Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. DL028277, Gary Vincent, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Tracy A. Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
IKOLA, J.
The court found Joseph S. (the minor), committed battery against two of his high school classmates, declared him a ward of the court, and placed him on probation with the condition he attend some other high school. Defendant contends this probation condition unreasonably violates his constitutional rights and was wrongly imposed without a social study. His first claim lacks merit; his second was waived. We affirm.
FACTS
The minor attended El Dorado High School in Placentia, as did Joseph W. and James M. The latter two boys were walking to an internet cafe one afternoon to check their grades on-line when they saw the minor. The minor blocked the entrance and stared at them. He told them, “You’d better walk away.” The two boys did just that. The minor followed them. He and a group of 20 others surrounded them. He told the boys “‘I’m going to fucking kill you.’” He pushed each of them on the chest. Joseph W.’s mother drove up; the two boys fled into her car. The minor approached the car and told the mother “‘I’ll fight you by myself,’” “‘I’ll go one-on-one with you,’” and/or “‘I’ll kill you too.’”
The District Attorney filed a petition to declare the minor a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) It charged him with two counts of criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422), two counts of battery (Pen. Code, § 242), and one count of disturbing the peace (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1)). The court found true the allegations in the battery and disturbing the peace counts. It adjudged the minor a ward of the court, ordered him to serve 90 days in custody, and placed him on probation on the condition he is “not to attend El Dorado High School.”
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
DISCUSSION
The Probation Condition Is Reasonable and Constitutional
The minor contends the probation condition barring him from attending El Dorado High School is not reasonably related to his offenses and violates his constitutional freedoms of assembly, association, and travel. “In an adult probation setting, ‘[a] condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid.’” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 940 (Antonio R.).)
But “juvenile conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders. This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.” (Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) “Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. The court may impose ‘any . . . reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’” (Id. at p. 940.) And “[p]robation conditions have been upheld even though they restrict a probationer’s exercise of constitutional rights if they are narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and rehabilitation [citation] and if they are specifically tailored to the individual probationer.” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084 (Babak S.).) “The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. And a parent may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of the constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent’s own constitutionally protected “liberty” includes the right to “bring up children” [citation,] and to “direct the upbringing and education of children.”’” (Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
Accordingly, courts have allowed probation conditions that infringe minors’ freedoms of association, assembly, and travel. (Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 942 [minor residing in Orange County barred from entering Los Angeles County without a parent or permission of probation officer]; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1243 [minor barred from associating with anyone disapproved of by his parents or the probation officer].)
The probation condition here similarly passes muster. It reasonably relates to the crime and to future criminality, in that the minor attacked two students of the high school. (Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) The probation condition bars the minor from attending only the victims’ high school, and is thus both narrowly drawn and specific to the minor. (Babak S., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) The court acted well within its “broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases.” (Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.)
The issue is reasonableness, not whether the probation condition is absolutely necessary to protect the minor’s victims. Thus, the minor misses the target by claiming he and the two boys have attended the same high school without incident since the confrontation leading to the arrest, and by noting the court issued a protective order.
The minor misplaces his reliance on banishment cases. (Babak S., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1080-1081, 1085 [minor ordered to live in Iran]; cf. Alhusainy v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 385, 393 [plea agreement conditioned on defendant leaving state].) The minor was not banished. He was not forced to leave the country, the state, the county, or the city where he lives. He may attend any school approved by his probation officer — other than the one school that his victims attend.
The Minor Waived Any Error from the Lack of a Social Study
The minor contends the court erred by conducting the disposition hearing without obtaining a social study. The code directs “the probation officer to prepare for every hearing on the disposition of a case as provided by Section 356 [or] 702, a social study of the minor, containing such matters as may be relevant to a proper disposition of the case.” (§ 280.) It similarly requires “[t]he court [to] receive in evidence the social study of the minor made by the probation officer. . . . .” (§ 706.)
We disapprove the court’s cavalier attitude toward this plain statutory mandate. At the disposition hearing, the court stated, “I guess I’m going to get some kind of recommendation from probation, or do I get a report, or what?” When informed the probation officer would need “four weeks out-of-custody” to prepare the social study, the court responded, “No, this thing isn’t worth that to me.” The Legislature has determined a social study is always “worth it.” (§§ 280, 706.) It is not the bench officer’s call.
But the minor waived any error by failing to object below. “It is well established that procedural errors may not be raised at the appellate level if they were not raised in the trial court level. ‘[E]ven constitutional rights, including those of a minor in the area of juvenile court procedure, will ordinarily be waived by silence, i.e., by their nonassertion.’” (In re Christopher S. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1344; accord People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352, fn. 15 [error in relying on outdated or untimely probation report is waived by failure to object]; In re Adolfo M. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1225, 1230 [any error in social study’s contents is waived by failure to object]; In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038 [any inadequacy of social study in dependency case is waived by failure to object].)
The minor’s reliance on In re L. S. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1103, 1106 (court wrongly issued disposition without social study) and In re Devin J. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1096, 1101 (court wrongly used fitness hearing social study at dispositional hearing) is unavailing because neither case addressed the issue of waiver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., BEDSWORTH, J.