Opinion
13-23-00239-CV
07-10-2023
IN RE CLAUDE RAY LEESON JR.
Filed Date July, 2023
On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(d) ("When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case."); id. R. 47.1 (requiring the appellate courts to "hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition"); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
Relator Claude Ray Leeson Jr. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an order of contempt and suspension of commitment. The trial court's contempt order concluded that relator violated court orders because he "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly removed [specific property] from its known location with the intent to obstruct the authority of the court to order a division of the estate of the parties"; "tampered with tangible property, causing pecuniary loss" to real party in interest Vanessa Leeson, and "removed, harmed, transferred, concealed, or alienated property . . . with the intent to obstruct the authority of the court." The contempt order provides for concurrent periods of confinement for each specified violation of the court's orders, and suspends confinement if relator returned the itemized property by January 10, 2023 and "commit[ted] no further acts" in violation of court orders.
An order of contempt may be reviewed through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A court will issue a writ of habeas corpus if the order underlying the contempt is void or if the contempt order itself is void. See id. at 722. The relator bears the burden of showing that the contempt order is void and not merely voidable. In re B.G.B., 580 S.W.3d 310, 315- 16 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2019, orig. proceeding); In re Munks, 263 S.W.3d 270, 272-73 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). A contempt order is void if it deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law or if it exceeded the power of the court to issue. In re Office of Atty. Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Mayorga, 538 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding).
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the limited record provided, and the response provided by receiver Steve Lopez, is of the opinion that relator has not met his burden to obtain relief. The contempt order suspended confinement if relator: (1) returned specified property by January 10, 2023, and (2) committed "no further acts in violation" of court orders. Under these circumstances, the contempt order does not sufficiently restrain relator to permit relief by writ of habeas corpus. See In re Rivas-Luna, 528 S.W.3d 167, 169 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding) ("Courts have held that suspended contempt orders which only require the contemnor to pay attorney's fees and otherwise comply with the trial court's orders do not constitute a sufficient restraint on liberty to allow the contemnor to challenge the contempt order by habeas corpus."); Ex parte Hughey, 932 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, orig. proceeding) ("Confinement is not an imminent possibility as long as Relator complies with the Temporary Orders and the terms of his probation."). Further, we note that the trial court signed the contempt order as an interim order on March 10, 2023, and signed a final decree of divorce thereafter on March 17, 2023. Relator has appealed the final decree of divorce, and his appeal is currently pending in our Court in appellate cause number 13-23-00158-CV. The divorce decree divides the parties' marital estate and encompasses the property at issue in the contempt order. Thus, it appears that the contempt order has been subsumed by the final decree of divorce. See In re Contract Freighters, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding).
We deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.