Opinion
H12CP17017280A
10-22-2018
IN RE JAYLA J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Burgdorff, J.
In accordance with General Statute § 46b-124 and Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.
This matter comes to the court by way of a petition pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 45a-715 et seq., filed on March 24, 2017, by Gina M. (Petitioner), the paternal great aunt and temporary guardian of the minor child, in the Hartford Regional Children’s Probate Court, seeking to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Shariha N. (Mother) and biological father, Matthew M. (Father), of their daughter, Jayla J., born March 4, 2014, and appoint her statutory parent with adoption being contemplated. The petition alleges five statutory grounds as to both Mother and Father: 1) that the child has been abandoned by Mother and Father in the sense that they failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. General Statutes Section 45a-717(g)(2)(A); 2) the child has been denied by reason of acts by the parents of commission or omission including but not limited to sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical, educational, moral or emotional wellbeing. General Statutes Section 45a-717(g)(2)(B); 3) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. General Statutes Section 45a-717(g)(2)(C); 4) a child of the parent was found by the Superior Court or Probate Court to have been neglected, abused or uncared for and has been neglected abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding, and such parent has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation that, within a reasonable period of time and considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. General Statutes Section 45a-717(g)(2)(D)(I); or 5) the child of the parent, who is under the age of seven years is found to be neglected, abused or uncared for and the parent has failed, is unable or unwilling to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent’s parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families. General Statutes Section 45a-717(g)(2)(E).
In support of the petition filed with the Probate Court, the petitioner alleges the following in her statement of facts: 1) Neither parent has made an effort to see, communicate or otherwise maintain a relationship with the minor child who is now three years of age; 2) neither parent has provided any financial or other support for the minor child since guardianship was awarded to the Petitioner on September 11, 2014; 3) the minor child was adjudicated neglected by both parents as of September 11, 2014, the minor child is currently the age of three and neither parent has taken any steps to rehabilitate themselves in the last one year and four months, such that it is no longer in the minor child’s best interest for reunification; 4) Mother has been incarcerated for drug charges, spent time at a half-way/sober house, and is currently living in places unknown to the Petitioner, and has made absolutely no efforts to contact, either directly or indirectly, the Petitioner or minor child, and has previously lost custody of a child born before the minor child, yet has taken no steps to allow for reunification with the minor child; 5) Father has made absolutely no effort to maintain contact, either directly or indirectly, with the Petitioner of the minor child, and has previously lost custody of a child born before the minor child, yet has taken no steps to allow for reunification with the minor child; and 6) there is no ongoing parental relationship between the minor child and either parent since September 11, 2014, and the minor child does not know who either parent is at the present time. The Petitioner also alleges that termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father is in Jayla’s best interest. The Petitioner seeks the court to appoint her as the statutory parent of Jayla and to adopt her.
The Petitioner made an oral motion to withdraw the second statutory ground during the final day of trial which was granted by the court on September 4, 2018.
Mother has not appeared for trial and has not made her position known with regard to the termination of parental rights petition. Father objects to the termination of his parental rights and wishes to maintain his current relationship with Jayla pursuant to his motion for visitation. He has represented to the court that he is not seeking custody of Jayla.
On October 30, 2017, Jayla’s attorney made an oral motion to transfer the matter to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford which was granted by the Court on October 31, 2017. Mother and Father appeared at the Hartford Juvenile Court on January 2, 2018 and were advised of their rights. Thereafter, the matter was transferred to the Regional Child Protection Session for trial. Service was confirmed as to Mother and Father. Notice of the petition was found to have been properly made. There is no proceeding in any other court regarding the custody of Jayla nor is there any claim of Native American affiliation. Counsel was appointed for Mother, Father and Jayla.
The Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Notice on June 4, 2018, which was granted by the Court on June 6, 2018. The Court also takes judicial notice of the entire court record including the chronology of the proceedings, the filings or submissions of the pleadings, petitions, social studies, statements of facts, affidavits, status reports, evaluations and court orders as well as all prior proceedings and filings with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters and the Probate Court concerning the minor children of Mother and Father including Shane M., Luis R., and Jayla J., including the following:
1. Decision of the court (Burgdorff, J.) terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father as to their son, Shane M., on April 30, 2013;
2. Decision of the court (Santos, J.) denying Father’s motion to transfer guardianship as to Luis R. on October 23, 2013;
3. Order of the court (Dannehy, J.) finding that Mother voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights as to Luis R. on February 19, 2014;
4. Decision of the court (Quinn, J.) terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father as to their son, Luis R., on December 18, 2014;
5. Ex parte motion for order of temporary custody of the minor child, Jayla J., granted by the court (Gilligan, J.) on March 11, 2014, finding that she was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to her welfare and that her temporary care and custody be vested in DCF;
6. Filing of petition of neglect as to the minor child, Jayla J., on March 11, 2014;
7. Order of the court (Dannehy, J.) dated March 21, 2014 sustaining the order of temporary custody on behalf of the minor child, Jayla J.;
8. Order of the court (Dannehy, J.) on March 21, 2014 approving and ordering preliminary specific steps for Mother in In re Jayla J. ; and
Mother’s specific steps included the following: cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of her address; undergo individual and parenting counseling with the goal of addressing mental health/trauma history, obtain improved coping skills and safe and nurturing parenting; cooperate with recommendations regarding assessment and treatment; submit to random drug testing; refrain from illegal drug and alcohol abuse, involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with probation and follow conditions of probation; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations and testing, service providers recommended for counseling, substance abuse assessment and treatment specifically Radiance Innovative Services and Community Health Resources or Wheeler; sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers; sign releases allowing child’s attorney to review child’s medical records; get and maintain adequate housing and income; immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household; cooperate with restraining/protective orders and/or appropriate safety plans approved by DCF; attend and complete appropriate domestic violence program; visit child as often as DCF permits; inform DCF of any person who the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement for the child and tell DCF the names and addresses of child’s grandparents.
9. Order of the court (Dannehy, J.) on March 21, 2014 approving and ordering preliminary specific steps for Father in In re Jayla J. ;
Father’s specific steps included the following: cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of his address; undergo individual and parenting counseling with the goal of addressing trauma history and substance abuse, and obtain improved coping skills; cooperate with recommendations regarding assessment and treatment; submit to substance abuse evaluation, treatment and random drug testing; refrain from illegal drug and alcohol abuse, involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with probation and follow conditions of probation; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations and testing, service providers recommended for counseling, substance abuse assessment and treatment specifically Radiance Innovative Services and Community Health Resources; sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers; sign releases allowing child’s attorney to review child’s medical records; get and maintain adequate housing and income; immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household; cooperate with restraining/protective orders and/or appropriate safety plans approved by DCF; attend and complete appropriate domestic violence program; visit child as often as DCF permits; inform DCF of any person who the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement for the child and tell DCF the names and addresses of child’s grandparents.
10. Judgment of the court (Burgdorff, J.) dated May 15, 2014 adjudicating paternity as to the respondent Father as to the minor child, Jayla J.;
11. Order of the court (Dannehy, J.) dated June 17, 2014 granting the Petitioner’s motion to intervene;
12. Decision of the court (Burgdorff, J.) on September 11, 2014 adjudicating Jayla J. neglected and ordering the transfer of her guardianship to the Petitioner.
Jayla J., the child who is the subject of the neglect petition, was born on March 4, 2014. The family has been involved with the Department of Children and Families (DCF) since 2010. The facts surrounding Mother and Father and the care of their three children have been extensively litigated on multiple occasions. As noted above, Mother and Father are the biological parents of two older sons, Shane M., born on May 1, 2010, and Luis R., born on December 20, 2011. Mother’s and Father’s parental rights were terminated as to Shane on April 30, 2013. This court adjudicated Luis as neglected and committed him to the care and custody of DCF on May 9, 2013. Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights as to Luis. Father’s parental rights as to Luis R. were terminated on December 18, 2014.
Jayla has never been in the care of either Mother or Father during the course of her young life. The application for order of temporary custody filed by DCF on behalf of Jayla on March 11, 2014, when she was seven days old was due to concerns regarding Mother’s history of transience and lack of stable housing, Father’s failure to adequately address his mental health and substance abuse issues, and the history of domestic violence between Mother and Father. DCF had reasonable cause to believe that Jayla was in immediate physical danger by DCF due to her newborn status and her lack of visibility in the community requiring her removal from her surroundings to ensure her safety. As noted above, a neglect petition was filed by DCF on March 11, 2014. Jayla was adjudicated neglected on by the court (Burgdorff, J.) and the transfer of her guardianship was ordered transferred to the Petitioner on September 11, 2014. As noted above, the termination of parental rights petition was filed in the Probate Court by the Petitioner on March 24, 2017.
This matter was tried to the court on June 6, 2018, June 7, 2018, July 23, 2018, and September 4, 2018. Mother failed to appear for each day of the trial which demonstrates to the court her lack of interest, not only in the proceeding, but in Jayla as well. Her attorney was present for each day of the trial. Father was present with his attorney for each day of the trial. The child’s attorney was present for each day of the trial. Father was advised pursuant to In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 795, 120 A.3d 1188 reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 921, 126 A.3d 1086 (2015).
The court heard testimony from seven witnesses who included a DCF social worker supervisor, two paternal great aunts, a paternal great-great-aunt, a paternal great-great-uncle, the paternal grandmother, the Petitioner, Father’s former therapist and Father also testified. Eleven exhibits were entered into evidence as full exhibits. These included Father’s psychological examination report dated September 25, 2012; decision of the court (Santos, J.) dated October 23, 2013; decision of the court (Quinn, J.) dated December 18, 2014; decision of the court (Burgdorff, J.) dated September 11, 2014; DCF probate study for application of termination of parental rights dated October 24, 2017; addendum to the probate study dated February 1, 2018; Mother’s and Father’s specific steps ordered on March 21, 2014; Father’s records from Community Health Resources (CHR); Father’s Wheeler Clinic records; and photocopy of Father’s medical marijuana card.
All counsel participated in the examination of the witnesses and closing arguments. The court has carefully considered and thoroughly reviewed the petition, the criteria set forth in the relevant statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented, the demeanor of Father, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the evaluation of their testimony with all other testimony and documentary evidence, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the Petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent Mother and the respondent Father as to their child, Jayla J. With regard to the TPR petition, the Court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence. With regard to the Motion for Visitation, the court makes its findings by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT
"The [fact finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005).
Mother
Mother has a lengthy history with DCF commencing in her childhood. Numerous petitions of neglect were filed on Mother’s behalf resulting in fifteen placements through DCF from 1998 to 2006. Mother reports having a terrible childhood and did not have a stable home until she was four years old due to maternal grandmother’s substance abuse and transience issues. Mother’s CPS history as an adult dates back to 2010 due to unresolved mental health issues, incarceration, criminal activity, homelessness and transiency. Mother has a history of depression, anxiety and oppositional defiance disorder and was diagnosed with Reactive Adjustment Disorder.
Mother was born on October 3, 1991, and is the mother of four children, none of who are in her care. Mother’s children with Father include her oldest child, Shane M., born in 2010, her second child, Luis R., born in 2011, and her third child, Jayla J., born in 2014. Mother married Father, Matthew M., who is the father of Shane M., Luis R. and Jayla J. They subsequently divorced. Mother was offered services but was unable to rehabilitate. As a result, as noted above, Mother’s parental rights were terminated as to her two oldest children, Shane M. in 2013 and Luis R. in 2014 due to her ongoing issues. Guardianship of Jayla was transferred to the Petitioner in 2014. Mother gave birth to her fourth child, Josiah B., on August 27, 2017. At the time of the delivery, Mother reported that her name was Jessica B., and that she was having twins. The hospital reported that there was no record of Mother ever being told that she was having twins. Mother also reported that she had two older children, not three older children. Mother reported that the father of Josiah is deceased. DCF is currently involved due to Mother’s ongoing issues of unaddressed mental health, transiency and homelessness and involvement with the criminal justice system resulting in a period of incarceration. Prior to her incarceration, Mother did not make herself or Josiah available to DCF. Due to Mother’s ongoing issues, she was referred for ongoing services with DCF under her alias, Jessica B. Josiah was subsequently removed from Mother’s care by DCF on October 30, 2017, and committed to the care of DCF on February 1, 2018.
Mother attended high school and became pregnant with Shane in her senior year at which time she dropped out. She has not obtained her GED. She reports employment with McDonald’s, Target, and IHOP prior to her incarceration. She is currently engaged in a relationship but has not complied with DCF’s request to meet and assess her partner. Mother has not sought visitation with Jayla nor maintained contact with the Petitioner since the transfer of guardianship in 2014. The Petitioner credibly testified that she has attempted to seek out Mother through contact with Mother’s relatives but was never given any contact information for Mother.
Mother has a criminal history dating back to 2009 with multiple incarcerations. She was arrested for Breach of Peace on November 26, 2009, for which she received a fine. She was convicted of Breach of Peace on February 3, 2010; Disorderly Conduct on February 25, 2010; Conspiracy to Commit Larceny on December 21, 2010; and Larceny 3rd on February 9, 2011. She was arrested for Breach of Peace on November 26, 2009, and was fined. On November 15, 2010, she was arrested for Larceny 3rd and Violation of Probation and was sentenced on December 21, 2010, to three years incarceration, three years suspended and two years probation. Mother was arrested on December 7, 2010 for Larceny 3rd and Violation of Probation and was sentenced on February 9, 2011, to two years incarceration, two years suspended and two years probation. She was arrested on March 2, 2011, for Wireless Communication at a Correctional Facility and was sentenced to six months incarceration, six months suspended. A re-arrest order was issued on July 21, 2011, stemming from Mother’s arrest on March 21, 2011, for Larceny 6th due to mother’s failure to attend a court hearing. Mother was arrested on August 4, 2011, for the failure to appear. She was arrested again on June 28, 2012 for Burglary 3rd, Larceny 6th and Criminal Trespass 1st. On November 19, 2012, she was sentenced to three years incarceration, six months to serve and three years probation. She was again arrested for Wireless Communication at a Correctional Facility on December 11, 2012, and was sentenced to ten days incarceration to run concurrently. She was subsequently incarcerated until April 2013. On August 22, 2013, she was arrested for Larceny 6th and Violation of Probation. On November 22, 2013, she was arrested for Assault 3rd and Violation of Probation. She was sentenced on May 22, 2014, to three months incarceration, three months suspended to run consecutively, one year probation and twenty-two hours of community service of the Larceny 3rd, and was sentenced to twelve months incarceration, twelve months suspended to run consecutively with two years probation on the Assault 3rd charge. She was arrested on May 7, 2014, and charged with Less Than $500 on Revoked Credit Card, four counts of Receipt from Illegal Use of Credit Card, six counts of Identity Theft 3rd, Larceny 6th and Failure to Appear 1st. She was sentenced to one year incarceration, six months to serve consecutively and two-day conditional discharge. She was arrested on June 24, 2014, for Interfering With Police Officer/Resisting Arrest. On February 20, 2017, she was arrested for Robbery 3rd, Larceny 2nd, Breach of Peace, Assault 3rd, Unlawful Restraint, Threatening 2nd and Violation of Probation. On July 28, 2017, she was arrested for Larceny 6th, Interfering, Resisting Arrest and Impersonation. On October 30, 2017, she was arrested for two outstanding warrants including Violation of Probation. She was incarcerated with a sentence of 180 days with a release date of April 27, 2018.
Mother has a history of domestic violence with Father including arrests and the issuance of four protective orders between them. Mother has been the protected person in three of the orders and Father has been the protected person in one of the orders. Mother completed a parenting education course on April 20, 2011. Mother was referred for a substance abuse evaluation in March 2012, but it was determined that she was not in need of services.
Mother has engaged in mental health services in the past including during her childhood. She was diagnosed with Depression, Anxiety Reactive Adjustment Disorder, and Oppositional Defiance Disorder, and was prescribed psychotropic medications which she felt were not necessary and stopped taking. As an adult, Mother engaged in mental health services regarding her children’s involvement with DCF. Pursuant to a clinical assessment in November 2011, she was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, Relational Problems, NOS and history of Reactive Detachment Disorder. Long-term therapy was recommended to address symptoms of depression, history of abuse, poor decision making, poor self-esteem and past dysfunctional relationships. Mother began individual therapy sessions in May 2012 but stopped attending in August 2012. Her therapist noted that mother was not invested in her treatment and had difficulty correlating her past to her present trauma.
Mother was referred for a court-ordered psychological evaluation to Dr. Derek Franklin on November 5, 2012. Dr. Franklin testified that mother had diagnoses of mood disorder NOS, generalized anxiety disorder and partner relational problems. He found her to be pessimistic with regard to the future with indecisiveness and difficulties in making decisions and was overall very unhappy. He further opined that she had exposure to some traumatizing event which left her changed in some fundamental way. Testing revealed antisocial thought patterns and that she is distrustful of close, intimate relations. Testing was inconclusive for substance abuse/dependence indicating that while mother may not be actively using drugs or alcohol, she may be thinking about using them. Test results also indicated that mother has manias including restlessness and high energy levels with evidence of poor delay of gratification. Dr. Franklin further opined that Mother lacks adequate insight and judgment. He noted that from a clinical perspective, Mother is impulsive, can be hostile, can misinterpret subtleties of social clues and believes others do not have her best interests at heart. As such, he opined that the challenges of raising a young child could cause Mother to misinterpret a child’s challenges to her as a parent personally. Dr. Franklin also expressed his concern that Mother continues to engage in antisocial activities that bring her before the judicial system. He strongly advised that Mother be referred for individual counseling with a female clinician experienced with working with trauma adults and that cognitive behavioral therapy would be the best approach in working with Mother. In May 2014, mother was referred to Community Health Resources for mental health treatment. She completed her intake on May 21, 2014, and was recommended for brief individual therapy with the potential for group therapy. However, mother declined group therapy. She was also recommended for a psychiatric evaluation with the potential for medication management but has not followed through. Her diagnoses at that time were Mood Disorder NOS with a reported history of Bipolar Disorder and reported mixed symptoms of Depression, Anxiety and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Mother reported to DCF that she attended counseling services during her most recent incarceration. No evidence was presented with regard to Mother engaging in services since her release from incarceration.
Mother has had no relationship with Jayla since her birth. She has made no attempts to contact her or the Petitioner. She has not contacted DCF seeking visitations with her. As noted above, Mother failed to appear at any time during the trial of this matter.
Father
Father’s history with DCF commenced when he was a child dating back to 1993. He was committed to DCF’s care in August 1999, due to issues of physical neglect, substance abuse and lack of adequate supervision. Father was placed with his paternal grandmother via a subsidized transfer of guardianship. He was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder as a child and was prescribed Ritalin.
Father met Mother in 2007 while in high school. They married on March 5, 2011 and divorced on April 5, 2012. As noted above, Mother and Father are the biological parents of Shane, born on May 1, 2010, and Luis R., born on December 20, 2011 as well as Jayla J., born on March 4, 2014. As noted above, Father was confirmed as the biological father of Jayla pursuant to a paternity test on May 15, 2014. As also noted above, Mother and Father’s parental rights as to Shane and Luis have been terminated. Father reported the termination of his parental rights were due to his lack of stable housing as well as substance abuse and mental health issues. As noted above, guardianship of Jayla was transferred to the Petitioner in September 2014, where she has resided since that time. Father reported that he has an open adoption with his two older children and took them to Six Flags during the summer. Father testified that the Petitioner does not allow Jayla to visit with her siblings. He also reported that he would see Jayla at the paternal grandmother’s home; the visits were stopped when the Petitioner learned the paternal grandmother was allowing Father to visit with Jayla in her home without her knowledge. In contrast to that testimony, the Petitioner credibly testified that Jayla has had visits with Shane and Luis on a regular basis over the past four years; Father has seen Jayla eight to twelve times since September 2014; she has never denied Father the ability to see Jayla, that she has invited Father to Jayla’s birthday parties; Father has contacted her only twice to see Jayla since that time; that he has never contacted her to set up regularly scheduled visits; and that Father dropped by her home unannounced on two occasions within the last four years. She also testified that she dropped off Jayla at a paternal great aunt’s home who supervised a visit with Father in February 2018. She also credibly testified that she will not let Father see Jayla unsupervised due to his past anger issues and his ongoing substance abuse issues; that Father has rarely sought out contact with Jayla over the past four years, has given her no financial support, cards, or letters; that he has never inquired of the Petitioner if Jayla needs anything; that he provided diapers and wipes for Jayla on one occasion; that Father has given Jayla several toys over the last four years; and that he has never inquired about her health and well-being nor her education or daycare. Most recently, the Petitioner brought Jayla to a visit with Father, Shane and Luis at Friendly’s in April 2018. Notably, Father became upset when Jayla called the Petitioner "Momma" and instructed Jayla to call her "Auntie Gina."
Father is currently married and reported they recently purchased a home. Father’s wife learned that Mother became pregnant with Jayla after her marriage to Father. While she was upset at learning this, she decided to focus on the best interest of Jayla. Father’s wife is in support of Father having a relationship with Jayla. She has had minimal visitation with Jayla in the past due to Mother’s past objections. She has not visited with Jayla since the transfer of guardianship and has no relationship with her.
Father graduated from high school in 2009. He attended classes for auto body work but did not complete his certification. He is currently employed as a shipping and receiving associate at a window and door distributorship. Father’s wife is employed with a moving and storage company as well as at a motel.
Father has a criminal history dating back to 2009. He was convicted of Breach of Peace 2nd on December 10, 2009, for which he was sentenced to 90 days in jail, execution suspended and a conditional discharge for one year. He was arrested for Disorderly Conduct on November 27, 2011, for which an active protective order was issued between Father and his grandfather. Father was sentenced to three months in jail, execution suspended, and probation for one year on February 10, 2012. Father successfully completed the terms of his probation on February 10, 2013.
Father has a history of domestic violence with Mother. On June 8, 2010, both he and Mother were arrested after an argument in the driveway of the home where Mother was residing. Mother and Father were arrested for breach of peace and protective orders were issued to each. On September 27, 2010, Father went to Mother’s residence, and tried to break down the door with a chair. He was arrested for breach of peace and trespassing as the result of that incident. A full protective order was issued against Father. As noted above, there have been a total of four protective orders between Mother and Father with Mother being the protected person in three. The most recent protective order expired on September 28, 2010. Father was referred to the Non Violence Alliance Program in January 2011. However, Father did not feel that he was in need of domestic violence services and stated that he was the victim in the relationship with Mother.
Father denied any present or past concerns with mental health. However, the DCF records reveal that Father has a significant history of mental health issues. He was admitted to the Institute of Living in June in 1999 for four days and was diagnosed with Depressive Disorder and Cannabis Abuse. He was discharged and was prescribed Celexa on a daily basis and was recommended to attend North Central Counseling. Father did not continue to take the medication and did not follow up with attendance for the therapy. On September 26, 2010, Father participated in a clinical assessment at Radiance Innovative Services. He was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, attention deficit disorder/hyperactivity disorder by history and cannabis abuse by history. Long-term therapy was recommended to father to address symptoms of depression, anxiety, feelings of abandonment by his mother, and past dysfunctional relationships. Father continued to meet with his therapist at Radiance Innovative Services to work on his issues with anxiety. His therapist recommended he consider a medical evaluation. Father agreed to the medical evaluation and sought out a doctor on his own without consulting with DCF to determine if the doctor was in the system of approved providers. Father informed DCF that his doctor needed approval to continue working with him. DCF informed Father that the doctor needed to be verified before payment could be approved. Father then indicated that he would not follow through with the evaluation. In February 2011, Father was referred for services at Community Health Resources for psychiatric treatment and individual counseling. Father stated he was attending only because he was ordered to do so. He did not engage in the service and was not fully committed to working on his individual issues. He was referred to Radiance Innovative Therapy for outpatient services which began in April 2011, but he missed several sessions. Father continued to feel that he did not need therapy. As of August 2011, he was consistent in attending his therapy. His therapist did not find Father to be clinically depressed but felt that Father had a very high level of anxiety and recommended Father to consider a medication evaluation. Father was not in agreement and would not cooperate with an assessment as he felt that he was not in need of medication. It was noted by his therapist that Mother was a trigger for Father and that Father may have some unrealistic expectations as to how he will care for his son. A concern was raised with regard to the incident regarding Father’s threat to burn his grandfather’s house in November 2011, due to it occurring after he had successfully completed a domestic violence batterer’s group in August 2011, which indicated that Father had not benefitted from that treatment. Because the primary focus of Father’s therapy had been to address his anxiety, it was felt that he could also benefit from anger management therapy and coping skills. Thereafter, Father expressed in March 2014, that he would cooperate with a medication evaluation. However, no evidence of that evaluation has been presented.
Father has made little effort to no effort to engage in mental health services since that time. In January 2018, during the pendency of this matter, DCF made a referral to Wheeler Clinic to submit to a substance abuse and mental health evaluation. A report issued by Wheeler Clinic noted that Father denied experiencing trauma symptoms during the month prior to the evaluation and that Father’s diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was being managed by medical marijuana. Notably, the report also stated that Father does not have any co-occurring mental health and no substance abuse conditions with no treatment recommended, although Father consumes marijuana on a daily basis. Currently, Father denies all symptoms of depression, anxiety, and psychosis, and does not feel the need for therapy. He reported that should he need therapy, he would reengage in therapy with Radiance. Father testified that he has made numerous attempts to re-engage with Radiance since January 2018, but did not receive a response. Father contacted his former counselor who informed him he needed to contact Radiance to resume counseling services. Father met with another therapist within the last several months, but did not follow up due to the lack of a bond with that therapist after the initial visit.
Father underwent an evaluation with Dr. Derek Franklin, a clinical psychologist on September 20, 2012 and September 25, 2012. Dr. Franklin diagnosed Father with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Cannabis Abuse and Anti Social Traits. He noted that the data suggests that there is a high potential for relapse, continued use or cravings which will need to be monitored and addressed. He opined that "individuals with similar profiles may typically misuse substances to obtain both emotional control and management of anxiety. Dr. Franklin opined that Father was emotionally stable but there was evidence to indicate that he may become hostile when under emotional duress. With regard to Father’s mental illness, Dr. Franklin opined that Father’s anxiety, mood dysregulations and ADHD marginally impact his day-to-day functioning, but that these are likely to be exacerbated under the weight of emotional and psychological distress. He recommended treatment for these issues, as well as the substance abuse. Notably, Dr. Franklin testified that it was imperative that Father be referred for a psychiatric consultation and that would serve to identify medication that could be useful in ameliorating of managing his symptoms, and that without medication, Father would most likely continue to have problems. He further strongly advised that Father engage in substance abuse groups "as the clinical data suggests that at a very minimum he continues to crave cannabis and, therefore, is subject to relapse." The Court notes that Father presented for a psychiatric evaluation on February 14, 2011, at Community Health Resources. The evaluator concluded that father did not require psychiatric services. However, a review of the report indicates that all information given to the evaluator was self-reported by father. There appears to be no independent verification done by the evaluator. Further, Dr. Franklin opined that the report was incorrect with incorrect diagnoses and was "woefully inadequate."
Father has had a long history of chronic substance abuse and an extensive history of smoking marijuana. DCF has made numerous referrals for Father over the years to address his substance abuse issues. Father was referred for a substance abuse/mental health assessment due to concerns of substance abuse, but Father failed to attend the scheduled evaluation in 2011. Father refused to comply with DCF’s request for a new substance evaluation. Father was arrested in May 2011, for possession of a controlled substance and did not report the arrest to DCF. Father was referred for random urine screens and tested positive for marijuana on August 18, 2011, September 2, 2011, September 9, 2011 and September 16, 2011. He participated in a urine screen on March 4, 2013, which was negative but was unsupervised. He had a negative test on August 25, 2011, and several negative screens which were unsupervised. As the result of the positive screens, Father was referred to ADRC for a substance abuse/mental health evaluation and hair test. Father failed to attend the appointments, scheduled on October 27, 2011, or January 4, 2012. Father missed three scheduled appointments and, as a result, was discharged from ADRC. Father did request to be referred to another program and was referred to Wheeler Clinic but arrived late for the evaluation on May 21, 2012, and was not able to be evaluated. Father then requested to be referred to an agency closer to his home and was referred to Community Health Resources on June 7, 2012, for an appointment on June 13, 2012. Father tested negative for substances, but his hair test was positive for marijuana on June 2, 2012. Father was then recommended for group therapy but initially refused to participate. However, he did begin outpatient substance abuse treatment at Community Health Resources in August 2012. Father completed the Early Intervention Group at Community Health Resources on December 27, 2012, and no further treatment was recommended. From January, 2013 to March 4, 2013, Father provided unsupervised negative urine screens. After agreeing to do a hair test on May 1, 2014, the results were positive for marijuana. Father was then referred to Community Health Resources for a substance abuse and mental health evaluation. He was discharged on November 24, 2015. Father testified that since the transfer of guardianship in September 2014, he has had "quite a few dirty urines" until DCF closed its case upon the termination of his parental rights as to Luis in December 2014.
Father obtained a Connecticut Registration Certificate on October 10, 2017, which expires on October 10, 2018, which authorizes marijuana use in the amount of 2.5 ounces per month and is prescribed to use as needed. Father reported that he does not experience any current symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder as they are likely being effectively managed by the marijuana. Notably, Wheeler Clinic, in its report dated January 22, 2018, diagnosed Father with Cannabis Use, mild, in early remission with continued use, despite negative consequences, and past use over longer periods of time than intended. Father reported to Wheeler Clinic that he currently uses medical marijuana as prescribed and that he uses it two times per week and over the weekend. He also reported that he has never felt that he should cut down on his drug use, but admitted that if he had not been smoking marijuana, his children would not have been taken away. However, Father testified that he smokes marijuana every evening and smokes during the day approximately once per week.
Father participated in a father’s parenting program through Radiance Innovative Services in July 2010. Father was very focused and actively involved in the program. He completed the in-home father-to-father program on December 28, 2010. It was recommended that he be referred for support services based on his tendency to become over anxious and overwhelmed with the many demands of life. He subsequently completed a parenting education course at the Hispanic Health Council on April 20, 2011. In November 2011, Father was again referred to the father’s parenting program. It was recommended that Father could benefit from some additional parenting education and Father completed the program. Father initially refused the assistance of a parent mentor but allowed a parenting coach to attend visitation sessions in September 2013. Father’s former therapist testified that Father was engaged in individual counseling from 2011 to 2012 for anger management. He confirmed that Father recently contacted him to resume individual counseling.
Prior to the transfer of guardianship, Father attended supervised visits with Jayla, as well as Shane and Luis. Father was observed to have some moments of frustration when visiting all three children due to his failure to provide structure. He required assistance when redirecting Shane and Luis. Father was resistant to suggestions and recommendations made by the observing staff member during the visits. As discussed above, Father has made little to no effort to engage in regular visitation with Jayla since the transfer of guardianship in September 2014, and has only seen her on rare occasions. As also noted, Father does not seek reunification with Jayla.
Jayla
Jayla was born on March 4, 2014, and is presently four years of age. At the time of her birth, her biological father was unknown. She was placed in a non-relative pre-adoptive special study foster home with her older sibling Luis on March 7, 2014, three days after her birth. She is healthy and her medical, dental care and immunizations are up to date. There are no known concerns of developmental delays. She is currently attending daycare. She has resided with the Petitioner since the transfer of guardianship in September 2014. The Petitioner has provided Jayla with a loving and safe home where all of her needs are being met. Jayla is closely attached to the Petitioner. The Petitioner is financially stable and owns her own home. Jayla continues to need a consistent caretaker and continues to require nurturing love, sameness and predictability all of which she has with the Petitioner. Jayla clearly loves the Petitioner and calls her "Momma." The Petitioner clearly loves Jayla and has been a responsible guardian for her over the last four years. She has provided Jayla with the love, structure and continuity that she needs. Jayla has been thriving in her care over most of her young life. She would like to be a permanent resource for Jayla and seeks to adopt her. She expressed her desire to legally change Jayla’s last name to reflect that of her brothers.’ Jayla has regular visits with her brothers, Shane and Luis, which are facilitated by the Petitioner who fully supports Jayla maintaining a relationship and a bond with her brothers. As discussed above, she has had no regular contact with Father although she recognizes him and calls him "Daddy." As discussed in detail above, the Petitioner also credibly testified that Father has had rare contact with her or Jayla since the transfer of guardianship.
ADJUDICATION
As noted above, the present case was brought under § 45a-717(g)(2)(B) in the Probate Court which permits a child’s guardian to petition the Probate Court to terminate the parental rights of that child’s parents. "In order to terminate a parent’s parental rights under 45a-717, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 45a-717(g)(2) exists and that termination is in the best interest of the child. General Statutes § 45a-717(g)(1)." In re Brian T., 134 Conn.App. 1, 10, 38 A.3d 114 (2012). "Termination of parental rights upon a petition by a private party is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child’s parent ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Statutes § 45a-707(8); In re Jacob W., 178 Conn.App. 195, 203, 172 A.3d 1274 (2017). Since virtually identical language is now contained in General Statutes 17a-112(b) as grounds for terminating parental rights in petitions brought in Superior Court, cases construing that statute are also applicable and relevant to understanding the meaning of these portions of the Probate Statutes. See e.g., In re Brian T., supra, 134 Conn.App. 16 ("apply[ing] the same meaning and analytical framework" to failure to rehabilitate claims brought under Probate TPR statutes as applied to TPR claims under juvenile court statutes because the statutory language is " virtually ... identical"). Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(6) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The Petitioner is required to prove any one of the grounds alleged in her petition by clear and convincing evidence. In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148-9, 692 A.2d 81 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); Practice Book § 35a-3.
The court must first determine whether the Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination as alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment. Practice Book § § 32a-3(b) and 35a-7. In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 149; In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 600 A.2d 1028 (1991). "A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence" ... In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 149; "In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights ..." Practice Book § 35a-7(a). "If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 629, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012); Practice Book § 35a-7(a); In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006); In re Egypt E., 327 Conn. 506, 526, 175 A.3d 21 (2018). "The best interests of the child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of his or her environment." In re Joseph M., 158 Conn.App. 849, 889, 120 A.3d 1271 (2015). "Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution ... [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Carla C., 167 Conn.App. 248, 258, 143 A.3d 677 (2016).
Abandonment
The Petitioner alleges the ground of abandonment as to Mother and Father in her petition. The law concerning abandonment has been extensively discussed by our Appellate and Supreme Courts. A parent abandons a child if the parent fails to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). "Abandonment focuses on the parent’s conduct ... Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare ... [General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911, 964 A.2d 545 (2009); In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008). "Abandonment focuses on the parent’s conduct ... A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment." (Citations omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993). General Statutes § 45a-717(g) defines abandonment as the "fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child." In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314-15, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001). "Attempts to achieve contact with the child, telephone calls, sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indications of concern, interest and responsibility." In re Kezia M., supra, 33 Conn.App. 17. General Statutes § 45a-717(g) contemplates that a parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.
"The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care: (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., supra, p. 18. See also In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 513-14 (2008); In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008). For this court to find abandonment on the part of Mother and Father, the court must examine the Mother’s and Father’s conduct to determine whether or not they have maintained a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of Jayla.
The court finds that Mother has made no effort to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of Jayla. She has not fulfilled any of the general obligations of parenthood as outlined above. Mother has made no effort to have any contact with Jayla. She has not visited her, displayed love or affection for her, or sent cards, letters, notes or gifts. See In re Justice V., supra, 111 Conn. She has not called her nor sought visitation with her since the transfer of guardianship in 2014. Further, Mother did not seek contact with Jayla nor did she contact DCF to seek visitation with her during her incarceration. A biological parent’s self-created absence for many years from her child’s young life is not a valid excuse for failing to perform the foregoing parental responsibilities and duties. See e.g., In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 315 (2001) (relating to absence because of incarceration). While imprisonment alone does not constitute abandonment, "it does not excuse a failure to attempt either to contact or to visit with [her] child." In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 194, 763 A.2d 37 (2000).
The court finds that Father has made no effort to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of Jayla. He has not fulfilled any of the general obligations of parenthood as outlined above. Although Father has intermittently had contact with Jayla via unplanned encounters with her and the Petitioner in the community, while visiting family members while Jayla was present, an occasional lunch in the community with Petitioner, Shane and Luis, there is no evidence of Father demonstrating any ongoing concern for Jayla’s welfare. Father has made no efforts to become part of Jayla’s life. He made no efforts to maintain regular contact with her via telephone or to seek regular visitation with her through the Petitioner. He has not attended any of her medical appointments or contacted the Petitioner to get updates on her education, progress at her daycare, as well as her health and well-being. Father testified that he is employed full-time but has made no effort to provide any financial support for Jayla nor pay any of her child care or unreimbursed medical expenses although he purchased a home and a car within the last year. He has made minimal attempts to contact her or visit her. He has not provided her with necessary food, clothing, housing and medical care. He has also failed to provide her with gifts or letters with the exception of a VHS tape, a used toy car and a toy purchased from Toys R Us, all within the last four years. He has not provided an adequate domicile. Father has clearly not met any of Jayla’s needs on a daily basis. He has not demonstrated a reasonable degree of interest in Jayla. In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 194, 763 A.2d 37 (2000). Further, he has made limited and sporadic attempts to develop a relationship with Jayla. By his actions, or lack thereof, he has demonstrated a lack of interest in Jayla’s health, education and wellbeing. He has failed to take advantage of opportunities for contact and visitation. Father, on rare occasions, has appeared unannounced at the Petitioner’s home seeking contact with Jayla, but failed to consider the Petitioner’s and Jayla’s schedule. He appeared to be under the assumption that he could see Jayla at any time he wished and at his convenience. He has failed to acknowledge Petitioner’s custodial rights as evidenced by his subterfuge in seeing Jayla at the paternal grandmother’s home. As this court noted when transferring guardianship to the Petitioner, the Petitioner acknowledged to the court that she would fully support continued visitation of Jayla with Mother and Father, and that she would ensure that said visits would ensure Jayla’s safety in light of her concern regarding Father’s anger and substance abuse issues.
As noted by the court (Santos. J.) in its decision denying Father’s motions to revoke commitment and to transfer guardianship of Luis in 2013, "Your client has come in at the 11th hour, having failed to rehabilitate. He has done so little, and it is just too late for him to try to grasp at this kind of straw I think he is ... trying to maintain some contact and not looking at the big picture that he really failed to do what he should have done. He never stepped up to the plate and is trying to use this as a bootstrapping argument to remain close to his son." Unfortunately, the same words can be used in this case as well. Father has utterly failed to evolve or progress since his parental rights as to Shane were terminated in 2013 and as to Luis were terminated in 2014. Father has failed to demonstrate or express a continuing interest in Jayla’s welfare. As in the past, he continues to rely on his relatives to provide primary care taking duties of his children. By his own admission, he does not seek to undertake this role. Father has demonstrated, at the most, a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of Jayla over the past four years. Based on the clear and convincing evidence present, Father has abandoned Jayla.
For the above reasons, the clear and convincing evidence does show that Father and Mother have abandoned Jayla in the sense that they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of their daughter, as contemplated in General Statutes § 45a-717g(G)(A).
No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship
Although the court need find only one statutory ground to grant a termination of parental rights petition, In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 816 A.2d 707 (2003), In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 214, 903 A.2d, 426 (2006), the court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Mother or Father and Jayla, and to allow further time for establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Jayla. A trial court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship which is defined as "the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child." In re John G., 53 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). "To allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child." In re John G., 53 Conn.App. n.1. The court must "undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child’s best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop." In re John G., 53 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). "In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ... The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent ... Feelings for the natural parent connote feelings of a positive nature only." In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006). In a case involving very young children, whose feelings are not readily discernible, consideration must also be given to the positive feelings toward the child. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 532, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (trial court erred in granting termination on this ground where DCF’s assumption of guardianship at child’s birth prevented relationship from developing); In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 422, 787 A.2d 608 (2001) (lack of ongoing parent-child relationship where father could have pursued relationship, but did not), aff’d, 262 Conn. 308, 311, 813 A.2d 87 (2002). "To satisfy the second prong [of the analysis], the trial court [is] required to determine whether it would be in the child’s best interest to allow additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship ... The ‘best interest’ standard, therefore, does not become relevant until after it has been determined that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists." (Citation omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 22, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).
Factors to be considered in determining whether it would be in the child’s best interest to allow a relationship to develop include: "(1) the length of stay with [the] foster parents; (2) the nature of [the child’s] relationship with [the child’s] foster parents; (3) the degree of contact [the child] maintained with the natural parents; and (4) the nature of [the child’s] relationship with the natural parents." In re Kezia M., supra .
The court incorporates its findings with respect to the ground of abandonment and includes the following findings: Jayla has had no contact with Mother since 2014 and she is a complete stranger to her. Jayla has no present memories or feelings for Mother. Jayla’s contact with Father has been minimal at best and their relationship is clearly not that of a parent-child; at best, Father is a casual acquaintance. He has clearly not met Jayla’s physical, emotional, moral and educational needs on a day-to-day basis. It is clearly not in Jayla’s best interest to allow additional time for that relationship to develop. Father has seen Jayla only sporadically, at best, and has made no concerted effort to visit with her or build a father-daughter relationship with her over the past four years. Further, Jayla has resided with the Petitioner for over three years and clearly has a relationship equivalent to a parent and child. It would not be in Jayla’s best interest to spend additional time to possible develop a relationship with Father. Therefore, the court finds for the Petitioner by clear and convincing evidence on the ground of no parent-child relationship between Jayla and Mother or Father.
Failure to Rehabilitate
As noted above, the Petitioner has also filed for termination of parental rights on the statutory ground of failure to rehabilitate. The grounds alleged in this petition are that the parents failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). "A trial court can terminate parental rights if the court finds that the child has been found by the Superior Court ... to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ... and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to facilitate the return of the child to the parent ... and ... has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a reasonable position in the life of the child ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 503, 78 A.3d 797 (2013). "Personal rehabilitation ... refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ... [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parents’] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ... [The statute] does not require [the parents] to prove precisely when [they] will be able to assume a responsible position in [their child’s] life. Nor does it require [them] to prove that [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their child], unaided by available support systems." In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 598, 112 A.3d 1247 (2015). "It requires the court, to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [they have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child’s] life." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elvin G., supra at 507. "The critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [their] ability to manage [their] own life, but rather whether [they] have gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making of the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition or events arising subsequent to the adjudicatory date when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable time. In re Damian G., 178 Conn.App. 220, 239, 174 A.3d 232 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 902, 177 A.3d 563 (2018); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000); In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003). See also In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 858-59, 949 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150 (2008). "An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires a historical perspective of the [respondent’s] child caring and parenting." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 867, 83 A.3d 1264 (2014). "Terminating a parent’s rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying [the child] a safe and permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the biological parent] ... continues to be incapable of providing such a home for [the child]." In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1977), aff’d, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999).
In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner has met her burden as to Mother and Father. The evidence here, as discussed in detail above, proves clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Jayla was previously found to have been neglected. As noted above, she was adjudicated neglected on September 11, 2014. Specific steps were ordered as to Mother and Father on March 21, 2014.
As previously discussed, both Mother and Father have a long history of failure to rehabilitate with regard to their three children. Neither parent is available or able to parent Jayla. Since the adjudication date in 2014, Mother has made no effort whatsoever to rehabilitate. She has utterly failed to comply with her court-ordered specific steps. She has not maintained contact with DCF with regard to Jayla. She has failed to attain any degree of personal rehabilitation and will not be able to do so within a reasonable period of time. Father has made little efforts to comply with his court-ordered steps. He failed to engage in any services from the time of the transfer of guardianship until January 2018, after the filing of the TPR petition. As discussed above, he decided to seek services from his prior counselor but was not able to do so and made one attempt to seek the services of another counselor. He made no effort to contact DCF after the transfer of guardianship to seek services prior to that time. Further, he clearly continues to have a substance abuse problem as demonstrated by his admitted and chronic use of marijuana which he uses to treat his underlying mental health conditions. As noted by Dr. Franklin, this is not beneficial and causes Father to engage in poor decision making. As a result, the evidence is clear and convincing that Father remains unable to parent Jayla, given her age and needs due to his failure to rehabilitate. Further, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Father has not gained sufficient insight or acknowledgment with regard to his ongoing and chronic issues and, as a result, is unable to put Jayla’s interests before his own.
Jayla, as does any child of four years of age, requires stability and permanency. She cannot delay any longer her need for permanency as "long-term stability is critical to a child’s future health and development ..." (Citations omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873, re-argument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 634 (1999). Further, the court notes that "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence" when resolving issues related to permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff’d, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992).
As previously discussed in this decision, Mother clearly continues to require ongoing services with regard to her mental health and parenting issues, and is not fully rehabilitated. Mother’s longstanding mental health, domestic violence, parenting and transience issues clearly demonstrate her lack of rehabilitation.
The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Father continues to be unable to meet the developmental, emotional, and medical needs of Jayla. He cannot provide for her shelter, nurturance, safety and security. See In re Paul M., Jr., 154 Conn.App. 488, 107 A.3d 552, aff’d, 154 Conn.App. 488, 107 A.3d 552 (2014). The issues resulting in Jayla coming into care remain outstanding including his mental health and substance abuse issues. It is clear that as of the conclusion of the trial, Father has not rehabilitated to the extent he can care for Jayla. He is no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of the filing the termination petition than he had been at the time of the [child’s] commitment." In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 367 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Moreover, the evidence clearly and convincingly proves that he will not be able to do so within a reasonable period of time, given Jayla’s age and needs. It is, therefore, clear and convincing to the court that as of the conclusion of the trial, Mother and Father have not rehabilitated to the extent that either could assume a responsible position in Jayla’s life and safely care for and provide for her particular needs within a reasonable period of time given her age and need for permanency. Giving them additional time to do so at some time far into the future will undermine Jayla’s need for permanency.
Failure to Rehabilitate-Grounds E
As noted above, Petitioner alleges that Mother and Father are the parents of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected and uncared for or that they have failed, are unable or are unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, and the parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the commissioner of children and families. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). This statute includes all of the elements set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(1), previously proven by clear and convincing evidence, as well as two additional elements: (a) that the child is under the age of seven years, and (b) that the parent’s rights to another child have been terminated. The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings it has previously made in this memorandum of decision regarding Mother’s and Father’s failure to rehabilitate. In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Mother with regard to this ground. Mother and Father are the parents of Jayla J., who was born on March 4, 2014, and, therefore is under the age of seven years. As noted above, Jayla was adjudicated neglected on September 11, 2014. As also noted above, Mother and Father have a prior judgment of termination of parental rights with regard to their child, Shane M., entered on April 30, 2013, pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner has met her burden of proving that Mother and Father have failed to achieve the necessary degree of rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Jayla, she can assume a responsible position in her life. Further, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father are unable or unwilling to benefit from services and they have failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time to assume a responsible position in Jayla’s life. See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 551, 979 A.2d 469 (2009). Further, the court has taken into account the numerous, appropriate and reasonable services offered to Mother and Father as referenced in their court-ordered specific steps. These included visitation, reunification services, parenting education, substance abuse services, and mental health management. Mother and Father have clearly been unable or unwilling to reunify with Jayla. Although Father did attempt to resume his counseling, he did not succeed in that endeavor and those attempts were half-hearted at best. Any effort he has made has been much too little and much too late. He clearly continues to struggle with substance abuse. While Father appears to love Jayla during his interactions with her during the few times he has seen her, he has made little effort to have regular, ongoing contact with her or to develop a parent-child relationship with her. Jayla refers to him as "daddy" but that in and of itself does not equate a father-daughter relationship and he has not demonstrated a parental role towards her in any capacity. Any love Father may feel for Jayla is not sufficient to prevent the termination of his parental rights. In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 762-63, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).
Mother has utterly failed to engage in any services as mandated by her court-ordered specific steps. She has no contact with Jayla since her birth and is a stranger to Jayla.
Accordingly, the court finds that as of the date of the filing of the petition, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother and Father have failed, or are unable or unwilling, to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Jayla, that they could achieve a responsible position in her life, and that their parental rights to another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF.
DISPOSITION
The court, having found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the Petitioner seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father have been proven, now proceeds to the dispositional phase. During this phase, the court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of Jayla. In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 163. "At the dispositional [phase of parental rights] hearing, ‘the emphasis appropriately shifts to the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.’ " In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356-57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding six factors delineated in General Statute § 45a-717(I) which provides: "Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent, and the child by a child-placing agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or child-placing agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (3) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian or the child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (4) the age of the child; (5) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstance, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return the child to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (6) the extent to which the parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child ... or by the economic circumstances of the parent. In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361-62, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). "The ... factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ... There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Citation omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261, 829 A.2d 855 (2003); In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422-23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012). As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to the Petitioner’s petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The court has also considered these findings in determining that termination Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent .
A child placing agency was not utilized in this matter and is, therefore, not applicable. DCF is not involved in the present matter other than preparing and submitting a Social Study. Prior to the transfer of guardianship, DCF offered timely services to Mother and Father to facilitate reunification with Jayla. Those services were sufficient and offered on a timely and consistent basis. Since the transfer of guardianship, Father did not contact DCF for services until January 2018, at which time he was referred to Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse and mental health evaluations which occurred on January 22, 2018. No additional services were recommended pursuant to Father’s report that he did not require services for mental health and substance abuse although Father continues to use marijuana on a regular basis reportedly for PTSD. Father has not contacted DCF regarding visitation with Jayla since the transfer of guardianship.
2. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order .
As noted above, specific steps were ordered as to Mother and Father on March 21, 2014. Prior to the transfer of guardianship, Mother and Father complied with some of their specific steps but failed to successfully address their ongoing problems all of which led to Jayla’s removal and subsequent transfer of guardianship. Neither Mother nor Father have complied with their obligations prescribed by their specific steps since the transfer of guardianship in September 2014.
3. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of the child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties .
There is no evidence that Jayla has any close feelings or emotional ties with Mother or Father. Jayla has no emotional bond whatsoever with Mother, who is a stranger to her. Jayla has a minimal bond with Father. During the few times she has seen Father over the past four years, she recognized him and calls him "Daddy" but has no significant emotional ties with him including that of a father and daughter. Any emotional ties they may have had prior to the transfer of guardianship have clearly dissipated since the transfer of guardianship occurred. Father has voluntarily chosen not to actively visit or engage with Jayla except on a very limited level.
The court finds credible and proven to be true the testimony of the Petitioner that Father has made little effort and contact seeking visitation and/or a relationship with Jayla. Jayla has a strong and loving bond with the Petitioner who has ably exercised physical, care, custody and control over her since the transfer of guardianship in September 2014. The Petitioner has provided her a with a loving home and provides comfort, safety and security for Jayla. Jayla clearly loves the Petitioner and calls her "Momma." The Petitioner has expressed the desire to adopt her.
4. The age of the child .
Jayla J. was born on March 4, 2014 and is four years of age.
5. The efforts that the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return the child to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child .
Father has made no effort to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in Jayla’s best interest to reunite with her. Mother has made no effort whatsoever to maintain or initiate contact with Jayla. Father has made no effort to make it in Jayla’s best interest to be placed in his home, care or custody. As noted above, Father has stated he does not seek to be reunified with Jayla but rather seeks only visitation with her. Since the transfer of guardianship, his contact with Jayla has been sporadic, infrequent and of short duration. He has done nothing to maintain an ongoing relationship with Jayla and has provided no emotional or financial support for her. He has not maintained regular contact or communication with the Petitioner over the past four years and has never attempted to schedule regular visitations with Jayla. The Petitioner has attempted to include Father in Jayla’s birthday visits, and visits with family members, as well as outings in the community.
6. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent .
Father’s own voluntary conduct prevented him from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Jayla. There is no evidence that Mother or Father have committed any unreasonable acts or conduct to prevent each other from maintaining a relationship with Jayla. Further, there is no evidence that the Petitioner has performed any unreasonable act or conduct to prevent a meaningful relationship with Mother and Father. The court found the Petitioner’s testimony credible that Father rarely contacted her and that she attempted to engage with Mother and Father to no avail. The Petitioner supported Father’s desire to have visitation with Jayla on a structured basis. Further, the economic circumstances of Mother and Father has not prevented a meaningful relationship with Jayla. In addition to the consideration of the above factors, the court has also considered Jayla’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of a safe and secure environment and balanced those interests against any benefit in maintaining a connection with Mother or Father. The court also notes that Jayla’s attorney advocated for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in Jayla’s best interest.
Best Interest of the Child
The Court must now address the issue of whether the Petitioner has established that termination of parental rights is in Jayla’s best interest. In determining the best interest of Jayla, the Court has considered adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father are incapable of resuming their parental roles. See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 462-63, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), aff’d 309 Conn. 626, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013); In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 168, 61 A.3d 606, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 908, 76 A.3d 625 (2013). Because the court has found the existence of a statutory ground for termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, it must now examine whether granting the prayer for relief would be in the child’s best interest. The final element of the parental rights statute, § 45a-717(f), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the Court must find "upon clear and convincing evidence ... that termination is in the best interest of the child ..." The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the Court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child’s welfare. In determining whether terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interest, the court has considered various factors, including her interest "in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [her] environment." Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985), In re Shyna B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); her age and needs; the contact and lack thereof that the child has had with her Mother and Father; the potential benefit or detriment of retaining a connection with both of her biological parents; her genetic bond to each birth parent; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999); and the six statutory factors and the Court’s findings thereon. The court has also balanced the child’s intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 313-14, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 211, 994 A.2d 106 (2010) (child’s physical and emotional well-being must be weighted against interest in preserving family integrity).
"It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty ..." Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed. 928 (1982); See also In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 494-95, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child’s future health and development ..." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, because of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, "time is of the essence" when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff’d, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992).
In consideration of these factors and after weighing the evidence, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is not in Jayla’s best interest to continue Mother’s or Father’s parental rights. They have abandoned Jayla and have no ongoing parent-child relationship with her. They have failed to rehabilitate.
The Court also notes that Jayla’s attorney is in agreement that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in Jayla’s best interest. For all of the reasons stated above, the court concurs.
The issues that led to Jayla’s removal have not been rectified and their actions clearly belie any intention on their part to do so. Father’s opposition to the termination of his parental rights demonstrates a desire to remain in her life but his conduct belies that apparent desire. Indeed, he has expressed no desire to regain her custody but rather wants to have visitation with her. Father had ample opportunity to maintain regular visits with Jayla and have a parent-child relationship with her over the last four years; he failed to seize those opportunities. Any motivation that he may have is not sufficient to overcome the evidence showing that allowing him to do so at this late date would not be in Jayla’s best interest. As previously discussed, he has displayed infrequent, erratic and inadequate interest in Jayla. He has done nothing to meet her needs and has made no contributions, financial or otherwise, to her welfare. The Petitioner has met all of Jayla’s needs and provided her with a stable home life, thereby ensuring her stability, continuity, and permanency that any child her age needs and deserves. Father’s attendance at Wheeler Clinic in January 2018, was much too little, much too late. His motivating factor in seeking services almost four years after the transfer of guardianship appears to be the Petitioner’s desire to adopt Jayla and Father’s anger when he heard Jayla call the Petitioner "Momma." The Court does not find credible Father’s testimony and reports to DCF that the Petitioner thwarted his contact with Jayla. Further, the court is deeply concerned about Father’s ongoing substance abuse issues which has been chronic and unabated for years, and which contributed to the removal of all three of his children. As discussed in detail above, Mother has had no relationship with Jayla since her birth. Her parental rights as to Shane and Luis were terminated. The court believes that to allow Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to continue would only serve to destabilize Jayla’s world and subject her to the prospect of more instability in Father’s rare presence. Father has voluntarily absented himself from Jayla’s life with only sporadic contact with her. He has left her to depend solely on the Petitioner for her care, guidance and control necessary for her physical, educational, moral and emotional wellbeing. Father has not demonstrated the ability to successfully address his substance abuse issues and no credible evidence was presented that he is willing to do so in the foreseeable future. Father has shown by his conduct that he is not a resource for Jayla. He does not have a significant relationship with Jayla and certainly not that of a parent and child. He continues to use marijuana. His parental rights have been terminated as to his two other children. There is no factor or evidence whatsoever to suggest that Jayla’s best interest would be served by any judicial order other than terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Jayla needs permanency and stability now.
Jayla is strongly bonded with the Petitioner. They have a clear parent-child relationship. The Petitioner has taken care of all of Jayla’s needs. She has been competently cared for by the Petitioner. The Petitioner has been a consistent and nurturing parental figure in Jayla’s life for the past four years. She owns her own home which is appropriate, safe and well maintained. The Petitioner is gainfully employed and has sufficient financial resources to adequately care for Jayla. They both love each other. It is in Jayla’s best interest not to be exposed to the tenuous relationship she has with Father, but instead, for the Petitioner to exercise sole responsibility, as she has done for the last four years, for meeting Jayla’s many needs- particularly for permanency, safety, continuity and stability rather than waiting for Father for some unknown time in the future to be ready, willing and able to assume a positive role in her life.
Having balanced Jayla’s individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Mother or Father, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Jayla’s best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain a legal relationship with Mother or Father.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered all of the evidence, statutory considerations, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, considering the totality of the circumstances, including Jayla J.’s need for a permanent family, and considering the recommendation of her attorney that it would be in her best interest to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Jayla’s best interest will be met by termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father and adoption by the Petitioner. The Petitioner, Gina M.’s, application for the termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights is granted.
ORDERS
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED the parental rights of Mother, Shariha N. and Father, Matthew M., are hereby terminated. In accordance with General Statutes § 45a-717(g), the Court appoints the Petitioner, Gina M., as guardian. The Petitioner shall maintain her guardianship of Jayla until such time a petition for adoption is filed with the Probate Court. Reports shall be filed with this court as required by General Statutes § 45a-717(j).
In light of the foregoing findings, Father’s motion for visitation is DENIED.