Opinion
No. COA11–1238.
2012-04-17
In the Matter of M.A., B.A., A.A., A.J., Jr.
Assistant County Attorney Theresa A. Boucher, for Forsyth County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Appellee. Richard Croutharmel, for Respondent–Appellant Mother.
Appeal by Respondents from order entered 4 August 2011 by Judge Denise S. Hartsfield in District Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 April 2012. Assistant County Attorney Theresa A. Boucher, for Forsyth County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Appellee. Richard Croutharmel, for Respondent–Appellant Mother.
Ryan McKaig, for Respondent–Appellant Father.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Murray C. Greason, III, for Guardian ad Litem.
McGEE, Judge.
Respondents appeal from the trial court's order adjudicating M.A., B.A., A.A., and A.J., Jr. (the children) as neglected. Respondents contend the trial court erred (1) by making findings of fact unsupported by the evidence, (2) by concluding the children were neglected based on insufficient evidence and findings of fact, and (3) by violating Respondents' rights to due process by consulting a third party before ruling on adjudication. In addition, Respondent–Mother contends the trial court failed to state the standard of review in the decretal portion of the order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
Respondents are the parents of M.A., born in 2008; B.A., born in 2006; and A.A., born in 2005. Respondent–Mother is also the parent of A.J., Jr., born in 2002. The father of A.J., Jr. was a party to the proceedings in the trial court but did not appeal and, therefore, is not a party to this appeal.
The Forsyth County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) became involved with the family in early 2011 due to mental health and domestic violence issues with Respondents. According to a juvenile petition filed by DSS on 12 April 2011, Bienvenida Myers (Ms. Myers), a DSS social worker, made an unannounced visit to Respondents' home on 11 April 2011, at approximately 3:30 p.m. One of the children came to the door, and told Ms. Myers that Respondents were asleep. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by the children to wake Respondents, Ms. Myers called 911. Police officers arrived and were also unable to arouse Respondents. EMS responders arrived and attempted to wake Respondents. EMS had to use an ammonia inhalant to wake Respondent–Mother. Based on Respondents' confused demeanor, Ms. Myers took the children into custody. DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging the children were neglected due to lack of proper care, supervision, or discipline and lived in an environment injurious to their welfare. DSS was granted nonsecure custody.
An adjudication hearing was held on 18 July 2011. After hearing the evidence, the trial court determined that DSS had presented clear and convincing evidence that the children were neglected juveniles pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2011). Respondents appeal.
II. Standard of Review
“The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court's adjudication of neglect and abuse is to determine (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact[.]” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C.App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). “If such evidence exists, the findings of the trial court are binding on appeal, even if the evidence would support a finding to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. Findings of Fact
Respondent–Mother challenges findings of fact twelve through seventeen as being unsupported by the evidence. Respondent–Father joins in challenging findings of fact twelve and thirteen. Although Respondents argue that the findings on adjudication fail to accurately reflect the evidence presented at the hearing, we note there is a more fundamental problem with the challenged findings of fact. After reviewing the record, we note that the adjudication findings of fact are quoted nearly verbatim from the allegations contained in the juvenile petition filed by DSS on 12 April 2011. Since the trial court failed to make its own independent findings of fact from the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court's order.
An adjudicatory hearing is a “process designed to adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–802 (2011). “The allegations in a petition alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–805 (2011). After hearing evidence, “the trial judge must determine which inferences shall be drawn and which shall be rejected[,]” and must make ultimate findings based on its evaluation of the evidence. In re Gleisner, 141 N.C.App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365–66 (2000). “[F]actual findings must be more than a recitation of allegations. They must be the specific ultimate facts ... sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘Ultimate facts are the final resulting effect reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts.’ “ Id. (citation omitted).
In the present case, challenged findings of fact twelve through seventeen, and findings of fact eighteen and nineteen, are taken almost word for word from the juvenile petition. Some minor differences are apparent. For example, the petition refers to Respondents as “Mr.” and “Ms.” with their respective last names, whereas the findings of fact in the trial court's order refer to Respondents by their full names in each instance. Also, in the juvenile petition, the DSS social worker is referred to as “SW” or “SW Myers,” whereas the trial court's findings of fact refer to her in most instances as “DSS social worker Bienvenida Myers.” Otherwise, the wording and contents of the allegations appear in substantially the same form in the trial court's findings of fact.
Since the trial court's findings of fact on adjudication are merely copies of the allegations made by DSS in its petition, the findings lack any indicia of the trial court's independent determination of the ultimate facts gleaned from the evidence. Therefore, the findings fail to show that facts exist to support the allegation of neglect, and we are unable to review whether “the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.” Anderson, 151 N.C.App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order adjudicating the children neglected and remand for further proceedings. Accordingly, we decline to address the remaining arguments made by Respondents, including whether sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing from which the trial court could have made adequate findings of fact, or whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conclusion of neglect. It is in the trial court's discretion whether to hear additional evidence upon remand.
Reversed and remanded. Judges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).