Opinion
No. 04-17-00781-CV
04-25-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF J.N.T., a Child
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016-PA-01311
Honorable H. Paul Canales, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice AFFIRMED
Y.T. appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, J.N.T. The only predicate statutory ground the trial court found in support of termination was Y.T.'s failure to comply with the provisions of a court order specifically establishing the actions she needed to take to obtain the return of J.N.T. Y.T. contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding on the predicate statutory ground. We affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
On June 16, 2016, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Y.T.'s parental rights to J.N.T. On the date the petition was filed, J.N.T. was twenty-two months old. A bench trial was held on November 14, 2017.
A family service plan for Y.T. was filed of record on August 18, 2016; however, the plan was signed only by the Department's representatives. On August 23, 2016, a status hearing was held, and the trial court incorporated the service plan into its order, making the service plan an order of the court. Y.T. signed the service plan on October 28, 2016.
Although Y.T.'s signature on the plan is dated 10-28-17, the service plan contains a print date of 10/28/2016, and the signatures of the Department's representatives are dated 10/28/16. Therefore, it appears the 2017 date by Y.T.'s signature is a typographical error.
The service plan identified several "service plan goals" also called "changes needed to reduce risk," including the willingness and ability to protect J.N.T. from harm, actively participating in therapy, demonstrating an ability to provide J.N.T. with basic necessities, and altering behaviors that expose J.N.T. to risk of harm. In addition, the service plan also identified specific "tasks and services" Y.T. was required to complete, including maintaining employment and providing the caseworker with monthly paycheck stubs and participating in individual counseling.
In the trial court's December 13, 2016 permanency hearing order, the court found Y.T. "has not demonstrated adequate and appropriate compliance with the service plan, but she has begun to engage." In its March 21, 2017 permanency hearing order, the trial court found Y.T. "has not demonstrated adequate and appropriate compliance with the service plan." In its July 11, 2017 permanency hearing order, the trial court found Y.T. "has demonstrated partial compliance with the service plan." In its final permanency hearing order before final order dated October 24, 2017, the trial court found Y.T. "has not demonstrated adequate and appropriate compliance with the service plan."
At trial, Y.T. testified she was employed as a housekeeper at a hotel, but admitted she had not provided her caseworker with her paystubs. Y.T. acknowledged she had only been employed in her current job for a week, but she testified she was employed at a different hotel before her current job.
Around the date the underlying case was filed, Y.T. was dating Matthew E., a registered sex offender with whom she had another baby, S.E., approximately six months before trial. Y.T. admitted lying to her caseworker about her relationship with Matthew E. Y.T. testified she stopped dating Matthew E. in August of 2017, and subsequently dated Robert L., whose child had been removed from his care by the Department. Y.T. stated she dated Robert L. for only one month in October of 2017, and she no longer dated him.
Y.T. admitted she had been involved in several verbal altercations at the homeless shelter where she was living. Y.T. further admitted the confrontations were jeopardizing her ability to stay at the shelter. Y.T. identified several tasks or services from her plan that she had completed; however, she admitted she did not complete her individual therapy.
Y.T.'s first therapist testified Y.T.'s progress was uneven. One homework assignment Y.T. was asked to complete was to observe others' parenting skills to identify good parenting skills. Y.T. told the therapist she did not complete the assignment because she did not get involved in other people's business. Because Y.T. was not engaged in therapy, Y.T. and the therapist agreed Y.T. should try a different therapist.
The Department's caseworker testified Y.T. did not complete her service plan, specifically identifying individual therapy and maintaining stable employment as tasks Y.T. had failed to complete. Because Y.T. failed to complete therapy, the caseworker testified Y.T. was unable to control her emotions and anger as evidenced by the altercations in which she was involved at the shelter. Y.T. admitted to the caseworker that she was unable to control her anger and would be kicked out of the shelter if she had one more altercation. The caseworker testified Y.T. was discharged by her second therapist due to her noncompliance, lack of engagement and three "no shows."
The caseworker also testified Y.T. failed to meet the goals of the service plan by failing to alter her behaviors that exposed J.N.T. to harm and failing to learn coping skills to deal with parenting stressors. The caseworker testified Y.T. had not demonstrated she could provide J.N.T. with a safe environment given the people with whom she chose to associate. The caseworker stated the Department had undertaken three investigations regarding S.E. and had an open investigation which the caseworker believed would be validated for neglectful supervision.
The caseworker stated Y.T. had been dishonest during the course of the case, including denying relationships with Matthew E. and Robert L. The caseworker testified Y.T. was adamant that she did not intend to work the service plan in July of 2016; however, she started engaging in services in November of 2016, after she discovered she was pregnant with S.E. The caseworker testified Matthew E. was a registered sex offender due to a crime he committed against an eight-year-old child, and Robert L.'s child was removed from his care because he left the child unsupervised.
After the trial court announced its decision to terminate Y.T.'s parental rights at the conclusion of trial, Y.T. responded, "Man, I swear to God, y'all get on my freaking nerves. Fu**. Fu** that sh**, man." The trial court signed an order terminating Y.T.'s parental rights for failing to comply with a court order, and Y.T. appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 161.001 of the Code, the Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (West Supp. 2017); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). We evaluate the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings under the standards of review established by the Texas Supreme Court in In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266-67 (Tex. 2002). Under these standards, "[t]he trial court is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, including the testimony of the Department's witnesses." In re F.M., No. 04-16-00516-CV, 2017 WL 393610, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER
In her brief, Y.T. asserts the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights for failure to comply with her service plan, asserting the only tasks she did not complete were individual counseling and stable employment. With regard to individual counseling, Y.T. contends she never understood the reasons her counseling with the two therapists ended. Y.T. also contends the evidence established she was employed as a hotel housekeeper at the time of trial and was employed by a different hotel prior to her current job.
Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code permits a trial court to terminate parental rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). In this case, Y.T. challenges the trial court's finding that she "failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for [her] to obtain the return of [J.N.T.]."
"Texas courts generally take a strict approach to subsection (O)'s application." In re S.J.R.-Z., No. 04-17-00238-CV, 2017 WL 6502563, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 20, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal quotation omitted); see also In re D.N., 405 S.W.3d 863, 877 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.). "Ground O does not quantify any particular number of provisions of the family service plan that a parent must not achieve in order for the parental rights to be terminated." In re B.H.R., 535 S.W.3d 114, 122 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.). "Subsection O [also] does not provide a means to evaluate 'excuses' or 'partial compliance.'" In re S.J.R.-Z., 2017 WL 6502563, at *9; see also In re J.S., 291 S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.) (holding subsection (O) "does not encompass an evaluation of a parent's partial achievement of plan requirements"). "In other words, 'substantial compliance is not the same as complete compliance.'" In re S.J.R.-Z., 2017 WL 6502563, at *9 (quoting In re A.M.M., No. 04-15-00638-CV, 2016 WL 1359342, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)). "A parent's failure to complete one requirement of her [family service plan] supports termination under subsection (O)." In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation omitted); In re M.C.G., 329 S.W.3d 674, 675 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding evidence that parent failed to complete individual therapy sufficient to support termination).
In her brief, Y.T. offers excuses for her failure to complete individual counseling; however, subsection (O) "does not 'make a provision for excuses' for the parent's failure to comply with the court-ordered services." In re S.J.R.-Z., 2017 WL 6502563, at *10 (quoting In re J.S., 291 S.W.3d at 67). Y.T. also suggests that her current employment coupled with her prior employment for an unknown period of time should satisfy the stable employment requirement; however, the trial court could have weighed the evidence differently. See id. (noting trial court as the trier of fact weighs the evidence and assesses the credibility of the witnesses). Y.T.'s "inability to successfully complete individual counseling and [maintain] stable . . . employment are significant deficiencies." In re B.H.R., 535 S.W.3d at 122. Finally, although Y.T.'s brief attempts to address her failure to complete the tasks and services listed in her service plan, the brief does not address her failure to meet the service plan goals. Having reviewed the record, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Y.T. failed to comply with the provisions of the court order, and we overrule the only issue presented by Y.T. on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order is affirmed.
Irene Rios, Justice