Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J. and Cornell, J.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. JJD063720, Valeriano Saucedo, Judge.
Maureen M. Bodo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Leslie W. Westmoreland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
In this case arising under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the parties dispute whether the juvenile court properly ordered that appellant, J.A., pay victim restitution on a count of receiving stolen property. Appellant had been an occupant of a stolen truck. However, appellant was not in the truck when the damage occurred. Therefore, appellant argues, the evidence was insufficient to support the restitution order.
As discussed below, the restitution order is reasonably related to the crime as well as rehabilitating appellant and deterring future delinquent behavior. Accordingly, the order will be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 10:00 p.m., the victim started her pickup truck to return home from work and left the engine running while she went back inside. The victim heard the truck door slam, turned around, and saw the truck driving away. The victim then called the police.
Knowing that the truck was low on fuel, the victim and her boyfriend started looking for the truck at gas stations. Approximately one hour after the theft, they found the truck at a gas station across from a Burger King. The victim saw four or five minors in the truck. The victim opened the door and yelled at them to get out of her truck. The person driving stepped on the gas, dragged the victim a few feet, and then took off. The victim’s boyfriend followed the truck and 30 seconds later the police followed him. After a pursuit, lasting one minute, the truck stopped and the minors fled.
When the truck first arrived at the gas station, two minors got out of the truck and walked into the station’s market. Just before the confrontation at the truck, two minors came out of the market and walked toward the truck. When they saw the victim, they turned and walked toward the Burger King. After the police arrived, the victim pointed out the two minors ducking behind bushes at the Burger King. Appellant was one of these minors.
The truck was returned to the victim but had sustained damages in the amount of $9,155.
The juvenile court found true the allegation that appellant had received stolen property, i.e., the truck. The court placed appellant on probation and ordered restitution in the amount of $9,155.
DISCUSSION
The courts have broad power to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety. (In re I.M. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1208-1209.) This power includes ordering restitution so long as it is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. (Id. at p. 1209.) In a juvenile case, the purposes of ordering victim restitution are to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole through compensation for his or her economic losses. (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.)
That a defendant was not personally or immediately responsible for the victim’s loss does not render a restitution order improper. (In re I.M., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209.) Rather, the trial court’s discretion encompasses ordering restitution as a condition of probation even when the loss was not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction. For example, restitution has been found proper where the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction, by conduct underlying dismissed and uncharged counts, and by conduct resulting in an acquittal. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) The question is simply whether the order is reasonably related to the crime or to future criminality.
In general, a restitution order will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (In re T.C. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) When there is a factual and rational basis for the restitution ordered, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
Appellant notes that the evidence presented at the jurisdictional hearing established that he was not in the stolen truck when the driver led the police on a chase that resulted in damage to the truck. Relying on the reasoning of In re Maxwell C. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 263 (Maxwell C.), appellant argues that, because he was not in the truck when the damage occurred, the evidence was insufficient to support the restitution order.
In Maxwell C., the court held that the minor, whose offense was receiving stolen property (a car stereo), could not be required to pay restitution to the owner of the automobile for damages caused by the stealing of the stereo without evidence that the minor was involved in the theft. (Maxwell C., supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at pp. 265-267.) In arriving at its holding, the Maxwell C. court relied on People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614 (Richards). In Richards, the court held that for restitution to be imposed it must be directly related to the crime charged and must relate to acts by the accused that were committed with the same state of mind as the offense of which the accused was convicted. (Maxwell C., supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at pp. 265-266, citing Richards, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 622.)
Appellant argues that there was little connection, if any, between the state of mind of the person who stole the truck, and the state of mind of appellant who went for a ride in the truck. Further, appellant contends, since he was no longer in the truck when it took off on the chase that resulted in the damages, the state-of-mind connection did not exist at the time when the losses occurred. Therefore, appellant asserts, the restitution order exceeds whatever losses could possibly be attributed to his conduct.
However, in People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1126, the court stated “insofar as Richards may be read to require that trial courts refrain from conditioning probation on restitution ‘unless the act for which the defendant is ordered to make restitution was committed with the same state of mind as the offense of which he was convicted...’ (id. at p. 622), we disapprove it.” Since both the reasoning and holding of Maxwell C. on the same point now relied on by appellant have been impliedly overruled, appellant’s argument is rejected.
Moreover, this case is factually distinguishable from Maxwell C. In Maxwell C. the stolen property the defendant was convicted of receiving was not the property for which restitution was ordered. In contrast here, the stolen property appellant was found to have received was the same property for which restitution was ordered. Thus, there is a connection between the crime and the restitution order.
Here, appellant was involved in the acts that ultimately led to the truck being damaged. As noted above, a restitution order is not improper merely because the defendant was not personally or immediately responsible for the victim’s loss. All that is required is that the restitution order be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted. Further, it is reasonable to require appellant to pay restitution in order to deter similar future conduct. Thus, there is a factual and rational basis for this restitution order. Moreover, it comports with the policies of juvenile court law, i.e., rehabilitation of the defendant, deterrence of future delinquent behavior, and victim compensation. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant to pay restitution.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.