Opinion
No. 04-16-00737-CV
04-12-2017
In the Interest of J.D.A.O., D.E.O., A.R.O., and E.R.T., Children
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-PA-00648
Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
This is an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights and granting an adoption. The mother of the children, A.M.G., challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interest. Because we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2015, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition for protection of the children, conservatorship, and termination of A.M.G.'s parental rights. The children who were the subject of the Department's petition were J.D.A.O., D.E.O., A.R.O., and E.R.T. The Department was appointed temporary managing conservator. During the pendency of this suit, the children were placed in multiple facilities and foster homes. One of these placements was with foster parents, A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.; however, the Department eventually removed the children from A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home and placed them in another facility. On June 6, 2016, A.E.K.S. and I.N.S., filed a plea in intervention seeking to adopt the children.
On September 19 and 20, 2016, the trial court held a bench trial on the petitions for termination and adoption. At the beginning of the trial, A.M.G. signed an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights. After hearing testimony from numerous witnesses, the trial court found that termination of A.M.G.'s parental rights was in the children's best interest and terminated A.M.G.'s parental rights on the ground that she had executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2016). The trial court also granted the adoption. A.M.G. appealed.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children's fathers, but they did not appeal.
APPLICABLE LAW
Termination of parental rights under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of at least one of the grounds listed in section 161.001(b)(1)(A)-(T) and that termination is in the child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1),(2). Clear and convincing evidence means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2014).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a strong belief or conviction that its finding was true. In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). "To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so." Id. "A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible." Id. If we conclude that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then we must conclude the evidence is legally insufficient. Id.
When a parent challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we look at all the evidence, including disputed or conflicting evidence. In the Interest of J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.
In evaluating the children's best interest, courts consider the factors articulated in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). These factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
Evidence proving acts or omissions under section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code may be probative of the child's best interest. In the Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). A best-interest analysis may consider direct and circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence. In the Interest of E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).
There is a strong presumption that a child's best interest is served by keeping the child with a parent. In the Interest of R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). However, the prompt and permanent placement of a child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (West Supp. 2016). Section 263.307(b) lists factors courts consider in determining if a parent is willing and able to provide a child with a safe environment. These factors include: (1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the Department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child's home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child's home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; (9) whether the perpetrator of harm to the child has been identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency's close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. Id. § 263.307(b).
In a series of cases, we have held that the Department is not relieved of its burden to prove best interest merely because a parent has executed a voluntary and irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. In the Interest of M.M., No. 04-16-00632-CV, 2017 WL 188097, at*2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 18, 2017, pet. filed); In the Interest of K.S.L., 499 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. filed), and In the Interest of A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 806-07 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).
In A.H., we held the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding when the only evidence of best interest was the conclusory testimony of a caseworker and the parent's affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. A.H., 414 S.W.3d 806-07. We recognized that a parent's relinquishment affidavit is relevant to the best interest inquiry, but it is not ipso facto evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. Id. at 806. "To hold otherwise would subsume the requirement of proving best interest by clear and convincing evidence into the requirement of proving an act or omission listed in section 161.001 by clear and convincing evidence." Id.
In K.S.L., no evidence was presented concerning the section 263.307 factors, the Holley factors, or other considerations relevant to the child's best interest. 499 S.W.3d at 112. Instead, the Department relied on the parents' affidavits of relinquishment of parental rights to support the trial court's best interest finding. Id. We held that the Department was not relieved of its burden to prove best interest merely because a parent has executed a voluntary and irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. Id. at 113. We reversed and rendered judgment denying the Department's petition for termination of parental rights. Id. at 114.
Finally, in M.M., the only evidence of best interest was the testimony of a caseworker and the parent's affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. 2017 WL 188097, at *2. There, the caseworker testified that the child was removed from the parent's care because of a neglectful supervision report, and that since her removal the child had been living in a safe environment and was doing well; that services were made available to the parent to assist her in maintaining her parental rights, but the parent was not able to comply with and complete those services; and that the Department was asking the court to terminate parental rights on the sole ground that the parent had relinquished her parental rights. Id. We concluded that, based on the paucity of evidence concerning the child's best interest, no reasonable trier of fact could have formed a strong belief or conviction that the trial court's best interest finding was true and, therefore, the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding. Id.
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED
Here, A.M.G. argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding. A.M.G. asserts that the only testimony that had any bearing on best interest of the children with respect to the termination of her parental rights was her own testimony and the testimony of a caseworker, which she contends was merely conclusory and cannot support the trial court's best interest finding. A.M.G. suggests her case is similar to the situation presented in A.H., where the only evidence of best interest was the conclusory testimony of a caseworker and the parent's affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.
On the other hand, the Department argues that the relinquishment affidavit coupled with the other evidence presented in this case was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding. Similarly, the foster parents who intervened, A.E.K.S. and I.N.S., argue the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding.
Alternatively, the Department argues that we should overrule In the Interest of M.M., No. 04-16-00632-CV, 2017 WL 188097 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 18, 2017, pet. filed), and In the Interest of K.S.L., 499 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. filed).
THE EVIDENCE
The following testimony was presented at trial. A.M.G.
A.M.G. testified that she was the mother of the children, who were ages six, five, three, and one at the time of trial. A.M.G. wanted what was best for the children, which she believed was for the children to be placed with a family that she knew, S.R. and his wife, and not with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. A.M.G. understood that the Department wanted to work toward placing the children with S.R. and his wife and she was in favor of this plan. A.M.G. further testified that she had participated in weekly visits with the children. During one of these visits, J.D.A.O. told her that the children had been spanked while living with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. A.M.G. was "really concerned" about this information and relayed it to a caseworker. After the children's statements were investigated, the children were moved from A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home and placed elsewhere.
A.M.G. confirmed that she had signed an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights. A.M.G. said that she was giving up her parental rights to her children because she could not take care of the children the way they should be taken care of. A.M.G. wanted a family to take care of the children the way they should be taken care of, and she felt that this would be in the children's best interest. Finally, A.M.G. testified that she submitted the affidavit of relinquishment because she believed it was in her children's best interest.
Department Caseworker
The caseworker testified that the Department's involvement in this case was prompted by A.M.G.'s drug use, her neglectful supervision of the children, and the existence of domestic violence. As far as rehabilitation, A.M.G. had demonstrated some sobriety; she had not tested positive for drugs while the caseworker had been assigned to the case, which was about five months. However, the caseworker indicated that A.M.G. had not been rehabilitated with respect to her ability to provide appropriate supervision and to maintain a household free of domestic violence. The perpetrator of the domestic violence was the father of three of the children. A.M.G. told the caseworker that she had not had any recent contact with the father, but A.M.G. also told the caseworker that he had recently broken into her house. The caseworker believed that the father still had access to A.M.G.'s home and was still a threat to A.M.G. and the children. However, on cross-examination, the caseworker testified that it was clear that A.M.G. did not give the father permission to be in her home because he had broken the patio door to enter A.M.G.'s home.
The caseworker further testified that she believed that termination of A.M.G.'s parental rights would be in the children's best interest because, although the Department had made significant efforts to reunify the children with A.M.G., she had not fulfilled the requirements and met the goals of the family plan. A.M.G. still had issues involving her mental health, and if the children were returned to A.M.G., she believed that they might be at risk of something happening to them. A.M.G. expressed to the caseworker that caring for the children would be overwhelming for her right now because she still had mental health issues, including postpartum depression. Additionally, about three months before trial, A.M.G. had exhibited self-harming behavior and the caseworker had made an appointment for her with a psychiatrist. A.M.G. made contact with the psychiatrist, but did not follow through with the treatment. The caseworker believed that A.M.G. was not able to care for herself or the children right now. Based on her recent conversations with A.M.G., the caseworker believed that A.M.G. had come to the realization that it was best that the children be with someone who could care for them and provide what A.M.G. could not provide them.
Next, the caseworker testified that all of the children were currently placed in a foster-to-adopt home and were doing well. J.D.A.O., who was in the first grade, was struggling with "the thought of not being with her mother." The foster home was working with her to adjust to life without her mother. J.D.A.O. was depressed and was exhibiting behavior like slapping herself and trying to bang her head against the wall. To help stabilize her, J.D.A.O. was prescribed Prozac. By the time of trial, J.D.A.O. was improving and she was being taken off of Prozac gradually. The caseworker attributed the change in J.D.A.O. to the new approach taken in J.D.A.O.'s therapy and the fact that J.D.A.O. was "opening up a lot" with her current foster parents.
The caseworker also testified that D.E.O., who was in kindergarten at the time of trial, was calm and friendly. D.E.O. desired to be with A.M.G., but he understood that she was not well. D.E.O. would sometimes ask if A.M.G. had completed her services. D.E.O. loved his siblings and expressed concern about being separated from them. D.E.O. was receiving therapy twice a month.
The caseworker went on to testify that A.R.O. was three years old and was receiving speech therapy. A.R.O. was making progress in this area, and because of this progress, the frequency of his speech therapy sessions had been reduced. A.R.O. was now friendlier and more outgoing than he used to be and interacted more with his siblings.
E.R.T. was a year old and was starting to talk. Previously, E.R.T. was very attached to her current foster father and would cling to him during the caseworker's visits, but recently she was more outgoing and willing to be with other people.
As far as the children's removal and placement history, the caseworker testified that the children were removed from A.M.G. for about six months in 2014 and then reunified with A.M.G. on March 17, 2015. However, about a week after their return to A.M.G., the children were removed from A.M.G.'s care because she started using methamphetamines again. A.M.G. blamed her drug relapse on E.R.T., who was a newborn at the time.
This removal occurred before E.R.T. was born.
The caseworker further testified that the children had been moved five or six times since the Department's termination petition was filed. The children were initially placed with their maternal grandmother for several months. When the grandmother failed to follow Department procedures, the children were moved to a foster home. The youngest two children, A.R.O. and E.R.T. were then placed with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. About five months later, J.D.A.O. and D.E.O. joined their younger siblings in A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home. And, about six months thereafter, the Department moved all four children from A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home to a facility, where they stayed for about ninety days. Thereafter, the children were placed with yet another foster family.
Finally, the caseworker testified that if the trial court terminated A.M.G.'s parental rights and granted the Department managing conservatorship, the Department would place the children in S.R.'s home. A.M.G. had a significant relationship with S.R. and his wife, and they had expressed a willingness to adopt the children. However, the children had not previously lived with S.R. and his family.
State Licensing Agency Investigator
An investigator for the state residential childcare licensing agency testified that she received a referral regarding inappropriate discipline in A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s foster home and investigated it. The investigator contacted the Department caseworker and visited all four children. She spoke with the two older children, J.D.A.O. and D.E.O, who complained of being "patted" on the bottom and yelling by I.N.S. D.E.O. also complained of pinching by I.N.S. She also spoke to foster parents, A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. denied that any inappropriate discipline had occurred. At the conclusion of her investigation, she found that inappropriate discipline had occurred and cited A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. for it. The investigator acknowledged that the children remained in A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home for about a month after the allegations were made.
Physician's Assistant
A physician's assistant testified that he had provided medical care for all four of the children while they lived with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. He stated that he believed the children had received excellent treatment and care while they lived with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. He had seen no signs of abuse or mistreatment, the children had not complained to him about abuse or mistreatment, and he had observed normal bonding and interaction between the children and A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. Additionally, he never saw A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. lose their patience with the children. Finally, the physician's assistant said that if he had not known that A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. and the children were a foster family, he would have thought that they were an "average run of the mill family." His reaction to the allegation that the children were spanked by A.E.K.S. or I.N.S. was disbelief.
Foster Home Manager
A foster home manager for St. Jude's Ranch testified that she was the manager for A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s foster home. She prepared a home study before the children were placed in the home, and she had visited the home multiple times after the first two children were placed there. The foster home manager was aware of the allegations that the children had been spanked, but she did not believe the allegations. She was of the opinion that A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. should be allowed to adopt the children.
Case Manager
A case manager for St. Jude's Ranch testified that she had regular visits with the children while they were living with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. Some of the visits were unannounced. She found the interaction between the children and A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. to be "pretty great"—the children appeared to be well cared for and they were happy and playing. She felt A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. had a bond with all of the children. The case manager interacted with all of the children, but she had the closest relationship with J.D.A.O. because the child was talkative and "really into school and drawing pictures." After the spanking allegations surfaced, the case manager talked to J.D.A.O. and D.E.O. privately about how the children were disciplined in A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home. J.D.A.O. did not repeat the spanking allegations. Instead, J.D.A.O. told the case manager that A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. had the children go to their rooms when they got in trouble. D.E.O also denied any physical punishment. After investigating the allegations, the case manager did not believe that spanking or any other type of physical discipline was happening in the home. The case manager also said she felt A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home was a great home for the children, the children had a great relationship with both of the parents and were thriving there, and she did not have any safety concerns.
Day Care Director
The three youngest children attended a day care while they lived with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. The day care director testified that the children had a strong bond with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. D.E.O., who was the only sibling who was verbal, was very happy and talkative and never complained of any mistreatment. The day care director said it was the practice at the day care to check the children daily for bruises, scratches, or injuries, and tell the parents about anything they found, and keep records of such findings. She said the day care providers never observed any abnormal bruises or scratches on the children. Furthermore, based on the day care director's observations of the interaction between I.N.S. and the children, I.N.S. seemed to have a lot of patience with the children.
Teacher
J.D.A.O.'s kindergarten teacher testified that J.D.A.O. never complained to her that she was being mistreated while she was living with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. The teacher had observed J.D.A.O. interact with A.E.K.S. and I.N.S., and J.D.A.O. seemed very happy. A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. were "willing to go above and beyond," and asked for extra guidance in helping J.D.A.O. with her schooling. The teacher believed that A.E.K.S. and I.N.S. cared very much for J.D.A.O. I.N.S.
I.N.S. testified that she and her husband loved the children and they had made a commitment to them. I.N.S. was a registered nurse, but she had scaled back her work hours significantly to care for the children. She now worked only three hours a week to maintain her nursing license. I.N.S. and her husband would be able to provide the children with all of their necessities. When the children came to live with them, I.N.S. and her husband purchased furniture for their rooms. They also traded in her husband's sports car for a van.
I.N.S. said the spanking allegation was first made during a visit with A.M.G. at Kidshare. I.N.S. understood the allegation to be that I.N.S. had spanked the boys on their bottoms. When I.N.S. learned of the allegation she was shocked and she contacted the Department caseworker to inform her about it. I.N.S. denied that she or her husband had ever spanked the children. Furthermore, I.N.S. said she did not think that she had screamed or yelled, but if she had screamed or yelled, it was not directed at the kids and it was not in the way it was described.
E.R.T. had repeated ear infections and needed surgery to have tubes placed in her ears. E.R.T. was going to have to wait three months for the surgery because of the surgeon's schedule; however, I.N.S. arranged for the surgery to be performed much sooner by a surgeon with whom she had worked.
When A.R.O. arrived in A.E.K.S. and I.N.S.'s home he was speech-delayed and was receiving speech therapy. I.N.S. continued to take him to his speech therapy and also learned how to help A.R.O. improve his speech by playing with him, talking to him, and repeating words and phrases for him. During the time he was in her home, A.R.O.'s speech improved. I.N.S. and A.R.O. would sometimes go through an alphabet book, and A.R.O. would repeat the things I.N.S. said to him.
I.N.S. described D.E.O. as "super sweet" and always looking out for his youngest sibling, E.R.T. I.N.S. explained how she and A.E.K.S worked diligently with D.E.O. to prepare him for kindergarten and to get him to perform routine things like putting his plate up after dinner and taking a shower before bed.
I.N.S. explained that after school each day she would meet J.D.A.O. at the school bus stop. J.D.A.O. had never had a tantrum at school, but she had had tantrums at home. The tantrums had occurred about once a month. During the tantrums, J.D.A.O. would cry and slap and scratch herself, but she never bruised herself or drew blood. I.N.S. described how she stopped using "timeouts" with J.D.A.O. and instead used "time-ins," which meant that if J.D.A.O. was sent to her room, I.N.S. would stay with her to make sure she did not hurt herself. Over time, the duration of J.D.A.O.'s tantrums had decreased.
I.N.S. understood that because she and her husband did not have the Department's approval to adopt the children, they would not receive any government subsidies. I.N.S. said this did not matter because she and her husband could provide for the children and they wanted to do so. I.N.S. and her husband wanted to adopt the children. A.E.K.S.
A.E.K.S. testified that he is a lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force. A.E.K.S. and his wife wanted to adopt the children because they were a blessing in their lives. They have not stopped thinking about the children since they left. They wonder where the children are and how they are eating. They wonder how A.R.O. is progressing with his speech and how J.D.A.O. is managing because she seemed traumatized when she left. Before the children left, A.E.K.S. and his wife prepared a summary of each child's routine and their preferences so that the next caretakers would be aware of the things the children liked. A.E.K.S. carries photographs of the children in the pocket of his uniform every day. S.R.
S.R. testified that he had known A.M.G. for about three years. S.R. and his wife had met A.M.G. when she was asking for help at Last Chance Ministries. S.R. was a minister. S.R. and his wife had experience working with children and teenagers. S.R. and his wife knew all four children. However, the children had never been to S.R.'s home, and he had never taken care of them. S.R. and his wife decided to become involved in this matter after they received a call from A.M.G. indicating that something needed to be done quickly. All of the members of S.R.'s household had been through a background check and a home study was conducted. S.R. understood that the Department wanted to place the children in his home, and he and his wife were ready to take on the task of raising them.
DISCUSSION
Here, the record shows that in addition to A.M.G.'s affidavit of relinquishment some other evidence was presented concerning the children's best interest. Specifically, both A.M.G. and the Department caseworker testified concerning the children's best interest. We cannot say that their testimony was merely conclusory. Unlike A.H., K.S.L., and M.M., this case does not present a situation in which the only evidence presented concerning the children's best interest was the parent's affidavit of relinquishment or the parent's affidavit of relinquishment and conclusory testimony. Therefore, the issue before us is whether A.M.G.'s relinquishment affidavit, in conjunction with the other evidence presented, was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding.
After reviewing the evidence presented, we are of the opinion that the trial court had ample evidence before it from which it could evaluate many of the Holley factors. The two children who were old enough to express their desires, J.D.A.O., and D.E.O., had expressed a desire to be with A.M.G. However, the desires of the children are not determinative. See Phillips v. Texas Dep't. of Prot. & Regulatory Serv., 25 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (recognizing that "[w]hat children want . . . is not always in their best interests."). Furthermore, the evidence indicated that A.M.G. could not meet the children's current emotional and physical needs, and it was uncertain whether A.M.G. would ever be able to meet these needs in the future. The evidence also indicated that A.M.G.'s drug use and neglectful supervision had caused emotional and physical danger to the children in the past, and that it might cause them emotional and physical danger in the future.
The evidence showed that A.M.G. lacked the parental abilities to care for the children and that the existing parent-child relationship was not a proper one. For example, the evidence showed that when the children were returned to A.M.G. in 2015, she immediately resumed her drug use and the children had to be removed from A.M.G. again. At the time, A.M.G. blamed her newborn child for her drug relapse. One of the excuses for A.M.G.'s conduct was her mental health issues. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that just several months before trial A.M.G. had been given an opportunity to see a psychiatrist to help address her mental health issues, but she had failed to take advantage of this opportunity.
Additionally, based on the evidence presented, the trial court could have evaluated many of the factors listed under section 263.307(b). All of the children were still quite young and vulnerable. The oldest child, J.D.A.O., was in the first grade and the youngest child, E.R.T. was just a toddler. Evidence was presented concerning A.M.G.'s drug usage and mental health issues. A.M.G.'s drug usage stemmed back to the time before E.R.T. was born. Although A.M.G. had not tested positive for drugs in the last five months, she still had mental health issues and showed an unwillingness to address these issues.
The frequency and nature of the out-of-home-placements in this case was significant. The children were initially removed from A.M.G.'s care in 2014, before E.R.T. was born. The children were briefly returned to A.M.G. in 2015, but A.M.G. had an immediate drug relapse and the children had to be removed from her care again. During the pendency of this case, the children lived in five or six different homes or facilities. Considering the totality of the evidence, the trial court could have concluded that the many removals and placements the children had experienced had taken a toll on them and that the most important factor for these children, particularly in light of their turbulent past, was stability and permanence.
The evidence further showed that A.M.G. was unwilling or unable to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time. The Department's involvement in this case has spanned about two years, but even by her own admission A.M.G. was still unable to care for and to parent her children. Again, the prompt and permanent placement of the children in a safe environment is presumed to be in their best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). The purpose of evaluating the section 263.307(b) factors is to determine whether a parent is willing and able to provide the children with a safe environment. Id. 263.307(b). In this case, the evidence could have led the trial court to conclude that A.M.G. was unwilling or unable to provide the children with a safe environment.
Viewing all of the evidence, including the affidavit of relinquishment and the relevant testimony presented, in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the termination of A.M.G.'s parental rights was in the children's best interest. We, therefore, conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding.
A.M.G. does not present a separate argument concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's best interest finding. Furthermore, the evidence relevant to the trial court's decision to terminate A.M.G.'s parental rights was essentially undisputed. Therefore, we conclude that the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the best interest finding was not so significant that a factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the termination of A.M.G.'s parental rights was in the children's best interest. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court's best interest finding.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Karen Angelini, Justice