Opinion
Nos. 25549-2-III; 25550-6-III; 25551-4-III; 25552-2-III.
July 15, 2008.
Appeals from judgments of the Superior Court for Spokane County, Nos. 04-7-02201-3 and 04-7-02202-1, Neal Q. Rielly, J., entered September 27, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, C.J., concurred in by Brown and Kulik, JJ.
Rafael Lopez and Amanda Crawford appeal the termination of their parental rights in J.L. and C.L. They contend that the record does not support the trial court's findings pursuant to RCW 13.34.180(1)(d)-(f) or that termination is in the best interests of the children. We conclude that the Department of Social and Health Services (Department) established the required statutory elements for entry of termination orders as to Ms. Crawford and Mr. Lopez. We therefore affirm.
A commissioner of this court considered this matter pursuant to RAP 18.13 and referred it to a panel of judges.
FACTS
Mr. Lopez and Ms. Crawford are the parents of J.L., born December 8, 1998, and C.L., born September 18, 2000. They separated at some point in 2002. In October 2002, the Department filed its first dependency petition regarding the children, alleging substance abuse by the parents, domestic violence, and neglect of the children. Eleven months later the Department dismissed the dependency, and Mr. Lopez was given custody of the children. However, in November 2003, Mr. Lopez returned the children to their mother for the holidays.
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Crawford was arrested for shoplifting. J.L. and C.L. were found in her car. They were hungry and cold and had head lice and severe dental problems. Ms. Crawford had drugs in her possession and smelled of alcohol. She was taken to jail and the children were placed in foster care. The second dependency petition, filed on December 19, 2003, alleged the children had no parent capable of caring for them because they were homeless, hungry, and unkempt when found; Ms. Crawford had drugs in her possession and three outstanding warrants; and dependency petitions had previously been filed as to the mother's two older children. The petition identified drug dependence as Ms. Crawford's primary parenting deficiency.
The children were initially placed with a maternal relative, but in May 2004 the relative asked that the children be moved due to their behavior problems. The children were then placed in a foster home, but were removed within a month for serious behavior problems. The children then lived in a group home for two months until their mother requested they be moved to a maternal aunt's house in Utah in August 2004. During these various placements, the children exhibited troubling behaviors. They destroyed things, had difficulty sleeping through the night, and acted out aggressively.
Soon after filing the dependency petition, the Department tried to contact Mr. Lopez. After four attempts at contact and two missed appointments, Mr. Lopez finally met with the social worker in March 2004. The social worker informed him of an April court hearing and the importance of maintaining contact. However, by March 23, Mr. Lopez's phone was disconnected. The social worker was unable to establish services due to Mr. Lopez's unavailability. In April 2004, the court entered an order of default against Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez later explained that he was using methamphetamine during this time. He also committed a burglary for which he was later convicted.
Ms. Crawford entered into an agreed order of dependency that required her to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment and treatment, urinalysis (UA) monitoring, and individual counseling, and to maintain a clean, safe, and drug free home. The court also ordered six hours a week of visitation.
The Department offered Ms. Crawford numerous programs to address her drug addiction. Assessments indicated that she was dependent on opiates, cocaine, and alcohol. On September 2, 2004, Ms. Crawford started an intensive inpatient drug treatment program at Isabella House. But within five days she was sent to detox because she was coming off methadone and having difficulty staying awake for the program. Ms. Crawford left the program on September 15 due to what she described as a "breakdown." Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 12, 2006) at 78.
In October 2004, Ms. Crawford reengaged in drug treatment at American Behavioral Health System (ABHS). She successfully completed the initial 30-day intensive inpatient phase and demonstrated a high level of commitment to recovery. But Ms. Crawford was confrontational with staff on several occasions, resulting in her early termination from the program in January 2005.
In March 2005, the Department referred Ms. Crawford to a treatment program at Spokane Addiction and Recovery Center (SPARC). She was scheduled to enter intensive outpatient treatment on April 5, but did not appear. She eventually started treatment on April 20, but was discharged from the program in June for attempting to get opiates during an emergency room visit. Her file was closed for noncompliance. She would not engage in treatment again for another year.
In August 2005, Debbie DeHaven, a case manager at Community Health Intervention Prevention Services (CHIPS), advised Ms. Crawford that she needed to apply for funding before another drug treatment program could be set up for her. Ms. Crawford failed to follow through or contact Ms. DeHaven for a reassessment.
On April 5, 2006, Ms. Crawford had another intake at SPARC. Ms. Crawford disclosed that she had last used opiates in February 2006. Intensive outpatient treatment was recommended. Dan Anderson, her treatment provider at the time of trial, testified that Ms. Crawford had two unexcused absences at the beginning of the program and several excused absences in May. He also testified that although Ms. Crawford was attentive and engaged in treatment, he believed her relapse potential was high. Between 2004 and the date of trial, Ms. Crawford had been discharged for noncompliance from TASC's (treatment alternatives to street crime) urinalysis monitoring seven times. Just before trial in April and May 2006, Ms. Crawford failed to show for four scheduled UAs.
In addition to drug dependency, Ms. Crawford struggled with severe mental health issues. Dr. Paul Wert evaluated Ms. Crawford in February 2005. He testified that she portrayed a false good on the MMPI (Multiphasic Personality Inventory) and lacked insight into her problems. He diagnosed her with a personality disorder with narcissistic, histrionic, and antisocial traits, as well as substance abuse induced dementia. He explained that these problems are long-term. He believed that her lack of judgment and inability to recognize her problems impaired her ability to parent. And he predicted a high probability of a drug relapse.
Mary Ann Sacco, Ms. Crawford's mental health therapist since 2004, confirmed that Ms. Crawford's problems are long-term and require ongoing therapy. She noted that Ms. Crawford struggled with just meeting the basics of life, characterizing her life as chaotic and her functioning as barely above survival mode. Ms. Sacco believed this instability was a significant barrier to effective parenting, testifying Ms. Crawford's multiple problems prevented her from being emotionally available to her children. She did not provide a specific time frame for when Ms. Crawford might be able to effectively parent.
The Department provided two visits per week for three hours before the children were moved to Utah. Although observers noticed that the children were bonded and affectionate with their mother, Ms. Crawford frequently missed visits or arrived late. When she did show up for visitation, she often failed to fully participate. Paul Bostian, a Department social worker, noted that the children often directed visits. Due to Ms. Crawford's methadone use during that time, her speech was often slurred and she was drowsy during visits. She would nod off, while the children continued to play. On one occasion, Mr. Bostian saw Ms. Crawford sleep during a visit. Ms. Crawford also struggled with the length of three-hour visits, sometimes cutting visits short. She eventually asked that visits be reduced to two two-hour visits per week.
After the children moved to Utah, Ms. Crawford's visitation was limited to phone contact. During this time, she had significant problems making actual contact due to the aunt's occasional refusal to answer the phone and Ms. Crawford's own unavailability. Ms. Crawford eventually requested physical visitation with the children. However, in-person visits never occurred because the aunt refused to allow the visitation to occur at her house and the social worker did not believe that physical visitation was in the best interests of the children.
The Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights in December 2004. After being notified of the petition, Mr. Lopez contacted the Department to engage in services. Like Ms. Crawford, Mr. Lopez's primary parenting deficiency was identified as his drug use. In March 2005, the court entered a dispositional order requiring Mr. Lopez to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment and any recommended treatment, UA/BA (urinalysis/breath analysis) monitoring, a domestic violence assessment, individual counseling, and if necessary, a psychological evaluation. He was later ordered to engage in parenting education. Due to his lengthy absence from the children's lives, his contact with the children was limited to writing them weekly letters.
Mr. Lopez completed a substance abuse evaluation at TASC in February 2005 and was diagnosed as dependent on methamphetamine. In June 2005, he was convicted of second degree burglary and court ordered to engage in drug treatment as a condition of probation. In August 2005, the Department of Corrections offered him drug treatment, but he failed to show for two scheduled appointments.
In October 2005, Mr. Lopez was referred to parenting education classes. The facilitator testified that Mr. Lopez's attendance was perfect, his participation was excellent, and he was a strong member in group therapy. In December 2005, Mr. Lopez opted to engage in an intensive outpatient treatment program offered through the parenting program. By trial, he had successfully completed the intensive outpatient portion of treatment.
In early April 2006, Mr. Lopez transitioned to the first phase of a lower level of outpatient treatment. He successfully completed six weeks of this aftercare. At the time of trial, his treatment schedule was reduced to one meeting a week and he had approximately four to six months to complete. Mr. Lopez's treatment provider testified that Mr. Lopez's prognosis for recovery was good.
The Department also required that Mr. Lopez participate in a domestic violence assessment. However, he missed two scheduled intake appointments. Mr. Lopez explained that he believed he was exempt from the requirement because he previously completed a domestic violence treatment program.
The trial court ultimately terminated Mr. Lopez's and Ms. Crawford's parental rights. The court noted the parents' improvement but ultimately found that neither of them was currently able to parent the children. It also found that termination was in the best interests of the children because they had integrated into their aunt's home, their behavior issues had decreased, and their treatment would suffer serious disruption if the parent-child relationship continued. Both parents appeal.
ANALYSIS
Termination proceedings require the courts to balance a biological parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child and the Department's duty to protect the child when the parent's actions or inactions endanger the child's physical or emotional welfare. In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. 562, 567, 815 P.2d 277 (1991); In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980). While family reunification is the first priority under the termination statute, our legislature has also declared that where the parents' legal rights and a child's right to basic physical and mental health conflict, the child's rights to nurture and safety should prevail. RCW 13.34.020.
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the Department must show that the six statutory requirements in RCW 13.34.180(1) are established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a). This means the Department must show that the fact at issue is "highly probable." In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). If the six termination factors are established, the Department must show by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. RCW 13.34.190(2); In re Dependency of A.M., 106 Wn. App. 123, 130, 22 P.3d 828 (2001).
Under the first element, the statutory requirements that the Department must prove are outlined in RCW 13.34.180(1).
Mr. Lopez and Ms. Crawford challenge factors (d), (e), and (f). Therefore, we treat the remaining factors as verities. RAP 10.3(g).
(a) That the child has been found to be a dependent child;
(b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130;
(c) That the child has been removed . . . from the custody of the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency;
(d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided;
(e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. . . .
. . . .
(f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
On review, the trial court's findings will not be overturned if supported by substantial evidence, i.e., clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 925, 976 P.2d 113 (1999). Because only the trial court has the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the witnesses, its decision is entitled to great deference and this court will not judge the credibility of the witnesses or weigh the evidence. A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 568.
A. Reasonable Reunification Services
We first address whether the Department offered all necessary services to the parents. They first argue that the Department's failure to provide in-person visitation after the children were moved to Utah requires reversal of the termination order. They argue that visitation is a service the Department must provide before the court can terminate parental rights. Additionally, Ms. Crawford argues that visitation was improperly denied because there was no court finding that visitation would harm the children, as required under RCW 13.34.136.
The Department counters that visitation is not a required service under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), but a right of the family under RCW 13.34.136. It points out that the Department is only required to maximize parent-child contact when it is in the best interests of the child, and that such contact was inappropriate here because the children were upset after telephone calls with their mother.
After the parties submitted their initial briefs, Division One of this court addressed the issue of whether visitation is a required service under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). See In re Dependency of T.H., 139 Wn. App. 784, 162 P.3d 1141, review denied, 162 Wn.2d 1001 (2007). In T.H., the court held that visitation is not such a service, reasoning that RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) limits the word "services" to those capable of correcting parental deficiencies. Id. at 791. We asked the parties for additional briefing in view of T.H. However, we decline to address the issue because of our conclusion that in-person visitation, even if designated a required service, would not have corrected the parents' parental deficiencies in the foreseeable future.
It is well settled that even where the Department inexcusably fails to offer services to a willing parent, termination will still be deemed appropriate if the services would not have remedied the parent's deficiencies in the foreseeable future, which depends on the age of the child. In re Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App 149, 164, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001). This means that when the record establishes that the offer of services would have been futile, the trial court can make a finding that the Department has offered all reasonable services. In re Welfare of Ferguson, 32 Wn. App. 865, 869-70, 650 P.2d 1118 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Wn.2d 589, 656 P.2d 503 (1983).
As to the mother's visitation rights, the court found that while the State could have made other efforts regarding visitation, the mother's life was chaotic, oftentimes she could not be contacted, for long periods of time she made little effort to stay in contact, and often failed to complete the visitation.
The record supports these findings. Ms. Crawford was offered eight months of consistent in-person visitation before J.L. and C.L. moved out of state. However, as indicated above, she did not fully avail herself of the service: she missed scheduled visits, arrived late, was sometimes drowsy, and asked to leave early.
Once the children moved to Utah, the Department offered telephone contact, which admittedly proved problematic due to the aunt's occasional unavailability. But Ms. Crawford also contributed to the problem. She too was unavailable at times and would change her phone number, making phone contact difficult. In view of Ms. Crawford's inconsistent participation with offered visitation, the Department was excused from increasing visitation. See In re Dependency of P.D., 58 Wn. App. 18, 26, 729 P.2d 159 (1990) (holding the State is excused from its duty to provide services when a parent is unwilling or unable to make use of such services).
In any event, there is no evidence that in-person visitation would have corrected Ms. Crawford's parenting deficiencies. As indicated, her problems were serious and long term. Further, frequent in-person contact between the mother and children was neither practical nor feasible because of the great geographical distance between them. In view of these facts, we conclude that increased visitation would have been futile. Accordingly, the Department's failure to offer in-person visitation is not a basis to reverse.
We reach the same conclusion as to Mr. Lopez. The court found that the Department could have made more effort regarding visitation, but excused the inadequacy because the father abandoned the children by dropping out of their lives for a lengthy period of time. Sufficient evidence supports this conclusion. Mr. Lopez was unavailable for the first 12 months of the dependency. Bo Gilbert testified of his inability to set up visitation for Mr. Lopez because Mr. Lopez's phone was disconnected and Mr. Lopez failed to stay in contact with the Department, missed scheduled appointments, and ultimately disappeared for months on an admitted drug binge. When Mr. Lopez reappeared in December 2004, the children had already moved out of state. The Department determined that Mr. Lopez's contact with the children should start with weekly letters and proceed to phone contact. However, Mr. Lopez did not avail himself of this opportunity. Between March 2005 and June 2006, Mr. Lopez sent only three cards to his children. Under these circumstances, the court properly found that the Department offered sufficient visitation.
Next, Mr. Lopez contends the Department failed to timely provide other necessary services. He concedes that he contributed to the initial delay, but points out that he was not offered services until October 2005 and that substance abuse treatment was not offered until January 2006, more than a year after he resurfaced and was available for services. This delay, he argues, was responsible for shaping the history that led to termination. We disagree.
The court found the Department offered all necessary services to Mr. Lopez including UA/BA monitoring, substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and domestic violence treatment. The record establishes that these services were offered, but that Mr. Lopez significantly contributed to the delay in their provision by disappearing for a year. However, Mr. Lopez blames the Department for the delay, arguing, "Had [the Department] timely provided [Mr. Lopez] with substance abuse treatment and parenting counseling . . . it is highly likely that [Mr. Lopez] would not have been out of his children's lives for two years and would have been in contact with them much sooner." Br. of Appellant at 20.
But Mr. Lopez misconstrues the record. He could have availed himself of drug treatment and parenting classes as early as 2004. After he reappeared, he showed little interest in contacting his children and failed to maintain regular contact with the Department social worker. Furthermore, Mr. Lopez ignores the fact that in August 2005, the Department of Corrections offered him a referral for drug treatment pursuant to his criminal conviction for second degree burglary. However, he failed to attend two scheduled appointments and did not engage in court ordered treatment until January 2006. A court "may consider any service received, from whatever source, bearing on the potential correction of parental deficiencies." In re Dependency of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644, 651-52, 102 P.3d 847 (2004). The evidence is substantial that Mr. Lopez was offered necessary services. The Department is not responsible for Mr. Lopez's failure to timely take advantage of them.
B. Likelihood of Improved Conditions in the Near Future
Next, the parents challenge the court's finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) that there was little likelihood that conditions would be remedied in the near future so that the children could be returned. RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) requires a showing that, at the time of the termination hearing, there were parental deficiencies that the parent was unlikely to cure in the near future. In re Welfare of C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942, 953, 143 P.3d 846 (2006). A determination of what constitutes the near future depends on the age of the child and the circumstances of the child's placement. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. 181, 205, 108 P.3d 156 (2005). Further, "A parent's failure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within twelve months following entry of the dispositional order shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future." RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).
As to Ms. Crawford, the court found she had only recently made progress in dealing with her addiction, her prognosis was guarded, and she was not capable of parenting anytime soon. Ms. Crawford contends the court erred in making this finding because there was no testimony on what constituted the near future for the children. She also argues that there was no testimony as to how much time was needed for her to remedy her parental deficiencies, the record showed she was improving, and the Department impeded contact with her children.
We disagree. The court's failure to explicitly define the near future does not mean that it did not address timing issues. As discussed above, a court may find that RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) is satisfied if the parent fails to remedy parental deficiencies within a year of the dispositional order. Here, the evidence shows that Ms. Crawford failed to remedy her problems during the two-year dependency and that they would not be corrected any time soon.
At the time of trial, Ms. Crawford still suffered from serious unresolved mental health problems that affected her ability to effectively parent. She was diagnosed with long-term problems, including a personality disorder and substance abuse induced dementia. Trial testimony indicated she lacks insight and is unable to recognize her problems. Ms. Crawford's life remains chaotic and her therapist testified that her instability presents a significant barrier to effective parenting any time soon.
Also, Ms. Crawford has not successfully addressed her drug addiction. At the time of trial, she was still engaged in a drug treatment program and her prognosis was guarded. Her relapse potential was high. Even Ms. Crawford recognized that her drug issues were not resolved. When asked why her children had been removed, she answered: "Because I am an addict and I wasn't able to properly take care of them the way they deserve to be taken care of. I am just learning to." RP (June 12, 2006) at 99.
In determining whether conditions will be remedied in the near future, the trial court may consider whether the parent's history of drug abuse was such that it renders them "incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time or for periods of time that present a risk of imminent harm to the child." RCW 13.34.180(1)(e)(i). A highly relevant factor is the "documented unwillingness of the parent to receive and complete treatment or documented multiple failed treatment attempts." Id. Such documented failures are present here.
Finally, Ms. Crawford failed to improve other aspects of her life. At the time of trial, her housing situation was unstable and domestic violence with a boyfriend remained an issue. In summary, Ms. Crawford's parenting deficiencies — drug addiction, lack of insight, serious mental health issues, lack of stable housing, domestic violence, and a chaotic lifestyle — were still present at the time of trial. Based on the testimony at trial, there was little likelihood that the conditions would be remedied in the near future.
Mr. Lopez presents a more difficult question. By all accounts, Mr. Lopez made good progress in addressing his parenting deficiencies toward the end of the dependency. Testimony indicated that he had completed parenting classes with perfect attendance and excellent participation. By the time of trial, he had completed the first phase of drug treatment and had transitioned to a lower level of aftercare. His urinalysis testing had been negative for nonprescription drugs for four months. A treatment provider testified that Mr. Lopez's prognosis for recovery was good. Nevertheless, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that his progress was inadequate.
The trial court found there was little likelihood that conditions would be remedied in the near future because Mr. Lopez abandoned his children for one year, failed to complete a domestic violence assessment, and still required four to six months of aftercare. Further, due to his absence from the children's lives, his relationship with them could not be rebuilt in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Lopez argues that the trial court's finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) is in error because the Department impermissibly relied solely on his past performance and shares blame for the delay in services. We disagree. Despite Mr. Lopez's recent progress in addressing his drug addiction, he had four to six months of drug treatment to complete. He failed to show up for a domestic violence assessment and treatment. He had not seen his children in over three years and demonstrated little interest in contacting them until shortly before trial. Under these circumstances, we fail to see how his relationship with his children could be rebuilt within the foreseeable future or that any progress will be sustained. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding.
C. Early Integration into a Stable and Permanent Home
The parents next challenge the trial court's finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) that continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. In support of this factor, the trial court specifically found that the children had integrated into their aunt's home, their behavior issues had decreased, and their treatment would be seriously disrupted if the parent-child relationship continued.
Ms. Crawford argues that the children's bond with their aunt does not justify termination and that the record does not support the court's findings that the children's treatment would be seriously disrupted if the parent-child relationship continued. Mr. Lopez argues that a child's ties to foster parents do not justify termination, and the evidence is insufficient that the children would face serious disruption if placed with him. He asserts, "There is no indication that the children would not continue to do even better in their own father's care with a stable residence and continued therapy — just as they had in the past." Br. of Appellant at 27.
The focus under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is not what constitutes a stable and permanent home, but the parent-child relationship and whether it impedes the child's prospects for integration. K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d at 927. A finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) necessarily follows from an adequate showing under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). In re Dependency of J.C., 130 Wn.2d 418, 427, 924 P.2d 21 (1996).
Here, as detailed above, substantial evidence establishes that neither parent is capable of remedying parental deficiencies in the near future. It follows that if they are unable to currently care for their children, then they cannot be placed in a permanent home until parental rights are terminated. As such, the continuation of the children's legal relationship with their parents diminishes their prospects for early integration into a permanent home.
D. Best Interests of the Children
Finally, the parents assign error to the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the children's best interests. Ms. Crawford does not provide argument on the issue and Mr. Lopez argues that the finding is premature.
We conclude that a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in the best interests of the children. RCW 13.34.190(2); A.M., 106 Wn. App. at 130. In termination proceedings, the paramount consideration is the health and safety of the child and conflicts between the parent's rights and the child's needs should be resolved in favor of the child. RCW 13.34.020. Where the parent has been unable to remedy parental deficiencies over a substantial period of time, the court is justified in finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 167. The trial court is afforded broad discretion in making a best interests determination, and its decision will receive great deference on review. In re Welfare of Young, 24 Wn. App. 392, 395, 600 P.2d 1312 (1979).
Here, the parents were unable to correct their parental deficiencies during a lengthy dependency. At the same time, the testimony established that the children were making significant progress in their maternal aunt's home. They progressed from deeply troubled children with severe behavior problems to children who could generally behave at home and school. The children have not been able to rely on their parents for proper care and cannot wait indefinitely for them to correct their problems. There is a tenable basis for the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interests.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence supports the statutory elements that the State was required to prove. Ms. Crawford's severe parenting deficiencies remain uncorrected. Although Mr. Lopez's recent progress is hopeful, it is very recently achieved, and capable of collapse. The children cannot wait in limbo to discover whether their father's recent progress proves to be long term. The trial court's decision was proper.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
BROWN, J., KULIK, J., concur.