Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County, Super. Ct. No. FL7376, Rolleen Kent McIlwrath, Judge.
Steven G. Mikelich for Appellant.
Goss & Goss, Michael A. Goss and Mark A. Goss for Respondent.
OPINION
CORNELL, Acting P. J.
Cynthia and Goroslav Vlahov dissolved their 18½-year marriage. In the trial on reserved issues, the trial court made determinations on a number of issues including (1) the validity of a premarital agreement, (2) the valuation, characterization, and distribution of property, (3) the entitlement and amount of credit for payment of community obligations after separation, and (4) the amount, if any, the community estate was entitled to be reimbursed. A statement of decision and judgment issued. Goroslav challenges the trial court’s statement of decision as ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence. He claims the trial court abused its discretion and asks for a new trial. With the exception of two postseparation debts treated as community and one duplicative reimbursement award, we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Cynthia and Goroslav were married on September 23, 1988, and separated on May 30, 2007. Cynthia filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 4, 2007; Goroslav filed his response on October 15, 2007. The marital status was terminated after that issue was bifurcated on August 1, 2008.
The trial on the remaining issues was held over three days commencing February 17, 2009. Cynthia and Goroslav testified, along with other witnesses, and numerous documents were admitted into evidence. The trial court issued a statement of decision on August 12, 2009, resolving the disputed issues. Neither party filed any objections to the statement of decision or pointed out any omissions or deficiencies in the statement of decision.
A judgment on reserved issues was filed October 1, 2009. The judgment set forth the various findings and conclusions of the trial court. It found that the premarital agreement was valid and that real property in Croatia purchased during the marriage was community property. Personal property was awarded to each spouse and a division of assets and debts was made, with an equalizing payment to be made by Goroslav to Cynthia. Cynthia was ordered to obtain a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) for purposes of determining the amount of her retirement to be paid to Goroslav. No credits or reimbursements were awarded to either party. The trial court ordered each party to bear their own attorney fees and costs. The trial court retained jurisdiction over spousal support and the retirement apportionment.
DISCUSSION
Goroslav is challenging the trial court’s statement of decision as ambiguous, unsupported by the evidence, and an abuse of discretion. Consequently, he contends he is entitled to a new trial on the reserved issues.
I. Standard of Review
Doctrine of implied findings
The doctrine of implied findings requires an appellate court to infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment. (Sammis v. Stafford (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1935, 1942.) In order to assert on appeal that a trial court erred in making or failing to make factual findings, a party must request a statement of decision and bring any ambiguities or omissions in the statement of decision to the trial court’s attention. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 (Fladeboe).)
The doctrine is based on the California Supreme Court’s statutory construction of Code of Civil Procedure section 634 and provides that a “party must state any objection to the statement in order to avoid an implied finding on appeal in favor of the prevailing party.… [I]f a party does not bring such deficiencies to the trial court’s attention, that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was deficient … and hence the appellate court will imply findings to support the judgment. [Fn. omitted.]” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134 (Arceneaux).)
The statement of decision here was filed in the trial court August 12, 2009. Our review of the record discloses that neither party filed any objections, request for clarification, or any other challenge to the statement of decision. As the California Supreme Court clearly stated in Arceneaux, a party who fails to object or assert a claimed deficiency to a statement of decision in the trial court waives the right to assert error on appeal. (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1132; accord, Californians for Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 273, 291; Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1380.)
If a party challenging a statement of decision fails to bring omissions or ambiguities to the trial court’s attention, “the appellate court will infer the trial court made implied factual findings favorable to the prevailing party on all issues necessary to support the judgment, including the omitted or ambiguously resolved issues. [Citations.]” (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.) An appellate court then reviews the implied factual findings for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Definition of substantial evidence
The substantial evidence standard for review has been described by our Supreme Court as follows:
“Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are bound by the ‘elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that … the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, ’ to support the findings below. [Citation.]” (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.)
The substantial evidence standard applies to both express and implied findings of fact made by the trial court in its statement of decision rendered after a nonjury trial. (See Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792-793 [implied findings].)
In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that reasonably could be deduced from the evidence. Conflicts in evidence, and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion, do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. A reversal is unwarranted unless it appears that no substantial evidence supports the judgment. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Applying this standard of review, we conclude the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence with the exception of (1) its finding that the postseparation obligations incurred by Cynthia on the Bank of America Visa account in the amount of $1,659 and the Citibank MasterCard account in the amount of $10,766 were community obligations, and (2) the duplication in charging for the reimbursement of $20,827 of Cynthia’s separate property in the simplified employee pension individual retirement account (SEP IRA).
II. Premarital Agreement
The premarital agreement was entered into on July 21, 1988; it was signed by both Goroslav and Cynthia. Goroslav wanted the premarital agreement as protection against his ex-wife and business partners. The parties put together the agreement, with Goroslav listing his separate assets in exhibit A and Cynthia listing her separate property in exhibit B. The premarital agreement provided that the separate property of the two was to remain separate. They each disclosed their debts, with Goroslav’s listed in exhibit C and Cynthia’s in exhibit D.
The parties discussed the premarital agreement before signing it. The premarital agreement was notarized. It was recorded in Santa Clara County, where they lived at the time. About six months after the premarital agreement was signed, they executed two quitclaim deeds that referenced the premarital agreement.
The premarital agreement confirmed as Cynthia’s separate property real property on Blossom Villa Way and Sunflower Lane, Wells Fargo checking, savings, and brokerage accounts, Hewlett Packard stock, a Hewlett Packard credit union account, and various other items.
Prior to the marriage, Goroslav owned real property in Croatia. After marriage, the parties purchased additional property in Croatia and also built a custom home on Slate Rim Road in Sonora.
Goroslav claims the premarital agreement was invalid, apparently because Cynthia executed it with a “hidden” intent. He also claims the premarital agreement was “fraudulent” because the parties did not live up to the agreement.
We reject Goroslav’s contention that the premarital agreement was invalid for three reasons. First, Goroslav does not support either of these claims with reasoned argument or citation to any legal authority. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citations.]” (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.) Goroslav’s failure to cite any legal authority or provide a legal analysis-not merely a recitation of disputed facts-constitutes a waiver of this issue. (Ibid.) Because Goroslav’s contention is not supported by reasoned argument or citation of authority, we treat it as waived.
Second, premarital agreements executed after January 1, 1986, are subject to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, set forth in Family Code section 1600 et seq. The party claiming a premarital agreement is invalid, as Goroslav is here, bears the burden of proof on that allegation. (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 27.) In its statement of decision, the trial court found that Goroslav’s testimony regarding the premarital agreement lacked credibility. This court defers to the credibility determinations made by the trial court. (See, e.g., In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109; California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 575, 588.) Goroslav failed to meet his burden of proof and produce credible evidence that the premarital agreement was invalid.
Third, Cynthia’s testimony provided substantial evidence that the parties discussed the nature of the premarital agreement and intended to abide by the agreement. Apart from Cynthia’s testimony, the evidence showed a clear intent by the parties to abide by the premarital agreement. They executed two quitclaim deeds referencing the documents and recorded the premarital agreement in Santa Clara County. This evidence constituted substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the premarital agreement was valid.
III. Valuation, Characterization, and Distribution of Property
Real property
Goroslav challenges the valuation of the real property, contending the trial court adopted the values testified to by Cynthia instead of the values testified to by Goroslav. Essentially, Goroslav is asking that we reject the testimony of Cynthia and accept his testimony in full. This constitutes a request that we reweigh the evidence and reject the credibility determinations of the trial court. This we cannot do. (California Youth Authority, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 588.)
Cynthia submitted appraisals for some of the real property at issue and testified to her own opinion of the value of other real property. This evidence constituted substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s implied and express findings in the statement of decision.
An owner of property is generally considered competent to estimate or offer a lay opinion of the property’s value. (Evid. Code, § 813, subd. (a)(2); Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Goehring (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 58, 64.) In addition to this common law rule, the Evidence Code contains special rules that are applicable to “any action in which the value of property is to be ascertained.” (§ 810, subd. (a).)
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise noted.
In such an action, the property’s value may be shown only by the opinions of either “(1) Witnesses qualified to express such opinions. [¶] (2) The owner or spouse of the owner of the property or property interest being valued.” (§ 813, subd. (a)(1)(2).) As pertinent here, a property owner “includes, but is not limited to, the following persons: [¶] (1) A person entitled to possession of the property. [¶] (2) Either party in an action or proceeding to determine the ownership of the property between the parties.…” (Id. subd. (c)(1)(2).)
Cynthia submitted appraisals of the Slate Rim Road property prepared by a qualified appraiser, Roxana Stobaugh. Stobaugh constituted a witness qualified to express an opinion on value. (§ 813, subd. (a)(1).) Although Goroslav claims the appraisal was defective, apparently because the appraiser relied upon assumptions, he is incorrect. Determining fair market value is an exercise in hypothesis, not the discovery of a fact. “[E]ven in the ordinary case, assessment of market value involves the use of assumptions.” (United States v. Miller (1943) 317 U.S. 369, 374.)
Cynthia’s opinion as to the value of those properties “is limited to such an opinion as is based on matter perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to the witness at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible … unless a witness is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for an opinion.” (§ 814.) In arriving at her opinion of the real properties in Croatia, Cynthia relied upon her own personal knowledge of and observation of the real properties, as well as information obtained from Internet research. Goroslav has cited no authority for the proposition that, as a matter of law, information obtained from an Internet search cannot be used as a basis for an opinion.
Although the trial court, as the trier of fact, was not bound to accept as conclusive Goroslav’s opinion on value, it did accept Goroslav’s opinion of value on several parcels of property in Croatia. The values adopted by the trial court for several of the Croatian parcels identify the value as per “Respondent’s appraisal, ” and Goroslav is the respondent.
Substantial evidence thus supported the trial court’s findings on the values of the real properties.
The determination of the properties as separate or community was supported by the premarital agreement. The agreement specified that properties in Croatia owned by Goroslav prior to marriage were his separate property, properties owned by Cynthia in Santa Clara County prior to marriage were her separate property, and real property acquired after marriage was community property, except to the extent separate property funds were used for its acquisition.
Personal property
Several items of personal property were required to be valued. A ferry boat/landing craft, household furnishings and appliances in two separate homes, vehicles, a dump truck and backhoe, forklift and tractor-trailer, golf cart, and several cars are the items whose value Goroslav is challenging. With respect to each of these items, Cynthia testified to her opinion of value, provided values variously based on purchase prices, catalog values, and Kelley Blue Book prices.
As we noted ante, under sections 810 and 813, subdivision (a)(2), an owner or spouse of an owner is allowed to offer an opinion as to value of property. Cynthia properly was allowed to testify regarding her opinion of the value of personal property.
Cynthia’s testimony on the household furnishings and appliances for the home in Sonora and the home in Croatia included identifying household items she inherited, items she owned prior to her marriage, and the cost of the items purchased after marriage for both homes from stores in San Jose. She valued the community household items in the Croatia and Sonora homes equally.
For the ferry boat/landing craft, Cynthia testified to the price she and Goroslav paid for the item when it was purchased and the $150,000 price at which Goroslav later sold the item. Cynthia’s opinion of the values of the motor vehicles was based on Kelley Blue Book values. The golf cart was purchased during the marriage and valued by Cynthia at $1,800.
The dump truck and backhoe were purchased in Croatia. Cynthia based her valuation of these assets on catalog prices for similar items sold in Croatia and on her own knowledge of the condition of the equipment. Cynthia’s values for the forklift and tractor-trailer were based on purchase prices and sales of similar items.
Cynthia’s opinion of the value of various assets met the requirements of section 814 that an opinion be based on personal knowledge and other information of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by a person in establishing the value of an item. Consequently, Cynthia’s testimony on the value of the personal property constituted substantial evidence supporting the statement of decision.
Bank accounts
The parties had numerous bank accounts. There appear to be two bank accounts where Goroslav disputes the trial court’s allocation of funds: the Wells Fargo IRA account ending in number 857 (hereafter IRA account #857) and the Wells Fargo brokerage account. IRA account #857, with a balance of $80,479, was awarded to Goroslav. Cynthia, however, was awarded an offset of $20,827. The brokerage account was awarded to Cynthia. Goroslav contends the brokerage account should have been deemed community property and the offset in the IRA should have been disallowed.
Again, we assess the evidence to determine if substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination. (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.) Once again, we conclude it did.
On the challenged offset to the IRA account, Cynthia testified that she received a profit of $206,709 from the sale of the Sunflower Lane townhouse. The Sunflower Lane property was her separate property, as set forth in the premarital agreement. She funded a SEP IRA with $20,827 and deposited $139,817 into the brokerage account.
On the brokerage account, Cynthia testified regarding the source of funds deposited into that account: $139,817 from the sale of her separate property (the Sunflower Lane townhouse), $337,951 from the sale of her separate property (the Blossom Villa Way house), $101,000 from repayment of the loan she made to Goroslav’s daughter from her separate property, and $114,884 she received as an inheritance from her mother, for a total of $693,652. Cynthia testified regarding the source of these funds deposited into the brokerage account and traced those funds.
The balance in the brokerage account at the time of trial was $327,282. The premarital agreement specified that this account and the Sunflower Lane and Blossom Villa Way properties were Cynthia’s separate property. Cynthia acknowledged that some community funds had been deposited into the brokerage account, but also testified that community expenses had been paid from the account. Because Cynthia had liquidated her separate property, she had no separate property expenses that needed to be paid from the account.
Cynthia’s testimony and supporting documentation provided substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s award of the brokerage account to Cynthia and the $20,827 offset for IRA account #857.
Credit card debt
Cynthia testified that the charges on the Bank of America Visa account ending in number 9541 and the Citibank MasterCard account were charges that she had incurred after separation. She acknowledged that these debts were her separate obligation. Consequently, the trial court’s determination that these were community debts was not supported by substantial evidence.
In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 (Epstein).
At the time of trial, Cynthia provided testimony regarding the payment of community obligations from her separate funds after separation. In Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pages 83-84, the court held that a spouse may claim reimbursement for amounts spent after separation on preexisting community obligations. Such reimbursement amounts generally are referred to as Epstein credits. Whether to award Epstein credits and in what amount is left to the trial court’s discretion. (In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1272.)
Goroslav contends the trial court determined that no Epstein credits or reimbursements were to be awarded; therefore, it erred when it applied Epstein credits for payment by Cynthia from her separate property of mortgage obligations, maintenance, and taxes for community assets.
There is an apparent ambiguity in the statement of decision in that it provided that assets and debts were awarded to Cynthia according to the list she submitted as an exhibit to her posttrial brief, which list set forth Epstein credits; but the statement of decision then stated no Epstein credits were to be awarded either party. The subsequent judgment contained the same ambiguity because it set forth the Epstein credits awarded, but also stated no Epstein credits were awarded either party.
If a party challenging a statement of decision fails to bring omissions or ambiguities to the trial court’s attention, “the appellate court will infer the trial court made implied factual findings favorable to the prevailing party on all issues necessary to support the judgment, including the omitted or ambiguously resolved issues. [Citations.]” (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60, italics added.) Here, Goroslav is challenging the statement of decision and failed to bring the ambiguity to the trial court’s attention; therefore, we imply factual findings favorable to Cynthia, as the prevailing party. (Ibid.)
Cynthia’s testimony provided substantial evidence of her expenditure of her separate property on community assets. The judgment after trial referred to specific amounts to be awarded to Cynthia as Epstein credits, separate and apart from the general statement that no Epstein credits were awarded. Construing the ambiguity against Goroslav, as we must, we conclude the trial court intended to award Epstein credits in the amount of $7,422 for payments on the mortgage, $4,290 for maintenance, and $13,704 for payment of property taxes, but no other Epstein credits, and that the trial court’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.)
V. Reimbursements
Goroslav was charged for reimbursement for community funds he gifted to family members after separation in the amount of $90,000 and for $6,000 in cash he withdrew from a community account on the day after he was served with the summons in this action. He also was charged with $20,827 for Cynthia’s separate property funding of the SEP IRA. (See In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 374.) Goroslav disputes all of these charges for reimbursement.
We first dispense with Goroslav’s contention that no reimbursement should be ordered because the trial court disallowed all reimbursements. The judgment after trial did state that no reimbursement was awarded either party; however, it also included a specific list of reimbursements to be paid by Goroslav to Cynthia. As with the Epstein credits, “the appellate court will infer the trial court made implied factual findings favorable to the prevailing party on all issues necessary to support the judgment, including the omitted or ambiguously resolved issues. [Citations.]” (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60, italics added.) Here, Goroslav is challenging the statement of decision and failed to bring the ambiguity to the trial court’s attention; therefore, we imply factual findings favorable to Cynthia, as the prevailing party. (Ibid.)
Goroslav challenges the charges for the SEP IRA reimbursement on the grounds (1) no reimbursement was to be awarded, and (2) the SEP IRA reimbursement charge was duplicative. Goroslav challenges the other reimbursement charges as disallowed under the statement of decision and unsupported by the evidence.
We agree with Goroslav that the charge for reimbursement of $20,827 was duplicative if Cynthia also was separately awarded this amount. We previously discussed the trial court’s award of a $20,827 offset to Cynthia from IRA account #857, the SEP IRA, and determined the award was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment after trial listed this award of $20,827 from the account to Cynthia; it then also charged this as a reimbursement to Goroslav.
Goroslav cannot be charged twice for this amount. Since the account was awarded to Goroslav in the full amount of $80,479, Cynthia’s offset for $20,827 of separate funds in that account should have been reflected as a credit for reimbursement owing from Goroslav, instead of listing the offset as item “J” in assets awarded to her.
Goroslav’s claim that the other reimbursement charges were not supported by substantial evidence is without merit. About the time the parties separated, Goroslav sent $70,000 of community funds to his brother. Goroslav contends this was a gift to his brother and that Cynthia agreed to the gift. Cynthia testified, however, that Goroslav had asked her to get a line of credit on their home in Sonora so Goroslav could buy his brother’s house, or a partial interest in it; Cynthia refused. Thereafter, Goroslav wired the funds to his brother.
Goroslav also wired $20,000 from a community account to his two cousins the day after he was served with the dissolution papers. He attempted to withdraw $26,000 in cash, but the bank refused. Goroslav then wired the $20,000 and withdrew $6,000 in cash. Goroslav claims this money was owed to the cousins; Cynthia considered it a gift from Goroslav of community funds made without her consent or approval.
The judgment after trial referred to specific amounts as charges for reimbursement to be paid by Goroslav: $90,000 for gifts to family and friends after separation, $6,000 for personal use of community funds after separation, and $20,827 for the separate funding of the SEP IRA. The judgment after trial included these specific reimbursements, as well as the general proviso that no reimbursements were ordered. Construing the ambiguity against Goroslav as the party challenging the award of reimbursements, we conclude the trial court intended to award reimbursement credits in the amount of $90,000 for Goroslav’s gifts to family and friends, $6,000 for Goroslav’s personal use of community funds after separation, and $20,827 for the SEP IRA. (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.)
Cynthia’s testimony regarding the $90,000 in gifted community funds and the $6,000 used by Goroslav personally provided substantial evidence supporting these reimbursement charges. While the reimbursement for the $20,827 of Cynthia’s separate funds into the SEP IRA was supported by substantial evidence, the trial court cannot charge Goroslav twice for this amount.
CONCLUSION
The statement of decision is hardly a model of clarity, yet neither party sought a clarification of the ambiguities nor pointed out to the trial court the errors contained in that document.
In this appeal, Goroslav challenges the statement of decision, and we infer all factual findings necessary to support the judgment and resolve ambiguities against him. (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.) Applying this standard of review, we have concluded the statement of decision and judgment after trial were supported by substantial evidence except for the duplicative charge for reimbursement of $20,827 and the treatment as community debt the Bank of America Visa and Citibank MasterCard charges incurred by Cynthia after separation.
We will direct the preparation of a corrected judgment reflecting a revised amount for an equalizing payment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in so far as it concludes that the $1,659 Bank of America Visa debt and the $10,766 Citibank MasterCard debt are community obligations, and awards to Cynthia the $20,827 in the SEP IRA as an asset. A corrected judgment shall be prepared that conforms to this opinion, including any adjustment to the equalizing payment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HILL, J.DETJEN, J.