Opinion
No. 57651-8-I.
April 21, 2008.
Petition for relief from personal restraint.
Denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
The State charged Montgomery Manro, a juvenile, with a crime that required automatic transfer to adult court for trial. When the jury acquitted Manro of that offense, the trial court erred by failing to remand the remaining charges to juvenile court for disposition. Manro has filed a personal restraint petition challenging the error. But because Manro has fully served his adult sentence, this court cannot provide meaningful relief by means of a personal restraint petition. Accordingly, we deny the petition as moot.
FACTS
On April 5, 2002, following an attack on two other high school students, the State charged Manro and three juvenile co-defendants with first degree assault. Manro was also charged with a separate count of fourth degree assault.
Because Manro was 17, the first degree assault charge resulted in an automatic decline of juvenile jurisdiction and transfer to adult court for trial under former RCW 13.04.030. Anticipating that he might be acquitted of the auto-decline offense, Manro repeatedly attempted, both before and during trial, to persuade the superior court to extend juvenile court jurisdiction. The trial court denied all of Manro's requests. Manro turned 18 after trial began but before the jury returned its verdict.
On December 16, 2002, the jury found Manro's co-defendants guilty as charged. The jury found Manro not guilty of first degree assault but guilty of the lesser included offense of fourth degree assault. The jury also found Manro guilty of the separate count of fourth degree assault. Prior to sentencing, Manro moved for entry of a nunc pro tunc order extending juvenile jurisdiction and for an arrest of judgment or new trial. The trial court denied the motion and on February 14, 2003, imposed consecutive suspended sentences with a total incarceration of seven months and 240 hours of community service. The court then stayed Manro's sentences pending appeal.
On appeal, Manro argued that the trial court erred by not extending juvenile jurisdiction and transferring the remaining charges back to juvenile court for disposition after the jury acquitted him of first degree assault, the sole charge requiring automatic declination. This court disagreed, concluding that under former RCW 13.04.030, the nature of the charge — and not the resulting conviction — determined adult court jurisdiction. Consequently, we reasoned, once a juvenile has been charged with auto-decline offenses and the case properly transferred to adult court, the subsequent acquittal of all auto-decline offenses does not defeat adult court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied further review.
State v. Manro, 125 Wn. App. 165, 173-74, 104 P.3d 708 (2005).
Manro, 125 Wn. App. at 174-75.
State v. Manro, 155 Wn.2d 1010, 122 P.3d 912 (2005).
Acting in response to this court's decision in Manro's appeal, the legislature amended former RCW 13.04.030 to expressly require that a juvenile be returned to juvenile court for disposition of any remaining charges if he or she is acquitted of all offenses that required an automatic decline. As amended, RCW 13.04.030 now provides:
See Laws of 2005, ch. 238, § 1; State v. Posey, 130 Wn. App. 262, 274-275, 122 P.3d 914 (2005), rev'd in part on other grounds, 161 Wn.2d 638, 647, 167 P.3d 560 (2007).
The juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of any remaining charges in any case in which the juvenile is found not guilty in the adult criminal court of the charge or charges for which he or she was transferred, or is convicted in the adult criminal court of a lesser included offense that is not also an offense listed in (e)(v) of this subsection. The juvenile court shall enter an order extending juvenile court jurisdiction if the juvenile has turned eighteen years of age during the adult criminal court proceedings pursuant to RCW 13.40.300. However, once the case is returned to juvenile court, the court may hold a decline hearing pursuant to RCW 13.40.110 to determine whether to retain the case in juvenile court for the purpose of disposition or return the case to adult criminal court for sentencing.
The amendment became effective July 24, 2005, before the mandate issued in Manro's appeal.
On December 27, 2005, shortly before he was to begin serving his adult sentence, Manro petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in superior court. Among other things, he contended that the recent amendment clarifying RCW 13.04.030 was remedial and should apply retroactively. Manro argued that the superior court therefore lacked authority to sentence him as an adult.
The superior court transferred the matter for consideration as a personal restraint petition. On February 17, 2006, we stayed Manro's petition pending a final decision in State v. Posey. After the Supreme Court filed its decision in Posey on September 20, 2007, we lifted the stay on Manro's petition and requested additional briefing from the parties. Manro has now fully completed his sentence.
See Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wn.2d 607, 746 P.2d 809 (1987).
State v. Posey, 130 Wn. App. 262, 275, 122 P.3d 914 (2005), rev. granted, pet. for review granted October 12, 2006.
State v. Posey, 161 Wn.2d 638, 167 P.3d 560 (2007).
DECISION
In order to be entitled to relief by means of a personal restraint petition, Manro must demonstrate either an error of constitutional magnitude that gives rise to actual prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that inherently results in a "complete miscarriage of justice." Manro must also establish that he is currently under some unlawful "restraint," which includes any "disability resulting from a judgment or sentence in a criminal case." The State contends that, because Manro is now 23 and has fully completed his adult sentence, this court cannot provide any meaningful relief. Because the error in this case involved the adult court's failure to transfer Manro's fourth degree assault convictions to juvenile court for disposition, we agree.
In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 813, 792 P.2d 506 (1990).
RAP 16.4(b); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Meyer, 142 Wn.2d 608, 615, 16 P.3d 563 (2001).
In State v. Posey, the 16-year-old defendant was charged in 2002 with one count of first degree assault and three counts of second degree rape. Because the first degree assault required automatic declination, the juvenile court transferred the case to adult court. Following trial, the jury acquitted Posey of first degree assault and found him guilty on two counts of second degree rape. The court then sentenced Posey as an adult to a minimum term of 119 months.
On appeal, Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed Posey's conviction and rejected his contention that the adult court lacked authority to sentence him once the jury acquitted him of the sole auto-decline offense. The court further acknowledged that under the 2005 amendment to RCW 13.04.030, Posey would have been returned to the juvenile court for disposition, but concluded the amendment could not be applied retroactively because it would contravene the judicial interpretation in State v. Manro.
State v. Posey, 130 Wn. App. at 273-75.
Upon further review, our Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Posey was incorrectly sentenced as an adult. Reviewing the statutory framework in effect in 2002 when Posey committed his offenses, the court concluded that under the automatic decline provision in former RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A), the nature of the conviction — rather than the charge — determined the adult court's authority to act, effectively overruling this court's analysis in Manro's appeal. The court further noted its previous recognition that the statute "furthers the legislative intent to punish with certainty and more severity those juvenile offenders who commit violent crimes rather than those youthful offenders who commit other crimes."
State v. Posey, 161 Wn.2d 638, 167 P.3d 560 (2007).
Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 643-44.
Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 644 (citing State v. Mora, 138 Wn.2d 43, 50, 977 P.2d 564 (1999)).
Consequently, when Posey was acquitted of the sole auto-decline offense, the adult court lacked "sentencing jurisdiction" and should have transferred the remaining charges back to juvenile court for disposition. The court considered the 2005 amendment to be additional evidence of the legislature's intent to maintain the distinction between the juvenile justice and criminal adult systems. Because the 2005 changes were consistent with its statutory analysis, the court did not have to reach Posey's contention that they should be applied retroactively. The court then affirmed Posey's conviction and remanded the matter to juvenile court for further proceedings.
Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 647.
Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 645-46.
Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 649.
Posey construed the same statutes in effect at the time Manro committed his offenses. As Manro repeatedly argued below and the State now concedes, the jury's acquittal on the first degree assault charge, the sole auto-decline offense, automatically restored juvenile court jurisdiction over the remaining fourth degree assault charges, and the matter should have been transferred to juvenile court, as in Posey, for disposition. But because Manro is now 23, the juvenile court no longer has any authority to act in this case. Moreover, Manro has now fully completed his adult sentence, and he has not demonstrated any restraint or disability remaining from his conviction. Because this court can no longer provide any meaningful relief, Manro's petition is moot.
See Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 641.
See RCW 13.40.300(3) (juvenile court generally has no authority to extend jurisdiction beyond juvenile offender's twenty-first birthday).
See In re Det. of Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828 (1983) (a claim is moot if the court can provide no effective relief).
Relying solely on In re Personal Restraint of Dalluge, Manro contends that he may be entitled to a new trial. In Dalluge, the State originally charged Dalluge, a juvenile, with an auto-decline offense. Before trial, the State amended the information to charge two lesser offenses, neither of which required automatic transfer to adult court. Nonetheless, the State tried Dalluge as an adult without holding a declination hearing. In granting Dalluge's petition, the Supreme Court concluded that once the charges were amended, the adult court lacked authority to render a judgment and should have remanded the matter to juvenile court for a decline hearing. Under the circumstances, the court determined that Dalluge was entitled to a hearing in accordance with Dillenburg v. Maxwell to determine whether the juvenile court would have retained jurisdiction:
152 Wn.2d 772, 100 P.3d 279 (2004).
Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d at 785.
70 Wn.2d 331, 413 P.2d 940, 422 P.2d 783 (1966).
We conclude that where the defendant has since turned 18, the appropriate remedy for a trial court's failure to remand to juvenile court is remand to the adult criminal court for a de novo hearing on whether declination would have been appropriate. If declination would have been appropriate, then the conviction stands, but if not, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d at 786-87.
Manro maintains that he is entitled to an identical remedy. But the error in Dalluge and the need for a Dillenburg hearing arose from the adult court's lack of authority to determine Dalluge's guilt without a decline hearing. Here, the case was properly transferred to adult court for trial, and there is no challenge to the trial court's determination of Manro's guilt. Rather, the resulting error, as in Posey, was the adult court's failure to transfer the remaining charges to juvenile court. In juvenile court, Manro would have been entitled only to a determination of whether he should have been sentenced in juvenile court or in adult court, not a new trial. The same result follows from the express language of the 2005 statutory amendment. Dalluge provides no support for additional proceedings here, and Manro has not identified any other basis for relief.
See Dalluge, 152 Wn.2d at 785.
See Posey, 161 Wn.2d at 647.
See RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(E)(II) ("once the case is returned to juvenile court, the court may hold a decline hearing pursuant to RCW 13.40.110 to determine whether to retain the case in juvenile court for the purpose of disposition or return the case to adult criminal court for sentencing").
Similarly, State v. Meridieth, No. 35345-8 (Ct.App. April 15, 2008), is inapposite because the court addressed the remedy for an improper automatic declination of juvenile jurisdiction before trial.
Because Manro has already completed his adult sentence, we can provide no further relief for the trial court's error. A remand for further proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we deny Manro's petition as moot.
Manro has not identified any issues of continuing and substantial public interest that warrant further consideration. See In re Pers. Restraint of Mines, 146 Wn.2d 279, 285, 45 P.3d 535 (2002).