Opinion
No. 4-711 / 04-0770
Filed December 8, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge.
Respondent appeals from the decree dissolving her marriage to petitioner. AFFIRMED.
Jane Odland and Lee Walker of Walker, Knopf Billingsley, Newton, for appellant.
J.C. Salvo of Salvo, Deren, Schneck Lauterbach, P.C., Harlan, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel, Zimmer, Hecht, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Joyce Crawford appeals from the decree dissolving her marriage to Ralph Crawford. She contends the district court erred in concluding a valid antenuptial agreement existed. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Ralph and Joyce were married December 19, 1982. It was Joyce's second marriage and Ralph's third. At the time of marriage, Ralph was sixty-one years old and Joyce was forty-five. Both parties had children from previous marriages.
Ten days before the parties married, they entered into an antenuptial agreement prepared by Ralph's attorney, Sanford Turner. Turner reviewed the agreement with Ralph and Joyce and answered their questions. He informed Joyce that if there was any disagreement over the terms of the antenuptial agreement she should consult her attorney. Joyce never objected to the agreement or consulted another attorney. The agreement was signed by both parties on December 9, 1982.
The preamble of the antenuptial agreement reads in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, JOYCE PARROT is the owner of a residential property as well as certain furniture, dishes, cooking utensils, beddings and other related property; savings accounts and a checking account; an automobile, plus other assets of various kinds, all of which have been fully disclosed to and discussed with RALPH CRAWFORD to his satisfaction.
WHEREAS, RALPH CRAWFORD is the owner of certain residence properties, rental properties, securities, annuities, retirement benefits, silver, gold, collectibles, antiques, life insurance, automobile and pickup, a house which is fully furnished with furniture, dishes, cooking utensils, bedding, washer, dryer, tools and other related property; savings account and checking account; plus other assets of various kinds, all of which has been fully disclosed to and discussed with JOYCE PARROT to her satisfaction.
The agreement then defines the respective rights of the parties regarding their property. It provides Ralph's home in Clarinda, his furniture, pension, automobile, and pickup were to become Joyce's property in the event they were still married at the time of his death, but would remain Ralph's property upon divorce. The agreement specified the furniture and antiques stored by Ralph and the furniture brought into Ralph's home by Joyce were to remain separate property. All the property owned by Joyce and Ralph at the time of the agreement, including the proceeds from the sale of the property, the reinvestment of the proceeds from any sale, and the increase in value of said property were to remain each parties' personal property. The agreement anticipated Ralph and Joyce establishing a joint checking account, to which each party would contribute. The agreement also established that each party would have rights in any jointly acquired property as created by the title documents.
During the marriage, the parties resided in Ralph's home in Clarinda. Joyce sold her home and used the proceeds to purchase $28,000 worth of silver bullion, and Ralph sold his duplex to pay for repairs to his home. Ralph also sold his shares in Nordaway Valley Packing for $113,000.
In 1987, Ralph inherited $175,000 from his mother, which he put into certificates of deposit (CDs) and bank accounts in his name. On some of the CDs, Joyce was listed as the pay-on-death beneficiary. On one CD worth $5000, Joyce was listed as a joint tenant.
On September 19, 2003, Ralph filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Following trial, the district court entered an order dissolving the marriage. The court held the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. The court awarded Joyce her vehicle, the furnishings in her possession, the silver bullion purchased from the proceeds of the sale of her home, and any bank accounts in her name. Ralph was awarded his vehicle, his home, the furnishings in his possession, any bank accounts titled in his name, his 401(k) account, and any CDs titled in his name. The $5000 CD jointly titled was to be evenly divided between the parties. The court also concluded:
The difference between the value of Ralph's premarital and inherited property ($400,000) and the value he places on the assets in his Affidavit of Financial Status ($513,000), is $113,000, which the Court finds should be evenly divided between Ralph and Joyce, given the length of the marriage and the parties' contributions to the accumulation.
Ralph was ordered to pay Joyce $18,500 to equalize the property settlement. Joyce was also awarded $1000 per month in alimony.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review claimed error in dissolution-of-marriage decrees de novo. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003). Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court's factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
III. Antenuptial Agreement.
Joyce contends the district court erred in finding the antenuptial agreement valid and enforceable. She argues the agreement was not valid because there was not a fair and reasonable disclosure of the parties' property or financial obligations prior to its execution. She also argues the agreement is not enforceable because the parties commingled their assets and incomes during the marriage. Joyce has the burden of proving the agreement's terms are unfair or the waiver of her rights was not knowing and voluntary. See In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1996).
Generally antenuptial agreements will be upheld if they are fair between the parties and were entered into fairly, freely and understandingly. In re Marriage of Christensen, 543 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Antenuptial agreements are favored in the law and should be liberally construed to carry out the intention of the parties. Id. Moreover, we construe and treat antenuptial agreements in the same manner as we do ordinary contracts. Id. Thus, such agreements can be abandoned in the same manner as any contract. Id.
Because of the relation of trust and confidence between the parties, the law requires the full and frank disclosure of all matters bearing upon an antenuptial agreement. In re Marriage of Sell, 451 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). Actual knowledge of a prospective spouse's assets alleviates the need to prove full and frank disclosure. Id. Joyce contends there was no disclosure or very limited disclosure.
We conclude there existed a full and frank disclosure of the parties' assets. The preamble of the antenuptial agreement provided a list of the assets of each party. While the assets were not valued, it is not required that a party have precise valuations of the other's assets. Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d at 317. Rather, a general knowledge of the true nature and extent of the other's properties is sufficient. Id. Joyce had a general knowledge of the nature and extent of Ralph's properties as the parties cohabitated prior to marriage. See In re Estate of Ascherl, 445 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) (holding wife had adequate knowledge of husband's property where she had dated him for a year and had visited his farm several times prior to their marriage).
Joyce also contends that during the marriage the parties abandoned the antenuptial agreement. She claims they did not maintain separate funds, instead commingling their funds and jointly paying bills. Joyce contends Ralph's actions of naming her on several CDs shows they had joint assets.
The act of abandonment must be unequivocal and decisive. In re Marriage of Christiensen, 543 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). We conclude Joyce has failed to show the parties abandoned the antenuptial agreement during the marriage. The antenuptial agreement itself provides the parties expected to establish a joint checking account. Furthermore, the CDs Ralph purchased with his inheritance simply listed Joyce as a beneficiary. The single CD in which Joyce was listed as an joint tenant was divided equally by the court, in conformity with paragraph eight (8) of the antenuptial agreement. ("[I]f they do acquire property jointly, they shall have what ever rights and interests in said property as are created by the title documents.") None of the actions to which Joyce cites are inconsistent with the antenuptial agreement or show an unequivocal and decisive abandonment of the agreement.
Because the antenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
All judges concur except Sackett, C.J., who specially concurs.
I concur with the majority opinion but write separately. Under ordinary circumstances I would not find the disclosure of assets sufficient. However, the relationship between and the cohabitation of the parties prior to marriage makes it reasonable to assume Joyce had general knowledge of Ralph's assets even if an itemized disclosure was not provided.