Opinion
02-23-00363-CV
02-01-2024
In the Interest of J.C., a Child
On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325-721871-22.
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Walker, Justice.
A.M. (Mother) and A.S. (Father) both appeal from the trial court's judgment terminating their parental rights to their child, J.C. The trial court found that both parents had constructively abandoned J.C. and failed to comply with a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of J.C. and that termination of their parental rights was in J.C.'s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O), (2). Father complains that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the termination-grounds findings and factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding. Mother complains only that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding. We will affirm.
We use initials for the names of the child and his family members to protect the child's privacy. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b).
I. BACKGROUND
J.C. was born prematurely on August 1, 2022, and he was removed and placed in the care of the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) about three weeks later. Four witnesses testified at the termination hearing, which occurred over three days in August and September of 2023: the Department caseworker, two Department investigators, and Mother.
The investigators explained the Department's concerns that precipitated J.C.'s removal. In the seventeen days between J.C.'s discharge from the hospital after his birth and his removal, he had been brought to the hospital three times by Mother. The Department received referrals on each of these visits related to concerns that Mother was homeless, that J.C. was underweight, and that Mother's boyfriend- whom Mother had listed on the birth certificate as J.C.'s father (Boyfriend)-was acting erratically and had possibly abused her.
J.C.'s third visit to the hospital occurred on August 17, 2022, after Mother had given him apple juice, which caused him to choke and stop breathing. Mother, J.C, and Boyfriend had been living in a homeless shelter, and Mother reported that someone at the shelter had suggested she give J.C. some apple juice to help with his constipation issues. J.C. arrived at the hospital underweight, and Mother reported that he had been having difficulties with feeding and choking, but he showed no such issues while at the hospital.
During this hospital visit, Boyfriend exhibited "unstable" behavior, and Mother conceded that she was aware that he had mental health issues but believed he was controlling them with medication. She also conceded that she had lied by putting on the birth certificate that Boyfriend was J.C.'s father. She explained that Father was actually J.C.'s biological father and that she had lied because she and Father had a volatile relationship history. She told one of the investigators that she did not want Father involved with J.C. because she did not think Father was safe to be with.
A DNA test confirmed that Father was J.C.'s biological father.
Mother had lived in Michigan with Father when she became pregnant, but moved to Texas shortly before J.C.'s birth because Father had been emotionally abusive and forced her into an unwanted polyamorous relationship. Investigators were also concerned by the fact that Mother had named J.C. after Boyfriend, even though she had only known him for two weeks. J.C. was removed from his parents' care on August 18, 2022.
The caseworker, Carmesha Sanders, testified that the trial court had ordered Mother and Father to follow service plans. Mother was ordered to complete parenting classes, counseling, a psychological evaluation, and domestic violence classes and to maintain stable housing and employment. Father was ordered to complete parenting classes, drug testing, individual counseling, and a psychological evaluation and to maintain stable housing and employment. Both parents were also ordered to have weekly visits with J.C.
Copies of both service plans were admitted into evidence at the final hearing.
In November 2022, having not completed any of her services in Texas, Mother moved back to Michigan to live with Father. While in Michigan, Mother completed her psychological evaluation and parenting classes, but she was dropped from her domestic violence classes and counseling because of attendance issues. Mother never had a job during the pendency of J.C.'s case. Sanders testified that the psychological evaluation recommended that Mother be placed in a facility "for people who have lower intellectual disabilities to help them be able to function in society."
Mother visited in person with J.C. most weeks while she lived in Texas. Those visits continued via Zoom videoconferencing after she moved to Michigan. Father was present with Mother at many of these Zoom visits.
Father refused to work any of his ordered services. He told Sanders that he had been recently ordered to complete the same services within the termination case of three of his other children in Michigan, and he saw no need to complete them again. Father worked a factory job in Michigan.
The termination order and findings of fact from the Michigan case were admitted into evidence. There, Father's parental rights were terminated in February 2023 as to three other children, and the Michigan court's findings of fact showed that Father had completed some services but not others. The Michigan court also found that Father had "clearly failed to rectify his barriers to safe parenting" and that "[d]omestic violence, unsafe relationships, mental health, emotional stability, and a lack of parenting skills remain[ed] significant concerns for the children's well-being should they be returned to his home."
Sanders said that she informed Mother and Father on multiple occasions that the Department would pay for them to travel from Michigan to Texas so that they could have in-person visits with J.C., but they declined these invitations. After Mother left Texas in November 2022, she never again visited in person with J.C., and Father never met J.C. in person. Sanders opined that neither parent had a bonded relationship with J.C. due to their having spent the majority of their visitation time with him in a virtual setting on Zoom. During the pendency of the case, neither Mother or Father provided any support or gifts to J.C.
As for J.C., Sanders said that he had lived with the same foster family since October 2022. He was "extremely bonded" to the foster parents and siblings and was "happy, thriving, [and] growing." She described the home as very loving and stated that the foster parents were duly licensed and ready to adopt J.C. if Mother and Father had their parental rights terminated.
Mother testified that she met Father in Michigan in September 2021, moved into his house in October, and became pregnant with J.C. that December. She lived with him until June or July of 2022 when Father accused her of raping him and called the police to have her escorted off the premises. Mother then decided to move to Texas where she had family. On the bus ride from Michigan to Texas, she met Boyfriend.
For the two weeks leading up to J.C.'s birth on August 1, 2022, Mother and Boyfriend lived together in Fort Worth at his mother's house and then "out on the streets." Upon being discharged from the hospital, Mother, J.C, and Boyfriend lived together at a homeless shelter. After J.C. was removed from Mother's care on August 18, she and Boyfriend continued to live in the shelter until Boyfriend did "something" that caused them to be kicked out. They then lived in a tent on the streets before Mother moved back to Michigan in November 2022 to live with Father again.
Mother testified that she had been diagnosed with autism, which affected her aptitudes in reading and math and, thus, her ability to maintain employment. She cited health issues such as "liver pain" as the reason she had not travelled from Michigan to Texas for in-person visits with J.C. but also agreed that such visits would have been "feasible" on at least a monthly basis given her lack of employment and the Department's offer to pay for the travel expenses. She also denied that Father had ever been emotionally abusive.
If J.C. came back into her custody, she planned to find a job and for them to live with Father in Michigan. She said that Father's parents or brother would provide childcare for J.C. while she and Father worked, though she had not spoken with them about that possibility and they had a history of CPS involvement which she characterized as "not [] relevant."
At the hearing's conclusion, the trial court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights to J.C, finding that they had both constructively abandoned J.C, that they had both failed to comply with their court-ordered service plan, and that termination was in J.C.'s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O), (2).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
For a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, the party seeking termination-the Department in this case-must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent's actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020).
Along with a best-interest finding, a finding of only one ground alleged under Section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder may draw inferences, but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
We must perform "an exacting review of the entire record" in determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent-child relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due deference to the factfinder's findings and do not supplant them or the judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the party seeking termination proved the pleaded termination grounds and that the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18-19. "If the evidence is factually sufficient, then it is necessarily legally sufficient as well." In re AS., No. 02-16-00076-CV, 2016 WL 3364838, at *7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 16, 2016, no pet).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Termination of Father's Rights On (N) and (O) Grounds
In his first issue, Father contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he had constructively abandoned J.C. and failed to comply with his court-ordered service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001 (b)(1)(N), (O). We hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the termination of Father's parental rights because he failed to comply with his court-ordered service plan pursuant to termination ground (O). See id. § 161.001 (b)(1)(O).
Ground (O) provides that a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing
conservatorship of the [Department] for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child[.]Id.
There is no dispute that J.C. had been in the Department's temporary conservatorship for more than nine months after he was removed pursuant to Chapter 262 on August 18, 2022. The final hearing commenced on August 2, 2023, and the trial court entered its termination order on September 26, 2023.
On appeal, Father does not claim to have completed any services to effectuate the return of J.C. into his care. Rather, he contends that "there was no court-ordered service plan in the record[] or one presented to the trial court." But Father is wrong. The trial court entered such an order, it is in the record, and the evidence shows that Father did not comply with that order.
The trial court held an initial permanency hearing on February 27, 2023, at which Father appeared in person. After this hearing, the trial court entered its Initial Permanency Hearing Order Before Final Order (Order). The Order explicitly stated that Father's service plan-which had been filed with the court on February 21, 2023-was made an order of the court. The service plan required Father to complete parenting classes, drug testing, individual counseling, and a psychological evaluation. The Order and service plan were also admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Sanders testified that she had discussed the service plan with Father but that he saw no reason to complete it because, according to him, he had completed the same services as part of his Michigan termination case. But Sanders testified that Father never provided any proof of these completed services, and the Michigan court's termination order and findings of fact refute that he completed them.
In light of our exacting review of the record and giving due deference to the trial court's findings, we hold that a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that Father had failed to comply with his court-ordered service plan as provided by Subsection (O). See id; H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108. We overrule Father's first issue.
Because a finding of any single ground under Subsection (b)(1) is sufficient to support termination, we need not also determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support termination on constructive-abandonment grounds. See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362.
B. J.C.'s Best Interest
Father (in his second issue) complains that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination was in J.C.'s best interest. Mother (in her sole issue) complains that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's best-interest finding. We disagree.
1. Applicable Law
Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child's best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child's well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a best-interest finding, we review the entire record. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Evidence probative of a child's best interest may be the same evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. Id. at 249; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the evidence in light of nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining the child's best interest:
(A) the [child's] desires . . .;
(B) the [child's] emotional and physical needs[,] . . . now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the [child's] best interest . . .;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or[, if applicable,] by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the [parent's] acts or omissions . . . indicat[ing] that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the [parent's] acts or omissions.Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, "we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors" (footnote omitted)); In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012). These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may not apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the child's best interest. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id.
2. Father's best-interest finding
The following evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and J.C. was in J.C.'s best interest:
• Father had recently had his parental rights terminated to three other children. See In re J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (explaining that, in making a best-interest determination, trial court may consider evidence of past conduct and the prior termination of rights as to other children).
• Father had never met J.C. in person, and Sanders did not believe he was bonded to J.C. See In re J.K.V., 485 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (considering lack of bond between parent and child).
• Father did not complete any of his court-ordered services and did not take advantage of the Department's offers to pay for him to travel and visit with J.C. in person. See D.F. v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 393 S.W.3d 821, 835-36 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.) (considering failure to complete services and take advantage of assistance offered by the Department).
• Father did not support J.C. throughout the case. See In re S.T.G., No. 04-17-00837-CV, 2018 WL 1935488, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering parent's failure to support child during termination case).
• Father did not articulate a plan for supporting and caring for J.C. in the future. See In re A.B., No. 02-23-00124-CV, 2023 WL 5615870, at *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering lack of plans for future care of children).
• J.C. was "extremely bonded" to his foster family and was "happy, thriving, [and] growing" while in their care. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2017, pet. denied) (considering child's bond to foster family).
• The foster family was motivated and ready to adopt J.C. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (explaining that adoption evidence is relevant to best interest).
In light of our exacting review of the record and giving due deference to the trial court's findings, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and J.C. was in J.C.'s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We overrule Father's second issue.
3. Mother's best-interest finding
The following evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and J.C. was in J.C.'s best interest:
• Mother struggled to maintain stable housing, having moved numerous times immediately before and during J.C.'s case. She had lived with multiple partners, in a homeless shelter, and in a tent on the streets. See In re A.S.S.-P., No. 04-23-00312-CV, 2023 WL 4921547, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering lack of stable housing).
• At the time of the final hearing, it had been approximately nine months since Mother had visited with J.C. in person, and Sanders did not believe she was bonded to J.C. See J.KV., 485 S.W.3d at 206.
• Mother did not complete all of her court-ordered services and did not take advantage of the Department's offers to pay for her to travel and visit with J.C. in person. See D.F., 393 S.W.3d at 835-36.
• Mother held no employment during the entire case. See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2014, no pet.) (considering lack of employment as affecting future stability).
• Mother did not support J.C. throughout the case. See S.T.G., 2018 WL 1935488, at *3.
• Mother's only plan for J.C.'s future was to move back in with Father-with whom Mother had reported having a tumultuous relationship. She testified that Father's family (who had previous history with CPS) would babysit J.C. while she and Father worked, though Mother had not asked them whether they would be willing or able to care for J.C., and she had not secured employment. See A.B., 2023 WL 5615870, at *6.
• J.C. was "extremely bonded" to his foster family and was "happy, thriving, [and] growing" while in their care. See J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 269.
• The foster family was motivated and ready to adopt J.C. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
In light of our exacting review of the record and giving due deference to the trial court's findings, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and J.C. was in J.C.'s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We overrule Mother's sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Father's issues and Mother's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.