Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04FL00159.
ROBIE, J.
In this marital dissolution proceeding, appellant Linda Boblitt (wife) claims numerous errors by the trial court. The vast majority of her claims of error, however, are not adequately developed and not properly supported by citations to the record on appeal or legal authority. To the extent wife’s claims are not doomed by inadequate argument and/or insufficient citations, we nonetheless find them without merit. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wife and respondent Steven Boblitt (husband) were married in December 1989 and separated in January 2004. Wife filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage in January 2004.
At the time of separation, the parties were running two companies: Boblitt Trucking and Made Rite Concrete. In 2005, Scott German, a certified public accountant, was appointed as a “sort of” receiver for the two companies plus a third, Steve’s Rock N Ready Mix.
German testified his role “got whittled down to basically an accounting function and keeping track of revenues and expenses and reporting out.”
The marriage was dissolved by a status only judgment of dissolution in October 2006.
In April 2007, a two-day trial was held before Judge Peter McBrien on the characterization of a parcel of real property (the Hedge Avenue property). The remainder of the case was tried over 19 days before Judge James Mize in July and August 2007. Judgment was entered in April 2008. Wife filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 660.) Wife filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Request For Dismissal Based On Acceptance Of The Benefits
We begin with a threshold issue husband raises. In his respondent’s brief, husband purports to “move the Court for... an order of dismissal of the appeal” on the ground that wife has “voluntarily accepted the benefits of the judgment.” We deny that request as improperly presented.
It is true that, “as a general proposition, one who accepts the benefits of a judgment cannot thereafter attack the judgment by appeal.” (Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 114, italics omitted.) It is also true that in a marital dissolution, “‘“a party cannot proceed to enforce such portions of the judgment as are in his favor, and appeal from the part which is against him”’” (Wilson v. Wilson (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 330, 334), and if a party does so, the appeal may be dismissed on a motion by the respondent (id. at pp. 332, 335).
However, a motion to dismiss an appeal must be made by a separate “written motion” filed with the court and served on the opposing party, and the motion “must be accompanied by a memorandum and, if it is based on matters outside the record, by declarations or other supporting evidence.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(a)(1) & (2).) Where, as here, the respondent argues the appellant has “accepted the benefits of the judgment, ” the respondent must present us with evidence supporting that assertion. Husband has not done so. His bare, unsupported assertions in his brief that wife took possession of various items of property she was awarded in the judgment, then lost them to foreclosure, are not “evidence.”
In the absence of a proper motion to dismiss, supported by admissible evidence, we deny husband’s request to dismiss the appeal. (See Thompson v. Boyd (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 365, 387 [“In view of the failure to file a motion to dismiss as required by the California Rules of Court and in the absence of any record upon which we can consider the merits of the relative contentions of the parties, the request to dismiss is denied”].)
II
Governing Legal Principles
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) “‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
To carry the burden to demonstrate error, the appellant must provide an adequate record on appeal. “‘For an appeal to engage the consideration of an appellate court, it must be brought up on a record which, in addition to being otherwise formally sufficient, shows the error calling for correction. Such error is never presumed, but must be affirmatively shown, and the burden is upon the appellant to present a record showing it, any uncertainty in the record in that respect being resolved against him.’” (People v. Clifton (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 860, 862.)
In addition to providing a record that shows the error the appellant is claiming, the appellant must direct the reviewing court to the parts of the record that show the claimed error. “An appellate court is not required to search the record to determine whether or not [it] supports [the] appellant[’s] claim of error. It is the duty of counsel to refer the reviewing court to the portions of the record which support [the] appellant[’s] position.” (Green v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 819, 835.) Under the California Rules of Court, each brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) “If no citation ‘is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as [forfeited].’” (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115.)
Furthermore, because a citation must be provided for “any reference to a matter in the record” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), italics added), it is not enough for the appellant to provide citations to the record in the “statement of facts” portion of the opening brief; the appellant must also provide pertinent citations to the record in the “argument” portion of the brief (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16). This “is the only construction consistent with the purpose of the citation requirement, which is to enable appellate justices and staff attorneys to locate relevant portions of the record expeditiously without thumbing through and rereading earlier portions of a brief.” (Ibid.)
The requirement of record citations is particularly important in a voluminous case like this, in which the record on appeal consists of an eight-volume reporter’s transcript totaling 2, 215 pages and a 21-volume appendix totaling more than 4, 254 pages. (We are uncertain of the total number of pages in the appendix because at various places the page numbers include decimals (e.g., pages 3992.1 to 3992.3).)
To demonstrate error, however, the appellant must do more than make a bald assertion of error with a supporting citation to the part of the record where the error allegedly occurred. “While formal assignments of error are a thing of the past” (Zalk v. General Exploration Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 786, 795), the California Rules of Court still require a brief to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)). “‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as [forfeited], and pass it without consideration.’” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) “‘Contentions supported neither by argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation, and to have been abandoned.’” (Estate of Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728-729.)
Finally, a word on substantial evidence review. “Inasmuch as the ‘reviewing court starts with the presumption that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact’ [citation], and must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the findings as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion, and resolve every conflict in the testimony in favor of the findings [citations], the burden is on the appellant ‘to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.’ [Citations.] A recitation of only [the appellant’s] own evidence or a general unsupported denial that any evidence sustains the findings is not the ‘demonstration’ contemplated under the rule. An appellant ‘is required to set forth in his brief all of the material evidence on the point and not merely his own evidence. If this is not done, the error assigned is deemed [forfeited].’ [Citations.] We are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains evidence that will sustain [the appellant’s] contentions.” (Green v. Green (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 31, 35.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to wife’s arguments on appeal.
Consistent with the foregoing rules, we consider only those “arguments” that appear in wife’s opening brief under separate, appropriate headings identifying the arguments; we do not consider the plethora of argumentative statements that appear throughout wife’s “statement of facts.”
III
Wife’s Arguments
A
Discovery Motions
Wife first mentions the “right to conduct discovery” and the “right to obtain relief to compel responses to discovery, ” then claims “[t]he court in pre-trial proceedings did not allow a motion to be heard, or even filed.” This assertion of error is not supported by any citation to the record; accordingly, we do not know what discovery motion (if any) the trial court refused to hear or prevented from being filed. Accordingly, this claim of error is forfeited.
Wife next asserts that “[t]he sole discovery hearing resulted in an order compelling Scott German [the receiver] to produce documents, ” but “[n]either Mr. German nor Husband produced the document... that the trial court in error considered more than any other evidence, until the middle of trial.” Wife further asserts that “[t]he trial court compounded this [error] by failing to act on trial motions for issue or evidentiary sanctions.”
In support of these claims of error, wife cites the document (exhibit EEE), which is an inventory of “Trucking and Concrete Equipment.” She also cites a single page of the reporter’s transcript, where her attorney complained to the trial court that he had subpoenaed documents from Ron Boblitt, First American Title, and husband, but “[n]one of those have been complied with. And we would, therefore, be asking at the appropriate time for issuing [sic] evidentiary sanctions for those particular matters.” Other than that, wife provides no citations to the record to support these claims of error.
Obviously these limited citations are not sufficient to demonstrate error. Of particular significance is that, on the cited page of the reporter’s transcript, wife did not actually make a motion for issue or evidentiary sanctions, let alone a motion specifically seeking to exclude the inventory of “Trucking and Concrete Equipment” of which she now complains. Instead, her attorney indicated that wife “would... be asking” for sanctions “at the appropriate time.” Having failed to draw our attention to any point at which she actually asked for sanctions, wife has forfeited her claim that the trial court “fail[ed] to act on trial motions for issue or evidentiary sanctions.”
Wife next asserts that “[t]he trial court abdicated its authority in stating that a discovery matter would have to be considered by the Third District.” In support of this assertion, wife cites two portions of the reporter’s transcript. The first portion is an entire page, where the trial court was responding to a complaint by husband’sattorney about “the discovery orders that were made” the day before, which counsel asserted he did not believe were “appropriate under the law.” The court’s response was that the court had not made any discovery “orders, ” but had made a “discovery request” “more as a courtesy and certainly not as an order.” Without more, nothing on this page supports wife’s assertion that the trial court “abdicated its authority” regarding “a discovery matter.”
The second portion of the reporter’s transcript wife cites in support of this claim of error consists of six lines on another page of the transcript, where the trial court stated as follows: “Presumably, you had the opportunity to raise all the objections that would be normal in this kind of a setting and maybe if you had a different judge, a different time, you might have gotten a different ruling; but, unfortunately, at this stage I am not permitted to undo those rulings. That is a third district effort.” Wife makes no attempt to explain the context of this statement or identify what “rulings” the court was talking about. Again, without more, there is nothing here that shows the trial court “abdicated its authority” regarding “a discovery matter.”
Wife next asserts that “[t]he extent of Husband’s failures and refusals to respond to not only discovery requests but special master orders and case management conference orders all but mandate issuance of terminating sanctions by the court during trial.” To the extent this assertion is intended as an assignment of error, wife fails to support the assertion by any citation to the record. Thus, we do not know whether wife ever requested terminating sanctions, and if she did so, on what basis. Accordingly, this assertion of error is forfeited.
Wife next contends the trial court erred “by applying a reverse inference, ” “h[o]ld[ing] that Wife was responsible for being unable to introduce the evidence that Husband withheld and refus[ing] to allow any evidence proving Husband withheld evidence.” Wife does provide some record citations relating to this argument, but her argument does not elaborate on the point. Thus, we do not know from wife’s brief what evidence she contends husband withheld or what evidence she contends the trial court refused to allow. Because this assertion of error is not adequately developed, we are not persuaded by it.
Wife next contends “[t]he trial court should have taken documentation provided by Husband and by simple calculation... determine[d] a value of the ongoing business Husband operated based on Husband’s income to be four times what he claimed.” Again, while wife provides some record citations relating to this contention, she does not elaborate on the point beyond what we have quoted. Thus, to the extent this was intended as an assertion of error, it is inadequately developed and therefore not persuasive.
Wife asserts “[t]he trial court should have found that Husband’s hidden $400,000 in WAMU accounts was community property that Husband had hidden.” Wife provides no citations to the record and no further argument or analysis on the point; therefore, it is forfeited.
B
Pretrial Interim Motions
Wife complains that “Judge McBrien was presented in ‘case management’ with motions the parties agreed to have heard, ” on which wife “presented full briefings and declarations, ” but “[t]he court never ruled on the motions.” Wife provides no citations to the record and no further argument or analysis on the point; therefore, it is forfeited.
C
Withheld Document And Uniformed “Auction”
Wife’s next assertion of error -- if that is what it is -- is all but incomprehensible. In her argument heading, she contends it was “[e]rror to base decision on withheld document that was itself based on an [sic] uniformed ‘auction.’” (Boldface text omitted.) Then, without citation to the record, she references a “preliminary distribution of commercial vehicles” that she contends was “done under threat by the trial court to bankrupt the parties, and was done when Wife was without counsel, was prevented from obtaining counsel, and was done without Wife’s understanding of the existence, location or condition of property.” She contends “[t]he trial court decision following the July 2007 trial accepted the unequal coerced distribution and to distribute the property as stated in the preliminary distribution.”
To the extent we can understand this assertion of error, what wife calls the “preliminary distribution of commercial vehicles” in her argument appears to be the same thing she calls the “initial separation of vehicles” in her statement of facts. What the record shows, however, is that this “distribution” or “separation” was accomplished by a signed stipulation of the parties, entered into in open court. Indeed, the record contains the transcript where wife acknowledged that she had “reviewed the terms of the proposed agreement, ” “fully underst[ood] the terms of th[e] proposed agreement, ” and was “freely and voluntarily entering into th[e] agreement.”
To the extent wife’s complaint is that the court at trial divided the commercial vehicles consistently with the parties’ pretrial stipulation, wife has failed to show any error. First, she has not demonstrated that the trial court did, in fact, divide the vehicles in that manner. It is true, as wife contends, that the court stated, “I’m going to award it to the person who has it....” But wife’s quote takes the court’s statement out of context. What the court actually said was this: “By the way, when I ask who has it, I’m going to award it to the person who has it unless you all tell me something different that somebody else ought to have it or that you’re holding it for the other person.” Thus, we do not know from wife’s limited citation to the record what assets the court divided or how the court divided those assets, let alone whether that division was consistent with the pretrial stipulation.
Second, even assuming the court at trial did divide assets consistent with the pretrial stipulation, wife has not shown that she objected to that division or on what grounds she objected. Thus, she has not shown that any alleged error in the division of the assets was raised in the trial court and thereby preserved for appellate review.
D
Personal Injury Claim
Wife asserts the trial court erred in “issu[ing] judgment on [a] personal injury claim not presented in this proceeding.” (Boldface text omitted.) To the extent we can determine from the portions of the record wife cites, this argument is based on the following facts:
In January 2007, during the pendency of this dissolution proceeding, wife filed a separate civil action for damages and injunctive relief against husband, alleging causes of action for domestic violence and assault and battery, breach of fiduciary obligations, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (We will refer to this other case as the damages action.) In January 2009, after the judgment on reserved issues was entered in this proceeding, the trial court in the damages action entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of husband on the ground that wife’s claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because “[t]he claims... were addressed” or “could have been raised in this dissolution proceeding.”
On our own motion, we take judicial notice that wife’s appeal from the judgment of dismissal in the damages action is pending in this court. (Boblitt v. Boblitt, C061307.)
With these facts in mind, we turn back to wife’s assertion of error in this case. She claims “[t]he portion of the judgment which contains at least an inference of a finding of no personal injuries is a finding on matters which were not the subject of the trial proceedings or issues presented for trial in the underlying dissolution proceeding.” To the extent wife is asserting that some portion of the judgment in this case contains “an inference of a finding” on an issue that was “not presented for trial, ” her assertion is not supported by any citation to the record and is therefore forfeited. As this appears to be wife’s only assertion of error in this case on this subject, we find no basis “to compel the trial court to reverse its Statement of Decision and Judgment to relieve confusion over this matter.”
To the extent wife claims it was error for the trial court in the damages action to dismiss that action, that issue will be resolved in her separate appeal in that case.
E
Exclusion Of Expert Witness Testimony
Wife called Thomas Dowling as an expert witness in her case. Before he testified, Husband moved to exclude Dowling’s testimony under section 2034.300 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that wife had unreasonably failed to produce a report from Dowling until the day he was called to testify. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.300, subd. (c) (hereafter section 2034.300).) Wife’s attorney explained that Dowling had prepared a report for trial, dated the day before, which was the report on which husband’s motion was based. When the court asked why Dowling “did not do his report until a couple of days into this trial, ” wife’s attorney explained that: (1) Dowling “had done a lot of work and needed more money to be paid to complete his services, which [wife] did not have money for”; (2) and “he had drafts of these reports and was waiting to obtain additional information to complete the reports, which [they] never received.” Wife’s attorney also argued that husband could not bring a motion under section 2034.300 because husband had not “made a complete and timely compliance with Section 2034.260” -- one of the requirements under section 2034.300 -- in that husband had not produced reports from two of his experts.
Eventually it was revealed that Dowling was going to testify about the value of the community businesses and his report included four alternate valuations of the businesses ranging from $640,000 to $2,560,000. The smallest value was “simply the value of the fixed assets of the vehicles alone, ” while the three higher values all included goodwill. The trial court ascertained that up to the time of trial Dowling had not determined any goodwill value for the businesses and in no pretrial statement had wife “listed an amount of goodwill.” The court expressed concern about the “significantly prejudicial” effect when “a case doubles or triples in value right in the middle of trial as a result of this kind of a statement” and ultimately determined that Dowling should be precluded from testifying “with respect to his opinion on the goodwill of the business.”
Wife contends the trial court’s ruling excluding Dowling from testifying on the value of the goodwill in the businesses was “based on both Husband’s multiple misrepresentations and a flawed and inaccurate reading of the provisions of the statute, ” by which wife presumably means section 2034.300. In essence, wife argues that: (1) husband was not entitled to invoke the statute because he “did not completely and timely comply with disclosure and production requirements”; and (2) wife did not “unreasonably” fail to produce the report that Dowling prepared the day before he was called to testify.
In relevant part section 2034.300 provides that “[e]xcept as provided in Section 2034.310 and in Articles 4 (commencing with Section 2034.610) and 5 (commencing with Section 2034.710), on objection of any party who has made a complete and timely compliance with Section 2034.260, the trial court shall exclude from evidence the expert opinion of any witness that is offered by any party who has unreasonably failed to... [¶]... [¶] (c) [p]roduce reports and writings of expert witnesses under Section 2034.270.”
“We generally review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to exclude an expert’s opinion for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘[D]iscretion is always delimited by the statutes governing the particular issue.’ [Citation.] But, ‘when the exclusion of expert testimony rests on a matter of statutory interpretation, we apply de novo review.’ [Citation.] To the extent that the question presented requires us to interpret section 2034.270, we apply de novo review. We review the trial court’s reasonableness determination under section 2034.300 for abuse of discretion.” (Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950.)
Here, we need not engage in a lengthy discussion of whether the trial court properly determined that husband “made a complete and timely compliance with Section 2034.260” or whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that wife “unreasonably failed to” produce Dowling’s report before the day he was called to testify, because even if wife is correct on either or both of those propositions, she still must demonstrate prejudice from the exclusion of Dowling’s testimony and she has failed to do so.
On this point, Evidence Code section 354 provides as follows: “A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it appears of record that: [¶] (a) [t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means; [¶] (b) [t]he rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision (a) futile; or [¶] (c) [t]he evidence was sought by questions asked during cross-examination or recross-examination.” Furthermore, “[p]rejudice is not presumed and the burden is on the appellant to show its existence.” (Marc Bellaire, Inc. v. Fleischman (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 591, 596.)
Here, wife makes no attempt to show us that the “substance, purpose, and relevance” of what Dowling would have testified to was made known to the trial court. Indeed, wife left it entirely up to us to discover, by reviewing the discussion in the reporter’s transcript, that Dowling’s proposed testimony related to the value of the community businesses. In her brief, wife asserts only that Dowling was “a key and critical witness.” To show prejudice, however, wife must show that the exclusion of Dowling’s testimony regarding the value of the goodwill in the businesses resulted in a miscarriage of justice. “A miscarriage of justice... occurs... when it appears reasonably probable that were it not for the error a result more favorable to the appellant could have been obtained.” (Williams v. Lambert (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 115, 126.) Wife does not make this showing. Her argument on prejudice amounts to this: because Dowling was not allowed to testify regarding the value of the business, “[t]his left the testimony concerning valuation... to [wife, ] who... was impaired in her ability to present evidence.” This is far from sufficient to demonstrate that if the trial court had allowed Dowling to testify, it is reasonably probable wife would have obtained a more favorable result. Accordingly, wife has failed to show prejudicial error.
F
Findings On Credibility
Wife contends the trial court “had an erroneous and prejudicial belief about how battered women would act” and “it was error for the trial court to state that [wife] ‘was ruining it for women who were really abused.’” This argument is based on the following statement by the trial court during its oral ruling at the end of trial:
“I’m really concerned about certain things such as statements about being raped twice before the wedding and then married him anyway. Yes, I understand that people -- that love is blind and that domestic violence sometimes is considered to be something that beaten women in particular have trouble sorting out in their mind, and that is a difficult issue. Nevertheless, the force of the term rape, once would be enough I think for most women to say if a person rapes me, that’s not the kind of person I’m going to be marrying. Rape me twice, it’s even more so.”
Wife contends that “[t]he trial court’s determination of what a victim of abuse would do is contrary to the findings and analysis in a multitude of decisions.” Even assuming this to be true, however, wife fails to show how the trial court’s assessment of how “most women” would react to being raped twice amounted to judicial error, and fails to show how any such error was prejudicial by showing a reasonable probability that a contrary assessment would have led to a better result for her. Thus, wife has failed again to carry her burden to show prejudicial error.
Wife next contends “[t]he [trial] court made a determination of credibility based on impeachment on surprise collateral matters, ... for which there was no evidence of impeachment.” This argument appears to be based on the trial court’s determination that wife was “incredibly evasive” in testifying about “recent cocaine use” and this evasiveness “bore on [her] credibility.”
As authority for this argument, wife cites a case that stands for the proposition that “[s]pecific bad acts, or specific instances of untruthfulness, cannot be shown for the purpose of impeaching a witness.” (People v. Arrighini (1898) 122 Cal. 121, 126.) Based on her citation to that case -- and her citation to two declarations she offered in support of her new trial motion relating to her alleged possession and use of cocaine -- what we understand wife to be arguing is that the trial court should not have allowed any questioning about “recent cocaine use” by wife and should not have used her “evasiveness” in responding to that questioning as a basis for doubting her credibility.
The most fundamental flaw in this argument is that wife does not direct our attention to the actual examination regarding “recent cocaine use” that led to the trial court’s finding of evasiveness. Absent the actual testimony, it is impossible for us to determine whether wife’s claim of error has merit. Accordingly, we will not discuss it further.
Wife next asserts the trial court erred “in ignoring Husband’s false statements.” (Boldface text omitted.) In essence, wife complains that the trial court “found Husband to be credible because he admitted beating Wife, ” while “ignor[ing] the multiple ways that Husband made contentions that were demonstrably false, ” as shown by “overwhelming documentary evidence contrary to Husband’s oral testimony.”
We find no merit in this argument because, among other things, “it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)
G
Exclusion Of Witnesses’ Testimony
Wife contends the trial court “abused its discretion in excluding evidence by virtually all of [her] witnesses.” Because wife does not support this assertion of error by even a single citation to the record, we deem it forfeited.
H
Exclusion Of Evidence Of Possession And Destruction Of Community Property
Wife contends she had evidence that husband had “possession and control over vehicles asserted to be missing, ” and she implies -- without ever coming out and saying so -- that the trial court excluded this evidence because of a claim by husband of “lack of notice” that was “at least inaccurate.” Because wife does not support this assertion of error by a citation to the record where such evidence was, in fact, offered and was, in fact, excluded, we deem the claim forfeited.
I
In Kind Distributions
Wife contends it was error for the trial court to “ma[k]e only in kind distributions” because “[w]ife had suffered physical, emotional and financial abuse due to Husband’s actions to control the community business and accounts” and had “stated that she would not continue to run the trucking business.” We are not persuaded by this abbreviated argument, which amounts to half a page. While wife provides some citations to the record to support her claim that she could not, and would not, “go out to run the business, ” wife does not cite to the record where the court actually divided the property, nor does she cite to the record where she proposed some alternate division that the trial court rejected (except to point to one place where her attorney argued, “we do not want to be involved in any process which would require her to enforce that [husband] give to her specific things”). Also, wife does not cite any legal authority about the trial court’s power to divide community assets or any limitations on that power. Under these circumstances, wife fails to convince us of the error she claims.
J
Community Component Of Husband’s Business
Wife contends that “[t]he failure of the court to provide for community property value in husband’s business... was contrary to the substantial evidence in this case.” While wife provides numerous citations to the record that are apparently aimed at showing community funds and/or assets went to husband’s business (Steve’s Rock N Ready Mix), nowhere in her argument does she actually cite to the record where the trial court made its ruling regarding husband’s business. Moreover, it is a well-established rule that “substantial evidence review requires examination of all the evidence, not just selective portions of the evidence favorable to the appellant, and it requires evaluation of that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, not an interpretation that ignores the inferences drawn by the trier of fact.” (Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1143.) Wife’s argument blatantly ignores “this ‘elementary, but often overlooked principle.’” (Ibid.) Accordingly, we find no merit in that argument.
K
Valuation And Characterization Of Vehicles
Wife contends that “[m]ultiple trucks were not accurately valued or characterized.” She mentions three vehicles in particular: “the ‘Ayles’ truck, ” “the WW vehicle, ” and “concrete truck two.” As to the first two vehicles, however, wife fails to present a fully developed argument.
Regarding the “Ayles” truck, wife asserts only that it “had every earmark of Husband hiding the ownership of the vehicle.” While she provides some record citations to support this assertion, she does not cite the record to show how the trial court valued and/or characterized that truck, nor does she explain how she believes the truck should have been valued and/or characterized or on what basis the value and/or characterization should have been different. This abbreviated, mostly unsupported argument is not persuasive.
Regarding the “WW” vehicle, wife asserts only that it “was demonstrated by documents to not be a JB vehicle.” What this means, we do not know. Absent further explanation, this argument is also unpersuasive.
The bulk of wife’s argument on this point is devoted to “concrete truck two, ” also identified in the statement of decision as “SAG 42 Steve’s Rock and Ready Mix’ Concrete Truck.” As wife points out, the trial court determined that this truck was “a mixed character asset with the community interest valued at $11,000.00 and the remainder the separate property of husband.” Wife contests this determination, but the ground for her complaint is entirely unclear. She states that “the community owned two damaged vehicles and joined them together as a unibody upon which with great amount of work and over months of time commencing during marriage a mixer was placed with Husband’s employee affixing a Made Rite logo to it.... [T]he mixer body was the subject of a contract and a purchase deposit of community property prior to separation.... This contract is a business opportunity of the community.” She then refers to testimony from husband about how many concrete trucks the community had. At no point, however, does wife explain why the trial court’s determination regarding the value and characterization of “concrete truck two” was erroneous based on the “facts” she relates in her brief. Without a more fully developed argument, we cannot find that the trial court erred regarding this asset.
L
Valuation Of Loma Lane
Wife contends the “[v]aluation of Loma Lane was not based on substantial evidence.” (Boldface text omitted.) “Loma Lane” apparently refers to some residential property in Orangevale that belonged to the parties. Wife asserts “[t]he dispute over the value of [the] Loma Lane residential property was whether two parcels could be valued as two parcels and not just one.” According to wife, “[t]he argument by Husband’s expert was that the property could not be improved, ” but “Husband himself said it could.” Wife also asserts that “[t]he expert’s basis for opining that Loma Lane could not be used as two parcels w[as] contrary to the expert’s opinions concerning the valuation of the Hedge Avenue property and the expert’s knowledge of other lots on Loma Lane being developed within the last two years.”
We are not persuaded by this undeveloped argument. Wife does not explain how the trial court valued and disposed of the Loma Lane property, and she does not cite to all of the evidence relating to the value of the Loma Lane property and explain how, notwithstanding that evidence, the trial court erroneously valued the property. Also, wife’s assertion that husband said the property could be improved is not supported by the portion of the record wife cites. What husband initially testified was that he thought “the parcel without a residence on it” “could” “be improved, ” but he did not know for sure. By the end of his answer, however, husband said, “Whether it’s doable, you throw a lot of money at something, it makes anything doeable most of the time, but I don’t feel it, you know.” (Italics added.)
Wife has not shown any error here.
M
Characterization Of Sonoma Property Rights
Wife contends “[t]he characterization of the [Sonoma] property was in error and not supported by substantial evidence.” She does not explain what the Sonoma property was, how the trial court characterized it, or why the characterization was erroneous. She does not cite all of the evidence relating to the characterization of the Sonoma property; in fact, her argument, which amounts to about a page, contains only two brief citations to the reporter’s transcript. We are not persuaded.
N
Failure To Include Property In Distribution Calculations
Wife contends “[t]he judgment failed to include several items.” First, she refers to “a 2003 GMC [Sierra] pickup” that was listed on husband’s preliminary declaration of disclosure from December 2004, that was testified about at trial, and that may have been included on the inventory of “Trucking and Concrete Equipment” (exhibit EEE) mentioned earlier (the inventory mentions only a GMC pickup). She contends that “in closing argument and without evidentiary basis... [husband]’s counsel changed this vehicle to a 1997 Chevy Tahoe.” And although wife did not direct our attention to this, we note that in the judgment the trial court awarded a “1997 GMC” to husband at no value.
Because wife fails to direct our attention to that portion of the reporter’s transcript where husband’s attorney allegedly “changed this vehicle to a 1997 Chevy Tahoe, ” we do not know how this assertion relates to wife’s claim that a 2003 GMC Sierra was omitted from the property distribution. Was the pickup erroneously identified as a 2003 Sierra when it was a 1997 Tahoe all along? And wife offers no citation to the record for her assertion that the 2003 Sierra had “a value of $25,500.00.” Once again, wife’s argument is insufficiently developed and not supported by citations to the pertinent parts of the record for it to be persuasive.
To the extent wife can establish there was a community pickup truck (or any other community property item) that was omitted from the property division, she can seek postjudgment relief by a motion in the trial court to divide that asset. (See Fam. Code, § 2556.)
Wife also contends that an “Allco trailer” was not accounted for in the judgment, although she claims husband “ended up with” it. The only citation to the record wife offers in support of this contention is to a portion of her own testimony, where she appears to have been testifying that “the stipulation and order from September of ‘05” did not award “any Allco transfer trailers” to either her or to husband. Obviously this is far from sufficient to carry her burden of demonstrating error, so we find none.
O
Husband’s Premarriage Tax Obligation
Wife testified at trial that during the marriage the proceeds of “refinancing the house on Ranchita Way” were used to pay off some delinquent federal taxes husband owed from before the marriage. Husband admitted some of the loan proceeds were used to pay off “taxes that [he] had hanging over [his] head.”
Although her argument is woefully short on appropriate citations to the record, it appears wife is contending the trial court erred in refusing to order husband to reimburse the community for these payments. While wife failed to direct our attention to it, the statement of decision contains a detailed resolution of this issue, which the trial court claimed wife raised “at the eleventh-hour [sic] with no evidence or prima facie case... as to how much the community paid, if any, to the alleged separate obligation.” Following posttrial briefing, the court determined that wife’s reimbursement claim was time-barred under subdivision (c) of Family Code section 920, which provides that a right of reimbursement “shall be exercised not later than the earlier of the following times: [¶] (1) Within three years after the spouse in whose favor the right arises has actual knowledge of the application of the property to the satisfaction of the debt. [¶] (2) In proceedings for division of community and quasi-community property pursuant to Division 7 (commencing with Section 2500) or in proceedings upon the death of a spouse.” The court concluded that wife knew from the time of the refinancing, in November 2001, that community funds were being used to pay husband’s tax debt, but “the first ‘exercise’ of her right to claim a reimbursement for that payment occurred in the May 22, 2007 document entitled ‘Petitioner Linda Boblitt’s Statement of Issues, Contentions and Proposed Disposition of the Case’ on page 7, line 20 through page 8, line 4” -- “over five and a half years” later.
Wife contends the trial court erred in finding her claim for reimbursement was time-barred because “the right to reimbursement was exercised by Wife by filing the Petition for Dissolution on January 9, 2004” in which she sought “a division of community and quasi-community property.” We are not persuaded. Wife offers no authority for the assertion the mere filing of a petition for dissolution seeking the division of community property can be deemed the “exercise” of a right of reimbursement for community property used to satisfy separate property debts. Absent some authority, or at least some reasoning as to why this should be so, we do not find any error in the trial court’s determination that a right to reimbursement is not “exercised” by the filing of a petition for dissolution that does not mention reimbursement.
We note that wife could have requested in her petition that the court order reimbursement by including that request in the “Other” section (7.j.) on page two of the petition.
Wife contends husband should not have been allowed to assert that her claim for reimbursement was time-barred because husband did not “raise[ this contention] prior to trial in any pleading, ... or in any letter or oral conversation.” In support of this argument, she relies on a local court rule that allows the court to impose an issue sanction on a party who fails to specify an issue in dispute in his or her statement of issues. She also (without citation to any authority) asserts that “[t]he affirmative defense of the statutes [sic] of limitations is a disfavored defense that must be raised in the pleadings.”
What wife fails to appreciate is that: (1) husband had no reason to raise the time bar of Family Code section 920, subdivision (c) in his response to her petition for dissolution because she did not plead her request for reimbursement in her petition; and (2) husband had no reason to raise the time bar in his statement of issues because, under the local rules, that document was not to be filed in response to hers, but simultaneously with hers. (See Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Local Rules, rule 14.11(F)(1).) Thus, wife has not shown that the trial court was bound to reject husband’s reliance on the time bar in Family Code section 920, subdivision (c) because of when he raised it.
P
Calculation Of Rent Due On The Hedge Avenue Property
Wife contends “[t]he trial court erred in its Statement of Decision [in] giving to Husband a credit for claimed expenses with absolutely no evidence, documentation, or notice.... Husband’s trial testimony about expenses for tenants was disproved by photographic evidence.... [¶] The trial court also erred in not including past due rent that Husband owes to Wife.”
In support of this contention, wife fails to cite the part of the statement of decision about which she complains; thus, we do not know what “credit” she claims was erroneous. Furthermore, the few record citations wife does include in support of this abbreviated argument do not demonstrate what expenses husband claimed, what those expenses had to do with the rent on the Hedge Avenue property, or anything about “past due rent” on that property. We are not persuaded by this undeveloped, unsupported argument.
Q
Characterization Of The Hedge Avenue Property
Asserting that title to the Hedge Avenue property (which was acquired during the marriage) was always in her name, wife contends “[t]he trial court erred in holding that [she] had the burden of proving that her 2007 testimony and that of other witnesses supporting her testimony, would not support separate property ownership of real property acquired in 1999.... Instead, the burden was on Husband.” The gist of this argument appears to be that the trial court erred in relieving husband of the burden of rebutting the “title presumption” with respect to the Hedge Avenue property, and this error was prejudicial because “[t]here was no evidence to rebut the... presumption.” (See In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 496 [“the form of the instrument creates a presumption that the title to the property is held as shown in the instrument”].)
A two-day trial in front of Judge McBrien in April 2007 addressed the characterization of the Hedge Avenue property. Following that trial, Judge McBrien issued a decision that was later incorporated in the judgment. Judge McBrien found that wife’s “claim that the down payment came from [her] separate property funds was not supported by the evidence.” He also noted husband’s claim that the Hedge Avenue property was put in wife’s name alone “for a period of time just as other properties were purchased in his name only, ” but “that it was always the parties[’] intent to share equally [the] Hedge Ave[nue] property which was used for the [community] trucking business. This construction of the parties[’] business/fiduciary arrangement would then require them to share equally in the proceeds (less any Epsteins during separation) or settle the property in both names if in fact it is not to be sold. To do otherwise would breach the fiduciary responsibility each has to the other, and thus [it] is so ordered.”
From Judge McBrien’s decision we cannot discern, as wife argues, that the court relieved husband of rebutting the title presumption. As for whether there was evidence to rebut the presumption, we have to presume there was, because the record on appeal does not include a reporter’s transcript or settled statement of the testimony at the trial in April 2007. (See Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [in the absence of a reporter’s transcript “‘the appellate court must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the findings’”].) Accordingly, wife has shown no error in the characterization of the Hedge Avenue property.
From the decision itself, it appears there was no reporter at the trial.
R
Spousal Support
Based on “all of the circumstances set forth in Family Code [section] 4320, ” the trial court ordered husband to pay wife $2,000 per month in spousal support for eight months, with support to drop to zero at the end of that period, provided certain conditions (largely, husband leaving wife alone) were met. The court provided that wife could return to court during the eight-month period and ask for an extension of support if the conditions were not met.
Wife’s complaint about the spousal support award is not clear. To some extent, it appears she is trying to argue that the trial court erred in setting a date for support to drop to zero, subject to her moving to delay the step down. Elsewhere, however, she suggests the ruling the court actually made is not accurately reflected in the statement of decision, which husband drafted.
Whatever wife’s argument is, it is not persuasive. The trial court signed the statement of decision husband’s attorney prepared (at the court’s direction), so the ruling contained therein is the court’s ruling, notwithstanding any earlier, conflicting statements by the court (none of which wife actually identifies or supports by citations to the record). And as for whether the court’s ruling was erroneous or an abuse of discretion, wife does not develop any argument or offer a single citation to authority on this point. No error has been shown.
S
Closing Argument
Wife offers various complaints about closing argument. Specifically, she complains: (1) “[t]he Judge had 12 minutes from introduction of numerous documents until it commenced argument”; “[t]he court started its decision process before there was any oral argument”; “[t]he court limited argument on various points”; and “[t]he trial court spent time on oral argument, but none of it covered the concerns stated by Wife until the last hour of total time, and then with repeated interruptions and limitations on discussion that effectively eviscerated analysis.”
The only citation to the record wife offers in connection with these assertions is in support of her assertion that “[t]he court started its decision process before there was any oral argument, ” but the single line of the reporter’s transcript she cites does not support this assertion in the least. Under these circumstances, we deem this claim of error forfeited.
T
Statement Of Decision
Without a single citation to the record or to any authority, wife contends it was error for the trial court not to file, read, or consider her objections to husband’s proposed statement of decision and her alternative statement of decision. As this claim of error is not properly supported with appropriate citations to the record or to the law, we deem it forfeited.
U
Motion For New Trial
Without a single citation to the record, wife contends it was error for the trial court to refuse to consider her new trial motion “on the basis of time.” (Boldface text omitted.) From our own review of the record, it appears the trial court determined it had no jurisdiction to rule on the new trial motion because it did not issue its ruling within 60 days of the clerk’s mailing of the notice of entry of judgment. This was correct. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 660 [“Except as otherwise provided in Section 12a of this code, the power of the court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire 60 days from and after the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5.... If such motion is not determined within said period of 60 days, ... the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court”].)
Despite lacking jurisdiction to rule on the motion, the trial court explained that even if it did have jurisdiction, it would have denied the motion.
Wife contends the motion should have been granted because “[t]he great weight of the evidence is contrary to the judgment.” This one paragraph argument, made without any citation to the record or to any authority, is not persuasive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Husband shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., BUTZ, J.