Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. SF005060
SIMONS, J.
James George Fischer (Husband) appeals from the trial court’s order enforcing a 1998 judgment and marital settlement agreement. He contends the court erred in finding that he was estopped from relying on language in the agreement specifying a date for the calculation of respondent Summer Linda M. Giron’s (Wife) financial interest in the marital home. We conclude the court erred and remand for interpretation of the agreement and division of the value of the house.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because no respondent’s brief was filed, we decide the present appeal on the basis of the record and Husband’s opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2); Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.)
Husband and Wife were married in June 1991, and Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in November 1993. In September 1998, a final judgment of dissolution was filed. The judgment incorporated a marriage settlement agreement (Agreement) made by the parties in November 1993. The Agreement divided various marital assets, including the marital home, which was acquired by the parties in 1988.
In March 2006, Husband filed a motion to compel compliance with the 1998 judgment. In response, Wife claimed that Husband had not complied with the judgment. In August 2006, the trial court filed an order resolving a number of the claims, but not a dispute over ownership of the marital home. In November 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding division of the house, receiving testimony from Husband and Wife. In February 2007, the court filed a written decision awarding each party one-half of the house.
DISCUSSION
At issue in this case is the interpretation of provisions in the Agreement relating to division of the marital home. Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the usual statutory rules governing the interpretation of contracts. (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439; see Civ. Code, § 1635 et seq.)
The November 1993 Agreement allocated to Wife “[one-half o]wnership ([one-half] equity value as of December 31, 1992) of house, spa, deck, and all permanent fixtures” at the marital home in Suisun. The Agreement further provides, Wife “waives the right to reside in home, unless something happens to where [H]usband cannot reside in home then [W]ife has choice to reside in home, otherwise both parties will make arrangements to rent, sell or lease property.” The Agreement allocated to Husband “[one-half o]wnership/[e]quity of [h]ouse, spa, deck, and all permanent fixtures” at the marital home in Suisun, “as well as the right to reside in such house for as long as [H]usband desires or is capable.” The parties disagree as to the significance of the December 1992 date associated with Wife’s allocation. Husband contends that the Agreement clearly limits Wife’s ownership interest to half of the couple’s equity in December 1992; Wife argued below that the present value of the house should be divided equally between the parties.
The trial court concluded that “[t]he provisions of the [Agreement] relating to the date to be used for the division of the home are ambiguous.” The determination of whether a contract provision is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Great American Ins. Co. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.) A provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. (In re Marriage of Iberti, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) We conclude that the Agreement is not ambiguous on the critical question of Wife’s share of equity. It clearly specifies her interest is one-half the couple’s equity in the house on December 31, 1992. Wife requested below that the trial court interpret the Agreement as allocating to her a one-half interest in the current full value of the house. This is not a reasonable interpretation of the Agreement, because it disregards and renders meaningless the express date for determining Wife’s equity interest. (See City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 473-474 [“[c]ourts must interpret contractual language in a manner which gives force and effect to every provision, and not in a way which renders some clauses nugatory, inoperative or meaningless”]; see also Civ. Code § 1638 [“[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity”]; Hard v. California State Employees Assn. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1348 [an interpretation that renders contractual language meaningless is unreasonable].)
The provision is not irrational. As Husband explained in a declaration, because the Agreement gave him the right to remain in the home as long as he wished, specifying the date for calculation of Wife’s equity interest protected her from the risk of depreciation in the value of the home. Effectively, the risk of depreciation (and benefits of appreciation) was allocated to Husband.
Although the trial court concluded the provisions relating to Wife’s equity interest are ambiguous, the court did not ultimately interpret the Agreement to resolve the perceived ambiguity. Instead, the court relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prohibit Husband from relying on the date specified in the Agreement. As a preface to its estoppel analysis, the trial court found the parties intended to evenly divide the value of the house at the time the Agreement was made, and implicitly found the parties intended to divide the house in a prompt fashion. Then, in justifying application of the estoppel doctrine, the court found that “a number of events intervened to prevent the parties from promptly carrying out their intention to equally divide the home.” The intervening events included a gunshot injury sustained by Husband in October 1994, tax liens filed against the property in 1995, and ongoing discussions about reconciliation. The court concluded, “These and other intervening events were not the fault of either party and both parties are now estopped from relying upon the ambiguous language of the original agreement to frustrate the clear intention of the parties to equally divide their real property.” The court awarded each party one-half of the marital home.
A finding of estoppel is an exercise of the court’s equitable powers to prevent a party from asserting a right where his conduct makes it unconscionable for him to do so. (In re Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 658; see also In re Marriage of Iberti, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442.) “The elements are a ‘representation or promise; made with knowledge of the facts; to a party ignorant of the truth; with the intent that the other party act on it; when the other party has, in fact been induced to rely on it.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Umphrey, at p. 658.)
Nearly all the prerequisites to the application of estoppel are missing here. There is no evidence that Husband promised to promptly sell the property or buy out Wife’s interest. There was no testimony to that effect, and the Agreement does not provide for a prompt division of the property. To the contrary, it expressly gives Husband the right to remain in the home and protects Wife against diminution of value by guaranteeing her share of the equity at a specified date. There is no evidence that Husband was aware of any facts regarding which Wife was ignorant. There is no evidence that Wife relied on any promise to promptly divide the home; the Agreement protected her equity interest as of December 1992, so any delay in division of the home did not prevent her from obtaining the benefit of her bargain. Finally, there is no showing of “unconscionable” conduct on the part of Husband sufficient to justify application of estoppel (In re Marriage of Iberti, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442); the trial court expressly found the intervening events were not the fault of either party. The trial court’s finding that Husband is estopped from relying on the date in the Agreement for calculating Wife’s equity interest is not supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
On remand, the trial court should divide the value of the house in accordance with the Agreement. The court should consider any other arguments raised by the parties relating to the appropriate division of the value of the home.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Husband is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: JONES, P. J., REARDON, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.