Opinion
J-S75045-13No. 2249 EDA 2013No. 2287 EDA 2013No. 2288 EDA 2013No. 2289 EDA 2013No. 2290 EDA 2013
03-14-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.C., III APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.C. APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.F. APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: J.E.F., III APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother IN THE INTEREST OF: J.S.T.C. APPEAL OF: M.M.C., Mother
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000355-2013;
CP-51-DP-0116572-2006
Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000356-2013;
CP-51-DP-0116570-2006
Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000357-2013;
CP-51-DP-0116571-2006
Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000358-2013;
CP-51-DP-0116569-2006
Appeal from the Decree/Order entered July 12, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000359-2013;
CP-51-DP-0052658-2007
BEFORE: GANTMAN, SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
M.M.C. ("Mother") appeals from the Decrees and Orders, entered by the trial court on July 12, 2013, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her children, J.J.C., III (born in March 2005), M.M.C. (born in March 2004); J.J.F., (born in September 2001), J.E.F., III (born in September 2001), and J.S.T.C. (born in May 2007) (collectively, the "Children") pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and changed Children's permanency goal to adoption pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. We affirm.
The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the Children's father, J.C. ("Father"), in decrees dated and entered on July 12, 2013. Father has not filed an appeal from the termination of his parental rights.
In its September 11, 2013 Opinion, the trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history of this appeal, which we incorporate herein by reference. Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/13, at 1-14. We additionally point out the following pertinent facts.
On May 6, 2011, the trial court ordered the removal of J.E.F. and J.J.F. from the care and custody of Mother, and placed them in Bethana treatment foster care home. Ten days later, the trial court adjudicated J.E.F. and J.J.F. dependent, and committed them to the custody and care of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS").
M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. resided with Mother and friends of the family from October 14, 2011 through October 17, 2011. However, on October 17, 2011, the trial court temporarily placed M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. in DHS's custody, with foster care provided through Bethana. On December 16, 2011, the trial court adjudicated M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. dependent, and fully committed them to DHS's custody.
On June 20, 2013, the DHS filed Petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to Children, and to change the permanency goals for each child to adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the Petitions, at which DHS presented the testimony of Asia Cooper and Steve Dehais, both of whom are social workers at Bethana, and DHS social worker Rae Griffin. Mother testified on her own behalf. On July 12, 2013, the trial court entered Decrees granting DHS's Petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children, and changing the goal for each child to adoption.
Mother filed her Notices of Appeal from the trial court's termination Decrees, and simultaneously filed Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). With the trial court's permission, Mother subsequently filed Amended Notices of Appeal and Concise Statements challenging the permanency goal change for each child to adoption.
On August 23, 2013, Mother filed a Motion to Consolidate her appeals in this Court. We granted Mother's Motion on September 20, 2013.
Mother presents the following claims for our review:
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)?Brief of Appellant at 4 (renumbered).
[2]. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was overwhelming and undisputed that Mother[] demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with [C]hildren?
[3]. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights without giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination would have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
4. Whether the trial court erred when it changed the goal to adoption when there did not exist clear and convincing evidence to do so?
We address Mother's first and second claims together, as they are related. Mother first claims that, in relation to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), DHS failed to satisfy its burden of establishing sufficient grounds to prove that she "refused or failed to perform parental duties." See Brief of Appellant at 8, 14. Mother contends that she had successfully completed, or was near completion of most of her Family Service Plan ("FSP") goals. Similarly, in her second claim, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights because there was overwhelming and undisputed evidence that she demonstrated a genuine interest, and a sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with the Children. Id. at 16. In support, Mother relies on this Court's decision in In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2003). Mother argues that J.L.C. holds that a trial court must consider the history of the case and its individual circumstances, including any explanation offered by the parent for his/her conduct. See Brief of Appellant at 16.
We review Mother's appeal in accordance with the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition forIn re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
termination of parental rights. ... [O]ur standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. ... As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. [The Supreme Court] observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as "testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing" as to enable the fact-finder to come to a clear conviction, "without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d at 1251).
This Court may affirm the decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will review the appeal pursuant to section 2511(a)(5) and (b), as discussed by the trial court in its Opinion.
Sections 2511(a)(5) and (b) of the Adoption Act provide as follows:
(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (b).(b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent....
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
We review the evidence to support the involuntary termination of parent's rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) as follows:
In order for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) to be proper, the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions which led to the child's removal or placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; (4) the services reasonably available to the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1273-74 (Pa. Super. 2003).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed the termination of Mother's parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(5), and concluded that Mother's first and second claims lack merit. Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/13, at 17-20. The trial court's findings are supported in the record, and we discern no error or abuse of discretion. We therefore adopt the trial court's determination that termination is appropriate under subsection 2511(a)(5), and affirm the trial court's determination on the basis of its Opinion. See id.
Next, we address Mother's third claim, which challenges whether the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) have been met. In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under subsection (b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include "[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child's "needs and welfare" requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The "utmost attention" should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Mother argues that DHS failed to meet its burden of showing, under section 2511(b), that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of her Children. See Brief of Appellant at 8, 16. According to Mother, the evidence established that a strong and loving bond existed between Mother and the Children. Id. at 16. Mother asserts that DHS presented minimal evidence as to whether severing the bond between Mother and the Children would result in any detrimental harm to the Children. Id.
The trial court fully and adequately discussed the bond analysis and the needs and welfare analysis under section 2511(b), which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/13, at 21-30. The competent evidence in the record shows that Mother failed to "exhibit [the] bilateral relationship which emanates from the parent['s] willingness to learn appropriate parenting . . . ." In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2008). Mother failed to place herself in a position to assume daily parenting responsibilities so that she could develop a real bond with Children. See In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d at 1249. Although Mother may love the Children and desire an opportunity to serve as their mother, a parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (recognizing that "[a] parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights"); see also In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that "a parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment."). A child's life "simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125.
As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial court's credibility and weight assessments, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights with regard to section 2511(a) and (b). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Thus, we affirm the Decrees terminating Mother's parental rights as to Children.
Finally, in relation to her fourth issue, Mother simply asserts that, because DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated, the trial court improperly changed the permanency goal to adoption. Brief of Appellant at 17. However, Mother failed to provide any discussion or citation to case law in her brief. "[A]rguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention." Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Thus, Mother's fourth claim is waived. Moreover, had Mother not waived the issue, we would find it lacks merit, as we have affirmed the Decrees terminating her parental rights. We, therefore, affirm the Orders changing the permanency goal for the Children to adoption.
Decrees and Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. _______
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
In the Interest of: J.J.C. III, M.M.C., J.J.F., J.E.F. III, and J.S.T.C., Minors Appeal of: M.M.C., Mother
2249 EDA 2013
2287 EDA 2013
2288 EDA 2013
2289 EDA 2013
2290 EDA 2013
CP-51-AP-0000355-2013
CP-51-AP-0000356-2013
CP-51-AP-0000357-2013
CP-51-AP-0000358-2013
CP-51-AP-0000359-2013
OPINION
Melissa M. Clark (hereinafter "Mother") appeals the July 12, 2013, Order of this Court which involuntary terminated her parental rights as to the subject minor children ("hereinafter J.J.C. III, M.M.C., J.J.F., J.E.F. III, and J.S.T.C"). PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The family first became known to the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (hereinafter "DHS") on September 17, 2010, as the result of a General Protective Services (hereinafter "GPS") report. The GPS report alleged that J.J.F. was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (hereinafter "ADHD") and Oppositional Defiant Disorder (hereinafter "ODD"), and that J.J.F. has significant behavioral issues both at home and at school. The GPS report also alleged that Mother failed to comply with J.J.F.'s mental health treatment and recommendations, and that someone other than Mother makes this child's mental health evaluations which Mother thereafter fails to keep. The GPS report stated that J.J.F. needs a mental health evaluation: he is aggressive; his behavior is declining; he is engaging in fights; and, he is disrespectful to authority figures at home and at school. This GPS report was substantiated.
On September 22, 2010, DHS received another GPS report which alleged: that the family's home was filthy; that M.M.C. had hair lice; and, that the children had bed bug bites covering their bodies. The GPS report stated that the children were not up to date with immunizations or physicals, and that none of the school-aged children attended school. The GPS report also alleged that Mother and maternal grandmother (hereinafter "Grandmother") both abuse prescription drugs. This GPS report was substantiated.
On November 19, 2010, DHS implemented In-Home Protective Services (hereinafter "IHPS") to assist Mother in caring for the children. During the week of April 17, 2011, Mother attempted suicide and was hospitalized at Episcopal Hospital.
On May 5, 2011, Mother and the children were asked to leave a family friend's home. Mother did not have enough food for J.E.F. or J.J.F. at the time. Between May 4, 2011, and May 6, 2011, Mother moved herself and the children three (3) separate times. On May 6, 2011, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (hereinafter "OPC") for J.E.F. and J.J.F. due to Mother's unstable housing and inconsistency with the children's mental health needs, whereupon J.E.F. and J.J.F were placed in a Bethanna treatment foster home.
On May 9, 2011, a shelter care hearing was held. At that time, the Court lifted the OPC and the temporary commitment of J.E.F. and J.J.F. to DHS was ordered to stand.
On May 16, 2011, an adjudicatory hearing was held, at which time the Court adjudicated J.E.F. and J.J.F. dependent and committed them to DHS. Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (hereinafter "CEU") and the Court ordered DHS to refer Mother to the Achieving Reunification Center (hereinafter "ARC"). At the hearing, the Court learned that J.E.F. was diagnosed with ADHD, ODD, and bi-polar disorder. The Court also learned that Mother's other three (3) children, J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C, all reside with their father, Joseph Clark (hereinafter "Mr. Clark").
On June 1, 2011, a Family Service Plan (hereinafter "FSP") meeting was held, whereupon FSP objectives were outlined for Mother and Mr. Clark: ensure children have appropriate clothing; ensure children receive adequate meals; ensure children practice appropriate hygiene; attend parenting classes; maintain clean, appropriate, and stable housing; attend mental health appointments and follow through with treatment recommendations; ensure children attend mental health appointments and follow through with treatment recommendations; and, attend CEU and follow through with recommendations. The father of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Mr. Roger Anderson (hereinafter "Mr. Anderson"), was given the FSP objective of making his whereabouts known to DHS. Mother did not attend this meeting.
On August 16, 2011, a permanency review hearing was held. The Court took notice that Mother and Mr. Anderson were not compliant with respect to the permanency plans developed for them. Mother and Mr. Clark were re-referred to the CEU for a drug screen and assessment. Mother and Mr. Clark were also re-referred to ARC for appropriate services.
On September 28, 2011, DHS learned that M.M.C. and J.J.C. were not enrolled in school, had head lice, and slept on the floor. DHS also learned that J.S.T.C. was malnourished, all the children were unclean, and the family was residing with the maternal step grandfather, Harry Parker (hereinafter "Mr. Parker"), who is a registered sex offender. The next day, September 29, 2011, DHS made a visit to the family's home, but there was no answer. DHS left a note for the family to contact DHS, but no contact was made before another DHS visit on October 13, 2011. On that date, DHS learned that M.M.C. and J.J.C. had not attended school, and the children were observed sleeping on the floor. Mr. Clark admitted the children had head lice.
On October 13, 2011, after DHS confirmed that Mr. Parker was a sex offender, Mother and the children began residing with a family friend, Ms. Margaret Attica. The next day, October 14, 2011, the family began residing with other fatuity friends, Mr. and Mrs. John Ritzheimer. On October 17, 2011, Mr. and Mrs. Ritzheimer no longer wanted to provide for the family, and Mother stated that she would hot enter a shelter. As a result, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (hereinafter "OPC") and placed the children in foster care through Bethanna.
On October 19, 2011, a shelter care hearing was held. At that time, the Court lifted the OPC and the temporary commitment of M.M.C, J.S.T.C, and J.J.C. to DHS was ordered to stand.
On November 21, 2011, an FSP meeting was held. Mr. Anderson was given the sole FSP objective of making his whereabouts known. Mother and Mr. Clark were provided with FSP objectives: understand how and why the children were injured; provide adequate and safe living conditions; achieve and maintain recovery from drugs and alcohol: stabilize mental health issues; maintain relationships with the children through visitation; and, assure the children's safety. All three (3) parents failed to attend this meeting.
On December 8, 2011. J.E.F. and J.J.F. had a permanency review hearing. Mother was found to be in minimal compliance with her FSP plan, and was ordered to the CEU for a drug screen and dual diagnosis assessment. On December 12, 2011, Mother tested positive for barbiturates at the CEU.
On December 16, 2011, M.M.C., J.J.C., and J.S.T.C. were adjudicated dependent and fully committed to DHS. Mother and Mr. Clark were ordered to the CEU for drug screens. On December 20, 2011, Mr. Clark tested positive for cocaine at the CEU.
On March 8, 2012, a permanency review hearing was held. The Court found that both Mother and Mr. Clark had shown minimal compliance with their respective FSP objectives. The Court took notice that Mother was in non-compliance with the CEU, and ordered both Mother and Mr. Clark back to the CEU.
On May 1, 2012, the ARC closed out Mother's sendees due to non-participation. On May 14, 2012, another FSP meeting was held. Mother, Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Clark were all given the same objectives they had been given at the previous two (2) FSP meetings. Both Mr. Anderson and Mother failed to attend this meeting.
On May 23, 2012, a permanency review hearing was held. The Court found that Mother had shown minimal compliance with her FSP objectives, that she was non-compliant with CEU, and that she was discharged from the ARC due to non- participation. Mr. Clark was found to be in no compliance with his FSP objectives. Both Mother and Mr. Clark were re-referred to the CEU, and Mr. Clark was re-referred to the ARC.
On September 27, 2012, a permanency review hearing was held. The Court found that Mother had shown minimal compliance with his FSP objectives, and Mr. Clark had shown no compliance with his FSP objectives. The Court took notice that Mother had made approximately fifty per cent (50%) of visits with the children, while both Mr. Clark and Mr. Anderson had not visited with the children. Mr. Clark was re-referred to the CEU when he availed himself, and Mother was re-referred for a parenting capacity evaluation and bonding evaluation.
On December 18, 2012, the CEU issued a report of non-compliance as to Mother both for testing positive for barbiturates and opiates on September 27, 2012, and for failing to complete a Court-ordered drug and alcohol assessment on October 17, 2012.
On December 19, 2012, a permanency review hearing was held. The Court took notice of Mother's report of non-compliance and she was re-referred to the CEU. The Court also took notice that Mother had not yet completed her parenting capacity evaluation.
On March 27, 2013, the CEU issued a report of non-compliance as to Mother for testing positive for barbiturates on December 19, 2012, and for failing to complete a Court-ordered drug and alcohol assessment on January 28, 2013. On April 19, 2013, Mother failed to attend a scheduled parenting capacity and bonding evaluation appointment.
On May 2, 2013, a permanency review hearing was held. The Court found that Mother attended roughly fifty per cent (50%) of visits since the last permanency review hearing. The Court ordered Mother to schedule and participate in a parenting capacity and bonding evaluation, and re-referred her to the CEU for a drug and alcohol screen and assessment
On July 12, 2013, the termination of parental rights hearing was held, whereupon this Court terminated the rights of bo th parents as to J.J.C., M.M.C., J.J.F., J.E.F., and J.S.T.C.
On August 8, 2013, Mother timely appealed this Court's July 12, 2013, Order, which appeal the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (hereinafter "Superior Court") docketed cumulatively at 2249 EDA 2013, 2287 EDA 2013, 2288 EDA 2013, 2289 EDA 2013, and 2290 EDA 2013. Simultaneous therewith, on August 8, 2013, Mother filed her Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Therein, Mother raises three (3) issues, to wit:
This Court notes that while Mother's instant appeal was filed on August 8, 2013, it was docketed on August l4, 2013.
1. [W]hether the trial court committed reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 [P]a. [C]. [S]. §2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8).Mother's 8/8/13 Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
2. [W]hether the trial court committed reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights without giving primary consideration to the effect that termination would have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 [P]a. [C]. [S]. §2511(b).
3. [W]hether the trial court entered because the evidence was overwhelming and undisputed that [M]other,idemonstrated a genuine and sincere, persistent and
unrelenting effort to maintain' a parent-child relationship with her children.
For the reasons set forth below, this Court's decision should be affirmed.
FACTUAL HISTORY
The foster care Agency Worker on the case, Ms. Asia Copper (hereinafter "AW"), testified that she began handling the cases of J.J.C. and J.S.T.C. in December of 2011, and the case of M.M.C. in March of 2013. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 8). The AW testified that all three (3) aforementioned children were placed through her agency, and that she has handled each of these cases continuously since these respective times. Id. The Agency Social Worker on the case, Mr. Steve Dehais (hereinafter "ASW"), testified that he has been handling J.E.F. and J.J.F.'s case since May of 2011. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 31). The DHS Social Worker on the case, Ms. Rae Griffin (hereinafter "SW"), testified that she has been working on all five (5) children's cases since July of 2011. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 47).
The AW testified that she had discussions with Mother about what Mother needs to do to reunify with her children. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 10). The AW also testified that Mother only discussed reunification with J.J.C., J.S.T.C, and M.M.C when their father was not in the picture. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 11).
The AW testified that an Individual Service Plan (hereinafter "ISP") was developed for Mother with respect to children J.J.C, M.M.C., and J.S.T.C. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 12). Mother was given ISP objectives: suitable housing; parenting classes; mental health treatment; and, consistent visitation. Id. The ASW testified that an ISP was similarly developed for Mother with respect to J.J.F. and J.E.F., and the goals for Mother were substantially similar to those in the other ISP. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 35). The AW testified that she discussed the ISP goals with Mother, and that Mother never indicated that she had a problem understanding what was expected of her. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 13). The SW testified that an FSP was developed for Mother, the goals of which mirrored those of the ISPs developed by the agencies. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 47). The SW also testified that she explained "on many occasions the FSP objectives to [Mother]." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 55).
The AW testified that Mother completed her parenting class in December of 2012. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 12, 27). The AW also testified that Mother never obtained suitable housing and never enrolled in drug and alcohol treatment. Id. Both the ASW and the AW testified that they never received any information from the CEU regarding an assessment for Mother. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 26, 35). Mother herself testified at the termination hearing that she was not receiving any drug and alcohol treatment. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 58). Mother testified that her positive screens from the CEU were a result of taking five (5) prescription drugs for various physical pain and mental illness; Mother never provided any documentation from any doctors regarding this claim. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 63, 64). The ASW testified that he has never received any documentation about Mother's mental health treatment. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 36). The SW testified that Mother never followed through with either her drug and alcohol treatment or mental health treatment. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 49). The SW testified that Mother never had appropriate housing, because "there wasn't [sic] enough sleeping arrangements in the home" and "[Mother] was living with an indicated perp." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 55).
The AW testified that Mother was referred to the ARC "two [(2)] or three [(3)] times," but she was discharged for failing to attend. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 24). The SW testified that she referred Mother to the ARC on several occasions, and that Mother has never completed any services at the ARC. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 47, 48). The ASW testified that aside from completing parenting classes and signing some consents for her . children, Mother has not complied with her ISP objectives. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 38). When asked to describe Mother's overall FSP compliance, the SW testified that Mother was in "minimal compliance" throughout the case, then "none" from the last court date until the date of the termination hearing. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 52, 56).
The AW testified that she supervised the visits between Mother and J.J.C., J.S.T.C, and M.M.C. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 13). The AW testified that Mother only consistently visited during the Spring of 2012, and since then Mother has only attended about fifty per cent (50%) of visits offered to her. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 14). The ASW testified that Mother's percentage of attendance at her visits with J.E.F. and J.J.F. vacillated between fifty per cent (50%) and sixty-seven per cent per cent (67%) from the Spring of 2012 until May of 2013. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 32). The AW testified that from the court hearing immediately prior to the termination hearing up to the termination hearing itself, Mother made zero (0) visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 14). This information was corroborated by the ASW, who testified that Mother made zero (0) of the six (6) visits offered to her between May of 2013 and the termination date. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 32). The ASW testified that Mother never requested makeup visits with her children. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 42).
The AW testified that Mother would only provide explanations for missing the visits weeks after they were missed. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 14). Mother informed the AW that she was ill and hospitalized, but Mother never provided the AW with any documentation to support her claim. Id. The ASW offered more detailed explanations provided to him by Mother, including "infected skin sore, a trip to the ER, ARC, appointment with the doctor, lack of tokens . . . physical therapy . . . the flu." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 33). The ASW testified that, despite requesting documentation from Mother, she never provided any information about any of the reasons for her missed visits. Id. The ASW also testified that, even though Mother never requested tokens from him, he still provided tokens to Mother but Mother still missed the subsequent visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 45). The AW testified specifically that for one (1) visit in March of 2013, when a pizza party was planned for J.J.C.'s and M.M.C.'s birthdays, Mother failed to attend this "birthday" visit. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 23). The ASW also testified specifically about one (1) visit to Chili's for all the children which Mother confirmed she would attend, but then failed to show up. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 43 ).
The AW testified that during Mother's visits with M.M.C., M.M.C.'s aunt helped the child with her homework rather than Mother. (NT., 7/12/13, pg. 14). The AW also testified that "[t]here is not a strong bond" between M.M.C. and Mother. Id. The AW testified that, out of all the five (5) children, only J.J.C. runs up to Mother when he sees her. (NX, 7/12/13, pg. 26). With respect to visitation with J.J.C, the AW testified that Mother has a "hard time getting a handle on the behaviors during the visits. And the visits do get chaotic and she would become very frustrated." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 15). The AW testified that Mother left three (3) visits early, and told the AW that she was' "frustrated and felt overwhelmed during the visit.'"' (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 15, 16). The AW concurred with this assessment and testified regarding the "chaos that tended to characterize the visits." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 34). When Mother was asked how her visits go with her children, she replied: "Sometimes chaotic. Of course its going to be like that." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 59). In terms of Mother's visits with J.S.T.C., the AW testified that the visits are very similar to those with J.J.C, and that J.S.T.C. is "off doing his own thing, running around, not really interacting." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 18). The ASW testified that both J.J.F. and J.E.F. would also exhibit negative behavior during visits with Mother. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 33, 34). The ASW testified that J.E.F. would "tend to not like the visits, leave the room without permission," while J.J.F. would "tend to withdraw by himself." Id.
When the AW provided redirection to Mother, Mother "sometimes [gets] frustrated and overwhelmed." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 18). The AW testified that Mother's discipline of the children at visits has "[n]o gross structure, just a lot of yelling." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 17). The AW testified that Mother never moved to unsupervised visits because of the "chaos going on and [Mother] not being able to handle all five [(5)] kids with three [(3)] staffers in the room." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 30). The AW also testified that Mother "occasionally, not often" treats her children affectionately throughout the visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 26). The AW testified that the children have shown no negative effects since Mother stopped visiting Completely in the months prior to the termination hearing. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 19). The AW testified that while Mother was referred for a bonding evaluation, Mother has missed all three (3) bonding evaluation appointments, April 9, 2013, May 31, 2013, and June 9, 2013. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 25).
The AW testified that J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C. have lived in their pre-adoptive foster home since October of 2011. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 20). The AW testified that all three (3) children have "positive" interactions with the foster parents and they all look to the foster mother as "Mom" and call her "Mom." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 21). The ASW testified that J.J.F. and J.E.F. are both placed in a pre-adoptive home as well. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 38, 41). The ASW also testified that the foster parents are fully committed to adopting J.J.F. and J.E.F., and they are demonstrating that fact through their actions, such as driving great distances for appointments or hiring private counselors to accelerate learning. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 39 - 42). The SW echoed the sentiments of the AW in testifying that J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C. "really love the foster parents," "call [the foster mother] Mom," and their foster parents provide the "structure, consistency, protection" that these children need. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 50, 51). The SW also agreed with the ASW's assessment of J.J.F. and J.E.F.'s placement, testifying that it is "a very pleasant environment," and their foster parents "assure that the kids are safe and put out of harm's way." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 52).
The AW testified that adoption is in the best interest of J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C, and that none of the children would suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 22). The AW testified specifically about the impact on M.M.C, stating that "[t]he home she is currently in right now has provided her with the stability and emotional support that she does need in order to be successful." Id. Similarly, the ASW testified that adoption is in the best interest of both J.J.F. and J.E.F., as he has witnessed the commitment made by the foster parents to the stability'" of the lives of these children. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 40, 41). The ASW also testified that neither child would suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. Id. The SW testified that none of the five (5) children would be irreparably harmed if Mother's parental rights were terminated. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 50-52).
DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
Standard of Review
In involuntary termination of parental rights cases, the Superior Court review is limited to a "determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence." In re: Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. 2011); Adoption of B.D.S., 431 A.2d 203, 207 (Pa. 1981). The Superior Court summarized the scope and standard of review for appeals from termination orders:
An appellate court, in reviewing a termination order, must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record, but is limited in its standard of review to a determination of whether the trial court's termination of [Mother's] parental rights is supported by competent-evidence. Stated differently, unless the lower court has abused its discretion or committed an error of law, the order must stand.In re: Baby Boy P., 482 A.2d 660, 661 (Pa. Super. 1984).
The trial court, not the. appellate court, must evaluate the "credibility of the witnesses and [resolve] any conflicts in the testimony." In re: M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004); In re: Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa. Super. 2002). In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is "free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." M.G. at 73-74. If the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence, then the appellate court must affirm, "even if the record could also support an opposite result" In re: In the Interest of S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied sub nom., S.H. v. V.H., 892 A.2d824 (Pa. 2005). "Absent an abuse of discretion, error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support, the trial courts termination order must stand." In re: C.M.S.M. v. D.E.H., 897 A.2d 1183 (Pa. 2006).
The standard of review for termination appeals is one of clear and convincing evidence. It is a well established principal of law in Pennsylvania that "in a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence for grounds for doing so." In re: N.W., 859 A.2d 501, 506-07 (Pa. Super. 2004). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as "testimony that is clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Pa. 1989).
The evidence presented at the July 12, 2013, hearing underlying the instant termination of the parental rights was clear and convincing.
A. The Trial Court Properly Terminated Mother's Parental Right's Pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a)(1), (2), and (5) of the Adoption Act by Clear and Convincing Evidence.
In the present case, DHS petitioned for involuntary tennination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a) which provides, in pertinent part, that the rights of a parent may be terminated upon any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct contmuing for a period of at least six [(6)] months either has evidenced a settled purpose of relmquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a)(1), (2), (5). In her Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Mother appeals this Court's finding that each of these aforementioned statutory sections was satisfied. This Court is satisfied that grounds for termination under each of the above-quoted subsections of the Adoption Act have been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, since the satisfaction of any one (1) subsection of §2511(a) is required in order to shift the analysis to §2511(b), this Court focuses on the subsections most applicable to the instant appeal, namely §§2511(a)(5). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a)(5) Failure to Remedy
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
. . . .
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six [(6)] months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time, and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
Pursuant to 23 Pa C.S. §2511(a)(5), the trial court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the parent has had sufficient time to correct the problems leading to the child's removal or placement, considering the number and severity of the problems to be corrected and the child's best interest. In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. 2008). The parent must exhibit a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the minor child at issue, or must show an inability to perform parental duties. In re: Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Emphasis added).
In this Court's attempt to determine whether Mother either relinquished her parental claim to K.M. or shows an inability to perform parental duties, this Court must consider Mother's compliance with her FSP objectives throughout the history of the case. The Superior Court has made it clear that a refusal to comply with FSP objectives may evince a lack of commitment to repairing a parent's relationship with his or her children, and may be sufficient to demonstrate an unwillingness and/or inability to care for those children pursuant to §2511 (a) of the Adoption Act. See e.g., In the Matter of the Adoption of J.M.M., 782 A.2d 1024 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 797 A.2d 914 (Pa. 2002). Parental rights cannot be preserved simply by waiting for a convenient time to begin parental duties and responsibilities. In re: Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297 (Pa. Super. 1996). Furthermore, "[p]arental duty requests that the parent not yield to every problem, but must act affirmatively, with good faith interest and effort, to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances." Dale at 302. Finally, a parent's current vow to cooperate with sendees offered, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may be rejected by the court as untimely or disingenuous. Id. Unwillingness or Inability to Perform Parental Duties
Pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a) of the Adoption Act, a parent must exhibit a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the minor child at issue, or must show an inability to perform parental duties. In re: Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Superior Court has made it clear that a refusal to comply with FSP objectives may evince a lack of commitment to repairing a parent's relationship with his or her children and may be sufficient to demonstrate an unwillingness and/or inability to care for those children pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a) of the Adoption Act. Adoption of J.M.M. at 1024.
Given the testimony of the AW, the ASW, and the SW, it is clear to this Court that Mother did not act affirmatively to demonstrate a desire to exercise parental care and control over any of her children. In the instant case, Mother had ample time to comply with her ISP and FSP objectives. The AW testified that the ISP developed for Mother with respect to children J.J.C, M.M.C, and J.S.T.C, included: suitable housing; parenting classes; mental health treatment; and, consistent visitation. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 12). The ASW testified that an ISP was similarly developed for Mother with respect to J.J.F. and J.E.F., and that the goals for Mother were substantially similar to those in the other ISP. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 35). The SW testified that an FSP was developed for Mother, the goals of which mirrored those of the ISPs developed by the agencies. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 47). Both the AW and SW testified that they discussed the ISP and FSP goals with Mother, and that Mother never indicated that she had a problem understanding what was expected of her. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 13, 55).
The AW testified that Mother completed her parenting class in December of 2012. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 12, 27); parenting class represents the only ISP or FSP objective Mother ever completed throughout the entire case. The AW testified that Mother never obtained suitable housing, never enrolled in drug and alcohol treatment, and never received any information from CEU about testing for Mother. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 12, 26). Mother herself testified at the termination hearing that she was not receiving any drug and alcohol treatment. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 58). The ASW testified that he has never received any documentation about Mother's mental health treatment. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 36). The SW testified that Mother never completed her drug and alcohol treatment or mental health treatment. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 49). The SW testified that Mother never obtained appropriate housing throughout the history of the case. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 55).
The AW and ASW testified that Mother has only attended about fifty per cent (50%) of visits offered to her. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 14, 32). The AW and ASW also testified that from the court hearing immediately prior to the termination hearing and the tennination hearing Itself, Mother made zero (0) visits. Id. The ASW testified that Mother never requested makeup visits with her children when she missed visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 42).
Aside from visits, Mother could have completed the vast majority of her ISP and FSP objectives at the ARC in a timely and efficient manner. However, Mother did not utilize this opportunity. The AW testified that Mother was referred to the ARC "two [(2)] or three [(3)] times," but that she was discharged for failing to attend. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 24). The SW testified that she referred Mother to the ARC on several occasions, and that Mother has never completed any services at the ARC. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 47, 48).
As a result of Mother's non-participation at the ARC, and refusal to engage in drug and alcohol and mental health treatment, Mother failed to meet her ISP and FSP requirements. The ASW testified that aside from completing parenting classes, Mother has not been in compliance with her ISP objectives. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 38). When asked to describe Mother's overall FSP compliance, the SW testified that Mother was in "minimal compliance" throughout the case, then "none" or no compliance from the last court date until the date of the termination hearing underlying the instant appeal. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 52, 56).
This Court agrees with the estimations of the AW, ASW, and SW as it bears upon Mother's lack of compliance with her ISP and FSP objectives. Thus, this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DHS has met its burden as contemplated by 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a)(5).
B. The Trial Court Properly Terminated Mother's Parental Rights Pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) of the Adoption Act by Clear and Convincing Evidence. Statutory Requirements
Termination of parental rights is controlled by statute. 23 Pa. C.S. §2511; In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 192-93 (Pa. Super. 2004). In its petition, DHS alleged the Statutory Grounds for Termination under 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). In order for the rights of a parent to be terminated, the moving party must satisfy at least one subsection of 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a), then satisfy 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). "Satisfaction of the requirements in only one subsection of 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 (a), along with consideration of the provisions in 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b), is sufficient for termination." In re B.L.W at 384. 23 Pa. C.S. §2511 requires, inter alia, that the Court find:
Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, finishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). Parent/Child Bond 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) mandates consideration of the "developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). In addition, although not expressly noted in the statutory language, said analysis includes consideration of any biological parent-child bond. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008); In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, the Superior Court explained that 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) requires the:
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). The Supreme Court has echoed this necessity, writing that "[a] court, in considering what situation would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents' rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial." In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522, 525-26 (Pa. 1990), appeal denied, 688 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1997).
The rendering of a decision that "termination served the needs and welfare of the child without consideration of emotional bonds, in a case . . . where a bond . . . obviously exists . . . is not proper." In re E.M. at 485. Failure of the trial court to consider the "presence or absence of a parent-child bond and the likely effect" on the minor child at issue is grounds for reversal and remand to properly examine any parent-child bond. In re C.W.S.M., 839 A.2d 398, 404-05 (Pa Super. 2003). However, reversal and remand is limited to cases where no consideration whatsoever is given to said bond. See, In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 515 (Pa. Super. 2006) (case remanded to consider bonding when the "presence or absence of a bond was not directly addressed in any way by the testimony of any witness for either party.") (Emphasis added); In re E.M. at 482 (case reversed and remanded based on testifying psychologist's failure to observe and examine bond between children at issue and biological mother). Furthermore, information by means of expert testimony or bonding evaluations is not required in a trial court's determination of the presence or absence of a bond. See, In re I.A.C., 897 A.2d 1200, 1207-09 (Pa. Super. 2006) (termination of parental rights affirmed based solely on bonding testimony from agency social workers.); In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95 (Pa. Super. 2011) (termination of parental rights affirmed over Mother's objection that a formal bonding evaluation was not performed, and bond analysis was based only on testimony by foster care case managers and agency workers).
In the instant case, the parent-child bond between Mother and her children was adequately examined by this Court. The AW testified that she is responsible for supervising ail visits between Mother and J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 13). The AW testified about the frequency of the visits, as well as the nature and quality of the visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 14, 15). In fact, the AW testified that "there is not a real strong bond"'' between Mother and M.M.C. Id. Additionally, the AW was cross-examined extensively regarding Mother's visitation with J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 26-29).
The ASW likewise testified that he supervises visits between Mother and J.J.F. and J.E.F. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 32). The ASW was extremely knowledgeable about Mother's visits with the children. The ASW testified as to the percentages of visits made by Mother, the dates and times of each visit offered to Mother, information about specific visits, and details about Mother's interactions with her children. (N.T, 7/12/13, pgs. 32, 34-36, 42, 43). The ASW was also cross-examined both on these issues by the child advocate and Mother's counsel, as well as on the nature and quality of the visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 42-46).
The AW and ASW were each questioned comprehensively, on both direct and cross-examination, about the respective bonds between both Mother and the children as well as the foster parents and the children. Thus, the Court adequately considered the respective bond between both Mother and the children as well as between each respective foster family and the children.
A trial court must also consider the type and nature of the bond between both the biological parent and the child at issue, as well as the bond between the foster/adoptive parent and the child at issue. The mere existence of a bond between the biological parent and child at issue does not preclude the termination of that parent's rights. In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 2008). The Superior Court has held:
[Father] did not bond with his children in the way a parent should bond with his or her children. It is not enough that 'both boys know their father,' 'enjoy being with him,' and 'love their dad.' That is not bonding. Being "Uncle Daddy" is not enough. . . .Children often know, love, and sometimes have ah enjoyable time with parents who have little to do with their upbringing, and even with parents who physically and mentally abuse them.In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2003). While recognizing that a loving bond existed between father and the children, the J.L.C. Court analyzed the bond between the foster and proposed adoptive parents and the children, and compared it to that of the bond between father and the children. In J.L.C, the Court affirmed the termination of parental rights, and found that the Commonwealth had met its burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard with respect to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). Id. at 1253. The J.L.C. Court wrote that the bond between the children and the proposed adoptive parent was stronger than that of the bond between father and the children. Specifically, the Court noted that the children have lived with the foster parents "for more than half of their young lives," and the children are "well settled, psychologically bonded with the foster/adoptive parents, rely upon them, and are loved by them. . ." Id. at 1250-51: See also, In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-65 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In the instant case, the AW testified that during Mother's visits with M.M.C, M.M.C.'s aunt helped the child with her homework rather than Mother. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 14). The AW also testified that "[t]here is not a strong bond" between M.M.C. and Mother. Id. The AW testified that out of all the five (5) children, only J.J.C. runs up to Mother when he sees her. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 26). With respect to visitation with J.J.C., the AW testified that Mother has a "hard time getting a handle on the behaviors during the visits. And the visits do get chaotic and she would become very frustrated." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 15). The AW testified that Mother left three (3) visits early, and told the AW that she was "frustrated and felt overwhelmed during the visit." (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 15, 16). The AW concurred with this assessment and testified regarding the "chaos that tended to characterize the visits." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 34). When Mother was asked how her visits go with her children, she replied: "Sometimes chaotic. Of course its going to be like that." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 59). In terms of Mother's visits with J.S.T.C, the AW testified that the visits are very similar to those with J.J.C., and that J.S.T.C. is "off doing his own thing, running around, not really interacting." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 18). The ASW testified that both J.J.F. and J.E.F. would also exhibit negative behavior during visits with Mother. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 33, 34). The ASW testified that J.E.F. would "tend to not like the visits, leave the room without permission," while J.J.F. would "tend to withdraw by himself." Id.
When the AW provided redirection to Mother, Mother "sometimes [gets] frustrated and overwhelmed." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 18). The AW testified that Mother's discipline of the children at visits has "[n]o gross structure, just a lot of yelling." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 17). The AW testified that Mother never moved to unsupervised visits because of the "chaos going on and [Mother] not being able to handle all five [(5)] kids with three [(3)] staffers in the room." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 30). The AW also testified that Mother "occasionally, not often" treats her children affectionately throughout the visits. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 26). The AW further testified that the children have shown no negative effects since Mother stopped visiting completely in the months prior to the termination hearing. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 19).
The record reveals two (2) important facts. First, the AW testified that while Mother was referred for a bonding evaluation. Mother has missed all three (3) bonding evaluation appointments, scheduled for April 9, 2013, May 31, 2013, and June 9, 2013. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 25). A positive bonding evaluation would have bolstered Mother's claim of a bond pursuant to the 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) analysis, yet Mother did not attend her three (3) scheduled evaluations. Second, the AW and ASW both testified that from the court hearing immediately prior to the termination hearing up to the termination hearing itself, Mother did not make any visits with any of her children. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 14, 32). Thus, as soon as Mother became aware that termination petitions had been filed, and a termination hearing was scheduled, she immediately stopped all visitation with her five (5) children. This is especially indicative of Mother's mindset with respect to her bond with her children.
This Court considered this bonding testimony credible, and, by clear and convincing evidence, found that in evaluating the respective bonds between both Mother and the children, and the respective foster parents and the children that termination was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). Swift Permanency
Another part of the bonding analysis pertains to the balancing of swift permanency for the child versus any detrimental effect the permanent severing of the relationship between the child and the natural parent would have on the child. As the Superior Court explained, a swift and efficient determination is needed because "the state should not seek to preserve in law a relationship which no longer exists in fact, with the result that the child is consigned definitely to the limbo of foster care or the impersonal care of institutions." In re Adoption of B.J.R., 579 A.2d 906, 915 (Pa. Super. 1990). The Superior Court has also instructed the trial court to give consideration to the "importance of continuity of relationships to the child and whether the parent-child bond, if it exists, can be severed without detrimental effects on the child." In re K.Z.S. at 763. See also, In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003) (trial court must determine whether termination of parental rights would "destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship."); In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (trial court must examine the nature and status of the bond, with attention provided to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.); In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010) (trial court should "consider the continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.").
The AW testified that adoption is in the best interest of J.J.C., M.M.C., and J.S-.T.C, and that none of the children would suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 22). The AW testified about the impact on M.M.C. specifically, stating that "[t]he home she is currently in right now has provided her with the stability and emotional support that she does need in order to be successful." Id. Similarly, the ASW testified that adoption is in the best interest of both J.J.F. and J.E.F., as he has witnessed the commitment made by the foster parents to the stability of the lives of these children. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 40, 41). The ASW also testified that neither child would suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. Id. The SW testified that none of the five (5) children would be irreparably harmed if Mother's parental rights were terminated. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 50-52).
This Court considered testimony by these witnesses credible, and found that the Commonwealth had met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). In re M.G. at 73-74. Needs Welfare of the Child
In addition to an examination of the presence or absence of a bond between the biological parent and minor child at issue, the trial court must also follow the statutory language and engage in a broad analysis of the "developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). As the Superior Court explained:
While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the Subsection 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.In re N.A.M. at 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). See also, In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529 (Pa. Super. 2008). The other factors to be considered include "intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. . ." In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005); In re A.S. at 483; In re Adoption of B J.R., 579 A.2d 906, 914 (Pa. Super. 1990).
In the instant case, the AW testified that J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C. have lived in their pre-adoptive foster home since October of 2011. (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 20). The AW testified that all three (3) children have "positive" interactions with the foster parents and they all look to the foster mother as "Mom" and call her "Mom." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 21). The ASW testified that J.J.F. and J.E.F. are both placed in a pre-adoptive home as well. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 38, 41). The ASW also testified that these foster parents are fully committed to adopting J.J.F. and J.E.F., and they are demonstrating that fact through their actions, such as driving great distances for appointments or hiring private counselors to accelerate learning. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 39 - 42). The SW echoed the sentiments of the AW in testifying that J.J.C., M.M.C, and J.S.T.C. "really love the foster parents," "call [the foster mother] Mom," and their foster parents provide the "structure, consistency, protection" that these children need. (N.T., 7/12/13, pgs. 50, 51). The SW also agreed with the ASW's assessment of J.J.F. and J.E.F.'s placement, testifying that it is "a very pleasant environment," and their foster parents "assure that the kids are safe and put out of harm's way." (N.T., 7/12/13, pg. 52).
This Court considered this testimony credible, and found that the Commonwealth had met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that the manner in which the respective foster parents provided these intangibles was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b). In re: M.G. at 73-74. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, this Court's decision should be Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_______, J.
EDWARD C. WRIGHT