during the proceeding. Indeed, respondents failed to attend the termination hearing. Although respondents had difficulty parenting their respective children, respondent-mother gave birth to another child during the proceeding. Given the lack of evidence that respondents could maintain their sobriety, stable housing, and employment, it is unlikely that they would do so within a reasonable time in the future. At the time of termination, the minor children were between the ages of 24 months and 13 years old. The minor children had been in care for almost two years, and they required permanency and stability. Thus, the trial court's finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was proper pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii) does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Because we have concluded that at least one ground for termination existed, we need not specifically consider the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision in Docket Nos. 350001 and 350003. Id. at 461.
The child that was born during the proceeding is not subject to this appeal.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject respondent-mother's argument in Docket No. 350001 that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts towards reunification because the only barrier remaining at the time of termination of her parental rights was substance use, and no referrals were made for outpatient treatment or individual counseling. This issue is unpreserved, In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012), and we review for plain error affecting substantial rights, In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 8.
As part of the case service plan, respondent-mother was ordered to complete a substance abuse evaluation and participate in substance abuse treatment, as well as submit to random drug screening once a week. Respondent-mother completed a substance abuse evaluation, but she failed to attend the follow up appointment that was scheduled to create her treatment plan. Additionally, with the exception of one reporting period, respondent-mother continuously tested positive for illegal substances. At various times throughout the proceeding, both respondent-mother and her counsel reported that respondent-mother was attending services at Victory Clinic, where she was participating in a methadone program and receiving individual counseling. Indeed, Vedrode testified that the reason she did not refer respondent-mother for outpatient services was because respondent-mother was already receiving services at Victory Clinic when she started working on the case. Furthermore, respondent-mother attended Sacred Heart Rehabilitation in Bay City, where she underwent her assessment and was scheduled to begin group sessions and create a treatment plan. For the most part, however, respondent failed to meaningfully participate in the services offered by petitioner. During the proceedings, respondent-mother unilaterally ceased attending these sessions and communicating with her therapist. Given that respondent-mother failed to avail herself of the services that were available to her, we are not persuaded that she would have fared better even if petitioner had offered other services. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). Thus, the trial court did not commit plain error affecting respondent-mother's substantial rights when it determined that petitioner made reasonable efforts to promote reunification and that respondent failed to "uphold her commensurate responsibility to engage in and benefit from th[e] services" offered by petitioner. See Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
V. BEST INTERESTS
In both dockets, respondents argue that the trial court erred by finding that termination of their parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
A trial court's best-interest determination is also reviewed for clear error. In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 226; 894 NW2d 653 (2016). "Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). "In making its best-interest determination, the trial court may consider the whole record, including evidence introduced by any party." In re Medina, 317 Mich App at 237 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
[T]he court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).]
In support of their argument that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination of their parental rights was in the children's best interests, respondents cite the parent-child bonds that existed in this case. However, this Court focuses on the children—not the parents—when reviewing best interests, In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), and the record herein supports that the minor children did not share a healthy bond with respondents given respondents' behavior. Between July 6, 2017 and August 4, 2017, respondents did not attend parenting time despite efforts on the part of petitioner to schedule it. Although respondents later began participating in parenting time, respondents' attendance was inconsistent, and they were never granted unsupervised parenting time because they continued to test positive for illegal substances. Testimony supported that the children exhibited behavioral issues when respondents failed to attend scheduled parenting times. Beginning in April 2019, respondents stopped attending any parenting-time visits. This was the case even though respondents were aware that the trial court had authorized petitioner to file a petition for termination of their parental rights. At the time of termination, evidence supported that the children's bond with respondents was deteriorating from the lack of visitation over an extended period of time. Consequently, respondents did not have a healthy parent-child bond with the minor children. See In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 196-197; 646 NW2d 506 (2002) (holding that the fact that there was a "serious dispute" on the record concerning whether the respondent had "a healthy bond" with her children supported that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests).
Additionally, the parent-child bond is only one factor for the trial court to consider. See Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41. As discussed above, respondents failed to comply with their case service plan. Despite several opportunities to remedy the barriers to reunification, respondents failed to demonstrate a benefit from the services provided, stopped communicating with their caseworker, and stopped visiting the children. Although the minor children had been in care for almost two years, respondents demonstrated an inability to provide stability and permanency to the children. In fact, respondents did not appear at the termination hearing, thereby evidencing disinterest and disregard for the children's well-being. Meanwhile, the children were doing well in their pre-adoptive foster homes, where they had the opportunity to achieve permanency and stability. According to Vedrode, the minor children had healthy bonds with their foster parents. Given the length of these proceedings and the children's ages, the children were in desperate need of stability and permanency, which the foster families were able to provide. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondents' parental rights to the minor children was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed in both appeals.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Anica Letica