Opinion
E076862
11-30-2022
In re the Marriage of PATTI and JONATHAN SHAPIRO. v. JONATHAN D. SHAPIRO, Appellant. PATTI S. SHAPIRO, Respondent,
Law Office of Iris Joan Finsilver and Iris Joan Finsilver, for Appellant. Westover Law Group and Andrew L. Westover, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. IND1302153. Mickie Elaine Reed, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Law Office of Iris Joan Finsilver and Iris Joan Finsilver, for Appellant.
Westover Law Group and Andrew L. Westover, for Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal in an extensive marital dissolution action largely centers around the parties' dispute over a mortgage that they could not resolve despite the family court's repeated efforts. The husband, Jonathan Shapiro, argues the family court made a series of procedural and substantive errors in its attempt to resolve the parties' disagreement about the mortgage. We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family court proceedings lasted over eight years and the record spans over 2,000 pages. Jonathan's briefing, which is at times unclear and difficult to follow, has made it challenging to understand the pertinent facts and proceedings.
Patti Shapiro petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Jonathan in December 2013. The proceedings continued for over four years and resulted in a judgment of dissolution in August 2017 entered by the Honorable Dale R. Wells after a multi-day bench trial. Patti and Jonathan signed the judgment and their attorneys approved it as to form and content. The judgment distributed the parties' property, including a house in La Quinta that they bought with community funds. Judge Wells awarded the house to Jonathan, which was valued at $1,050,000 with a $1,048,000 mortgage. The judgment, however, did not address Patti's interest in or liability for the mortgage.
We refer to the parties by their first name to avoid confusion because they share the same last name. We mean no disrespect.
Jonathan subsequently filed a Request for Order (RFO) directing Patti to execute an interspousal transfer deed to transfer her interest in the La Quinta house to Jonathan. Patti responded by asking the family court to order Jonathan to refinance the mortgage under his name only so that she would not be liable for it.
At a hearing on April 30, 2018, Judge Wells ordered Patti to execute an interspousal transfer deed by the end of the week so that Jonathan could refinance the mortgage. Judge Wells then gave Jonathan until July 13, 2018 to refinance. Judge Wells explained that if Jonathan did not comply with that deadline, he would "deed [the house] back to both of them" and sanction Jonathan.
Patti executed an interspousal transfer deed the next day. On July 13, 2018, the last day for Jonathan to comply with Judge Wells's order, Jonathan applied with Bank of America to refinance the mortgage. The application was denied.
Because Jonathan failed to refinance the property, Patti filed an RFO in February 2020 asking that her name be added to the La Quinta property's title or that the property be sold. At a hearing on October 5, 2020, Commissioner Mickie E. Reed ordered Jonathan to refinance or assume the mortgage so that Patti's name would be removed and she would not be liable for the mortgage. If Jonathan failed to do so, Commissioner Reed would order that the property be listed for sale by January 15, 2021. By making these orders, Commissioner Reed intended to "complete the order that Judge Wells began."
At Jonathan's request, Commissioner Reed issued a Statement of Decision (the SOD) on October 27, 2020, memorializing these and other orders. The SOD concluded by directing Patti to "prepare a formal order after hearing."
Jonathan filed objections to the SOD about a week later. He disputed, among other things, that Commissioner Reed properly ordered him to sell the house if he could not refinance the mortgage as ordered, because she did not indicate she would order the property sold at the October 5 hearing. Commissioner Reed overruled Jonathan's objections, rejected his arguments, ordered that all previous orders remained in effect, and directed Patti to prepare proposed "Findings and Order After Hearing" (FOAH)
Shortly afterward, Jonathan moved for a new trial. At a hearing on January 21, 2021, Commissioner Reed denied Jonathan's request for a continuance and denied his motion for a new trial.
About a month later, Patti filed proposed FOAH as directed. On March 09, 2021, Commissioner Reed filed a FOAH, which effectively adopted Patti's proposed FOAH. The FOAH made a series of findings and orders that addressed Jonathan's request for a SOD, his objections to the SOD, and the parties' remaining disputes. Jonathan timely appealed.
Commissioner Reed filed an amended FOAH to correct a date in the original FOAH.
III. DISCUSSION
Jonathan argues Commissioner Reed made seven errors. We find no prejudicial error.
A. The Mortgage
In her FOAH, Commissioner Reed concluded that Judge Wells intended for Jonathan to refinance the La Quinta property under his name alone or remove Patti's name from the mortgage so that she would not be liable for it. She found, however, that the mortgage on the La Quinta property was an "omitted liability" that remained unaddressed by Judge Wells's judgment. Relying on Henn v. Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323 (Henn), Commissioner Reed thus awarded the mortgage to Jonathan and ordered him to either finance the property under his name or assume the mortgage. If he failed to do so by the end of 2020, Commissioner Reed would order the property sold.
Jonathan contends Commissioner Reed erred in doing so because the judgment awarded the La Quinta property to him as his separate property. Thus, according to Jonathan, any dispute over the mortgage had been fully resolved by the judgment and could not be subsequently litigated.
In Henn, the parties' marriage dissolution judgment did not address the husband's military retirement pension, which he had partially earned during the marriage. (Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 327.) Years after the judgment issued, the wife requested that the family court divide the husband's pension as community property. (Ibid.) The family court denied the wife's request, but our Supreme Court reversed. (Ibid.) The Henn court found that the pension was community property and should have been divided, but it was omitted from the judgment of dissolution. (Id. at p. 330.) The judgment therefore did not "extinguish" the wife's interest in the pension. (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the Henn court rejected the husband's argument that the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion prevented the wife from litigating the issue. (Id. at pp. 330-331.)
The judgment said nothing about the mortgage while awarding the property to Jonathan as his separate property. The judgment of dissolution thus did not resolve Patti's interest in and liability for the mortgage on the La Quinta property. Like the husband's pension in Henn, the mortgage was subject to later litigation because it remained an unadjudicated debt after the judgment of dissolution. As both Judge Wells and Commissioner Reed correctly noted long after the judgment had been entered, Patti remained liable for the mortgage so long as it was under her name and thus remained a community debt. (See Fam. Code § 910, subd. (a) [" . . . the community estate is liable for debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage...."].) Commissioner Reed therefore properly "complete[d]" Judge Wells's order by directing Jonathan to remove Patti's name from the mortgage or assume it under his name only. As Henn shows, the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion did not bar Commissioner Reed from making that order.
B. New Trial
Jonathan argues Commissioner Reed erroneously denied his motion for a new trial. In his view, a new trial was warranted because Commissioner Reed made orders about the mortgage that Patti did not request in her RFO. Jonathan thus contends Commissioner Reed exceeded her jurisdiction and denied him due process by making orders outside the scope of Patti's RFO.
To support his position, Jonathan relies heavily on In re Marriage of Siegel (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 944, but that case does not help him. There, the wife filed an RFO asking the family court to order the husband to disclose information about an insurance policy. (Id. at pp. 946-947.) The family court ruled on the RFO by ordering the husband to establish a six-figure trust for the wife. (Ibid.) The Siegel court held the family court denied the husband due process because he had no notice that the court would make that order given the wife's limited request in her RFO. (Id. at pp. 953-954.)
Here, however, Patti's February 2020 RFO requested that Commissioner Reed order Patti's name back on the La Quinta property title or that the property be sold. In her declaration in support of the RFO, Patti explained that she had signed the interspousal transfer deed almost two years prior yet she remained liable for the La Quinta property's mortgage despite having no ownership interest in it. In his response to the RFO, Jonathan argued Patti's request should be denied for many reasons, including that "it was impossible" to take Patti's name off the mortgage, the judgment was final and rendered Patti liable for the loan, and Patti had repeatedly lied to the court about other matters.
Patti's RFO and Jonathan's response to it show that he had notice that Commissioner Reed could make the orders on the mortgage that she did at a later hearing. Jonathan was not denied due process like the husband in Siegel.
Commissioner Reed also did not exceed her jurisdiction by ordering that Jonathan had to take Patti off the mortgage or that the property would be sold. Patti's RFO unambiguously asked Commissioner Reed to order the property to be sold or, "[i]n the alternative," that she be added back on to the title. Jonathan provides no authority that suggests Commissioner Reed lacked jurisdiction to rule on that request.
C. Patti's Stipulation to the Judgment
Jonathan argues Commissioner Reed erroneously found that Patti did not stipulate to the terms of the judgment, but stipulated only to its form and content. In his view, Patti assented to the judgment's terms and thus agreed that Jonathan assumed the liability for the mortgage.
Even if Jonathan is correct that Patti agreed to the terms of the judgment, any error was harmless. Once Judge Wells entered the judgment, it became an enforceable judgment. Whether Patti stipulated to its terms or only its form and content is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. As explained above, the judgment did not adjudicate the parties' respective liability for the mortgage. Patti's assent to the terms of the judgment (or just its form and contents) does not change that fact.
D. Judge Wells's Intent
Jonathan challenges Commissioner Reed's purported finding that Judge Wells "intended to modify the [j]udgment into perpetuity." He claims that Commissioner Reed incorrectly found he failed to a meet a non-existent deadline Judge Wells imposed to remove Patti from the loan. He also claims that Judge Wells never intended to order Jonathan to add Patti to the title or sell the property if he failed to remove her from the mortgage.
We reject Jonathan's arguments. At the April 30, 2018 hearing, Judge Wells ordered Jonathan to refinance the La Quinta property by July 13, 2018, so that Patti would be removed from the mortgage and not liable for it. Judge Wells explained that if Jonathan failed to do so, he would "deed it back to both of them," meaning that he would order Patti to be placed back on the title.
When Jonathan failed to comply, Patti moved for sanctions. Judge Wells's refusal to sanction Jonathan does not show, as he suggests, that Judge Wells did not intend to order Jonathan to add Patti's name to the La Quinta property title or order the property sold. Judge Wells declined to sanction Jonathan because both parties had "misbehaved in this case." Judge Wells then chastised both parties for failing to bring this case to an end and told them they "need to go on their way" and "leave each other alone." Because the parties' dispute over the La Quinta property ensued for years, Commissioner Reed found it appropriate to order Jonathan to remove Patti from the mortgage or assume it. Jonathan fails to provide any argument as to why this was improper, even if Judge Wells may not have ordered the same relief.
E. Continuance
Jonathan argues Commissioner Reed erroneously denied his request for a continuance. Even if so, Jonathan does not argue that the denial prejudiced him in any way. He therefore fails to show, as he must, that Commissioner Reed committed reversible error by denying him a continuance. (See Reales Investment v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463, 468-469; People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 678.)
F. FL-150 Form
Commissioner Reed found it unnecessary for Patti to file a FL-150 "Income and Expense Declaration" form before issuing the FOAH. Jonathan argues this finding violated California Rules of Court, rule 5.92(2)(A), which states that a party in a family law case requesting an RFO concerning "the parties' property or finance" must file an FL-150 along with the RFO. We assume without deciding that Jonathan is correct. Even so, Jonathan provides no argument on how Patti's failure to file an FL-150 prejudiced him. He therefore fails to show, as he must, that Commissioner Reed committed reversible error by finding it unnecessary for Patti to file an FL-150. (See In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519, 524 [family court's violation of Rule of Court was not reversible error because it did not prejudice appellant]; Estate of Cooper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1121["While a Rule of Court phrased in mandatory language is generally . . . binding on the courts . . . departure from it is not reversible error unless prejudice is shown."].)
G. Jurisdiction Over La Quinta Property
Jonathan's final two-paragraph argument is that Commissioner Reed lacked jurisdiction over the La Quinta property after Judge Wells awarded it to him as his separate property. Jonathan forfeited the argument by failing to support it with any authority. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [appellant forfeits argument made without analysis or authority].)
H. Sanctions
Patti requests that we sanction Jonathan for filing an unnecessarily large record and a frivolous appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(2) [party may be sanctioned for "[i]ncluding in the record any matter not reasonably material to the appeal's determination"], rule 8.276(a)(3) [party may be sanctioned for "[t]aking a frivolous appeal"] Although we agree with Patti that the clerk's transcript includes many irrelevant filings and that this appeal lacks merit, we impose sanctions "sparingly" and only to deter "the most egregious conduct." (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 651.) Jonathan and his counsel's conduct does not satisfy this stringent standard. We therefore deny Patti's request for sanctions.
IV. DISPOSITION
The family court's orders are affirmed. Patti's motion for sanctions is denied. Patti may recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: MILLER Acting P. J., MENETREZ J.