Opinion
No. 4-173 / 04-0166
Filed March 24, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Kristin L. Hibbs, Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her daughter. AFFIRMED.
Judith Amsler of the Amsler Law Office, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Lance Heeren, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Judy Goldberg, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Tina J. is the mother of Karmen K., who was born on February 21, 2003. On April 21, Karmen was removed from her parents' custody after it was discovered they were operating a methamphetamine lab in their home while in Karmen's presence. Both parents were charged with child endangerment, and Karmen's father Jay was also charged with possession of precursors and manufacturing methamphetamine in the presence of a minor. Karmen was later, by stipulation of the parents, adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) (2003). On October 22, 2003, the State filed a petition to terminate Tina's and Jay's parental rights. Following a hearing, the district court granted the petition and terminated Tina's parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(h) and (l). Tina appeals.
The court also terminated Jay's parental rights to Karmen, however, he does not appeal from this order.
Standard of Review.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000).
Americans With Disabilities Act.
Prior to trial, Tina moved to continue the termination hearing, alleging that she suffers from a substance abuse addiction, a disability which entitles her to reasonable accommodations. In particular, the accommodation Tina sought was additional time in which to establish her suitability as a parent. The court denied the motion, stating:
See the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101- 12213.
the record is clear that an opportunity of nearly eight months was afforded these parents to take advantage of the services and treatment offered to them. A reasonable accommodation to the parents should not mean that Karmen must continue [to] wait for her parents to get serious about providing a home and appropriate care for her as her parents.
The ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a disabled person by excluding him or her from participation or by denying the benefits of public services, programs, or activities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132. The ADA requires the public entity to make "reasonable accommodation" to allow the disabled person to receive the services or to participate in the public entity's programs. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1994).
In light of Tina's extensive history of drug involvement, failed treatments, and inability to control her addiction, we find no reason to believe further treatment or accommodation would achieve reunification within the reasonably forseeable future. Tina reported to having used methamphetamine since her early twenties and went through an inpatient drug treatment facility as early as 1989. The family first came to the attention of the Department of Human Services in March of 2003 when Tina was found to have been smoking marijuana and drinking heavily around Karmen at a party. Less then one month later the incident occurred in which authorities found an operational methamphetamine lab in Tina and Jay's residence. In 2003 Tina completed ASAC inpatient treatment, but left the program against medical advice. Throughout the pendency of this case, she continued to test positive for the presence of illegal drugs. The district court noted she had "not had one clean month since Karmen's removal." Her continued drug use after the most recent round of treatment and refusal to participate in aftercare is significant. Assuming without deciding that Tina has a qualifying "disability" under the ADA, we conclude the State reasonably accommodated her. We thus hold no reversible error occurred in the juvenile court's ruling because no further accommodation would have likely achieved a different outcome.
Best Interests.
Tina next maintains termination is not in Karmen's best interests. We recognize that even if the statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interest of the children. In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1986). In assessing the best interests of the child, we evaluate the child's long-range as well as immediate interests. In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1989). We must consider what the future likely holds for the child if returned to his or her parents. Id. We gain insight into the child's prospects by reviewing evidence of the parent's past performance, for it may be indicative of the parent's future capabilities. Id.
On our de novo review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court's conclusion termination of Tina's parental rights are in Karmen's best interest. It is clear Tina places her own self-gratification above Karmen's well-being. Tina's continuing and substantial drug problem would certainly place Karmen in a position of danger if returned to her care. The record also shows a serious lack of knowledge of appropriate parenting and a disregard for medical advice. Further, Tina has an extensive history of criminal involvement and does not have a stable home in which to care for Karmen. In consideration of these factors, we conclude Karmen's best interests are met by termination. We therefore affirm the district court's ruling.