Opinion
G058574
11-01-2022
In re Marriage of RYAL W. and ALICIA MARIE RICHARDS. v. ALICIA MARIE RICHARDS, Appellant; RYAL W. RICHARDS, Respondent, JONATHAN RICHARDS et al., Appellants.
Alicia Marie Richards, in pro. per., for Appellant. Greg Remsen, in pro. per., for Appellant. Jonathan Richards, in pro. per., for Appellant. Lawrence Remsen, in pro. per., for Appellant. Law Offices of Kevin E. Robinson and Kevin E. Robinson for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeals from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. 15D009634 Andre De La Cruz, Judge. Motion to dismiss denied. Consolidated appeals to be treated as petitions for writ of mandate and denied.
Alicia Marie Richards, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Greg Remsen, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Jonathan Richards, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Lawrence Remsen, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Law Offices of Kevin E. Robinson and Kevin E. Robinson for Respondent.
OPINION
O'LEARY, P. J.
Alicia Marie Richards and Ryal W. Richards have been embroiled in a long drawn-out and highly acrimonious dissolution action for several years. Alicia has filed multiple unsuccessful appeals in connection with the couple's stipulated judgment and Ryal's efforts to enforce it. This appeal relates to Ryal's subpoena of Alicia's bank records in preparation for his postjudgment request for an order modifying child custody, visitation, child support, and spousal support. Alicia has appealed from the trial court's order denying her motion to quash the subpoena and imposing a $2,000 discovery sanction.
We will refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion.
(In re Marriage of Richards (Jan. 9, 2020, G055927) [nonpub. opn.] (Richards I) [affirmed order refusing to set aside stipulated marital dissolution judgment ordering sale of family residence]; In re Marriage of Richards (Jan. 9, 2020, G056626) [nonpub. opn.] (Richards II) [regarding postjudgment orders]; In re Marriage of Richards (May 18, 2020, G056921) [nonpub. opn.] (Richards III) [postjudgment orders regarding enforcement of judgment]; In re Marriage of Richards (Oct. 6, 2020, G057803) [nonpub. opn.] (Richards IV) [affirmed 2018 orders denying motions to quash/vacate Ryal's writ of possession].) We have also considered tangentially related appeals arising from the dissolution action. (See Lavacot v. Richards (Mar. 30, 2020, G056745) [nonpub. opn.] (Lavacot) [Alicia dispute with her great-grandparents' trust for money to buy out Ryal's interest in the family residence]; Zech v. Richards (Mar. 8, 2022, G057798) [nonpub. opn.] (Zech) [Alicia's dispute with former attorney, who prevailed in his breach of contract action for unpaid legal fees]; Richards v. Richards (May 2, 2022, G059675) [nonpub. opn.] [dismissal of Alicia's civil fraud action against Ryal]; Richards v. Strang (May 2, 2022, G059305) [nonpub. opn.] [dismissal of Alicia's action against Ryal's mother].)
Several members of Alicia's family filed a notice of appeal challenging the same discovery ruling. We consolidated their appeal with Alicia's appeal, however, it is well settled discovery orders are not appealable. Nevertheless, for judicial economy purposes, we grant Alicia's request to treat the appeals as writ petitions and deny Ryal's motion to dismiss the appeals as arising from non-appealable orders.
Gregory Remsen, Johnathan Richards, and Lawrence Remsen jointly filed a notice of appeal and indicated they were self-represented litigants. The briefing does not explain their relationship to Alicia or connection to these dissolution proceedings. As set forth in our prior opinion, Lawrence is Alicia's father. (Lavacot, supra, G056745.) Gregory (referred to in the briefing and other court documents as Greg) is Alicia's brother. (Ibid.) For the sake of consistency, we will refer to him as Greg in this opinion. Johnathan is Alicia's adult son. (Richards IV, supra, G057803.)
As will be explained in more detail below, we deny Alicia's petition. Alicia did not meet her burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to compel or that there was any prejudicial error with respect to the discovery ruling or sanction award. We deny her family's petition because they are nonparties who failed to prove they had standing to challenge discovery orders in a family law matter.
FACTS
This case has a lengthy and complex procedural history. However, we need not recount those facts because they are not relevant to the narrow issue before us, and Alicia has designated a limited appellate record.
Accordingly, we incorporate by reference our factual summary of the underling case outlined in Richards I, supra, G055927. Suffice it to say, Alicia and Ryal married in 1994, and they stipulated to a dissolution judgment in 2017. (Ibid.) At the time, the couple had three minor children and one in college. (Ibid.) Ryal has repeatedly tried to enforce the judgment and sell the family residence, and Alicia has managed to stop this from happening for several years.
Turning our attention to the limited facts relevant to this discovery dispute, our record shows that on August 19, 2019, Alicia filed a motion to quash a subpoena to produce bank records. Six days prior, Ryal had served a notice to consumer and a subpoena duces tecum for the production of records. The subpoena requested that the Schools First Credit Union (the Credit Union) produce the following: "All account statements, checks, drafts, and other documents regarding all accounts in which . . . Alicia M. Richards aka Alicia M. Remsen has any interest including, but not limited to, possessory, signature powers, or beneficiary interest therein including the 'Remsen Family Trust.'" Ryal declared there existed good cause for the production of these documents because he "ha[d] no other access to this information" and "[t]he financial status of [Alicia was] material to the issue of child and spousal support."
In her motion to quash, Alicia alleged there was no good cause for production of the subpoenaed documents and the service of the "notice [to] consumer" was defective. She noted Ryal failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.410 due to his failure to serve proper notice on all interested parties.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
In the supporting memorandum, Alicia asserted the subpoena sought information protected by attorney-client privilege. Without providing a copy of the Remsen Family Trust (the Trust), she alleged the subpoena violated "subsection C" of the Trust. She generally complained the bank account information was irrelevant to the upcoming hearing. She believed Ryal's request was harassing, overbroad, and unnecessarily burdensome. She maintained Ryal, "failed to identify with specificity each individual category of item sought" as required by section 2031.030. Finally, Alicia asserted the subpoena violated the privacy rights of "non-party Trustee-Greg Remsen." She added there were other nonparties, including Johnathan and Lawrence, who should have been served with the subpoena and provided an opportunity to object. She failed to explain her relationship to these nonparties, why they had standing to object, or the basis for their purported challenges.
Alicia asserted Ryal was being dishonest in claiming he needed the bank account information to prove Alicia was a trust beneficiary. She pointed out the Credit Union was "not a holder of the Trust" and Ryal found out about the Trust's assets during his deposition of the "family trustee." She added Ryal was aware she and the family trustee were litigating a dispute with the Cain Family Trust because this information was disclosed in her bankruptcy proceedings.
Alicia submitted a declaration in support of the motion to quash. She acknowledged the subpoena was part of Ryal's action for "a post judgment modification of child support, alimony, and custody in dissolution of marriage." Yet, she argued Ryal could easily obtain the information he needed, which she believed was discovery of the Trust's beneficiaries, by taking depositions rather than digging through bank records. She noted Greg also served an objection to the subpoena on Ryal's attorney on August 17, 2019, and this document was attached as an exhibit to Alicia's declaration.
The exhibit contained a document purportedly filed by Greg, a selfrepresented litigant. Greg stated he objected to the inspection demand set forth in the subpoena in his capacity of trustee of the Trust. He argued Ryal should have served him with the subpoena. He objected "to all categories of documents identified in the subpoena to the extent they seek the disclosure of documents and/or information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine." However, he did not specify the name of the attorney claiming this privilege or attach documents proving the Trust existed or that he was in fact the trustee. Moreover, nothing in our record suggests Greg filed a motion to quash in the trial court or that he joined in Alicia's motion.
In October 2019, Ryal filed an opposition to the motion to quash and requested attorney fees under section 2033.290, subdivision (d). He stated the subpoena asked for financial information about Alicia, which was an issue relevant to the upcoming hearing regarding modification of child and spousal support. He stated the Family Code clearly provided a party did not have a right to privacy to their financial information, including tax returns and bank accounts. Ryal stated the subpoena did not ask for any of Greg's records, and therefore, his objection was not "well founded and [was] a nonstarter." Ryal asked the trial court to impose monetary sanctions against Alicia for filing a frivolous motion to quash. He requested $2,000 and claimed this amount was supported by his attorney's declaration.
Alicia filed a reply claiming Ryal's discovery request was harassment because she would have attached her recent banking records with her income and expense declaration before the hearing. She offered to provide the trial court with an opportunity to conduct an in-camera inspection of the Trust. She promised to also produce a copy of an agreement, between her father and herself, that allegedly proved she was not a Trust beneficiary. She added her father could be available during the in-camera inspection to eliminate any hearsay objections. Her reply failed to include the name of her father. Alicia concluded Ryal's request for attorney fees should be denied due to his failure to comply with California Rules of Court, as well as his failure to pay child support, alimony, and household bills.
At the hearing, the trial court considered arguments from both parties. In its minute order, the court denied the motion to quash "with the following limitations": (1) Ryal was entitled to bank documents "wherein" Alicia was a "signatory, beneficiary, or has an interest in the account"; and (2) the records were limited in time from January 1, 2016, through to the present. The court ruled Alicia owed Ryal's counsel $2,000 in attorney fees and the sum would be paid out of her portion of the family residence sale proceeds.
DISCUSSION
After filing his respondent's brief, Ryal filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated appeals. He correctly noted discovery orders were generally not appealable. (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432-1433 ["There is no statutory provision for appeal from an order compelling compliance with a discovery order"].) However, based on Alicia's request and for reasons of judicial economy, we choose to treat this appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. As explained below, we conclude Alicia's numerous challenges to the trial court's discovery order lack merit.
"'"We review discovery orders under the abuse of discretion standard, and where the petitioner seeks relief from a discovery order that may undermine a privilege, we review the trial court's order by way of extraordinary writ." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493; see e.g., Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96 [writ relief where attorney ordered to violate attorney-client privilege in answering deposition questions].)
"Where there is a basis for the trial court's ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court's determination will be set aside only when it has been demonstrated that there was 'no legal justification' for the order granting or denying the discovery in question. [Citations.]" (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612.) Similarly, "'[t]he power to impose discovery sanctions is a broad discretion subject to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action.' [Citations.]" (Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.)
The trial court's order gave Ryal the right to access documents pertaining to Alicia's personal financial information. This type of information comes within the zone of privacy protected by the California Constitution. (Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 664 (Harris), disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.) However, the privacy right "is not absolute and, upon a showing of some compelling public interest, the right of privacy must give way." (Harris, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 664.)
In applying this balancing test, courts have long upheld orders requiring one spouse to disclose financial documents to the other spouse when child support is at issue. (Harris, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 664 [cases "involving child support necessarily involves the public interest"].) Each spouse has a compelling interest in "complete disclosure of all relevant information" to allow an independent review for purposes of determining disputed issues, including appropriate child support payments. (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 715; see also Fam. Code, § 2100, subd. (c) [public policy requires "full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities" in dissolution actions].) The state also has a compelling interest "to ensure that children receive adequate care and support" and to facilitate the just resolution of legal claims. (Harris, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 664; see also Hansen v. Dept. of Social Services (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 283, 293.)
Accordingly, absent unusual circumstances, a spouse's right to full and complete information outweighs the other spouse's privacy rights in financial documents, particularly when there are disputed questions involving a spouse's financial condition/income and regarding the appropriate spousal or child support amount. (See In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-1477; see also Thomas B. v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 255, 261-262.) Applying these well-settled legal principles, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining the requested financial documents were relevant to the pending disputed issues (child support and spousal support obligations) and that the need for this information outweighed Alicia's privacy rights. We found nothing in the record indicating there were unusual circumstances diminishing the strong relevance of this routine financial information (checking and savings account information and documents reflecting income).
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the requested financial documents did not relate to any other recognizable privacy rights or privileges. Neither Alicia nor her family members met their burden of proof in this regard. Greg, Jonathan, and Lawrence failed to submit any relevant evidence showing the subpoena related to their privileged financial information.
The trial court reasonably disregarded Greg's declaration that stated he had the right to object to the subpoena in his role as the Trust's trustee. Greg did not explain why he also believed he had standing to assert there was an attorney-client privilege at stake. The record contains no evidence, other than Greg's self-serving declaration, proving there was a Trust, he was trustee, or he was an attorney representing one of the parties. And we can only speculate as to why Jonathan and Lawrence believed they had standing to appeal the discovery ruling. They did not attempt to make an appearance in the action by filing an objection, moving for a protective order, or seeking to later overturn or modify the court's discovery order. The briefing does not mention what privacy rights these nonparties believed were at issue.
In light of the above, we conclude Greg's, Jonathan's, and Lawrence's appeal/writ petition must be denied because they were neither parties to this dissolution action, nor nonparties having standing to interfere in a child support hearing. Our record shows they did not file a motion to intervene. (Gray v. Begley (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1521 [way for nonparty to acquire appellate standing in the lawsuit]). Other steps a nonparty can take to gain standing are not applicable in this case. (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 2:276, pp. 2-177 to 2-178 [listing procedures for nonparty to become a party, such as by filing a motion to vacate the judgment, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or motion for new trial].) We have no reason to allow these nonparties to insert themselves into a discovery dispute, disrupting an already highly contentious dissolution action, and effectively delaying resolution of a child support issue without good cause.
We deny Alicia's writ petition because the trial court reasonably determined Alicia failed to present any evidence showing the subpoenaed documents contained information that was so confidential or private that her privacy rights, or those held by the Trust (if it existed), outweighed the need to have a complete and full disclosure of Alicia's financial condition. Because the continuing and pending disputes over child support depend on these facts, we cannot say the court's ruling was contrary to the law, was arbitrary, or was capricious.
DISPOSITION
The motion to dismiss is denied. We treat the consolidated appeals as petitions for a writ of mandate and deny the petitions. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, J. MARKS, J. [*]
[*]Judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.