Opinion
No. CP01-012408-A
September 16, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This memorandum of decision addresses a petition brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Maria D. and Michael Sr., the biological parents of Michael M., soon to be two years old. The Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) filed the TPR petition at issue on August 13, 2002, alleging failure to achieve rehabilitation and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship as to both Maria D. and Michael Sr.; the petition also alleged that Michael Sr. had abandoned his son. For the reasons stated below, the court finds all issues in favor of the petitioner, and terminates the respondents' parental rights.
Maria D. and Michael Sr. had recently filed Motions for Increased Visitation and Objections to the Permanency Plan; Michael Sr. had also filed an Objection to DCF's Motion for Extension of Commitment. These motions were consolidated with the TPR trial. As the respondents' parental rights are herein terminated, the court declines to decide these matters. Furthermore, on July 15, 2003, the court granted the petitioner's motions for default against both respondents due to their personal failure to appear in court. Judgment was deferred. Given the abundance of evidence supporting the alleged grounds for TPR, the court declines the opportunity to enter judgment upon the defaults.
Trial of this highly-contested mailer took place on July 14 and 15, 2003. Neither Maria D. nor Michael Sr. attended trial on either date. Maria D.'s court-appointed conservatrix attended court on July 14, 2003, but was excused from further participation in the matter. The petitioner, both respondents and the child were effectively represented by counsel throughout.
Neither Maria D. nor Michael Sr. has ever served in the military. (Exhibits 4, 5.)
On November 17, 1997, the Court of Probate, District of New Haven (Heffernan, J.) appointed Johanna D. to serve as conservatrix of the person of Maria D., finding in pertinent part: "Clear and convincing evidence has been presented to this court that said respondent is incapable of caring for him/herself, expressly including the exercising of all civil or personal rights described in C.G.S. § 45a-644(c) as modified by C.G.S. § 45a-656, by reason of Schizophrenia." (Exhibit 6.) The conservatrix manages Maria D.'s finances and pays the bills for her. (Exhibit 4.) In court on July 14, 2003, the conservatrix advised the court that her ward's best interests would be served CT Page 10335-aj by proceeding with trial in the absence of Maria D.
The Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of Michael M.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS CT Page 10335-b
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petitions, the TPR social study and the multiple other documents submitted in evidence which included court records; DCF reports; psychologist's reports; hospital records; reports of the Department of Public Safety; and records of substance abuse treatment. The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of the sole trial witness, a DCF social worker. Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial:
The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. Practice Book § 33-5.
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). "The trial court . . . is not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of any witness . . . and is in fact free to reject such testimony . . . The trier . . . has the right to accept part or disregard part of a witness' testimony." (Citations and question marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 197, 208, 763 A.2d 45 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001).
Additional facts will be referenced as necessary.
I.A. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
DCF has been involved with Michael since November 6, 2001, when the child was a month and a half old. Maria D. was then involved with law enforcement authorities and was unable to care for her hospitalized son; she was also identified as having significant substance abuse problems. Michael Sr.'s whereabouts were unknown. The child was taken into DCF custody, where he has remained pursuant to court orders.
I.B. MARIA D., THE MOTHER
Maria D. was born on September 22, 1968. A high school graduate who briefly attended college, Maria D. has limited experience with earning lawful income, and has had long periods of unemployment. Maria D. has a significant history of poly-substance abuse; her chronic narcotic addiction has been largely refractory to treatment. (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 14.) On November 17, 1997, Johanna D. was appointed conservatrix of Maria D.'s person. Two months later, Maria D. gave birth to her first child, Gina. Almost immediately following Gina's birth, guardianship of this child was transferred to Johanna D. (Exhibit 1.)
Maria D.'s intellectual functioning is "at a level that is better than two thirds of the population her age." (Exhibit 4.)
"[Maria D.'s] substance abuse history includes the following: marijuana ages 13 to 14, did until 21 years and occasionally; cocaine 17 but first time was 14, at 18 through 21 everyday and then stopped for two years, 23 to 24 shooting everyday until 29; crack, ages 23 to 25, then stopped and started IV cocaine, ages 19 to 33 smoked crack daily and shot heroin daily (heroin started at age 23); alcohol, ages 14 to 15 drank everyday; Klonopin and Xanax, ages 26 and 27, with methadone but most recently taking it so that she would not get anxious." (Exhibit 4.)
See footnote 4.
Gina was born with evidence of illegal drugs in her system. (Exhibit 1.)
Maria D. has a long history of involvement with the criminal justice system that commenced prior to Michael's birth. She has accumulated multiple arrests and convictions for prostitution, larceny, criminal trespass, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, possession of burglary tools, disorderly conduct, failure to appear, and probation. On November 2, 1999, Maria D. was sentenced to serve a total of fifteen months in jail for violating the conditions of her probation. Maria D. was arrested on three occasions while she was pregnant with Michael; she was arrested on July 10, 2001 and charged with CT Page 10335-c possession of narcotics; on August 29, 2001, she was arrested and charged with prostitution and criminal trespass; and on September 16, 2001 she was arrested and charged with Criminal Trespass. (Exhibits 8, 11.) Michael was born four days later, on September 20, 2001. (Exhibit 1.)
In a child protection matter, evidence of a parent's arrests may be considered by the trial court because "even though CT Page 10335-ak those arrests did not result in conviction; that evidence was relevant to establish that the respondent's habits and acts of misconduct were competent to deny the] child the care, guidance or control necessary for [his or her] physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being." In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 819, 719 A.2d 907 (1998).
The September 16, 2001 arrest arose from Maria D.'s actions in crossing from the westbound rest area on I-95 in Milford, to the eastbound rest area on I-95 just prior to 7 p.m. She was also charged with Reckless Use of the Highway by a Pedestrian. (Exhibit 12.)
Maria D. also has a long history of mental illness which has impaired her ability to function within a family unit. Prior to September 1997, Maria D. had multiple psychiatric hospital admissions for detoxification, treatment of drug overdoses and for decompensation of her Schizoaffective disorder. In September 1997, Maria D. received a week of inpatient psychiatric treatment at a major university hospital (YPI) due to "[i]ncreasing violence at home and combativeness with parents." (Exhibit 14.) She received medication for her psychiatric conditions. (Exhibit 14.) Upon discharge from that admission, YPI reported that the respondent mother's prognosis was "Poor" as Maria D. refused to cooperate with therapy, and had "little insight into how to maintain a safe life . . ." (Exhibit 14.)
Maria D. has been diagnosed with Cocaine Dependence, Opioid Dependence, Anxiolytic Abuse (benzodiazepine addiction), Schizoaffective Disorder, and Personality Disorder. (Exhibit 14.) As an adult, Maria D. "has been victimized sexually and physically." (Exhibit 4.) When she was twenty-nine, Maria D.'s thirty-three-year-old brother died of congestive heart failure. At the time of his death, he was "using drugs and alcohol abusively." (Exhibit 4.) Maria D.'s grandfather had died when she was twenty-three years old. Psychologically, these deaths "were both significant losses for her . . ." (Exhibit 4.)
In the community, Maria D. had access to psychiatric mental health outpatient treatment at WHMHC. She had access to methadone and substance abuse treatment at a LAMC, a local clinic. (Exhibit 14.) In October 1997, when she was pregnant with Gina, Maria D. returned to YPI, and underwent a month of hospital care for her psychiatric conditions and for infections related to her intravenous drug use. (Exhibits 1, 14.) During this admission, Maria D.'s "capacity to participate [in group therapy] was limited by the severity of her psychiatric illness and continued substance use. The patient remained labile, impulsive, and unable, with multiple resource supports in the community, to follow through on treatment plans." (Exhibit 14.) On discharge in November 1997, the YPI staff again noted that Maria D.'s prognosis was "Poor." (Exhibit 14.)
Maria D. met Michael Sr. "on the street" in approximately 1992. (Exhibits 4, 5.) As noted above, Michael was born to the respondents on September 20, 2001. Maria D. had limited prenatal care, although she claimed to have been engaged in methadone treatment. At delivery, Maria D. tested positive for cocaine and opiates in addition to methadone. Michael was underweight and had respiratory problems, complicated by his pre-natal drug exposure and resultant symptoms of withdrawal. Michael remained hospitalized after Maria D.'s discharge. During visits with her child, Maria appeared to be under the influence of drugs, and she CT Page 10335-d was unable to provide safe basic care for Michael. To her credit, Maria D. admitted to the hospital staff that she was presently unable to provide appropriate care for her child, acknowledging that she required inpatient drug treatment. (Exhibit 3.)
Maria D. was taken into police custody on November 5, 2001. (Exhibits 2, 3.) On November 6, 2001, while Michael remained hospitalized, DCF obtained an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) (Conway J.) for the child. The OTC was sustained (Conway J.) on November 16, 2001.
On January 9, 2002, Maria D. underwent court-ordered compentency, clinical and intellectual evaluations performed by Logan Green, Ph.D. Maria D. was found to be competent for court purposes. (Exhibit 4.) On January 29, 2002, the court (Conway, J.) adjudicated Michael to be an uncared for child, and committed him to the custody of DCF. At that time, the court also imposed specific steps upon Maria D. Among other things, the steps required her to refrain from substance abuse; submit to substance abuse assessment and treatment when released from prison; and to participate in parenting and individual counseling. (Exhibit 10.)
Following Michael's entry into foster care, Maria D. continued to acquire new arrests and criminal convictions. On March 15, 2002, she was convicted of two counts of Criminal Trespass in the third degree, and two counts of Failure to Appear in the second degree based on offenses that had occurred when she was pregnant with Michael. Maria D. was sentenced to time served. (Exhibit 8.) On March 28, 2002, she was arrested and charged with Prostitution. (Exhibit 12.) On May 2, 2002, Maria D. was convicted of possession of narcotics for an offense that had occurred on April 13, 2002; she was also convicted of a second count of possession of narcotics for an offense that had occurred on July 10, 2001, when she was pregnant with Michael. Maria D. received a total effective sentence of three years in jail, suspended, with three years of probation. (Exhibits 8, 11, 12.)
On May 3, 2002, Maria D. tested positive for use of cocaine and benzodiazepines. (Exhibit 2.) On May 22, 2002, at DCF's referral Maria D., was admitted to CSDP, a local detox center. (Exhibit 1.) On June 11, 2002, Maria D. was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia in connection with an offense that occurred on May 4, 2002, just two days after her conviction for possession of narcotics. She received a sentence of 90 days in jail, concurrent with her other sentences. (Exhibit 8.) CT Page 10335-e
On June 11, 2002, Maria D. was also convicted of the offense of Failure to Appear in the second degree, in relation to an offense that had occurred on May 15, 2002. (Exhibit 8.)
The TPR petition at issue was filed on August 13, 2002.
On September 19, 2002, Mafia D. was convicted of Prostitution in relation to an offense that had occurred on March 28, 2002. She was sentenced to serve 1 year in jail, suspended, with one year of probation. (Exhibit 8.) On October 7, 2002, Maria D. underwent a re-evaluation by Dr. Green, along with a psychological assessment of her interaction with Michael. (Exhibit 5.) On October 25, 2002, while the TPR petition was pending, Maria D. again engaged in criminal acts, was arrested and charged with Possession of Narcotics and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. (Exhibit 12.)
On November 2, 2002, Maria D. was again admitted to YPI for treatment of apparent suicidal ideation and Valium toxicity; she also received treatment for her chronic polysubstance abuse and depression. The psychiatric staff had "significant concern for the patient's relapse to drugs" even after her acute care had been completed. (Exhibit 14.) Maria D. entered a state-sponsored inpatient drug treatment program (CVHSP) on November 18, 2002, and remained involved with this program until her discharge on January 7, 2003. (Exhibits 1, 4.) Returned to the community, Maria D. then was provided with access to mental health and substance abuse treatment at CMHC, a local clinic. (Exhibits 4, 14.)
The November 2002 YPI admission was in response to a Physician's Emergenvy Certificate. (Exhibit 14.)
In early 2003, Maria D. continued her substance abuse treatment through APR, where she worked with a case manager, and obtained methadone maintenance through CAMP, a community-based provider. Notwithstanding her repeated experiences with inpatient and outpatient treatment, however, Maria D. admitted current use of heroin and cocaine in February of 2003. (Exhibit 2.)
Maria D.'s substance abuse persisted. On March 28, 2003, Maria D., at the referral of CMCH, Maria D. was again admitted to YPI for psychiatric treatment." The evaluating YPI physician found that Maria D: "continues to struggle [with] drug recidivism" and designated treatment for that problem. (Exhibit 14.) Nonetheless, Maria D. continued to use illegal drugs. On July 2, 2003, just before the commencement of the TPR trial, Maria D. again engaged in criminal acts, leading to her arrest on charges of Possession of Narcotics, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Simple Trespass. (Exhibit 11.) CT Page 10335-f
Maria D. also underwent surgery in March of 2003. (Exhibit 14.)
I.C. MICHAEL SR., THE FATHER
Michael Sr. was born on September 3, 1959. A high school graduate, he also attended computer training school. Michael Sr. has worked in a warehouse, as a carpenter, for a flooring company, and for a cable TV company. He has had long periods of unemployment and has also supported himself by drug dealing. (Exhibits 1, 5, 15.) Michael Sr. has a long history of substance abuse problems, and has been diagnosed with Dependence on Opioids, Alcohol, Cannabis and Cocaine. He first sought treatment for his intravenous heroin use when he was thirty-five years old, and successfully attended a state-sponsored residential treatment program at DH from July 1 through September 14, 1995. Thereafter, Michael Sr. attended outpatient methadone treatment at LAMC, but he did not succeed with this program. (Exhibit 15.)
Michael Sr. commenced using heroin, his drug of choice, at age twenty-one; used cocaine between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five; began smoking crack cocaine at age thirty-five; and had started smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol as an adolescent (Exhibit 5.)
Over the years, Michael Sr. has also been consistently involved with the criminal justice system. On a regular basis from 1988 until Michael was born, the respondent father accumulated numerous arrests and convictions for felony and misdemeanor larceny, felony and misdemeanor failure to appear in court as ordered, assault, burglary, possession of burglary tools, possession of narcotics, possession of controlled substances, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal impersonation, issuance of bad checks, criminal trespass, interfering with arrest, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, and violations of the conditions of probation. (Exhibit 9.)
After Michael's birth on September 20, 2001, Michael Sr. did not visit the child at the hospital; he clearly was not available as a placement or planning resource for his son. As found in Part I.B., DCF obtained an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) (Conway, J.) on November 6, 2001; this OTC was sustained on November 16, 2001. On January 29, 2002, Michael was adjudicated an uncared for child (Conway, J.), and was committed to the custody of DCF. He has remained in DCF care ever since.
Again involved with the criminal justice system, the Office of Adult Probation (OAP), referred Michael Sr. to the long-term CR program. He commenced residential treatment on June 17, 2002 and met program criteria: he developed a working relationship with his primary counselor and worked on avoidance issues within his own behavior; he remained sober; attended meetings and groups directed at substance abuse treatment and relapse prevention; CT Page 10335-g attended parenting classes through the WYSS; engaged in lawful employment and properly attended to his financial responsibility to the program; attended self-help meetings in the community; and successfully completed stress management and domestic violence classes. (Exhibit 15.)
The TPR petition at issue was filed on August 13, 2002. On August 19, 2002, Michael Sr. was convicted of Possession of Narcotics in relation to an offense that had occurred in May 2002, when Michael was eight months old. Michael Sr. was sentenced to 1 year in jail, suspended, with three years of probation which required continued residence at the CR program. (Exhibit 9.)
On October 2, 2002, Michael Sr. was convicted of Larceny in the sixth degree, relating to an offense that had occurred on January 7, 2002, when his son was three and a half months old. Michael Sr. was sentenced to 3 months in jail, suspended, with one year of probation. (Exhibit 9.)
On October 7, 2002, Michael Sr. underwent a thorough court-ordered psychological evaluation and interactional assessment performed by Dr. Green. (Exhibit 5.)
On March 14, 2003, having remained sober since June 2002 and having successfully completed CR's long-term residential program, Michael Sr. was released from that program. He was referred to an outpatient substance abuse treatment facility (SATU) for follow-up and aftercare supervision. (Exhibit 15.)
I.D. MICHAEL M., THE CHILD
Michael was born on September 20, 2001, with symptoms as described in Part I.B. He remained hospitalized through November 19, 2001, withdrawing from his prenatal drug exposure. Although Michael still has vision problems, his physical condition is stabilized. (Exhibit 1.)
Michael was placed in a legal risk foster home in September 2002. (Exhibit 1.) At his psychological evaluation on October 7, 2002, the child displayed "developmental delays that were of some importance" with regard to motor, cognitive and adaptive skills. Appropriately, he receives services from the Birth to Three program for these specialized needs. (Exhibit 5.) CT Page 10335-h
II. ADJUDICATION
In the adjudicatory phase of this trial, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to the date upon which the TPR petition was filed insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment are concerned. With regard to the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial. Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to both Maria D. and Michael Sr.
"Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ CT Page 10335-al 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); see also In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).
Practice Book § 35a-7(a) provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights." The commentary to this rule elucidates subsection (a): "Post-adjudicatory evidence may be considered in the adjudicatory phase in a termination of parental rights case alleging the grounds of no ongoing parent-child relationship or failure to rehabilitate. In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776 [, 746 A.2d 222] (2000); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224 [, 763 A.2d 83] (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742 [, 789 A.2d 1024] (2002)."
Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.
II.A. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
As a predicate to granting a TPR petition, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that "DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds in [the TPR] proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); see In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 386, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). Both respondents have been duly served, and their location is not at issue in this case. In addition, the petitioner has met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence both that the reunification efforts made by DCF were reasonable given the respondents' circumstances and their incarceration or participation in other programs during the major part of Michael's time in foster care, and that both parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from the reasonable reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.
"Although `[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).
II.A.1. MARIA D.
Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that the petitioner has met the burden established by § 17a-112(j)(1) by proving both that Maria D. is unable or unwilling to benefit from statutory reunification efforts, and that although reasonable efforts at reunification were extended to Maria D. by DCF and by other agencies; these CT Page 10335-i efforts failed to yield a sufficient benefit to affect the child in a positive manner. In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.
As a part of its reasonable efforts to promote reunification of the family, DCF provided Maria D. with appropriate family treatment and permanency plans, case management services and administrative case reviews, and transportation so that Michael could visit with her. Maria D.'s drug use was obvious on each of the six times she visited with Michael during his two-month hospitalization. She was incarcerated for several months during the spring of 2002; during this time, DCF was unable to extend any services to her other than visitation.
DCF's efforts to extend visitation to Maria D. have been largely impeded due to her substance abuse, hospitalizations and frequent short-term incarceration. DCF provided the respondent mother with monthly visits whenever she was incarcerated, and twice-monthly visits when she was at liberty. Maria D. missed two visits in the fall of 2002 because she was overly late. In 2003, Maria D. "has been much more consistent in keeping her appointments with DCF." (Exhibit 2.)
The DOC alone is able to assign inmates to rehabilitation services. See In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998) (excusing DCF from providing reasonable efforts at reunification for incarcerated parent).
In a further reasonable effort at reunification, DCF appropriately investigated and considered relatives whom the respondents suggested as placement resources. A maternal uncle, Anthony D., initially demonstrated interest in caring for the child; however, he subsequently refused to cooperate with the department. Another maternal uncle was properly determined to be unable to care for Michael, given the child's specialized needs and that uncle's own mental health issues. (Exhibits 1, 2.)
Moreover, a review of the abundant clear and convincing evidence establishes that reasonable reunification efforts were extended to Maria D. through referrals by DCF or other agencies to myriad substance abuse and mental health treatment programs. This treatment was a necessary element of the reunification process, but Maria D. remained unwilling or unable to obtain measurable benefits from services that were appropriately geared to serve her particular needs. As described in Part I.B., during the years prior to Michael's birth, Maria D. engaged in substance abuse treatment and mental health care at YPI, WHMHC, and LAMC. These efforts seemed to ameliorate Maria D.'s substance abuse and mental health problems on a temporary, crisis-oriented basis, but failed to effect an enduring improvement in her functional condition. (Exhibits 4, 5, 14.)
Maria D. has offered no basis, in law or reason, for requiring DCF to duplicate counseling referrals, rehabilitation services or other reunification services that are otherwise extended to a parent through community agencies or other government-sponsored entities.
In finding that Maria D. is unable or unwilling to benefit from services, the court has concluded that the department properly identified and reasonably relied upon the appropriate corollary mental health and substance abuse services extended to the respondent mother, as these services were well-suited to meet the respondent mother's needs. Thus, DCF complied with its statutory mandate to take into consideration the respondent's overall mental health status when determining what "reasonable efforts" to make at reunification. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 479.
As found in Part I.B., Maria D. received outpatient psychiatric care in 1997 from WHMHC, along with outpatient substance abuse treatment and methadone services from the LAMC. In September of 1997, Maria D. was hospitalized at YPI in an attempt to deal with her psychiatric and addiction issues. She required readmission to YPI in October of 1997 for continued psychiatric care and for management of abscesses which had developed at the sites where she was injecting illegal drugs into her body. (Exhibits 4, 5, 14.)
After Michael was born in the fall of 2001, Maria D. continued to struggle with her serious mental health and substance abuse issues, but was still unable or unwilling to benefit from the additional efforts that were extended to her; DCF referred Maria D. to APT-CTU for a substance abuse evaluation scheduled for April 3, 2002, but she was unable or unwilling to attend this appointment. On May 22, 2002, Maria D. was admitted to CSDP for CT Page 10335-j detox services; although CSDP recommended inpatient treatment in view of her condition at the time, the respondent mother was unable or unwilling to cooperate with the proffered aftercare, so that her mental health and addiction status relentlessly continued to adversely affect her ability to function. (Exhibit 1.)
DCF also referred Maria D. to substance abuse evaluation and treatment at two other local clinics, the PHC and the NHC. However, notwithstanding the specific steps' applicable order, the respondent mother refused to sign releases, leaving DCF CT Page 10335-an without the capacity to obtain information from these providers about the outcome of any treatment Maria D. may have accepted from them. (Exhibit 1.)
Maria D's serious mental health and substance abuse persisted after the TPR petition was filed in August of 2002, but she remained unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable efforts to address her condition. As found in Part I.B., Maria D. again required admission to YPI in November 2002, for psychiatric treatment of her manifest suicidal ideation and renewed depression. She was discharged from YPI to an inpatient treatment program at CVHSP, where additional substance abuse and mental health services were rendered to her in the structured, supervised environment that was necessary to meet her needs. In February 2003, DCF referred Maria D. to parenting education classes at CCCC, but she failed to complete the program. Maria D. proved unable or unwilling to benefit from the outpatient treatment then extended to her at CMCH in early 2003, so that she was referred by that provider back to YPI in March 2003. (Exhibits 1, 14.)
Moreover, as fully discussed in Part II.B.1., the psychological evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Maria D. is unable or unwilling to obtain reasonable, timely benefits from appropriate reunification services. The court credits Dr. Green's well-founded opinion that from a psychological perspective Maria D. remains so affected by her personal psychiatric conditions and substance abuse issues that she is unable to manage her own affairs, let alone attend to remediation of her parenting deficits. Maria D.'s psychological conditions and personality structure render her "preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success" even in the face of repeated failure to benefit from reunification services. (Exhibit 5.) Maria D. is unable to effectively benefit from instruction; she cannot learn from her own mistakes, or make valid use of reasonable services directed at improving her mental health status, addiction issues, or parenting deficits. Maria D.'s psychological inability or unwillingness to benefit from reasonable reunification services is clearly corroborated by the fact that she persisted in engaging in substance abuse and criminal conduct in the summer of 2003, after years of drug treatment and psychiatric treatment. Her failure to attend either day of the trial in this matter CT Page 10335-k further establishes that Maria D. is unable or unwilling to benefit even from such exemplary services as were extended to her in this case.
Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted not by the conduct of the department, but by Maria D.'s own behavior in continuing to abuse illegal drugs and engage in criminal conduct, and by her obvious inability or unwillingness to achieve a reasonable benefit from the panoply of appropriate mental health, substance abuse and parenting services extended to her. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350. Furthermore, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Maria D. remains unable or unwilling to timely benefit from any reasonable reunification services. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385 (parent must respond to reunification efforts in a timely way so as to assist the child). Thus, the petitioner has met her burden of proof as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).
Maria D. may attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification under the analysis utilized by In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637 (2002); cert denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. Unlike Maria D., the parent in Vincent B. had successfully participated in "a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program to treat a lengthy alcohol addiction." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 642. He had apparently achieved functional recovery, as in that matter "[t]he record shows no evidence of relapses." Id., 644. Furthermore, the psychological expert in Vincent B. had formed her opinion concerning the respondent father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts based only upon an evaluation performed " prior to his successful completion of the treatment program." (Emphasis added.) Id., 646. In this case, on the other hand, there is no reliable evidence establishing that Maria D. has ever achieved a functional ability to remain abstinent from illegal drugs, or that she has ever achieved a meaningful ability to manage her psychiatric conditions. In the absence of such evidence, the principles of Vincent B. are inapposite to the present case.
II.A.2. MICHAEL SR.
Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that the petitioner has met her reunification burden by proving both that Michael Sr. is unable or unwilling to benefit from statutory reunification efforts, and by proving that reasonable efforts at reunification were extended to Michael Sr., without yielding a sufficient timely benefit to affect the child in a positive manner. In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348; see also In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.
A review of the clear and convincing evidence impels this conclusion. It is uncontroverted that Michael Sr. failed to make himself available to DCF for assignment of services during the first eight months of Michael's life. Michael Sr. was incarcerated upon his arrest for Possession of Narcotics on May 4, 2002; the clear inference is that the respondent father's continued use of illegal drugs during the months prior to this arrest, caused or contributed to his inattentiveness to his newborn son and added to his underlying disinterest in working toward reunification. On June 5, 2002, when DCF met with Michael Sr. in jail, he did not request visits with the child, and still demonstrated no interest in his son. Michael Sr. did not inform DCF when his place of incarceration was changed, or when he was transferred to the CR residential treatment CT Page 10335-l program, leaving DCF temporarily unable to locate Michael Sr. or to provide timely father-son visitation. (Exhibits 1, 2.) During this period, then, Michael Sr. was unwilling or unable to respond to reasonable reunification efforts.
Having contested paternity, Michael Sr. underwent a test that established his biological relationship to the child at issue in this matter. (Exhibit 1.)
It is the factfinder's prerogative "to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) State v. Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 338, 746 A.2d 761 (2000); see also In re Adalberto S., 27 Conn.App. 49, 53, 604 A.2d 822 (1992).
When DCF located Michael Sr. at CR, the respondent father did agree to the department's proffer of monthly visits. On August 29, 2002, Michael Sr. visited with his son for the third time since his birth nearly one year before. (Exhibits 1, 2.) Since his discharge from CR in March 2003, Michael Sr. has been provided with opportunities to visit with Michael twice each month, under DCF's supervision. (Exhibit 1.) Given the multiple demands Michael Sr. faced while resident in the CR program and while working to maintain sobriety after his release into the community, the court finds that DCF provided him with reasonable efforts at reunification by adopting this visitation schedule.
Although Michael Sr. may attempt to argue that DCF's visitation schedule provided him with an insufficient opportunity to visit his son, the court file does not reflect that he made any efforts to enhance the regimen of contact with Michael in effect in this case. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 425, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), affirmed per curiam, 262 Conn. 308 (2003) (reasonable to expect parent make affirmative efforts to CT Page 10335-ao achieve increased contact with the child whose custody is at issue).
In addition, the evidence clearly and convincingly illustrates that the respondent father remains unable or unwilling to develop a valid understanding of the fragility of the sobriety he had apparently maintained while he lived under CR's long-term strict scrutiny, leaving him still unable or unwilling to effectively utilize reunification efforts. The CR program was well-suited to Michael Sr.'s particular needs for long-term substance abuse and life skills treatment. At first glance, it might appear that Michael Sr. had achieved meaningful control over his substance abuse issues by following the CR protocol from June 2002 through March 2003. However, although the CR staff referred Michael Sr. to additional after care and relapse-prevention services at APT-SATU in the Spring of 2003, after his discharge from the residential program, he failed to pursue any treatment. Michael Sr.'s failure to adequately attend to his underlying substance abuse issues, notwithstanding the residential facility's referral to a designated outpatient program for additional care and treatment clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father was unable or unwilling to obtain a measurable benefit even after nearly nine months of inpatient care from a program that was reasonably suited to meet his needs. (Exhibit 1.)
Michael Sr. has offered no basis, in law or reason, for requiring DCF to duplicate to him the comprehensive rehabilitation services that were extended through the CR program as a part of his involvement with the criminal court.
As achieving control over his substance abuse issues and development of a lawful lifestyle was fundamental to Michael Sr.'s reunification with his son, the court has concluded that the department properly identified and reasonably relied upon the comprehensive CR program, taking into consideration the respondent father's overall condition and obligation to the criminal justice system, when determining what "reasonable efforts" to make in this case. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 479.
Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted not by the conduct of the department, but by Michael Sr.'s own failure to maintain contact with his newborn child; by his involvement in criminal conduct which resulted in his CT Page 10335-m sequestration from his son; by his failure to cooperate with a relapse-prevention program after his release from CR; and by his overall lack of interest in serving as a valid caretaker for Michael. In re Amelia W., supra, 62 Conn.App. 506; In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 350. As Michael Sr. remains unable or unwilling to timely benefit from any reunification services contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1), the petitioner has met her burden of proof on this issue. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.
Michael Sr. may attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification under the analysis utilized by In re Vincent B., supra. 73 Conn.App. 637. Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. It is significant that the father in Vincent B., showed not only the ability to successfully complete long-term substance abuse treatment and avoid relapse, but also manifested a sincere, meaningful interest in reunification with his child. In the present case, however, while Michael Sr. may have succeeded in his work at CR, there is scant evidence, if any, that he remained willing or able to serve as his son's caretaker after his discharge from that program. As found in Part II.C.1., he has failed to attend a material administrative case review session, held at the end of his residential placement in the CR program, and he failed to attend either day of the TPR trial. To apply Vincent B. to this case would elevate form over substance, obnubilating the fact that a parent's commitment to caring for a child is at least as important as his ability to complete a highly-structured residential treatment program.
II.B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — MARIA D. II.B.1. PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner first alleges that the court should terminate Maria D.'s parental rights because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). Maria D. counters that she has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in her young son's life. As Michael was found to be uncared for on January 29, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who: "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of CT Page 10335-ap such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."
"Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., [ 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)] . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [the] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but rather whether [the parent] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied 255 Conn. 250, 759 A.2d 63 (2001).
Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Maria D. has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to her fundamental issues of substance abuse and dysfunctional personality as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future she could assume a responsible position in Michael's life. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. First, the psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that Maria D.'s capacity to parent her son remains significantly impaired despite repeated efforts at mental health and substance abuse treatment. Dr. Green's skilled analysis of the data accumulated from his thorough psychometric testing and interview of Maria D. in January 2002 established that the respondent mother's major depressive disorder was clearly remediated by her Paxil therapy, and that her anxiety disorder was also responding well to medication. CT Page 10335-n However, the court credits and accepts Dr. Green's considered opinion that even though these conditions may have been under control, Maria D. still had "limited ability to manage interpersonal relationships in a comfortable and rewarding manner." (Exhibit 4.) Maria D. lacked the ability to learn from her own experiences, and her "emotional and psychological status [was] quite fragile" at the time. (Exhibit 4.) Maria D.'s psychological condition thus presented serious impediments to her potential for providing Michael with safe and appropriate parenting, and she was clearly unable to fulfill this role as of January 2002.
"The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).
Dr. Green is Board Certified in Forensic Psychology. (Exhibit 5.) Herein, the court has reasonably relied on the testimony of the court-appointed psychological evaluator, a mental health expert, "regarding the depth and seriousness of the respondent's mental health problems . . ." In re Victoria B. (2003).
Dr. Green's specific psychological diagnoses for Maria D. in January 2002 included Anxiety Disorder, NOS; Major Depressive CT Page 10335-aq Disorder, recurrent, moderate; Polysubstance Dependence, early full remission, in a controlled environment; Cocaine-induced Psychotic Disorder, in remission, by history and self-report; and Personality Disorder, NOS, with narcissistic, antisocial and schizoid features. (Exhibit 4.)
The court credits and accepts the court-appointed psychologist's considered opinion that: "[Maria D.'s] emotional impairments as well as her substance abuse and dependence over many years have resulted in serious impairments which are likely to impact her ability to discharge childcare responsibilities. There are also indications of personality deficits and in the ability to develop reciprocal relationships. The sum of these impairments suggest that she may not accede to any but the briefest therapy. This would increase the likelihood of early relapse. Any insight into the need for understanding children and their care was lacking. She is also likely to resist any probing or personal exploration, especially those forms of exploration that imply deficiencies on her part. Thus therapy for her is likely to take a very long and arduous course." (Exhibit 4.)
When Dr. Green re-evaluated Maria D. in October of 2002, her emotional status was even more fragile than it had been in January of that year, notwithstanding the fact that she was continuing to take a variety of psychiatric medications that had been prescribed for her at the clinics she attended. As found in Part I.B., Maria D. had also continued to use illegal drugs during the months following her January 2002 psychological evaluation; she had undergone detox services at CSDP; had accumulated several arrests; and had failed to comply with DCF's referrals for additional substance abuse treatment at APT-CTU. When she was re-evaluated in October, despite her medication therapy, Maria D. was "overwhelmed" with the evaluation process, and was unable to complete several tests or the psychological interview that had been ordered by the court. (Exhibit 5.) Given the sufficient data available in October 2002, Dr. Green diagnosed Maria D. with Anxiety Disorder, NOS; Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent, moderate; Polysubstance Dependence, Early Partial Remission; Psychotic Disorder, NOS; and Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Schizoid and Schizotypal features. Maria D. was again showing signs of Schizoaffective Disorder, adding to her psychological instability. (Exhibit 5.)
Notwithstanding Maria D.'s limitations on this occasion, Dr. Green acquired data that was sufficient to support reliable psychological interpretation. (Exhibit 5.)
Maria D.'s drug dependency issues were found to be less stable in October 2002 than they had been in January 2002, when Dr. Green diagnosed her as having "Polysubstance Dependence, early full remission, in a controlled environment." (Exhibit 4.)
This diagnosis was essentially unchanged from the diagnosis Dr. Green had assigned for Maria D. ten months earlier, although the respondent mother's Narcissistic Personality Disorder was more fully defined. Overall, her psychological condition effectively ". . . prevents [the respondent mother] from putting herself `in Michael's shoes' and would cause her to act in a self-serving way with regard to her son." (Exhibit 5.) Given Maria D.'s continuing drug use, Dr. Green credibly opined in October 2002 that she "will have to remain free of cocaine and other mind altering substances for at least a year before a more CT Page 10335-o specific diagnosis as to her psychosis could be determined." (Exhibit 5.) However, the clear and convincing evidence reflects that despite additional treatment at YPI, CVHSP, APR, CAMP and CMCH, Maria D. has never passed Dr. Green's reasonable test of parental sobriety. As found in Part I.B., Maria D. admitted in February 2003 that she was still using heroin and cocaine. In March 2003 her physician at YPI found that Maria D. "continues to struggle, [with] drug recidivism" and designated treatment for that problem. (Exhibit 14.) Nonetheless Maria D. continued to use illegal drugs. In July 2003, Maria D. was again in possession of narcotics and paraphernalia related to drug use. At the time of trial, Maria D.'s psychological condition thus not only remained unimproved from its condition at the time of Michael's adjudication as an uncared for child in January 2002, but it remained so unstable and so affected by her drug use that an accurate diagnosis could not be reached even by a forensic specialist.
Dr. Green's October 2002 diagnosis was corroborated by the fact that Maria D.'s mental health status continued to deteriorate during the days following the evaluation, leading to her readmission to YPI for treatment of depression and suicidal ideation on November 2, 2002. (Exhibit 14.)
The clear and convincing evidence of Maria D.'s chronic pattern of her serious substance abuse and unresolved mental health issues overwhelmingly establishes that Maria D. continues to lack the capacity to parent a very young child such as Michael, even when she repeatedly receives support from appropriate service providers. The court credits and accepts the court-appointed psychologist's uncontroverted opinion that it is not likely, given Maria D.'s special needs, that she will be able to achieve a functional degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable time so as to assume a responsible position in Michael's life, in the face of her substance dependence, her personality dysfunction, and her psychotic disorder. (Exhibit 5.) Thus, from a psychological perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Maria D. has failed to achieve rehabilitation. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665.
In reaching this determination, the court has adhered to the principle that "rehabilitation does not require that a parent be able to assume the full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs . . ." (External citations omitted.) In re Victoria B., supra.
It is the respondent's inability or unwillingness to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not her mental health status per se, that leads the CT Page 10335-ar court to find that she has failed to achieve rehabilitation in the context of this case. See In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 673, 723 A.2d 356 cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999).
A second aspect of the clear and convincing evidence also establishes that Maria D. will not be able to play a responsible role in Michael's life in the reasonably foreseeable future. The empirical evidence abundantly establishes that despite the passage of more than a year and a half since Michael's adjudication, Maria D. continues to lack the practical ability to function as a responsible caretaker for her son. Maria D. admits that she has no close friends or family upon whom she could rely for social or emotional support during the stressful or CT Page 10335-p disconcerting times that, along with joys, are inherent in the process of parenting a young child. The respondent's mother, Johann D., serves as the guardian and caretaker for Gina, and also functions as Maria D.'s conservatrix; in these capacities, she supports the termination of Maria D.'s parental rights to Michael, rather than recommending the continuation of their legal bond. Maria D.'s only sustaining relationship is with Michael Sr., with whom she currently makes her home. (Exhibit 2.) However, as found in Parts II.A.2. and II.C.2., Michael Sr. faces serious psychological and substance abuse issues of his own, such that he is an inappropriate co-caretaker for this young child. (Exhibits 4, 5.) Furthermore, as a practical matter, Maria D. is so lacking in basic child care skills that she failed to notice when Michael's diaper needed to be changed during the October 2002 interactional evaluation, leaving the child to suffer much distress from this situation. (Exhibit 5.) Her failure to complete the parenting classes at CCCC, tendered during the winter of 2003, impels the inference that her child care skills remain unimproved and that they are thus inadequate to meet her son's fundamental needs. Maria D.'s failure to attend the trial of this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that while she may love her son, she lacks even the most rudimentary ability to demonstrate that love in a practical, appropriate manner.
Although Johanna D. continues to serve as her daughter's conservatrix, Maria D perceives that she has been "`banned from the family.'"(Exhibit 5.)
A third aspect of the clear and convincing evidence further establishes that Maria D. has not achieved a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to enable her to serve as a valid parent for Michael. Although the court assigned specific steps to assist Maria D. in achieving rehabilitation, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that she failed to fulfill a number of measures which were critical indicators of her ability to safely parent Michael. For instance, the specific steps clearly prohibited substance abuse of any type. However, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Maria D. violated this provision of the steps by continuing to use heroin and cocaine in February of 2003, maintaining her struggle with drug use in March 2003, and possessing narcotics and related drug paraphernalia in July 2003. Also, although the steps proscribed further involvement with the criminal justice system, Maria D. violated that provision through her arrest in July 2003 for possession of narcotics, possession of drug paraphernalia, and trespass, further indicating her failure to achieve compliance with the court's expectations or to meet minimal criteria for safe parenting. (Exhibit 11.) CT Page 10335-q
It is clearly and convincingly evident in this case that Maria D. has not only failed to achieve the capacity to manage her own life, but that she has not gained any reasonable measure of ability "to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448; see also In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. Michael is nearing his second birthday. As this child is totally unable to provide for himself, he requires consistent care and attention to meet his physical needs for food, shelter and clothing, and protection from his environment, as well as nurturance for his emotional needs. In addition, as found in Part I.D., Michael has developmental delays that require the attention of specialized providers who will expect not only cooperation but consistent support from caretakers who are willing and able to implement appropriate measures at home to supplement the child's professional care. Maria D. lacks the capacity to follow through with her son's necessary care, and lacks the ability to advocate on his behalf to ensure that his needs are met by the providers.
Thus, Maria D. has failed to achieve rehabilitation at present, and further finds that statutory rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time given the age and needs of her child, warranting termination of her parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(B). In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has honored the legal axiom that "`Termination [of parental rights] has been consistently recognized as being in the best interest of the child when the parent has a mental deficiency or illness which renders her unable to provide the child with necessary care.' In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 605, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987)." In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 473. Even if Maria D. should now actively engage in rehabilitation and manifest an ability and willingness to gain control of not only her substance abuse issues but her mental health challenges as well, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that a minimum of one year of psychotherapeutic treatment would be required to address her personal needs, before she could begin to safely parent Michael. (Exhibit 5.) Any such efforts would be "too little and too late" for Michael given the more than eighteen months that have passed since the child entered foster care, and the minimum additional one year of sobriety before effective treatment of mental health issues could commence. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). CT Page 10335-r
In its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that despite some participation in a rehabilitation regimen, Maria D. remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her son and lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in Michael's life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the petitioner has proved Maria D.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
II.B.2. LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP — § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)
The petitioner next alleges that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists between Maria D. and her son, that Michael's best interests will not be served by allowing additional time for this relationship to be developed, and that the TPR petition should be granted pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights "where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."
The relevant legal algorithm first requires the court to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists between Maria D. and Michael. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. The clear and convincing evidence set forth in Parts I.B. and I.D. makes it abundantly clear that Maria D. has never met, on a day to day basis, her son's emotional, moral or educational needs, fundamental aspects of parenting contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). During Michael's first weeks of life, when he was under the care of hospital specialists, Maria D. had every opportunity to provide emotional support as the child struggled through the physical rigors of the withdrawal process. Instead of standing by her child's side, however, Maria D. almost exclusively attended to her personal needs outside of the hospital, continuing to use drugs and visiting the child only rarely. As found in Parts I.B., II.A.1. and II.B.1., when Maria D. did visit with Michael at the hospital, she appeared to be under the influence of drugs, which significantly interfered with her ability to effectively communicate love or affection to her newborn. (Exhibits 2, 3.) Later on, Maria D. missed visits either due to incarceration, attempts at substance abuse treatment, hospitalizations for mental health treatment, or failure to CT Page 10335-s cooperate with the visitation schedule. While Maria D. has recently demonstrated improvement in attending scheduled meetings with DCF, her overall lack of attention to her child's needs, her repeated involvement in substance abuse and criminal activity, her failure to adequately participate in her parenting classes at CCC and her persistent substance abuse have all formed the basis for the absence of a parent-child relationship, as contemplated by § 17a-112(3)(D). (Exhibit 1.)
Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D) "`. . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . .' In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999)." (Internal and external quotations omitted.) In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. See also In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 470, 815 A.2d 1261 (2003).
Moreover, Maria D's lack of an ongoing relationship with Michael was overtly manifest through her failure to attend court on either July 14, or 15, 2003, notwithstanding the gravity of the TPR issues then scheduled for hearing. Despite the vigor of her attorneys attention to the cause, Maria D.'s absence from the TPR trial serves as a most persuasive indication of the respondent mother's disregard for engaging in the "relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child." § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
Further indicating the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship in this case, the court finds that although Michael maintains present feelings for Maria D., those feelings are not positive in nature. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. The uncontroverted evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Maria D. is sometimes very careful in handling Michael during visits, and she demonstrates some affection for him now that he is no longer an infant. However, the child is essentially non-responsive to the respondent mother, although he does not resist contact with Maria D. and sometimes touches her. Michael does not appear happy and often cries in Maria D.'s presence. (Exhibits 1, 5.) These non-verbal behaviors provide a clear indication that while Michael may tolerate interactions with Maria D., he has no positive attachment to her.
In reaching this determination, the court has adhered to the principle that "in cases involving the development of a parent-child relationship in the earliest stages of the child's life, we also must be mindful of the positive feelings of the parent toward the child. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 301, 618 A.2d 1 (1992)." In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 425-26, 787 A.2d 608 (2001). While Maria D. may love Michael, as found throughout, she lacks even the most rudimentary ability to demonstrate that love in a practical, appropriate manner, such that placement with her could not serve the child's best interests.
As it is thus apparent that no statutory parent-child relationship exists between Maria D. and Michael, the court is next called upon to assess whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to allow additional time for a parenting relationship to be developed with the respondent mother. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. As fully discussed in Parts I.B., II.A.1. and B.1. although multiple services have been extended to Maria D. through a variety of providers, she has failed to reap any lasting benefit from these meritorious efforts. Maria D.'s substance abuse issues CT Page 10335-t remain so entrenched, and her pattern of criminal activity is so ingrained, that she continued to abuse drugs and violate the law during the better part of the adjudicatory period, and repeated this conduct through the weeks immediately before the commencement of trial. During Maria D.'s most recent YPI admission, in March of 2003, the facility's staff found Maria D. to be in continued need for treatment to address her repeated relapses into substance abuse. (Exhibit 14.) This grim prognosis for Maria D. was mirrored by the serial assessments performed by the court-appointed psychological evaluator, who consistently opined that in view of the child's special developmental needs and the respondent mother's personality structure, any efforts at establishing a mother-child relationship would likely fail, and that such efforts would have a detrimental effect on the child by adding to his confusion about where caretaking bonds should be formed. (Exhibit 5.) The court was presented with no evidence to contravene the overwhelming indications that Maria D. will not, in the foreseeable future, develop the ability to nurture her son, meet his special developmental needs, or serve as a responsible caretaker. Thus, it is abundantly apparent that Michael's best interests would be adversely affected if additional time were allotted for the purpose of allowing him to develop a parenting relationship with the respondent mother. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525.
See footnote 77.
Although the respondent mother may contend that her very presence at visits indicates that she has made progress in developing a meaningful relationship with Michael, the "visits were not productive enough to establish and maintain [a] stable parent-[child] relationship . . ." In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000).
The factors considered in deciding whether it would be in the children's best interest to permit further time for a relationship with their mother to develop are set forth in Part III.B.
"It is reasonable to read the language of no ongoing parent-child relationship to contemplate a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." (Citations omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). Such construction is applicable to the present case, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that any valid parenting relationship that Maria D. might have developed with Michael has been definitively lost due to her substance abuse, criminal activity, and her unrelenting mental illness. As the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists between Maria D. and her son, and that it is not in the best interests of the child to allow more time for him to develop a relationship with his biological mother, the petitioner has met her burden of proof under § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525; In re John G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 22. CT Page 10335-u
Either Maria D. or Michael Sr. may attempt to argue that the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship was due to the fact that their child was released from hospital care directly into DCF custody, relying upon an overly-broad interpretation of the principles set forth in In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 613 A.2d 478 (1992). However, "the similarity between In re Valerie D. and the present case begins and ends with the child's being placed in foster care within days of birth. Here, the respondents, rather than the state, created the circumstances that caused and perpetuated the lack of an ongoing relationship" between either respondent and young Michael. (External citation omitted.) In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 424, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), affirmed, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003). Despite the fact that Michael has been in foster care for almost two years, neither Maria D. nor Michael Sr. made timely efforts to attempt to modify the visitation schedule although it is reasonable to "expect such an affirmative step on the part of the respondent" who is willing to work toward the development of a relationship with the child. Id. In this case, the respondents' motions to increase visitation were not filed until May 2003, approximately six weeks prior to commencement of the TPR trial. The respondent parent's personal needs, involvement with the criminal justice system, and Maria D.'s hospitalizations may have prevented them from providing a home and other life necessities for Michael, but they did not prevent these respondents from expressing appropriate interest in the health, care and well-being of the child during his stay in foster care. Id.
II.C. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — MICHAEL SR. II.C.1. ABANDONMENT — § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
The petitioner first alleges that Michael Sr. abandoned his son within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of credible evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.
"`Abandonment focuses on the patent's conduct . . . General Statutes [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the CT Page 10335-at fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . Section 17a-112 . . . does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.'" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193.
A review of the clear and convincing evidence related to Michael Sr.'s conduct reveals that from the time of Michael's uncared for adjudication on January 29, 2002 through the filing of the OTC on August 13, 2002, this respondent failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. As found in Part I.C., Michael Sr. had no contact with his son during the months immediately following the child's birth. Following his incarceration in May 2002, DCF met with Michael Sr., but he did not inquire about the health of the infant, did not request visits, and demonstrated only scant interest in baby Michael.
The respondent father's lack of attention to his son during the adjudicatory period was fully consistent with his prior lack of interest in Michael. As found in Part I.C., Michael Sr. never visited with his son while the child was hospitalized following his birth on September 20, 2001; he failed to provide Michael with any financial, emotional, or physical support during that period, and even contested whether or not he was the biological parent of this child. (Exhibits 1, 2.) Between September 2001 and January 2002, it is likely that Michael Sr. spent intermittent periods in pre-trial incarceration, rendering him physically unable to provide for his son, but not limiting the respondent father's ability to inquire about baby Michael's well-being. (Exhibit 9.)
During the adjudicatory period, Michael Sr. never initiated contact with DCF to inquire about the well-being of his son; to arrange for visits; or to offer assistance or support for Michael. He never sent cards, gifts, letters, mementos, or other items to his child as an expression of care, affection or concern for him. He has never supplied Michael with an adequate domicile; necessary food, clothing and medical care; or social and religious guidance. In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. Michael Sr.'s visitation with his son was sporadic at best during the period prior to his commencement of the CR program in mid-June 2002, near the end of the adjudicatory period, and he failed to in any other way express love and affection for the child. In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193.
Even if the court considers post-adjudicatory evidence in the context of resolving this aspect of the petitioner's allegations, Michael Sr.'s statutory abandonment of Michael remains clearly apparent. While he willingly visited with Michael on a regular basis during long-term confinement at the CR program, after the TPR petition was filed; although he completed the WYSS parenting CT Page 10335-v classes in conjunction with his CR stay; and although he interacted well with Michael during these visits, the respondent father has still failed to demonstrate any interest in the child other than as a playmate with whom to have contact from time to time. Furthermore, although he had attended an administrative case review (ACR) on August 28, 2002, while he was under the auspices of the CR program, he failed to attend another ACR that was scheduled for February 13, 2003, just prior to his program discharge. (Exhibit 2.) Also, as noted throughout, Michael Sr. failed to attend either day of the TPR proceedings, effectively abandoning the court process as he has abandoned his child. The respondent father's lack of interest in or commitment to these ministerial proceedings raises overwhelming doubt about his interest in or commitment to taking care of young Michael in a parenting capacity, or in any other role.
Whether the adjudicatory date of August 13, 2002 or the dates of the July 2003 trial are used to circumscribe the facts at issue, the evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that Michael Sr. has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified in In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the petitioner has met her burden of proving that Michael Sr. has abandoned his son Michael, within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
II.C.2. PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE-§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner next alleges that Michael Sr.'s parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). Michael Sr. counters that he has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in the life of his child. As Michael was found to be uncared for on January 29, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Michael Sr. has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to his underlying drug dependency, mental health issues, and pattern of criminal CT Page 10335-w behavior as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future he could assume a responsible position in his son's life. See In re Daniel C., supra; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. First, the credible, reliable psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that this respondent's capacity to parent young Michael remains significantly impaired, as his unresolved psychological issues and parenting deficits have persisted even after intensive multi-modal inpatient treatment and individual counseling at CR. (Exhibit 15.) Based upon the results of his psychometric testing and his interview with Michael Sr. in October of 2002, when this respondent had been resident at the CR program since June 2002, Dr. Green discerned "features of an antisocial personality style" in Michael Sr., and diagnosed him with Opioid Dependence, Early Full Remission (by self-report), in a controlled environment. (Exhibit 5.) The psychologist identified Michael Sr.'s propensity to project blame onto others without accepting responsibility for his own actions, a characteristic that had persisted despite specific counseling to address this problem through the CR program. Michael Sr.'s traits of self-indulgence and insistence on getting his own way were also apparent, as were his low level of perseverence and unreliability. (Exhibit 5.) These findings are consistent with Michael Sr.'s long pattern of criminal conduct which has resisted reformation despite repeated arrests, convictions, and associated involvement with the criminal justice system. In addition, these findings are inconsistent with the attributes associated with a parent's capacity to provide a safe, secure, and stable environment in which a young child can be nurtured and supported.
See footnotes 39 and 40.
In reaching this determination, the court acknowledges that Michael Sr. has not acquired any new arrests or convictions since his discharge from CR in March 2003. However, the results of Dr. Green's thorough, detailed, independent psychological assessment in October 2002 are compelling, as the psychologist concluded mid-way in his long-term residential program that "[Michael Sr.'s] emotional state is unstable . . . he harbors some hostile, or perhaps antisocial, tendencies [and] [h]is social-emotional development is relatively immature." (Exhibit 5.) After his discharge from CR, follow-up care at APT-SATU was recommended in order to help meet Michael Sr.'s need for continued management of these conditions. However, as found in Part II.A.2., the respondent father failed to attend any aftercare programs, demonstrating his instability and immaturity — with regard to his CT Page 10335-x obligations toward managing his own drug dependence issues. Any ostensible improvement in Michael Sr.'s ability to resist the use of illegal drugs, or to desist from engaging in criminal acts, or to focus on meeting the needs of a very young child is very new, largely untested, and still subject to the respondent father's relatively immature socioemotional development, instability, and extant hostile or antisocial tendencies. In view of his persisting needs for treatment with regard to his substance abuse, his history of relapse and pattern of criminal conduct, neither Michael Sr.'s chronological completion of the CR program nor his recent arrest-free period can serve as a reliable indicator of his actual psychological capacity to serve as a safe parenting resource for his son.
The psychological evidence further establishes that Michael Sr. retains other parenting deficits that render him unable to provide a secure, stable environment for his son. Testing and evaluation reveal that Michael Sr. "is not very sensitive to others' feelings" and that he "has a serious deficit of interpersonal resources to handle stress;" these characteristics leave him without the skills necessary to manage the challenging behavior presented by any pre-school child such as Michael. (Exhibit 5.) Even though he has ostensibly been instructed in appropriate parenting techniques through the WYSS program, and even if he has improved his ability to manage his own life, Michael Sr. has still not gained the ability to care for Michael's particular needs for guidance in the development of basic life and socialization skills, nurturance and emotional stability, safety and security in his environment. Thus, from a psychological perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Michael Sr. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665.
The evidence does not permit the court to ascertain whether Michael Sr. had completed the WYSS parenting program as of October 2002 when Dr. Green performed his interactional evaluation with Michael. At that time, however, Michael Sr. was so lacking in basic child care skills that he failed to notice when Michael's diaper needed to be changed, leaving the child to suffer much distress from this situation, and leaving the court to doubt that he possesses any realistic understanding of the developmental challenges which young children present to CT Page 10335-au caretakers on their way to maturity. (Exhibit 5.)
It is the respondent's inability or unwillingness to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not his substance abuse issues or mental health status per se, that leads the court to find that he has failed to achieve rehabilitation in the context of this case. See In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 673.
A second aspect of the clear and convincing evidence also establishes that Michael Sr. will not be able to play a responsible role in his son's life in the reasonably foreseeable future. The empirical evidence clearly indicates that Michael Sr. has still not achieved a sufficient degree of control over his substance abuse issues to render him able to amend his past habits and patterns of unlawful activity, fundamental to safely parenting young Michael, as even though he met the criteria for discharge from the CR program in March 2003, he ominously failed to pursue the many facets of after care that the provider clearly CT Page 10335-y indicated were necessary to ensure his continued abstinence once he had left the confines of residential care. Historically, as described in Part I.C., even when Michael Sr. has successfully completed other inpatient drug treatment programs, he has failed to pursue aftercare and then relapsed back into his substance abuse lifestyle. Thus, although Michael Sr. successfully attended an inpatient substance abuse program at DH from July through September 1995, this success was followed by a host of arrests for criminal conduct which included drug-related activity. Thereafter, Michael Sr. failed the long-term outpatient methadone maintenance treatment he commenced at LAMC in September 1998; as followed his DH program, the LAMC treatment regimen ended with the respondent father's arrest and confinement to the CR program in June of 2002. (Exhibit 15.)
CR's discharge recommendations included: "on-going one-on-one counseling dealing with relationship issues and parenting skills; full time employment; 12 step meeting attendance minimum of three times per week; regular contact with his 12 step sponsor and writing of the 12 steps; regular random urine testing for any mind or mood altering substances; adherence to all legal and DCF stipulated mandates; maintain abstinence from all mind and mood altering substances; maintain healthy boundaries in regard to living with significant other and possible relapse triggers. Stay in close regular contact with Probation Officer . . ." (Exhibit 15.)
Repeating the cycle attendant his past treatment history, although Michael Sr. cooperated with the court-ordered treatment at CR, he failed to follow through with the necessary aftercare program. He did not pursue counseling for relationship issues and parenting skills; and did not adequately cooperate with his 12-step recovery program. (Exhibit 1.) Michael Sr.'s absence from this trial provides ample basis for the inference that he has once again lost, or at least diminished, his abilities to meet obligations that he is able to meet when he resides in a structured treatment program. His experience of repeated relapses after ostensibly successful substance abuse treatment, along with his failure to demonstrate adequate interest in the TPR trial, compel the obvious inference that Michael Sr. remains engaged in a substance abuse lifestyle, propounding only a poor prognosis for his ability to ever develop a safe parenting capacity.
Even if Michael Sr. has demonstrated that he is able to manage his own affairs when he is strictly scrutinized and participating in a structured, highly organized treatment program with exhaustive support systems in place, such experience does not indicate that he has developed the requisite ability to care for the special needs of the particular child at issue in this case. In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448; see also In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. Michael Sr. lacks any understanding of his son's special developmental needs. He has no valid social support system in place, which will make the process of remaining abstinent outside of CR's walls far more difficult to achieve than it was when he was in residence at the program. (Exhibit 15.) The CR staff acknowledged that CT Page 10335-z Michael Sr.'s partner, Maria D., has alcohol and drug abuse problems which remain unresolved; in Parts II.A.1. and II.B.2., the court made equivalent findings. Not only will such a living arrangement challenge the respondent father's ability to maintain his own sobriety, it will markedly reduce his ability to provide a home in which a young child could safely reside. (Exhibit 15.)
As Michael's special chronological developmental needs are addressed in Parts I.D. and II.B.1., in the interest of judicial economy the court will not reiterate those needs in this portion of the opinion.
As noted above, Michael Sr. again makes his home with Maria D., whose specific problems with substance abuse and psychiatric conditions are documented in Parts I.B. and II.B.1. Other than his partner, Michael Sr. ". . . has not had any close, long lasting friendships." (Exhibit 15.) "[Michael Sr.] states that he has been estranged from his family for the past 13 years due to his drug usage." (Exhibit 15.)
It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384. Even if Michael Sr. has achieved some degree of stable functioning, with regard to his serious substance abuse issues, the evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that he has been able to maintain his limited sobriety only while under the strict supervision of a residential treatment program. Any personal gains he may have achieved have never been successfully transferred to his life in the community, where he is faced with the need to structure his own life. Morever, any gains he may have made "were not made in a timely way so as to assist [his] child." In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384; see also In re Victoria B., supra.
Moreover, based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that Michael Sr.'s rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed the respondent father's relative lack of present rehabilitation as it relates to Michael's particular needs for a responsible parent who can appropriately plan and provide for his special developmental needs, along with extending the emotional stability, security, and consistency the child requires. As he nears his second birthday and becomes increasingly ambulatory and curious, young Michael's particular needs render it absolutely necessary that he be raised in a secure and stable home, with predictable, consistent parenting, and appropriate attention to the child's physical safety. Michael Sr. is clearly unable to serve Michael's special developmental needs now, as his "personality issues will need to be resolved in order for [him] to provide Michael with sufficient parenting." (Exhibit 5.)
The court credits and accepts the court-appointed psychological evaluator's uncontroverted opinion that it is not likely, given Michael Sr.'s functional history, that he will be able to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable time so as to assume a responsible position in Michael's life, in the face of his substance dependence and personality disorder. (Exhibit 5.)
Even if Michael Sr. should now actively engage in rehabilitation and manifest an ability and willingness to gain CT Page 10335-aa insight into and manage his mental health challenges along with maintaining his sobriety and freedom from criminal activity, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for Michael given the year and a half that has passed since his adjudication as an uncared for child in January 2002, and the minimum additional one year of psychotherapeutic treatment that would be required to address the respondent father's characterological concerns. In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 481-82. Under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable for the court to find that Michael Sr. has the ability to acquire or develop the capacity to responsibly serve as his child's caretaker.
See In re Michael D., 58 Conn.App. 119, 123-24, 752 A.2d 1135, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 911, 759 Conn. 505 (2000).
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that despite participation in a rehabilitation regimen, Michael Sr. remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent young Michael and lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in this child's life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the petitioner has proved Michael Sr.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
II.C.3. LACK OF AN ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP — § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)
The petitioner next alleges that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists between Michael Sr. and his son, that the child's best interests will not be served by allowing additional time for this relationship to be developed, and that the TPR petition should be granted pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). Michael Sr. argues that his visits with Michael have sustained their bond. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.
As discussed in Part II.B.2., the relevant legal algorithm first requires the court to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists between Michael Sr. and young Michael. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. The clear and convincing evidence set forth in Parts I.C. and I.D. makes it abundantly clear that Michael Sr. has never met, on any basis, his son's emotional, moral or educational needs, fundamental aspects of the parent-child relationship contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) During young Michael's first weeks of life, when he was under the physical care of hospital CT Page 10335-ab specialists, Michael Sr. never visited while his newborn was struggling through the physical rigors of withdrawal. Although he was ostensibly involved with substance abuse treatment through LAMC at the time, Michael Sr. paid no heed to the child after his birth, and even contested paternity. (Exhibit 15.) As Michael grew into babyhood, Michael Sr. had limited visits due to his enrollment in the CR program. Michael Sr.'s overall inattention to his child's needs, his obligations to the criminal justice system, and his failure to demonstrate any measurable interest in contributing to the child's moral, educational or physical care, all formed the basis for the absence of a statutory parent-child relationship. (Exhibit 1.)
See also Part II.C.1.
Moreover, Michael Sr.'s lack of interest in creating or maintaining a relationship with his son was overtly manifest through the respondent father's failure to attend the trial at which the grave TPR issues were scheduled for hearing. Despite the vigor of his attorneys attention to the cause, Michael Sr.'s absence from the TPR trial serves as a most persuasive indication of this respondent's disregard for engaging in the "relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child." § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). Thus, while Michael Sr. may love his son, he lacks even the most rudimentary ability to demonstrate that love in a practical, appropriate manner.
In discerning whether a parent-children relationship exists, the court must also determine whether Michael has any present feelings for Michael Sr. and, if so, whether those feelings are positive in nature. In re Jonathan G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. The uncontroverted evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes while Michael Sr. sometimes demonstrates appropriate affection for the child, young Michael often cries despite the respondent father's efforts. While the child does not resist contact with Michael Sr. and allows himself to be held, Michael does not seem happy in his presence, and appears disinterested. (Exhibit 5.) These non-verbal behaviors provide a clear expression that while Michael is not unduly distressed during interactions with Michael Sr., he has no positive attachment to his biological father.
In reaching this determination, the court has again honored its obligation to "be mindful of the positive feelings of the parent toward the child." (External citation omitted.) In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn.App. 425-26. While Michael Sr. may profess to love his son and desire to care for him, his absence from this trial amply demonstrates that he lacks the ability or willingness to demonstrate that love in a practical, appropriate manner, such that placement with him could not serve the child's best interests.
As it is thus apparent that no statutory parent-child relationship exists between Michael Sr. and his son, the court is next called upon to assess whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to allow additional time for a parenting CT Page 10335-ac relationship to be developed with the respondent father. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525. Despite the multi-modal treatment and counseling treatment he has received, Michael Sr.'s substance abuse issues remain deeply ingrained, and his personality structure does not permit him to attend to Michael's needs at the expense of his own. See Parts I.C., II.A.2. and C.2. The grim prognosis for Michael Sr.'s ability to serve as a safe, effective parent for his son was established by the court-appointed psychological evaluator, who credibly opined that due to the child's special developmental needs and the respondent father's psychological status, any efforts at establishing a parent-child relationship would likely fail, causing a detrimental effect on the child by adding to his confusion about where healthy caretaking bonds should be formed. (Exhibit 5.) In this matter, the court was presented with no evidence to contravene the overwhelming indications that Michael Sr. will not, in the foreseeable future, develop the ability to nurture his son, meet his special developmental needs, or serve as a responsible caretaker. Thus, it is abundantly apparent that it Michael's best interests would be adversely affected if additional time were allotted for the purpose of allowing him to develop a parenting relationship with the respondent father. In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525.
See footnote 77.
The respondent father may argue that through his visits, he was developing a valid relationship with Michael. However, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the visits were "`decidedly one-sided in favor of [the respondent]'" without any meaningful benefit or experience for the child. See In re Amy H., 56 Conn.App. 55, 60, 742 A.2d 372 (1999). Thus, the mere occurrence of the visits could not reasonably support Michael Sr.'s claim that his child's best interests would be served by allowing additional time for a father-son relationship to develop.
As found in Part II.B.2., the language of § 17-112a(j)(3)(D) contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child has never known his father in a parenting capacity, so that no relationship has ever developed between them. (Citations omitted.) In re John G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 22. Such construction is applicable to the present case, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Michael Sr. never visited his child during the first months of his life, and that he thereafter maintained a visiting relationship with the child only at DCF's prompting. Any valid parenting relationship that Michael Sr. might have developed with his son has been definitively lost due to the respondent father's inattentiveness, self-centered interest in substance abuse and criminal activities, and his long sequestration while participating in the CR program. As the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that no ongoing parent-children relationship exists between Michael Sr. and his son, and that it is not in the best interests of the child to allow more time for him to develop a relationship with his biological father, the petitioner has met her burden of proof under § 17a-12(j)(3)(D). In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 525; In re John G., supra, CT Page 10335-ad 56 Conn.App. 22.
See footnote 55.
III. DISPOSITION
As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. In the dispositional phase the court considered the evidence and testimony related to events occurring through the close of trial.
The remaining element of the termination of parental rights statute requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . that termination is in the best interest of the child." § 17a-112(j)(2).
"[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5 [now § 33a-9]." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).
III.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS
The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings when determining the child's best interests. See In re Victoria B., supra; In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516.
III.A.1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)
Maria D. received a panoply of substance abuse treatment services from other providers, including LAMC, CSDP, CAMP and CVHSP. (Exhibits 1, 2, 14.) She received mental health treatment services from YPI, WHMHC, and CMCH. (Exhibits 1, 14.) DCF directly provided Maria D. with timely and appropriate services as described in Parts I.B., II.A. and A.1., and II.B.1., including substance abuse testing and treatment at APT-CTU and parenting classes at the CCCC. (Exhibit 1.) In addition, while she was taken into custody by law enforcement agencies, DCF strongly encouraged Maria D. to utilize DOC services.
DCF's ability to provide Michael Sr. with timely and appropriate services was markedly circumscribed by his obligations to the criminal court and OAP, which mandated his long-term participation in the CR program commencing when Michael was nine months old, and ending when the child was eighteen months old. As described in Parts I.C., II.A. and A.2., and II.C.2., Michael Sr. also received substance abuse treatment at DH and LAMC, and he attended parenting classes at WYSS. (Exhibit 15.) CT Page 10335-ae
See footnotes 25 and 33.
III.A.2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, as timely and reasonable reunification services were extended to Maria D. and Michael Sr., as set forth in Parts I., II., and III.A.1. The court previously found that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of Michael from his home given his fragile medical condition at birth.
III.A.3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)
As found in Part II.B.1., Maria D. failed to comply with the specific steps that required her to refrain from substance abuse by continuing to use illegal drugs; by engaging in unlawful activity, she failed to comply with the specific step that prohibited involvement with the criminal justice system and mandated cooperation with the conditions of her probation. (Exhibits 8, 11, 12.) By her possession of heroin and cocaine in February of 2003, and her use of cocaine and benzodiazepines thereafter, Maria D. violated the specific steps, and also violated the conditions of her court-ordered probation. (Exhibit 2.)
As found in Part I.B., after the specific steps were issued, Maria D. engaged in the following criminal acts: prostitution which occurred on March 28, 2002; possession of narcotics on April 13, 2002; possession of drug paraphernalia on May 4, 2002; possession of narcotics and drug paraphernalia on October 24, 2002; and possession of narcotics, possession of drug paraphernalia and criminal trespass on July 2, 2003. (Exhibits 8, 11, 12.) Many, if not all, of these arrests constituted violations of Maria D.'s court-ordered conditions of probation pursuant to the principles of State v. Breckenridge, 66 Conn.App. 490, 496, 784 A.2d 1034 (2001); and Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn.App. 395, 523 A.2d 917 (1987); aff'd, 207 Conn. 565, 541 A.2d 504, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S.Ct. 242, 102 L.Ed.2d 230 (1988).
No specific steps were imposed upon Michael Sr. in this case. Although he failed to follow through with the after-care protocol recommended upon his discharge from residential treatment at CR, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that such omission would violate the conditions of his court-ordered probation.
III.A.4. THE CHILD'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)
Michael knows the respondent parents only though their visits to him. During visits, Maria D. often fails to demonstrate appropriate nurturing behavior; as a result, Michael is uncomfortable in her presence. Although Michael Sr. is more careful in handing the child, Michael often cries when he is in the presence the respondent mother or the respondent father. Although he sometimes tolerates their presence of and demonstrates some interest in them, Michael has no measurable attachment to either Maria D. or Michael Sr. He turns to his current foster mother for comfort. (Exhibits 1, 5.) CT Page 10335-af
III.A.5. AGE OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(5)
Michael was born on September 20, 2001, and is nearing his second birthday.
III.A.6. PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)
During the first few months of Michael's life, neither respondent maintained adequate contact with either the hospital or DCF regarding the status of the child. By continuing to engage in criminal activity during the child's entire stay in foster care, by continuing to use drugs, and by failing to make adequate use of the rehabilitation services rendered to her, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Maria D. has not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform her conduct to even minimally acceptable parental standards. Although Michael Sr. availed himself of myriad services when he was in court-mandated residence with the CR program, his failure to even appear at trial shows that he, too, has failed to make realistic and sustained efforts to conform his conduct to even minimally acceptable parental standards. Giving either respondent additional time would not likely bring their performance, as parents, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the child to be reunited with them. See Parts II.B. and C.
III.A.7. EXTENT TO WHICH PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(7)
No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented either Maria D. or Michael Sr. from maintaining relationships with Michael, nor did the economic circumstances of the parent prevent such relationships, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system were in effect. See Parts II.A.1. and 2.
III.B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(j)(2)
In determining whether it would serve Michael's best interests to terminate the respondents' parental rights, the court has applied the appropriate legal standards to the facts which are clearly and convincingly apparent in this case. Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter CT Page 10335-ag establishes that it is not in Michael's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with either Maria D. or Michael Sr. Therefore, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented, the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner. See Part II.
"Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents . . . Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action. In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990)." (Quotation marks and internal citation omitted.) In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).
In determining whether termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the best interests of Michael, the court has examined the multiple relevant factors, including his interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature of his relationship with his foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). The court has also considered "the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, [which] although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced Michael's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) CT Page 10335-ax (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
In reaching this determination, the court credits and accepts the uncontroverted expert opinion tendered by Dr. Green, the court-appointed psychologist, who stated "I do not believe that placement with his biological parents is-consistent with [Michael's] best interest." (Exhibit 5.) Recommending psychotherapy for both Maria D. and Michael Sr. in order to address their respective personality dysfunctions, the psychologist cautioned that "structural changes in their personalities are likely to take not less than one year." (Exhibit 5.) Young Michael, who was been hospitalized during the first few months of his life, has remained in foster care ever since, while his biological parents attempted substance abuse treatment and faced the consequences of their repeated criminal activities. As discussed in Part II., despite the tender of appropriate and timely services, neither respondent parent is able or willing to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts, and neither respondent parent has achieved statutory rehabilitation despite the passage of many, many months. Neither respondent is able to offer Michael a secure, stable living environment in which the child's interests in sustained growth, development, and well-being, will be met in a timely and adequate fashion. In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. As found in Parts I.D., II.B.2, II.C.1. and 3., and III.A.3., Michael has but scant relationships with his biological parents. The respondents may sincerely love Michael, and desire to serve as his custodian and caretaker. However, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that neither respondent can serve as a competent parent to the child because neither can provide him with the nurturing, safe and structured environment warranted by his young age and special needs, "[a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 667.
Michael is in imminent need of a permanent, safe and secure home to call his own. This child should not be further burdened by having to wait any longer for either Maria D. or Michael Sr. to achieve sufficient rehabilitation with regard to their parenting deficits, particularly when the evidence is replete with references to the child's developmental delays and CT Page 10335-ah special needs; the respondent mother's chronic relapse into narcotic use, repeated criminal conduct, and psychiatric instability; the respondent father's persisting psychological concerns and the untested nature of the results of his long-term inpatient treatment at CR. (Exhibit 5.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385. Fortunately, Michael is now in placement with a pre-adoptive, loving foster family; this family is well able and willing to care for his developmental delays, nourish his spirit and attend to his physical needs, and, to provide him with the stable, secure and consistent caretaking that the child so dearly deserves. Also acting as his statutory GAL, Michael's attorney has vigorously argued that termination of parental rights will serve the child's best interests. The court is constrained to agree and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that young Michael is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the long period of uncertainty as to the availability of his biological parents as caretakers, so that he can be placed in a permanent home with loving and responsible caretakers.
Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).
In a termination proceeding, the Appellate Court has affirmed the relevance of the suitability of adoptive parents to the court's consideration of best interests issues. In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 666, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). While considering the attributes of his current foster parents in the context of determining Michael's best interests, the court has fully adhered to the axiom that "a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parents' rights in order to substitute another more suitable set of adoptive parents." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992), cited in In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 835, 733 A.2d 298 (1999).
See General Statutes § 46b-129a(2).
Having balanced Michael's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with either Maria D. or Michael Sr., the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that this child's best interests will best be served by termination of the respondent's parental rights. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14. Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court herein terminates the respondents' parental rights to Michael.
IV. ORDER OF TERMINATION
WHEREFORE, after due consideration of Michael's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship he has with his foster parents, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS: CT Page 10335-ai
That the parental rights of Maria D. and Michael Sr. are hereby terminated as to the child Michael M.
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Michael for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for him.
That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of Michael shall be offered to his current foster family.
BY THE COURT,
N. Rubinow, J.