Opinion
No. 5-264 / 04-1202
Filed May 11, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Carl D. Baker, Judge.
Tracy Anderson appeals the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Krystal Anderson. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Judd Kruse of Kruse Dakin, L.L.P., Boone, for appellant.
Loren Nalean of Nalean Nalean, Boone, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Tracy Anderson appeals the economic provisions of the supplemental decree entered following the dissolution of his marriage to Krystal Anderson. We affirm as modified.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Tracy and Krystal were married on June 14, 1997. After Tracy developed medical problems, the parties decided to dissolve their marriage, following which they would remarry in order to be able to add Tracy to Krystal's insurance policy. Accordingly, they entered into a stipulation distributing the assets of the marriage and procured the dissolution from the district court. Shortly thereafter, Tracy informed Krystal he did not intend to remarry her, and Krystal filed a petition to set aside the property settlement and division of debt. The district court granted the petition, concluding Tracy had committed fraud in procuring the dissolution, and we affirmed the district court's order on appeal. In re Marriage of Anderson, No. 01-1649 (Iowa Ct. App. April 30, 2003).
A retrial on the issue of property and debt division was held on May 19, 2004. The parties agreed that the division of assets and liabilities would be based on the financial situation of the parties as of May 30, 2000, the date the original dissolution decree was entered. Following trial, the court entered a supplemental decree dividing the assets and liabilities of the parties and ordering Tracy to make a lump sum payment of $40,000 to Krystal. Tracy appeals this order.
Scope and Standards of Review.
In this equity action, our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4. The partners to a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). Iowa courts do not require an equal division or percentage distribution. Id. The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each circumstance. Id. The distribution of the property should be made in consideration of the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (2003). In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983).
Distribution of Assets and Debts.
We begin by noting the values assigned to the parties' assets are not contested on appeal, only the distribution. Under the supplemental decree's distribution scheme, the court awarded Tracy substantially all of the parties' assets, including the homestead, a pickup truck, and a Golden Corral Restaurant. In total it awarded Tracy $226,204 in assets, and Krystal $5,800 in assets. In addition, the court ordered Tracy to assume all of the parties' debts, including the mortgage on the home, his pickup truck loan, and nearly $60,000 in medical bills. After this division of assets and debts, the court concluded "the evidence supports a lump-sum payment to Krystal of $60,000.00." However, it further found that Krystal should be responsible for a portion of Tracy's medical debt, as it accumulated during the marriage. In recognition of this, the court reduced the lump-sum payment due Krystal to $40,000. Accordingly, Krystal received a net distribution of approximately $45,000, while Tracy received $142.56.
Tracy suffers from cystic fibrosis, which caused a significant uninsured medical bill in January of 2000.
On appeal, Tracy asserts this lump-sum payment is "neither fair nor equitable." We agree. While Iowa Courts do not require an equal division or percentage distribution of marital assets, see In re Marriage of Hoak, 365 N.W.2d 185, 194 (Iowa 1985), it should nevertheless be a general goal of trial courts to make the division of property approximately equal. In re Marriage of Conley, 284 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Iowa 1979). The exception to this general goal occurs if there is an intended disparity, which is apparent from the district court ruling. In re Marriage of Bonnette 584 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Here, the district court made no specific finding for its severely disproportionate distribution, stating only, "the evidence supports a lump-sum payment to Krystal. . . ." The only possible explanation appearing in the record is Tracy's superior income-producing ability, which was nearly $60,000 in 1999. However, this was not referenced as a reason in the district court's decision.
The court did note that Krystal requested "a reasonable rate of return on her equity" in the Golden Corral restaurant since May 2000. In a post-trial ruling, the court added: "This Court deemed it inequitable to award the Golden Corral Restaurant and the residence to Tracy free of any claim thereto by Krystal, without recognizing that these were assets purchased during the marriage and without recognizing Krystal's contributions to the marriage." However, the stipulated evidence was that neither the residence nor the restaurant had, in May of 2000, any equity whatsoever to divide and the parties had agreed to accept May of 2000 values. Therefore it appears the district court looked beyond the date of the original decree and considered the subsequent financial success of Tracy, in awarding Krystal such a large lump sum payment. See In re Marriage of Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (noting the value of assets are ordinarily determined as of date of trial) Moreover, the marriage was of short duration, lasting approximately three years, during which time Krystal was able to obtain a two-year associates' degree from a community college.
With no explanation for the grossly disproportionate division of assets, we fail to see the equity in the district court's decree. Accordingly we modify the decree to reduce Tracy's payment to Krystal to the amount of $20,000.00. This amount shall be paid to her within thirty days of the issuance of procedendo in this case.
Attorney Fees.
The district court ordered Tracy to pay Krystal the sum of $3,862.50 to apply to the attorney and expert witness fees incurred by her. On appeal, Tracy maintains this award is excessive. Furthermore, Krystal seeks an award of appellate attorney fees.
An award of both trial and appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests within the court's discretion. In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Whether attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective abilities of the parties to pay the fees and the fees must be fair and reasonable. In re Marriage of Applegate, 567 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the district court's decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Iowa 1999). In consideration of these factors, we affirm the award of trial attorney fees and award no appellate attorney fees. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally.