Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. J185771
Siggins, J.
Brandi S. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her son Jordan S. She argues it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to deny a request for a continuance by the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency). Mother also contends that the court failed to adequately consider Jordan’s wishes; that there was sufficient evidence Jordan would benefit from continuing his relationship with Mother so that the statutory exception to termination of parental rights applied; and that no substantial evidence supported the court’s finding of adoptability. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jordan was born in February 1998. He was first removed from Mother’s home when he was four years old and was discovered walking alone in the street when Mother was found in their apartment, “intoxicated and vomiting.” A petition alleged Jordan came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), because Mother “ha[d] an alcohol problem which interfere[d] with her ability to care for and provide for the minor” and was on medication for depression.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
An amended petition added allegations that Jordan’s father had a history of substance abuse and the parents had a history of domestic violence that resulted in police intervention.
In November 2002, the court found the allegations against Mother true and placed Jordan with Mother with family maintenance services. In March 2003, Jordan was again removed after a supplemental petition alleged Mother was unable to care for Jordan’s needs due to her ongoing substance abuse and mental health issues. Mother reported she was overwhelmed by caring for Jordan, “who often hit[], kick[ed], and curse[d] at her,” and she wanted to be involuntarily hospitalized. The court sustained the supplemental petition and ordered Jordan placed in foster care. Reunification services were ordered continued at the May and August 2003 review hearings. A July 2003 status report observed “[t]here is no consistent visitation between Jordan and his mother at this time because she lives in Washington State and Jordan remains in California.”
The report noted Jordan had last seen Mother in May 2003, but talked to her on the phone “approximately every week.”
In October 2003, Mother filed a petition seeking a change in the court’s order based upon new circumstances pursuant to section 388. Mother alleged she had graduated from a residential substance abuse program and obtained a safe and appropriate residence for Jordan in Washington State. The court denied the petition and extended reunification services. By January 2004, Mother told her case worker she had relapsed and that she wanted to return to California and enter a treatment program. In February 2004, the court determined that Mother’s progress was minimal and there was a substantial risk it would be detrimental to return Jordan to her care. The court terminated reunification services and ordered the matter set for a section 366.26 hearing.
The court terminated reunification services for Father in October 2003.
Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition, but apparently no petition was filed.
Over the next three and a half years the case was repeatedly continued. While the Agency considered Jordan to be adoptable during this time, several Agency reports noted that his “emotional and behavioral challenges” made it difficult to find an appropriate adoptive home. In October 2004, Jordan was diagnosed with attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity and was prescribed medication. A few months later, Jordan was also diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder and prescribed additional medication. He had an approved special education plan (504 Education Plan) that called for special interventions in school to address his needs in light of his attention deficit disorder.
In November 2004, the court approved a planned permanent living arrangement of long-term foster care with a specific goal to terminate Mother’s parental rights and place Jordan in adoption. The court also precluded visitation between Jordan and his parents, because “[n]either parent ha[d] maintained contact with Jordan nor shown any evidence of[] addressing their problems.” In December 2004, Jordan was placed with the foster mother with whom he continued to reside when the section 366.26 hearing was finally held in October 2007.
The Agency was granted discretion to allow visits with Jordan’s adult cousin.
Jordan formed a positive relationship with his foster mother during this time, and she began to consider becoming Jordan’s legal guardian or adopting him. Jordan’s foster mother and the foster family agency social worker reported that Jordan’s medications “ha[d] made a tremendous difference in Jordan’s behaviors.” He was “sleeping better, able to focus in school[,] and ha[d] better behavior overall.”
In March 2007, the court scheduled the section 366.26 hearing for that July. Mother attended the scheduling hearing and requested visitation with Jordan. The Agency did not object to Mother accompanying Jordan’s adult cousin on her scheduled visit with Jordan that day, and if the child welfare worker agreed, Jordan’s counsel had no objection. Mother visited with Jordan three times following this hearing. Shortly after the hearing, Jordan met his Mother in March 2007 for their first visit in several years, and he was upset afterwards. He did not have behavioral problems after their second visit in June 2007. A third visit was scheduled for September 2007.
Mother again filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition in this court, but the filing of the record was stricken in May 2007 after she failed to timely file her petition.
In July 2007, Mother filed another section 388 petition seeking return of Jordan. The petition alleged Mother and a cousin had visited Jordan, and that Mother had relocated to Florida where she was employed, a member of her church, had stable housing, and a “clean and sober lifestyle.” The petition claimed placement with Mother would be in Jordan’s best interests because the reasons for his initial removal were resolved, and Jordan was still attached to Mother in a positive relationship. The court summarily denied Mother’s petition.
The Agency’s July 2007 interim report stated that Mother had relocated to Florida the previous month. Mother testified that she considered moving to California to be closer to Jordan, but decided to move to Florida because it was “best for [her].”
Mother filed another section 388 petition in August 2007, based upon the same allegations as contained in her July 2007 petition, and supporting them with a declaration and other documentation. The petition was heard on September 27 and October 1, 2007.
At the hearing on this second section 388 petition, Mother testified that she was ready to care for Jordan in Florida, and had not used methamphetamine for a year and a half. But Mother also admitted she drank alcohol on the day before the hearing, even though she was not to have any alcohol. She learned during her inpatient treatment that alcoholism is a disease. Mother also acknowledged she has a bipolar disorder, but was not taking her prescribed medications because she did not like how they made her feel. She also had not completed a recommended domestic violence program. The court commended Mother on her improvements, but concluded it was not in Jordan’s best interests to be returned to her care because he was doing well in a stable relationship with his caretaker and there were “too many unknowns” in Mother’s current situation. The court denied the petition and proceeded to the section 366.26 termination hearing.
The denial of Mother’s section 388 petition is not raised as an issue on appeal.
The Agency’s report prepared in anticipation of the October 1 termination hearing recommended continuing the hearing for 120 days to allow for completion of a pending adoption home study. The report stated that Mother was “in agreement with the continuance.” The Agency also reported that Jordan and his caregiver had lived together since December 2004 and had grown to love each other. The caregiver was “willing to move forward to adoption.” A recent adoption assessment concluded Jordan was adoptable and it appeared likely he would be adopted. The report specifically stated Jordan was “placed with [a] foster parent willing to adopt [him].” His foster mother was “willing and prepared to make a permanent commitment to Jordan.”
The report stated that the request for a home study was submitted in late July 2007, but the foster mother had not yet submitted the required paperwork.
Jordan was reported to be “a healthy, active, little boy,” who was “charming and usually pretty sweet.” His third grade teacher found him “a pleasure to have in class,” where he worked “at grade level or slightly above in all areas.” Jordan was described as “a delightful, inquisitive child,” “generally emotionally stable,” who “responds well to his foster mother.” He had friends in the neighborhood, and was “close to the caregiver and her adult daughter.” Jordan “continued to do well on the medication” he took for his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiance disorder. He was “a lovable, adoptable child” who “[felt] secure with his caregiver, and stated he wanted to stay with her.”
Jordan, who was then nine years old, said he wanted to stay with his foster mother, but he also wanted to visit Mother. The Agency recommended visits with Mother be continued, “as consistent with the best interest of the child at the discretion of the caregiver.” The caregiver was described as “the central figure in Jordan’s life,” who had “demonstrated ability to meet his needs.” Jordan was accepted as a member of the family, and the caregiver was “willing and prepared to make a permanent commitment to [him].” The report also stated: “Jordan does not really understand adoption. He has said he wants to stay with his caregiver, whom he calls mom.”
At the contested section 366.26 hearing on October 1, 2007, the Agency moved for a continuance to allow the court to hear from Jordan’s therapist. County counsel believed the therapist “would testify concerning the need for permanency in this case, and . . . would speak in favor of adoption as the preferred permanent plan.” Mother’s counsel did not object, but requested that, if the hearing was to be continued, the Agency pay for Mother’s plane ticket from Florida.
Jordan’s counsel opposed any continuance of the section 366.26 hearing on the basis that the court had sufficient evidence to proceed and that Jordan had been waiting a long time for permanency in an adoptive home. Jordan’s counsel reported that he had spoken with the therapist, who recommended “permanency and a quick permanency.”
The court denied the continuance, received the section 366.26 report into evidence without objection, and heard testimony from the supervising social worker and the former case worker. The former case worker testified that she recommended adoption as the permanent plan in the section 366.26 report, but had personally preferred a plan of legal guardianship. She believed Jordan had a bond with Mother, based on the case worker’s own visit and discussion with Jordan a year earlier and on the foster family agency case worker’s reports of Jordan’s recent visits with Mother. The case worker’s supervisor testified that in her professional opinion Jordan should be adopted, because it was the most permanent plan available to him and was in his best interest. The supervisor had taken the former case worker’s views into account in reaching her conclusion.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Jordan was likely to be adopted, terminated Mother’s parental rights, and ordered adoption as the permanent plan. When it reached its decision, the court stated: “I am very cognizant of the fact the child was with his mother for the first four plus years of his life, but I also cannot ignore the fact that he’s been out of her care for more than five years—going on five years. And during that time, he’s gone through some rather rough periods, and we now have a nine-year[-]old child who [has] been in the home of his current caretaker for close to three years. And the proposal is that that caretaker’s desire to adopt Jordan be honored. And so we do have a situation where the plan that is preferred by the [L]egislature, by the whole legislative scheme, that plan being adoption, that it happen. And this is a nine-year-old child who may not have such an opportunity again for this kind of permanency. And under those circumstances, I do think the case law is pretty clear that we must proceed with the adoption, that the relationship between Jordan and his mother does not rise to the level where it would outweigh the well-being for Jordan to actually have a permanent home. [¶] A child at this age has—that’s his greatest need, really, is for permanence, and so I think we have to give him that.” Mother timely appealed.
This court appointed appellate counsel for Jordan on the recommendation of the First District Appellate Project.
DISCUSSION
A. The Agency’s Requests for a Continuance
Mother argues the court abused its discretion when it denied the Agency’s requests for a continuance to allow the Agency to obtain information from Jordan’s therapist and for completion of the pending home study of Jordan’s foster mother. County counsel and Jordan’s counsel argue that Mother lacks standing to raise this issue on appeal because it was the Agency that requested the continuance and Mother was not harmed when it was denied. But Mother agreed to the Agency’s requests for a continuance, and her counsel stated that he believed the therapist’s testimony would be helpful to Mother. Mother’s argument is that the court’s ruling deprived her of access to testimony concerning Jordan’s wishes and his adoptability, and she points to the case worker’s testimony that Jordan benefitted from his visits with Mother, and that the therapist reported Jordan was no longer sure he wanted to be adopted.
“We liberally construe the issue of standing and resolve doubts in favor of the right to appeal.” (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.) We will therefore address the denial of the continuance of the section 366.26 hearing on the merits. When we do, we conclude that Mother has not shown the court abused its discretion when it denied the request.
Section 352, subdivision (a) authorizes the court to continue a hearing on request of counsel, but provides that “no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the minor’s interest, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements. [¶] Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance.”
Jordan’s counsel opposed the Agency’s request for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing, and emphasized Jordan’s need for permanency after his lengthy period in foster care that included three years in his current placement with a foster mother who wished to adopt him. County counsel told the court he expected the therapist to testify in favor of adoption and Jordan’s counsel concurred. Mother’s counsel did not argue otherwise. While Jordan’s former case worker testified that she heard that Jordan’s therapist said he “wasn’t so sure anymore that he wanted to be adopted,” the former case worker also testified that Jordan’s therapist previously told her that Jordan should stay with his foster mother. Moreover, Jordan’s counsel had reportedly spoken to the therapist since the session when Jordan was said to have been ambivalent about adoption, and counsel reported that the therapist thought adoption was in Jordan’s best interest.
At the conclusion of the hearing, county counsel stated that the newly assigned case worker had recently spoken with Jordan’s therapist, who did not recommend ongoing contact with Mother because he did not believe it would be beneficial to Jordan. The therapist also believed adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for Jordan.
By the time the Agency sought the continuance on October 1, 2007, the section 366.26 hearing had already been continued long past the statutorily mandated period of 120 days from the date of the review hearing. (§ 366.3, subd. (h).) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the requested continuance in order to avoid further delays to permanency for Jordan, who had been in foster care for almost five years. (See In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811 [“Continuances are discouraged . . . and we reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion”].)
On March 19, 2007, the court scheduled the section 366.26 hearing for July 12, 2007. It was subsequently continued to September 27, 2007, and then to October 1, 2007.
B. The Wishes of the Minor
Mother also argues the court failed to adequately consider the wishes of the minor, as required by section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1), and the case should be remanded specifically for that purpose. We disagree.
Section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1) states: “At all proceedings under this section, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child.” When the child is four years of age or older, section 317, subdivision (e) requires counsel to interview the child to determine the child’s wishes, and to advise the court accordingly. The Agency is also required by statute to include in its assessment “a statement from the child concerning placement and the adoption or guardianship, unless the child’s age or physical, emotional, or other condition precludes his or her meaningful response, and, if so, a description of the condition.” (§§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(E), 366.22, subd. (b)(1)(E).)
Mother did not raise this issue in the juvenile court where any error could have been expeditiously remedied. Her failure to bring this alleged deficiency to the juvenile court’s attention could be considered a forfeiture of her right to assert this claim on appeal. (See In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [failure to object to adequacy of adoption assessment at section 366.26 hearing waived issue on appeal], citing In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 and In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412.)
However, Mother argues this claim “is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to the minor’s wishes and indeed, the ultimate deficiency of which [she] complains is the lack of evidence to support the court’s finding that the minor was adoptable.” She relies on In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 622-623 for the proposition that a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is not waived by failure to object in the trial court. Assuming the issue is not waived on appeal, Mother’s claim fails on the merits.
Mother claims that “neither the Agency nor the minor’s counsel provided the court with a statement from the minor concerning adoption and placement . . . .” But the Agency’s report admitted into evidence without objection at the section 366.26 hearing stated that Jordan wanted to stay with his foster mother, who had cared for him for three years and who he called “mom.” Mother also argues that Jordan’s wishes were not “formally presented by the minor’s attorney,” but Jordan’s counsel repeatedly told the court that Jordan wanted to be adopted. Counsel said he had discussed the matter directly with Jordan, who had stated his wish to be adopted. While the case worker testified she had not discussed adoption with Jordan, the record shows Jordan’s counsel did so, and reported his client’s wishes to the court. Mother cites no legal authority that requires a written or “formal” statement from the minor or counsel.
The report also stated Jordan wanted to visit with Mother, and that he “[did] not really understand adoption.” The foster family agency social worker reportedly stated her belief that Jordan’s foster mother “would be flexible and willing to talk about a plan [for visits with Mother],” and the Agency’s report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing recommended visits with Mother “as consistent with the best interest of the child at the discretion of the caregiver.”
Mother relies on In re Diana G. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1480 to argue that the court was required to receive direct evidence of Jordan’s wishes regarding termination of parental rights. But the evidence considered sufficient by the court in Diana G. consisted essentially of reports from several sources that the children said they wanted to be adopted. Such evidence included statements attributable to the children in social worker reports and statements by their attorneys. (Id. at p. 1481; cf. In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1592-1593 [“in considering the child’s expression of preferences, it is not required that the child specifically understand the proceeding is in the nature of a termination of parental rights”]; accord, In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820-821.)
The record in this case shows substantial compliance with the statutory requirements that the court be informed of the minor’s wishes (see In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378), and Mother has not shown that any alleged deficiency in the Agency’s assessment was prejudicial in light of the totality of the evidence before the court. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60 [appellant must show reasonable probability of more favorable result in absence of alleged error]; In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 413 [inadequacies of report found insignificant in light of the evidence as a whole].) The record contains sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s statement that it “considered the wishes of the child, consistent with the child’s age, and all findings and orders of the court [were] made in the best interest of the child.” (See § 366.26, subd. (h)(1).) (See In re Leo M., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1592-1593 [“The purpose of the statutory injunction that the court ‘consider the wishes of the child’ simply requires the court to consider what the child’s preferences are. It is a reminder to all . . . that the child is not a cipher in the process”]; cf. In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 208-209 [requiring “ ‘ “some evidence of the minor’s feelings” ’ ” and finding compliance with § 366.26, subd. (h)(1) “marginal at best” absent “[e]vidence of minor’s feelings towards his biological parents and of his thoughts concerning his living situation”].)
We say “substantial compliance” because while the record clearly shows that Jordan said he wanted to be adopted, the attribution of Jordan’s statements arises in front of the court in a variety of contexts that focus upon an issue separate from Jordan’s wishes, including during the course of his counsel’s speaking objection to evidence. Nevertheless, we are confident the juvenile court was aware of Jordan’s wishes from these multiple references to his desires that are scattered through the record.
Mother argues that Jordan’s expressed wishes to remain with his foster mother and to visit with Mother, as reported in the Agency’s assessment, were consistent with a permanent plan of legal guardianship. But adoption is the statutorily preferred permanent plan, and while guardianship may be a more stable option than foster care, it “is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341, 1344-1345.)
C. Benefit to the Minor of Continuing His Relationship with Mother
Mother argues that this case falls within an exception to termination of parental rights because she has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Former § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A), recently renumbered as § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The juvenile court determined otherwise, and we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351-1352.)
Mother argues that she visited regularly with Jordan “once visitation was . . . again permitted in March 2007.” But the record shows she had at most three visits with Jordan over a six-month period from March to October 2007, after not seeing him at all for three years. The no-contact order that was in place for some of those three years was imposed only after Mother failed to maintain contact with Jordan for a substantial period, and failed to address the issues that caused Jordan to be removed from her care. While the relatively recent visits between Jordan and Mother reportedly went well, a parent must show more than the status of a friendly visitor to establish the basis for the statutory exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1417-1420 [loving and happy relationship between children and parents does not require juvenile court to apply statutory exception to termination of parental rights]; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576 [parental relationship must “promote[] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents”]; see also In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 [“a parent may not claim entitlement to the exception . . . simply by demonstrating some benefit to the child from a continued relationship with the parent”].) Mother’s argument that established case law on this issue “misconstrues the plain meaning of the statute, is unjust, and should be rejected or modified by this court” is unpersuasive. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, at pp. 1347-1350 [rejecting a similar challenge to the standards set forth in In re Autumn H.].) We see no reason here to depart from established precedent.
Nor has Mother shown that she met her burden of proof. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350 [parent has burden to show application of statutory exception].) “ ‘The balancing of competing considerations must be performed on a case-by-case basis and take into account many variables, including the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs. [Citation.] When the benefits from a stable and permanent home provided by adoption outweigh the benefits from a continued parent/child relationship, the court should order adoption.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1349-1350.)
The court was not required to accept the former case worker’s personal opinion that legal guardianship was preferable for Jordan because he had “a bond with his mother,” when other evidence demonstrated Jordan’s history of behavioral challenges, his acting out after his first visit with Mother, and his current needs. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350 [“[t]he juvenile court may reject the parent’s claim simply by finding that the relationship maintained during visitation does not benefit the child significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for adoption”].) And while Mother cites the former case worker’s testimony that Jordan’s therapist thought he benefitted from his visits with Mother, county counsel reported that the current case worker learned from the therapist that he did not recommend ongoing contact with Mother because he did not believe it would be beneficial to Jordan. “This is not the extraordinary case where an adoption should have been foreclosed by the exception provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).” (In re Jasmine D., supra, at p. 1352.)
The former case worker’s supervisor also testified that she had taken her subordinate’s views into account when she recommended adoption as the appropriate permanent plan for Jordan.
Jordan’s therapist also reportedly believed adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for Jordan.
D. The Finding of Adoptability
Finally, Mother argues the court erred when it terminated her parental rights because there was no substantial evidence to support the finding that Jordan was adoptable. Mother argues that Jordan was not generally adoptable because of his behavioral challenges, and that the Agency failed to show an approved family was available to adopt him because the home study had not been completed at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. But the home study has since been completed. The Agency has requested that this court take judicial notice of the completion of the home study in January 2008, as reported in the Agency’s March 2008 status review report. The Agency says the conclusions of the home study render Mother’s concerns in this regard moot.
Jordan’s counsel joins in the Agency’s request for judicial notice of the completion of the home study.
Mother opposes the request for judicial notice on the grounds, inter alia, that it was not presented to the trial court and contravenes our Supreme Court’s holding in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396. But her reliance on Zeth S. is misplaced. In Zeth S., the court ruled that postjudgment unsworn statements of counsel did not provide a basis for a reviewing court “to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard” and reverse an order terminating parental rights. (Id. at p. 410.) Here, the proffered evidence consists of a certified copy of a status review report filed in the juvenile court, and is offered not to reverse the order terminating Mother’s rights but in support of the trial court’s ruling. Postjudgment evidence has been considered in other cases to show that dismissing an appeal is in the child’s best interests (see In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676), or that an issue raised in the appeal is moot. (In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420-1422 [augmenting appellate record to include postjudgment agency report that disclosed approval of adoptive home study, rendering appellate issue moot]; In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 166 [taking judicial notice of postjudgment minute order reflecting completion of home study]; see also In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1240-1241 [augmenting record with postjudgment agency report that showed children were placed in adoptive home, rendering issue of adoptability moot].)
Mother also objects that the proffered evidence is “untested, inadmissible hearsay,” but does not challenge the truth of the report’s assertion that the home study has been completed. We deferred consideration of the request for judicial notice until the decision on the merits of the appeal.
We grant the motion for judicial notice, and conclude the challenge to the finding of Jordan’s adoptability due to an incomplete home study is moot. In light of the approval of the foster mother’s home study, there is no reason to further delay Jordan’s chance at stability and permanence in an adoptive home. (See In re Salvador M., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.)
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P.J. Jenkins, J.