Opinion
A100901.
10-24-2003
In re MARCUS B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARCUS B., Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Marcus B. contends the court abused its discretion by committing him to the California Youth Authority (CYA), after appellant admitted involvement in a gang-related stabbing attack. We find no abuse of discretion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal raises solely an issue concerning the propriety of the disposition order, after appellant admitted allegations of the petition regarding an assault. We therefore draw the facts of the offense from the probation report filed October 3, 2002.
Appellant and his friends "crashed" a party early on New Years Day, 2002, in Concord, which was being attended by the victim of this offense. The victim and other partygoers witnessed appellant and his associates making gang signs, displaying a knife, and talking about plans to assault someone. One member of appellants group was talking on a cell phone, encouraging fellow gang members to come to the party to assist in the attack. The victim overheard "gang talk" and heard one of the group make reference to "187." One of the witnesses asked appellants group to empty their pockets in order to check for knives, and then asked them to take their knives outside to their vehicles.
The members of the group repeatedly engaged in aggressive, confrontational behavior with other guests at the party. Appellant stole a lighter from one partygoer and almost provoked a fight. A videotape of the party showed appellant talking about stealing someones camera, making gang signs, rapping, displaying knives, and saying something like "somebodys going to die tonight." As the party was ending, and appellant and his group began to leave, appellant yelled, "East Oakland 187, well be back, were going to get our `homeboys."
The victim also left the party when it seemed to be ending. As he walked to a nearby store, he saw the same group of uninvited party crashers, including appellant, across the street. Suddenly, one of the members of that group ran up to him, and started attacking him. Three other members of the group joined in the attack. While the victim was pinning one of his assailants to the ground, he felt what he thought was a hit to his ribs. Then he felt a sharp pain and saw blood coming from his shirt. He never saw a knife, and did not know who stabbed him.
The victim identified his assailants as the uninvited party crashers. When he later viewed the videotape of the party, he picked out the two primary assailants, identifying appellant as the one who "punched" him in the place where he had, in fact, been stabbed.
Appellant told the investigators that he joined in a fight to defend his friend Anthony from an attack by the victim. Appellant said he hit the victim several times, but then stopped to pick up his shoes and walked away. Appellant at first denied ever having a knife, but when shown a still picture from the videotape in which he was holding a knife, appellant claimed that someone had lent him the knife. When shown another still picture showing him throwing gang signs, appellant stated he was merely making gestures representing his home neighborhood on Willow Pass Road.
The victim suffered four stab wounds to his torso and face. One wound penetrated and collapsed a lung. The victim was hospitalized for eight days, two of those days in intensive care. He lost eight weeks in wages, suffered physical and psychological trauma, and was unable to fully open his jaw for several months.
The juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) filed by the Contra Costa County District Attorney charged appellant with assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and the special allegations of personally inflicting great bodily injury (GBI) and personally using a dangerous or deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12020, 12022.7, subd. (a).)
At the jurisdictional hearing, appellant entered a negotiated plea, admitting the amended charge of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, as well as the GBI allegation, in exchange for the striking of the "deadly weapon" language and personal use allegation. The court found a factual basis and accepted appellants plea.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declined to place appellant at a local ranch program, as recommended by the probation department, and committed him instead to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for a maximum period of seven years. The trial court announced and explained its ruling as follows: "Im sending him to the California Youth Authority. [¶] I think that is — that is the only place this court could send somebody with your propensity for violence, that would do the type of violence that you did on an innocent person. [¶] We have no facilities — local facilities — that this court feels are correct or that would be appropriate. [¶] Ive been a judge here for over nine and a half years. I know every single local facility available. You need to be in a secure facility, a facility that is locked and where you will not be a danger to other people, until — somehow — you can find out what makes you do something so awful and to give a story that is so absolutely ludicrous as you gave."
As the trial court also observed, appellant was "a very dangerous young man" who "brutally victimized an innocent person [by inflicting] four stab wounds, one to the lung," and appellant was lucky he was "not sitting here in this court on a murder case." The court expressly found that the ranch recommendation was inappropriate because most of the wards there had committed far less serious offenses, and because at the ranch it was too easy for someone like appellant to just "walk away."
II. THE CYA COMMITMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Appellate courts review a commitment to CYA only for an abuse of discretion, and must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473 (Asean D.); In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395 (Michael D .).) To determine if there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law. (Michael D., supra, at p. 1395.)
Alternative placement options should generally be considered before committing a minor to CYA, because of the danger of incarcerating unsophisticated youths with sophisticated criminals. (See In re Anthony M. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 491, 503.) Somewhat dated authority from our Supreme Court expresses the view, "`The statutory scheme . . . contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders . . . namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, Youth Authority placement." (In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Aline D).) More recent rulings of our Supreme Court, however, instruct that "there is no absolute rule that a Youth Authority commitment should never be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted." (In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183 (Ricky H.); accord, Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; see also In re John H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18, 27 (John H .).) Instead, there must merely be evidence that the probable benefit to the minor and protection of society justify the commitment to CYA. (John H., supra, at p. 27; accord, In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.)
Contrary to appellants suggestions, there is no requirement that a local program first be attempted. The juvenile court may act to protect the public, and may conclude a CYA commitment is appropriate in the first instance, after considering the suitability of alternatives. In this case, the juvenile court did exactly that. It considered a local program alternative, a ranch placement, which was less restrictive, and this alternative was discussed extensively in the reports the court reviewed. (Cf. Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 183-184 [trial courts failure to order less restrictive alternatives at dispositional hearing does not mean the court neglected to consider them].) With this as a backdrop, the court concluded such a less restrictive local placement would be inadequate or ineffective, and that no less restrictive placement was adequate for appellant.
One could reasonably conclude that appellant might benefit from the more structured environment at CYA. He had stopped attending high school, and appellants school credits were those of a freshman even though he should have been a senior; he had become involved with deadly weapons and a violent youth gang; and he had problems with alcohol abuse and drug abuse, which appear to have contributed to the assault.
It cannot be overlooked that the crime appellant committed was very serious, and could have resulted in the death of another young man. While a prime objective of the juvenile court law is rehabilitation of the minor, another important purpose is also the protection and safety of others. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a) & (b).) To that end, punishment is a recognized rehabilitative tool; restrictive commitment is a means of protecting the public safety; and a minor may be committed to CYA, after the consideration of other less restrictive placements, when the circumstances of a particular case indicate the desirability of such a commitment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b); Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151 (Tyrone O.); Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.)
Reviewed under these standards, appellants claim of an abuse of discretion is unpersuasive. A decision to commit a minor to CYA does not amount to an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates probable benefit to the minor, and less restrictive alternatives might be ineffective or inappropriate. (See In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379.) As the juvenile court observed, appellant would probably benefit from CYA programs. Thus, it determined that a CYA commitment was favored by the factors of probable rehabilitation of the minor; such a commitment would also better protect others.
Appellant argues that "nearly every factor" that goes into a juvenile dispositional decision "demonstrates that the court abused its discretion" in committing appellant to the CYA. He mounts four main arguments. First, although acknowledging that he admitted the assault and the personal infliction of GBI, appellant questions the witnesses identification of him as the party crasher who was seen brandishing knives, throwing gang signs, and subsequently attacking and "punching" the victim. Second, appellant brings to our attention his minimal criminal record, and that "no less restrictive placements were ever tried with appellant." Appellant also raises a related argument, asking: "[H]ow could the court conclude that less restrictive placements would be ineffective when the probation department recommended a [ranch] program and appellant had never been given a chance in one?" Finally, appellant contends the courts statement finding a probable benefit from a CYA commitment was "perfunctor[y]," and the court did not identify any particular CYA program that would benefit him. The failure to identify a particular beneficial CYA program, appellant argues, demonstrates the court was "guided by retribution rather than rehabilitation," and was ordering a CYA commitment "based on the offense alone" rather than assessing his individual characteristics in light of the less restrictive ranch placement recommended by the probation department.
These arguments are lacking in merit. The juvenile court properly considered the seriousness of the offense, appellants lack of remorse, the inappropriateness of the probation departments ranch recommendation, and the probable benefit to appellant of a CYA commitment. We note appellant relies on two inapposite cases for the proposition that a CYA commitment "is the final treatment . . . option for juveniles," and may be imposed only after "less restrictive options were properly considered and rejected." He cites In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 58, and Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d at page 564. However, our Supreme Court has consistently recognized, even before the 1984 changes to the juvenile law, that a CYA commitment is not always a "last resort." In John H., supra, 21 Cal.3d at page 27, the court stated: "[T]he circumstances in a particular case may well suggest the desirability of a Youth Authority commitment despite the availability of such alternative dispositions . . . ." (Id . at p. 27, italics added.) This conclusion was expressly restated in Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 183: "[T]here is no absolute rule that a Youth Authority commitment should never be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted." This is even more true after the changes to the juvenile law. As amended in 1984, Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 recognized punishment as a rehabilitative tool and "shifted its emphasis from a primarily less restrictive alternative approach oriented towards the benefit of the minor to the express `protection and safety of the public [citations], where care, treatment, and guidance shall conform to the interests of public safety and protection. [Citation.]" (Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.) That appellate decision explained the consequences of the 1984 amendment: "Thus, it is clear that the Legislature intended to place greater emphasis on punishment for rehabilitative purposes and on a restrictive commitment as a means of protecting the public safety. . . . [T]here must continue to be evidence demonstrating (1) probable benefit to the minor and (2) that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. However, these must be taken together with the Legislatures purposes in amending the Juvenile Court Law." (Michael D., supra, at p. 1396.)
In the present case, the juvenile court determined a CYA commitment was necessary for three reasons: (1) the seriousness of the injuries appellant inflicted on the victim; (2) the inappropriateness of any less secure facility for a dangerous person with appellants "propensity for violence"; and (3) the probable benefit to appellant of the reformatory, educational, mental health and drug treatment programs at the CYA. As the juvenile court pointed out, appellant "brutally victimized an innocent person [by inflicting] four stab wounds, one to the lung," and appellant was lucky he was "not sitting here in this court on a murder case." The court also took note of appellants "absolutely ludicrous" explanation for what he did to the victim, and it expressly found that the ranch recommendation was inappropriate because most of the wards there had committed far less serious offenses, and because at the ranch it was too easy for someone like appellant to just "walk away." Appellants claim that the recommended ranch placement "best met the needs of appellant" is belied by the courts observation that the ranch is not a locked facility, and appellant could easily "walk away" from it.
Nor has appellant provided any case authority to support his claim that the ranch would be more appropriate for his serious problems. Appellant contends the ranch placement would be more effective, because the ranch placement was ultimately recommended by the probation department, as meeting appellants psychological, emotional, and educational needs. However, the court is not bound by the views of the probation department, and it has long been recognized that CYA programs could provide benefits to minors with psychological, emotional, or educational needs. (See Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 153 [holding that the CYAs "specialized institutions and rehabilitative programs tailored to the delinquents sophistication and need for security . . . offered the promise of probable rehabilitative benefit"], citing 1 Cal. Juvenile Court Practice: Delinquent Minors (Cont.Ed.Bar 1981) §§ 4.1 & 10.3 [1981 main text and 1988 supp.].)
Appellant also suggests the juvenile court may have been confused as to the recommendation of the probation department, which had examined the suitability of both CYA and a ranch commitment, and had mentioned that either commitment would be appropriate, while ultimately suggesting a ranch commitment. It is true that the juvenile court did state at the disposition hearing: "Im going to follow the recommendations. I dont want to keep you in suspense: I am sending you to the California Youth Authority." It may be that the court misspoke by using the word "recommendations" because it appears the juvenile court was referring only to the recommendation of the prosecutor for a CYA commitment, and not the probation departments recommendation for a ranch placement. In any event, after appellants counsel pointed out that the probation department had not recommended CYA, thereby correcting any misapprehension, the court adhered to its ruling that a CYA commitment was appropriate. Any misstatement by the juvenile court in this respect was harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Finally, the record does not support appellants claim that the court ordered a CYA commitment solely for the protection of society, rather than for appellants rehabilitation, without consideration of less restrictive alternatives. As discussed above, the court expressly noted the CYAs potentially beneficial programs, as did the probation report itself. The court also expressly considered, and rejected, the recommendation of a ranch placement, on the ground that it was an insecure facility, incapable of protecting the community from someone who inflicted such grave injury upon his victim in an act of unprovoked gang violence.
The juvenile court law focuses "on the dual concerns of the best interests of the minor and public protection." (In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.) The juvenile court weighed those interrelated concerns—the probable benefit to appellant of a CYA placement, and the need for public protection—and concluded that appellants interests as well as the public interest would be best served if he were placed at CYA. Although we view this case as somewhat close, and the juvenile court could have reached a different result, it was not an abuse of discretion to commit appellant to CYA under these circumstances.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of commitment to CYA is affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P.J., and SIMONS, J.