Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ44487, Robert Totten, Commissioner.
Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Joseph F. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment sustaining a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, finding that he committed second degree robbery as an aider and abettor in violation of Penal Code section 211.
We find substantial evidence that Joseph F. acted as an aider and abettor and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Jose Rosales was walking home while listening to his iPod on the night of February 26, 2010. A four-door red Toyota drove past him, turned right, and stopped. Rosales continued to walk. Two of the men in the Toyota got out of the vehicle and approached Rosales. One man was in front of Rosales and the other was behind him. They asked him where he was from. Rosales understood this to refer to any gang with which he was affiliated. Rosales said he was not part of that. The men said they liked his iPod. The man in front grabbed Rosales “from [his] shirt” and said he wanted his iPod or he would “shank” Rosales. The man put his hand into his pocket, and Rosales said they could take the iPod. The man took the iPod and both men ran back to the Toyota.
After the robbery, Rosales continued walking home and within minutes saw two police officers in a vehicle. He told them about the robbery. As he was giving the officers information, the red Toyota containing the robbers passed by on the street. Rosales was able to see that the occupants were the same as at the time of the robbery. He pointed out the vehicle as the one used in the robbery. The officers went in pursuit of the vehicle. Later, Rosales was taken to a field identification of three men. He told the officers which men had gotten out of the car, and identified the driver. Rosales identified Joseph as an occupant in the car, who did not get out to rob him. The following day, police officers returned his iPod to Rosales.
Los Angeles Police Officer David Vela and his partner were the officers approached by Rosales when he reported the robbery. When Rosales pointed out the vehicle and the men involved in the robbery, Officer Vela and his partner followed them. The suspects’ vehicle was involved in a traffic collision as they approached. Officer Vela identified Joseph as the driver of that vehicle. All of the occupants ran. Three were taken into custody. Los Angeles Police Officer Dora Born testified that Rosales identified Joseph as the driver of the car at a field identification.
Joseph testified in his own defense, admitting that he drove the car involved in the robbery of Rosales. The occupants were a friend of his and two men his friend had introduced to him at a park. He did not know the others intended to commit a robbery. As he was driving the men to drop them off, the two told him to stop, got out of the car, and walked behind it. Joseph kept the car running. The men returned to the car and Joseph started driving away. The men said they had committed a robbery. Joseph said he did not know what to do, so he just continued driving.
Joseph saw a police car, which flashed its lights toward him. He “took off” because he was frightened that he would be pulled over for the robbery. He braked, jumped out of the car, and ran. He did not put the transmission in “park.” The car rolled forward and went onto the sidewalk.
A petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed charging Joseph with second degree robbery. That petition was sustained. Joseph was declared a ward of the court, the offense was declared a felony, and he was ordered placed in a camp for a nine-month period. The maximum time of confinement was set at five years and eight months. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Joseph challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the petition on the ground that he aided and abetted the robbery of Rosales. He contends “his mere presence in a vehicle from which others exited and committed a robbery does not amount to aiding and abetting that offense.” Joseph asserts that he never contemplated committing a crime.
“We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) Thus, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the alleged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence, and if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings as to each element of the charged offense, we must affirm even if the circumstances and evidence would support a contrary finding. (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)” (In re Brandon G. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079-1080.)
“‘“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he..., (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating, or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 851.)” (People v. Busch (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 150, 161.)
“‘For purposes of aider-abettor liability, the commission of a robbery continues so long as the property taken is being carried away to a place of temporary safety. [Citation.] “The act of ‘taking’ begins when the separation of the victim from his or her property occurs, and it continues through the forcible consummation.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1291 (Haynes), quoting People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 421.) In Haynes, the issue was sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant aided and abetted a robbery. The circumstances were unusual. In the initial physical altercation the robber tore the victim’s currency in half and escaped with it. The defendant kicked the side window of the victim’s car. The defendant then drove the robber in pursuit of the victim. A second altercation followed in which the other half of the victim’s money was forcibly taken. The defendant was found with a torn bill in his shoe and was charged as an aider and abettor. The defendant claimed the first robbery ended when the robber got into his car for the pursuit to commit a second robbery. He claimed there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
The Haynes court rejected defendant’s claim that the principal had reached a place of temporary safety when he entered and rode in the defendant’s car. It reasoned: “Temporary safety is not tested based on subjective impressions or recklessness of the robber but on an objective measure of safety following the initial taking. [Citation.]” (Haynes, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.) After examining the evidence which supported a finding that the robber had not reached a place of temporary safety, the court concluded that “jurors were free to find an aiding and abetting act [citation] anytime during the course of events, provided defendant’s knowledge and intent to assist arose sometime prior to or during the commission of the robbery [citation].” (Id. at p. 1294.) One of several factors supporting the requisite act and intent was the defendant’s conduct in driving the robber away from the second location. (Ibid.)
Here, after taking the iPod, the robbers got into the car driven by Joseph and told him they had just committed a robbery. At that point, with knowledge of the taking, Joseph chose to drive the men away in an attempt to reach a place of safety. In People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, the Supreme Court applied the rule that the asportation element of robbery continues “as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety” to a case of aider and abettor liability. (Id. at p. 1165.) It held: “[I]n order to fulfill the requirements of [People v.] Beeman [(1984)] 35 Cal.3d 547 for conviction of the more serious offense of aiding and abetting a robbery, a getaway driver must form the intent to facilitate or encourage commission of the robbery prior to or during the carrying away of the loot to a place of temporary safety.” (Ibid, fn. omitted.) There was substantial evidence that Joseph formed the requisite intent to aid and abet the robbery when he drove the principals from the scene after being told the iPod had been stolen. He testified that he “took off” when he saw the police car flash its lights in his direction.
Joseph takes comments by the trial court out of context to argue for reversal. First, he cites a portion of the court’s comment in denying a defense motion to dismiss, in which the court noted that the victim thought Joseph was not the driver, although Joseph admitted he was behind the wheel of the car. Joseph argues that once “the court believe [sic] he was the driver, he imputed all the same criminal intent of the passengers onto appellant.” The court’s full statement is instructive. After noting that the victim erred in identifying Joseph as a passenger, the court said: “By being the driver and participating in the setting up of the robbery and the escape of the robbers and then of the fleeing from the traffic collision, showing consciousness of guilt, I believe there is no doubt he was involved in the robbery. Motion denied.” Thus the court was relying on Joseph’s flight from pursuing officers as well as his role as getaway driver.
Joseph also argues “the court was very upset over the manner in which appellant stopped the vehicle” contending that undue emphasis was placed on this factor alone. The cited comment occurred when defense counsel argued that there was a reasonable explanation for Joseph’s conduct in driving the principals from the scene of the robbery and for fleeing when he saw the police because he feared being caught up in something he did not do. The court interrupted and said: “He gets out of the car and leaves it running.” Defense counsel countered: “It’s not his.” The court pointed out the car was left with the transmission in drive. Defense counsel reiterated that Joseph was “freaking out” in fear that he was being caught up in something he did not do.
Finally, Joseph cites the court’s comment in selecting a disposition, again referring to evidence that the car was left running. The court explained why it chose a nine-month camp placement despite argument by Joseph’s mother that a six-month placement was appropriate: “I [sic] tell you why it’s nine months, because he got out of the damn car, left it running so somebody else could get killed. If you would have put the darn car in park, I wouldn’t have this kind of problem but I’m seriously angry with regard to what occurred. It could have been your mother walking along the sidewalk, that car could have gone up the curb; there could have been a baby in a stroller; that’s what really ticked me off.”
We have reviewed the entire reporter’s transcript. It establishes that the court relied on the evidence we have summarized in sustaining the petition. The court noted that Joseph left the car running. Its strongest statements were made in explaining to Joseph and his mother why he was being placed in camp for nine, rather than six, months. We find no basis for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, J. SUZUKAWA, J.