Summary
holding termination of spousal support when payor reached age sixty-five equitable where fifty-one-year-old wife received one-half of payor's retirement benefits at that time
Summary of this case from In re Marriage of GustOpinion
No. 5-915 / 05-0373
Filed February 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Bobbi M. Alpers, Judge.
Rebecca Crutchfield (f/k/a Rebecca Aronson) appeals the alimony and property division provisions of the trial court decree dissolving her marriage to Mark Aronson. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Russell Dircks of Dircks Dircks, Davenport, for appellee.
Linda Levey of Levey Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Rebecca Crutchfield (f/k/a Rebecca Aronson) appeals the alimony and property division provisions of the trial court decree dissolving her marriage to Mark Aronson. Rebecca requests appellate attorney fees. We affirm as modified.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Rebecca and Mark were married March 9, 1979. The parties have no children. Rebecca moved out of the marital home in February 2002 and Mark filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on July 22, 2003. Trial was held on the petition on November 15, 2004. Mark was fifty years old at the time of the dissolution trial. He has two bachelor's degrees which he obtained before the parties' marriage. The parties moved to Montana shortly after their marriage so Mark could obtain a master's degree in zoology. Since 1985 Mark has been employed full time by Eastern Iowa Community College as a faculty member in the biology department. He has also taught a wilderness course through the college during some summers in the past. He receives additional pay when he teaches the wilderness course. According to Mark's W-2 forms, he earned $51,695 from the college in 2003. His 2003 Iowa Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS) statement estimated his monthly benefit at retirement without further accumulation would be $1,632.20. He will no doubt accumulate additional retirement benefits, which will in turn increase the monthly benefit amount he will receive, by the time he reaches age sixty-five or retires.
Mark has also operated a business known as Aronson Instrument Service since 1980 in which he repairs and restores saxophones. The trial court found there was no evidence this was a profitable business or has any current income-producing capability. The court further found Mark did not have any known health problems at the time of trial and was willing and able to work full time. However, the court also concluded there was no evidence his earning capacity would significantly change in the years ahead.
Rebecca was fifty-one years of age at the time of the dissolution trial. She had a bachelor's and master's degree in music before the parties married. While the parties lived in Montana Rebecca worked as a music teacher and gave private music lessons. Her mother made generous gifts to the couple throughout her lifetime, including one that was used as a down payment for their home in Montana. Through her professional contacts as a music teacher Rebecca made referrals to Aronson Instrument Service to help get it started. She also assisted Mark by getting the instruments ready for repair and helped some with record keeping, but her role in the business was not extensive. In 1985 Rebecca began work on a doctoral degree in music. She had a teaching assistantship which provided a financial stipend and her mother made a substantial contribution to her tuition. Rebecca never finished the doctoral degree. After moving to Iowa Rebecca gave music lesions at Muscatine High School and taught part-time at Luther College. She stopped working in 2000 and has not worked since.
Rebecca's mother died in 1993 and in 1996 Rebecca was diagnosed as having a major depressive disorder. She was similarly diagnosed in 1997. She has continually sought professional care for this condition since then and has been hospitalized five or six times since then based upon feelings of hopelessness and suicidal ideation. Rebecca also suffers from several physical health concerns. She had a pituitary tumor which has shrunk and apparently presents no problems. She has hypothyroidism, hip and knee problems related to arthritis, high blood pressure, and neck problems. She currently takes numerous medications for her various physical and mental health problems and all of these conditions negatively affect her ability to work. The trial court found there was no evidence Rebecca is likely to be employed, either full- or part-time, in the foreseeable future due to her health problems. This finding is not disputed by Mark.
Due to her health problems Rebecca receives Social Security disability benefits of $429 per month. She also receives Medicaid and Medicare health and medical benefits and receives food stamps. Since June 2004 Rebecca has been receiving $600 per month form Mark as temporary spousal support. She also receives federal Section 8 vouchers for her rent. Her out-of-pocket rent expense was ninety-seven dollars per month at the time of trial but was apparently due to increase to $250 per month due to the temporary alimony she had been receiving.
At the time of trial Rebecca was also receiving an annuity from an insurance policy of her mother's. She received $1,308 in 2003, but the annuity was due to end in January 2006. She also receives approximately $125-$150 per month from royalties on gas leases inherited from her mother.
Rebecca and her brother inherited a 200-acre farm in Arkansas from their mother. The farm has a value of $80,000-$100,000, and produces rent of about $3,000 per year. The rent is consumed in paying real estate taxes and maintenance on the farm.
The trial court noted that during their approximately twenty-five year marriage the parties accumulated a modest amount of assets and a substantial amount of debt. The parties agreed prior to trial that the personal property should be distributed as currently divided, the marital residence and the debt thereon should go to Mark, Mark would pay the parties' joint marital debts, and each party would receive the vehicle in his or her possession. Accordingly, the court awarded Mark the marital residence which had a market value of $50,000, subject to first and second mortgages on it in the total amount of $44,971. Each party received their own bank accounts, life insurance, musical instruments, and other personal property in their possession at the time of trial, all of which other than the musical instruments apparently had limited value. Mark was awarded the 2001 Ford Explorer valued at $21,000 subject to the debt of $18,000 thereon. Rebecca was awarded the 1999 Ford Explorer valued at $9,000 subject to the debt of $5,250 thereon. The court ordered Mark to pay total debts in the amount of $105,543. It ordered Rebecca to pay debts in the amount of $10,932, plus any debt owed to her brother, which she represented to be in the amount of $4,000. The court found this to be an equitable distribution based on the parties' individual financial circumstances and their own agreement related to debt distribution.
Rebecca was awarded as her sole property all interests in property inherited from her mother, which included her interest in the Arkansas farm, the annuity, and the royalties from gas leases.
The trial court found Rebecca has a need for traditional spousal support and that Mark has a limited ability to provide it. However, the court concluded that Mark's ability to pay spousal support was greatly affected by the fact it was requiring him to pay "all of the marital debts and some of Rebecca's debts as well." Based on the parties' financial circumstances at the time of trial and the property and debt division, the court ordered Mark to pay Rebecca $300 in monthly support until he reaches age sixty-five, Rebecca remarries, or either party dies. Mark was further ordered to pay $1,250 of Rebecca's trial attorney fees, an amount which included an earlier award of $750 in temporary fees. Rebecca was also awarded one-half of Mark's IPERS benefits accrued during the parties' marriage.
Rebecca appeals from the trial court's decree, contending the court's award of alimony was inadequate in amount and duration and the property division was inequitable. She requests appellate attorney fees.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
In this equity case our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We examine the entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998). In such proceedings, we give weight to the district court's findings of fact, especially when considering the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g); In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2005).
III. MERITS.
A. Alimony.
Rebecca contends the alimony Mark was ordered to pay was inadequate in both amount and duration. More specifically, she argues that based on the length of the marriage, her poor health, her limited earning capacity, Mark's income and potential to earn more, and the standard of living the parties enjoyed during the marriage she should be awarded alimony for the duration of her life and in an amount close to the $1,200 per month she requested at trial.
"Alimony is an allowance to the spouse in lieu of the legal obligation for support." In re Marriage of Sjulin, 431 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Iowa 1988). Any form of spousal support is discretionary with the court. In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1996). Spousal support is not an absolute right; an award depends on the circumstances of each particular case. In re Marriage of Dieger, 584 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The discretionary award of spousal support is made after considering the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.21(3) (2003). Id. We consider the length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the parties' earning capacities, the levels of education, and the likelihood the party seeking alimony will be self-supporting at a standard of living comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage. In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Property division and alimony should be considered together in evaluating their individual sufficiency. In re Marriage of Trickey, 589 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
An alimony award will differ in amount and duration according to the purpose it is designed to serve. In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). In marriagesof long duration, both spousal support and nearly equal property division may be appropriate, especially where the disparity in earning capacity is great. Id.
Traditional or permanent alimony, such as was awarded here, is usually payable for life or for so long as the dependent spouse is incapable of self-support. Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d at 922.
[T]he spouse with the lesser earning capacity is entitled to be supported, for a reasonable time, in a manner as closely resembling the standards existing during the marriage as possible, to the extent that that is possible without destroying the right of the party providing the income to enjoy at least a comparable standard of living as well.
In re Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983).
In this case neither party is receiving a substantial amount of property and the property that is being divided has limited value. The trial court did order Mark to pay significantly more of the parties' debts than Rebecca; however based on the parties' particular circumstances we conclude this was equitable. Mark is much more capable of paying such debts than Rebecca is, either now or in the foreseeable future. Although Rebecca was only fifty-one years of age at the time of the dissolution trial the record supports the trial court's finding that her health has deteriorated since the death of her mother in 1993 and it is not likely to improve. It is undisputed by Mark that she suffers from several ongoing mental and physical problems, is on several medications, and that her health issues prevent her from working in a position that would allow her to be self-supporting at this time or in the foreseeable future. Rebecca has been determined to be disabled by the Social Security Administration and social security disability benefits and other government benefits are her only sources of income other than royalties from gas leases and spousal support.
This is a long-term marriage, of over twenty-five years. Mark has a substantially greater earning capacity than Rebecca, who is permanently disabled. Rebecca's earning capacity appears limited to her social security and other government benefits. Mark continues to earn over $50,000 per year, is in good health, and apparently will continue to have a capacity to earn this much or more into the foreseeable future.
In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the monthly amount of spousal support awarded to Rebecca by the trial court should be increased to $900. See Anliker, 694 N.W.2d at 541-42 (finding the trial court's award of traditional alimony in the amount of $1,250 per month was justified where the parties were married twenty years, recipient spouse was in poor health and unable to work while payor spouse was healthy and had annual earning capacity of $50,000 or more, recipient spouse received social security disability benefits of $309 per month and apparently received no other public assistance and had no other income, and payor spouse was assigned $34,356 of the parties' debts while recipient spouse was ordered to assume only $5,633 of the parties' debts).
We further conclude the court's order requiring the spousal support to end when Mark reaches age sixty-five, Rebecca remarries, or either party dies to be fair and equitable. Rebecca is approximately fifteen months older than Mark and unless she remarries she thus will receive alimony until she is over sixty-six years of age. Rebecca is entitled to receive one-half of the IPERS benefits Mark had accumulated as of the December 23, 2004 decree in this case, that is an amount somewhat greater than one-half of the $1,632.20 per month he had earned as of the end of 2003. In addition, although Mark will receive IPERS benefits once he retires his income will presumably be greatly reduced from its current level at that point. Finally, the amount of monthly alimony we have ordered should allow Rebecca to plan and save accordingly for her future expenses if she so chooses.
B. Property Division.
Rebecca next argues the trial court's property division was inequitable. More specifically she contends (1) Mark dissipated marital assets which the court should have factored into the property division but did not; (2) Mark should be assigned the $5,250 debt on her car because they had agreed the car was a "parting gift" to Rebecca and he would make the payments on it; and (3) Mark should pay back the loan of $2,605.47 he took on her life insurance policy because he promised to do so when he took out the loan. Finally, she argues that the equity in the marital home Mark received as part of the property division, the benefits Mark enjoyed from her inheritance, and her mother's generous contributions to the parties during her lifetime are all factors the court improperly failed to consider in dividing marital assets and debt.
The partners to a marriage are entitled to a just share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). Iowa courts do not require an equal division or percentage division. Id. The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each circumstance. Id. Adjudicating property rights in a dissolution action inextricably involves a division between the parties of both their marital assets and liabilities. In re Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 1980). The allocation of marital debts therefore inheres in the property division. Id. Accordingly, the term "property division" incorporates both division of assets and assignment of responsibility for debts.
First, Rebecca complains Mark was at a loss at trial to explain how the parties could have spent their sizable income and accumulated so much debt. However, she was equally either unwilling or unable to offer a reasoned explanation as to how this happened other than speculating that Mark secretly gambled and spent. We, like the trial court, find no evidence in the record that Mark gambled, spent exorbitantly on hobbies or other interests, or in any way acted secretly and dissipated marital assets. It is clear that throughout their marriage both parties contributed both to earning money and spending it. Accordingly, the property division need not be adjusted in any way based on speculation that Mark dissipated marital assets. There is no substantial evidence in the record that he did so.
Rebecca next contends the court should not have assigned her the remaining debt on her car. She claims Mark should be responsible for making her vehicle payments because the vehicle was a parting gift from him and he agreed to make the payments on it. She also argues Mark should be ordered to pay back the loan he took against her life insurance policy because he promised to do so when he took out the loan.
Although the parties may well have agreed, hoped, and planned Mark would make Rebecca's car payments and pay back the loan he took out when they were married, their plans were most likely based upon their marital relationship continuing. The situation has now clearly changed, and thus any plans they had regarding these matters are no longer realistic because of the dissolution of their marriage and the ensuing change in their financial circumstances. Furthermore, the only evidence that any such plans or agreements were made is Rebecca's otherwise unsupported claims. We conclude the trial court was not required to consider any such plans or agreements in dividing the parties' property and did not err by not doing so.
Finally, Rebecca contends the trial court failed to take into account several pertinent factors in determining the division of marital assets and debts, including the equity in the parties' marital home, the benefits Mark enjoyed from her inheritance, and the generous monetary contributions her mother made to the parties during her lifetime. We disagree. It is clear from the court's decree that all of these factors were taken into account by the court in determining division of marital assets and debts and the court's final property division was fair and equitable. C. Appellate Attorney Fees.
We note that after ignoring the relatively small amounts of personal property upon which the trial court did not place values, the sizeable amount of inherited property set aside to Rebecca, and the equally divided IPERS benefits, the trial court's property division resulted in Rebecca receiving approximately $6,000 of debts in excess of assets while Mark received approximately $34,000 of debts in excess of assets.
Rebecca seeks appellate attorney fees from Mark. An award of appellateattorney fees is not a matter of right but rests within our discretion. In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We consider, among other things, the needs of the party making the request and the ability of the other party to pay. Id. Rebecca currently has significant financial needs and Mark has a better ability to pay such fees at the present time. After considering all of the relevant factors we award Rebecca $1,000 in appellate attorney fees.
IV. CONCLUSION.
Based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court's award of spousal support to Rebecca should be increased to $900 per month and modify the court's decree accordingly. The duration of the spousal support ordered by the trial court is appropriate, and spousal support shall at the latest end when Mark reaches age sixty-five, as provided in the decree. The trial court's property division is equitable. Rebecca is awarded $1,000 in appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal are taxed one-half to Mark and one-half to Rebecca.