Opinion
Nos. K09-CP03-008774-A, K09-CP03-009112-A
March 8, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On July 1, 2004, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("DCF"), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Minera J. and Jesse C. to their children, Isabella C. and Annabella C. The Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Waterford entered a default with regard to father on September 27, 2004 (Bear, J.). Father then appeared in court on November 14, 2005 at which time he was advised of his rights in connection with the TPR petition. Father did not move to reopen the default and was permitted to participate in the trial for dispositional purposes only. Trial of this matter took place before this court on December 5 and 6, 2005 and January 26, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
Father appeared for trial on December 5, 2005, but did not appear on December 6, 2005 or January 26, 2006.
The statutory grounds alleged against respondent mother and father as to both children were (1) that the children, Isabella and Annabella, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)); and (2) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)). On February 24, 2003, DCF sought an Order of Temporary Custody ("OTC"), and filed a neglect petition with regard to Isabella. The neglect petition alleged that the child was denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and that she had been abandoned. The OTC was issued on February 24, 2003 (Jongbloed, J.) and sustained on February 28, 2003 (Jongbloed, J.). Following Annabella's birth on November 25, 2003, an OTC was issued (Jongbloed, J.) and DCF filed a predictive neglect petition on behalf of Annabella alleging that she would be denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally, and that she would be permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being. On December 5, 2003, both Isabella and Annabella were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF (Jongbloed, J.). On July 1, 2004, the petition for termination of parental rights was filed. On November 30, 2004, commitment was maintained until further order of the court (Cosgrove, J.), and on February 23, 2005, the court made a finding that further efforts to reunify with mother were no longer appropriate (Swienton, J.). On November 7, 2005, the court found that further efforts to reunify with mother and father were no longer appropriate (Driscoll, J.).
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, CT Page 4284 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904 (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
I. FACTS
At trial, the court heard testimony from seventeen witnesses. Petitioner introduced the social study, the psychological evaluation, DCF narratives and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social workers Patrice Flatley, Shirley Reguin, and Joelle Suroviak. Petitioner also called as witnesses Peg Getchell (Madonna Place), Norma LaCasse (Office of Adult Probation), Deborah Smith (Access Shelter), Barbara Wagenbrenner (Birth to Three), Marilyn Cohen (Alternative Incarceration Center), Leah Russack-Baker (The Connection, Women's Services of Groton) and Nancy Randall, Psy.D. Respondent mother Minera J. called Talia Hudgens (The Connection), Rev. Kenneth Harris (Outreach Ministries), Tamara Lanier (Office of Adult Probation), Amy Quinn-Calhoun (Lighthouse Family Services), Kristine Johnson (Madonna Place), and Dorothy Reas. Mother also testified on her own behalf. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
On December 20, 2002, Isabella was born at twenty-three weeks gestation and weighed one pound, five ounces. Mother and father fought in the hospital room twice necessitating calls to the hospital police. Mother left the hospital in the middle of the night after pulling an IV line from her arm. She spent an hour in the car in the parking lot of the hospital before she agreed to return to her room. Parents told hospital staff that they had been living in the woods, but had recently rented a room. On February 20, 2003, when Isabella could no longer receive medication and nutrition intravenously, the hospital needed to insert a Broviac line. The hospital attempted to reach parents, but were unable to do so for over twenty-four hours. On February 21, 2003, out of medical necessity, the hospital inserted the line without parental consent. Parents did not maintain consistent contact with the Neonatal Intensive Care nursery and they did not visit consistently.
A. Respondent Mother Minera J.
Respondent mother, Minera J., was born in New London, Connecticut on June 1, 1982. She has four siblings. Her father was abusive. In 1988, Minera's mother was diagnosed with a terminal illness. She died in 1998 when Minera was fifteen. In 1994, when Minera was thirteen, she was sexually assaulted by males aged fifteen and seventeen. While she did not file a complaint with the police, she did receive crisis counseling. After the sexual assault, Minera became increasingly defiant toward her mother. She became physically aggressive toward her siblings and destroyed property in the home. Altercations in the home escalated to the point where her mother requested that Minera be removed from the home.
Minera's mother filed a Family With Service Needs Petition (FWSN) on February 28, 1995. Minera was committed to DCF as a FWSN child on May 25, 1995. She then underwent twenty-five different placements, including foster homes, shelters, residential facilities, detention centers and hospitals. Minera was unsuccessfully discharged from most of these placements due to aggressive and assaultive behavior. As a result of her conduct, she was committed to Long Lane. She was ultimately discharged from Long Lane into the care of Dorothy Reas, the woman Minera's mother had appointed to be the legal guardian of her three youngest children upon her death. Although Minera did well for a short time, she failed to return to that home after visiting a friend in Hartford. When Ms. Reas indicated that she did not wish to have Minera returned to her, Minera was placed at the Hartford Youth Shelter. Minera sought her own housing and employment at this time in an effort to become independent and indicated her intention to sign herself out of DCF care on her eighteenth birthday. She left the shelter permanently on May 9, 2000. DCF closed its case and was unaware of mother's whereabouts until it received the referral regarding Isabella from the hospital on January 28, 2003.
Mother reported to DCF that she held numerous jobs ranging from housekeeping to working for an investment firm, but has never had long-term stable employment and has never provided any proof of employment to DCF. She has not obtained her GED.
Mother has a substantial history of substance abuse. Mother stated that she started using marijuana when she was eighteen or nineteen and described herself to the court-appointed evaluator as a "big pot head." Ex. 10, p. 4. She stated that she stopped using marijuana in April or May 2004 because she would "rather drink" and that in March 2004 "[s]he was drinking everyday, all day." Id. In April and May 2004, she tested positive for marijuana use and, during a substance abuse evaluation in June 2004, she admitted to using ecstasy. At the time of her evaluation with Nancy Randall, Psy. D., mother stated that she was not using substances because she was pregnant. Mother also has a history of depression for which she has taken medication at times including Trazadone, Zoloft and Wellbutrin.
Mother has a criminal history including convictions for disorderly conduct, threatening, assault in the third degree, probation violation, interfering/resisting, breach of peace, and criminal mischief. Both parents were involved in a domestic violence incident on January 11, 2004 for which mother required stitches. After this incident the parents lost their rented room and the owner filed for a restraining order against mother.
In May 2004 mother made a telephone call to Susan Wax, DCF worker Flatley's program supervisor. During that conversation, mother threatened Ms. Flatley stating "[i]f I see Patrice in court or somewhere else, I want to be violent toward that lady. I want to strangle and kill her. I know her license plate." Mother was convicted of threatening and placed on probation, which she later violated. On May 25, 2004, mother's probation officer sent her to the Alternative Incarceration Center to be assessed for an anger management program. During the assessment, mother told staff member Marilyn Cohen that she had "paid someone off" to kill her DCF worker and that she would not be linked to the murder because she would not be in the state when it happened. Mother was incarcerated from June 2004 through January 2005. When mother was released from custody, she was referred to Womens' Services in Groton. On January 22, 2005, shortly after her release, mother was arrested in connection with a domestic violence incident. The charge was later dismissed and she was continued on her probation. Mother resided at the Access Shelter in Danielson from March 14, 2005 through April 14, 2005 when she was discharged because she had been verbally abusive toward the staff and entered the main office and intervened when staff was communicating with another resident. She lived at a hotel and in a car until she entered the Reliance House Emergency Shelter in May 2005. Because she was pregnant, she sought admission to Mother's Retreat in Groton and was accepted there in July 2005. Mother has been doing well at Mother's Retreat where she was living at the time of trial with her infant, Jesse, who was born on October 4, 2005.
B. Respondent father Jesse C.
Respondent father, Jesse C., was born in Wellsville, New York on December 29, 1975. He graduated from Norwich Free Academy. Although he received a wrestling scholarship for college, he never used it. He did attend AIC College in Springfield, Massachusetts for two years where he was on the wrestling team, and planned to teach English. He took some time off from college, however, at which time he met mother and began to have significant problems with criminal conduct. He and mother have had a number of domestic violence incidents. Although he is the father of all three of mother's children, he has not shown an interest in Isabella or Annabella. He does express an interest in moving forward with mother and baby Jesse as a family. He proposed marriage to mother recently and they are engaged.
Father has a criminal history including sale of a controlled substance, failure to appear in the first and second degrees, possession of drug/marijuana, and interfering/resisting.
Due to his lack of cooperation with substance abuse evaluation and testing, DCF did not have specific information as to whether father was engaged in substance abuse. Father was arrested on June 24, 2005 by the Norwich Police Department and had in his possession a platform scale, small empty Ziploc bags, four hits of hallucinogenic acid, approximately eight grams of marijuana, a two-piece smoking bowl and $632. Ex. 6. He also arrived at a scheduled visitation at Madonna Place on May 12, 2004 unable to control his movements and visibly under the influence of some kind of substance. Madonna Place indicated that he would not be permitted any further visitation until he addressed the issue with them. He failed to do so and had no further visits there.
Father was employed at Blunt Kingz in Norwich during most of the duration of the case. With regard to housing, father has had a transient lifestyle, moving often, sometimes living in the woods and with friends. He has not maintained housing appropriate for children.
C. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court and signed by mother and father on December 5, 2003. The specific steps required parents to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep their whereabouts known to DCF and their attorneys; participate in parenting, family and individual counseling to address treatment goals including anger management and domestic violence issues; submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations made regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing; cooperate with recommended service providers; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; follow all recommendations made by service providers; participate in and complete recommended medical training; and visit with the children as often as DCF permits.
With regard to compliance with the specific steps, both parents attended some appointments with DCF but failed to keep many others and were generally uncooperative with DCF throughout much of the case. Both parents moved often and on numerous occasions failed to provide information on their whereabouts to DCF.
Although mother visited more often than father, she did not visit with the children as often as permitted. In 2003, out of thirty-two available visits with Isabella, mother attended only eleven. When she and father came to a visit on June 11, 2003 and learned that Isabella was placed with paternal grandparents, they walked out of the visit and had no visits again until December 2003. Mother resumed visitation with both girls, who have a visiting relationship with her, but do not look to her to have their needs met. Ms. Getchell of Madonna Place observed mother's visitation with the girls from January through June 2004. Of thirty-six scheduled visits, mother was a no-show, no-call for ten visits and she was late for twenty-four of the twenty-six she did attend. Ms. Getchell did not observe a parent-child bond between the girls and mother though mother was appropriate with them and made an effort to interact with them. While mother was incarcerated, she did have several visits with the girls. Recently, at a visit on November 28, 2005, both girls took a while to warm up to mother and routinely looked to foster mother for care and guidance. At the end of the visit, although they said good-bye to mother, they did not hug or kiss mother good-bye. At a visit on December 22, 2005, both girls had difficulty when they realized that foster parents were not in the room. Mother brought numerous gifts for the girls, but despite the gifts, the children still cried and were anxious for the return of foster parents. Again, the girls did not offer hugs or kisses good-bye to mother at the end of the visit. Mother did not follow through successfully with parenting, anger management and individual counseling until she was admitted to Mother's Retreat. Father has not participated in counseling services.
Although mother failed to attend an earlier scheduled substance abuse evaluation, she did attend one at the direction of her probation officer in June 2004. Mother admitted to drinking heavily, using ecstasy and marijuana. Father's substance abuse was unknown since he failed to participate in court-ordered substance abuse evaluation and testing. Both parents have been unable to maintain stable housing and employment.
D. The Children 1. Isabella C.
Isabella C. was born December 20, 2002 at John Dempsey Hospital in Farmington, CT. She weighed one pound, five ounces at birth and was diagnosed with Bronchopulmonary Dysplasia and was placed on oxygen. She underwent emergency surgery on December 26, 2002 for a perforated bowel and underwent a double hernia repair on April 30, 2003. When she was discharged from the hospital, she was placed in a medically complex foster home. She was taken off medically complex status in June 2003 and was placed with her paternal grandparents. Grandparents were unable to be an adoptive resource and, in June 2004, following a transition period, Isabella was placed in a pre-adoptive home. She has continued to have extensive visitation with grandparents. Isabella received Birth to Three services up until her third birthday to address numerous delays. At two she had severe speech and oral delays, include difficulty eating. After receiving intensive therapy with the consistent, exceptional work of the foster family, Isabella made significant progress and by the age of three was considered developmentally age appropriate in all areas. Isabella's preadoptive foster parents are ably meeting all of her physical, medical, educational, and emotional needs.
2. Annabella C.
Annabella C. was born November 25, 2003 at Lawrence and Memorial Hospital in New London, CT. She weighed five pounds, five ounces at birth. Due to respiratory problems and feeding difficulty, she was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. She was discharged on December 5, 2003 and placed in a DCF foster home. She progressed well, was no longer considered to be medically complex and on May 7, 2004, she was placed in the same pre-adoptive home into which Isabella was being transitioned. She is strongly bonded with Isabella and her pre-adoptive foster parents. The foster parents are providing exemplary care and more than meeting all of the girls' needs. Annabella calls foster parents Mom and Dad.
E. Psychological Evaluation
Mother was evaluated by Nancy Randall, Psy.D. in June 2005. Randall conducted an individual evaluation as well as an interactional evaluation with the children. Randall testified that mother failed to fill out any of the formal psychological testing requested by the evaluator. Randall found that mother had a lengthy history of instability in her living situation, finances and treatment, and minimized her substance abuse issues. Randall observed that mother had not followed through with her work on reunification goals with her children and was not able to provide an adequate home for her children. Randall observed that mother had no relationship with the children and appeared at a loss as to how to even try to comfort them. Randall observed that mother appeared to function best when she was in a highly structured setting, such as incarceration, and was taking medication. She noted that mother was not taking any medication at the time of her evaluation as she was pregnant. Randall testified that mother stated during the evaluation, that she knew DCF would take her children away permanently, that it was only a matter of time, but that she wanted to fight for them so they would know when they grew up that she fought to keep them.
During the interactional part of the June 2005 evaluation, Randall observed that neither of the girls had any particular relationship with mother. They both cried throughout the interactional evaluation and after fifteen minutes into the session, the evaluator terminated the session because it was clear that the girls were very upset and mother was unable to console them. Mother acknowledged that the girls did not know her. Ex. 10 p. 8. Randall concluded that it was not advisable to reunify the children with mother. Randall also opined that even assuming mother was doing well with her new baby, she would be at very high risk once she left the structured setting of Mother's Retreat. She testified that mother would have to demonstrate an ability to successfully maintain employment, housing and sobriety on her own for a minimum of six to eight months after leaving the one-year program at Mother's Retreat before any reunification could be considered and that this was too long a period of time for the girls who have no real relationship with her. Randall stated that it would be damaging to the children to allow that additional period of time for rehabilitation and that these children require a sense of permanency and security in their family.
F. Testimony of Respondent Mother
Respondent mother testified on her own behalf. She stated that with the benefit of the counseling and support she has received at Mother's Retreat, she now understands that she made serious mistakes with regard to Isabella and Annabella. She understands that she should not have threatened the DCF worker, walked out on visitation, let father make decisions for her and that she should have asked for help with housing. Mother loves her children and believes that she can successfully care for them.
Mother has made significant progress since entering Mother's Retreat. She has been fully compliant with all of the requirements at Mother's Retreat and participates actively in parenting and individual therapy. She attends her group sessions and has been meeting her goals of maintaining sobriety, addressing anger management and domestic violence issues, and learning how to successfully parent her son. She is pursuing plans for housing upon her discharge from Mother's Retreat. In addition to continued therapy and relapse prevention services, mother also plans to draw support from Rev. Kenneth Harris and her former foster mother Dorothy Reas, both of whom are willing to provide continued support for mother. Mother continues to be compliant with her conditions of probation. Mother has done well in caring for her son and in supervised visitations among mother, father and the baby. Amy Quinn-Calhoun testified that during these supervised visits, father has expressed to her that he does not feel as strongly about the girls and is not fighting to get them back. He has stated that he would like to "start over" and move on as a unit with just the baby, but that mother disagrees with this. Mother was disappointed that father was not supporting her efforts throughout the trial.
II. ADJUDICATION
The grounds alleged in the petition as to respondent mother and father are (1) that the children, Isabella and Annabella, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and that the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)); and (2) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).) The petitioner is required to prove these grounds by clear and convincing evidence. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).
A. Location and Reunification § 17a-112(j)(1)
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).
On April 15, 2005, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother were no longer appropriate (Swienton, J.). The finding was made as to both mother and father on November 7, 2005 (Driscoll, J.). Under the statute, a finding that reasonable efforts were made is not required if the court has determined, as in this case, that reasonable efforts are no longer appropriate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001). Nevertheless, the court finds that DCF made substantial reasonable efforts to reunify the children with parents. Throughout DCF's involvement, numerous referrals were made to service providers who could help respondent mother address substance abuse and mental health issues as well as parenting. Mother was not able to successfully participate in services until well after the adjudication date when she ultimately benefitted from services at Mother's Retreat.
Father has not played an active role in the lives of the children during the time they have been in DCF care and although initially he visited with them on occasion, he stopped visiting them, and has not put himself in a position to have the children placed with him. He has not taken advantage of the services offered and has been unable or unwilling to benefit from them. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify in this case.
B. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that parents' parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Isabella and Annabella were found to be neglected on December 5, 2003, the critical issue for this court is whether parents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the children. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that mother has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). The psychological evidence in this case clearly establishes that mother has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. Dr. Randall testified that at the time of the evaluation, mother continued to demonstrate instability in her living situation, a lack of financial security, and minimization of substance abuse issues. She concluded that mother had not followed through with her work on reunification goals with her children and was not able to provide an adequate home for her children. Randall observed that mother had no relationship with the children and appeared at a loss as to how to even try to comfort them. Randall observed that mother appeared to function best when she was in a highly structured setting such as incarceration and was taking medication.
Although specific steps were issued to assist respondent mother in achieving rehabilitation, she failed to fulfill them in a number of significant measures. As described above, mother continued to engage in criminal behavior by threatening the social worker and was incarcerated. She did not successfully complete any substance abuse program or counseling and she did not visit with the children as often as permitted. Mother tested positive for marijuana in April and May 2004 and, during a substance abuse evaluation in June 2004, admitted to using ecstasy.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of July 1, 2004, mother had not brought herself into a position in which she could provide adequate care for the children. Mother continued to refuse substance abuse and mental health counseling and treatment, did not benefit from services, did not have appropriate housing for herself and the children and failed to maintain even a consistent visiting relationship with the children. Thus mother demonstrated neither the ability nor the desire to provide day-to-day care for the children who have been in DCF care essentially for their entire lives.
The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of the adjudicatory date of July 1, 2004, father had not brought himself into a position in which he could provide adequate care for the children. He demonstrated no ability or desire to provide day-to-day care for the children and rarely visited with them. He encouraged mother not to cooperate with DCF. He failed to take advantage of services offered to him and failed to participate in counseling and court-ordered substance abuse evaluations and testing.
The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). Mother's conduct after the adjudicatory date does show significant improvement. She has done very well in the structured setting of Mother's Retreat which she entered in July 2005. She has been participating in counseling, substance abuse treatment and parenting education and has demonstrated an ability to parent her four-month-old son with substantial support. She appears to demonstrate an understanding of her past mistakes and appears to genuinely desire to remain stable, clean and sober. While this progress is commendable, it does not amount to rehabilitation which would reasonably encourage a belief that within a reasonable time she can assume a responsible position in her children's lives.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Randall testified that mother would have to demonstrate an ability to successfully maintain employment, housing and sobriety on her own for a minimum of six to eight months after leaving the program before any reunification could be considered and that this was too long a period of time for the girls who have no real relationship with her. Randall stated that it would be damaging to the children to allow that additional period of time for rehabilitation and that these children require a sense of permanency and security in their family.
Isabella and Annabella have been in DCF care essentially for their entire lives. For children who now have the stability of a wonderful foster home and foster parents who would like to adopt them, the time needed for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable. And in this case, rehabilitation itself remains uncertain given that mother will be at very high risk when she leaves the structure of Mother's Retreat as noted by Randall. Moreover, rehabilitation will be contingent on numerous factors, including continued successful counseling and substance abuse treatment.
Mother has been able to manage her own life with her son only with the intensive support and structure of Mother's Retreat. Mother is not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children or to assume a useful role in their lives and she has not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, mother had not rehabilitated to the point where she was in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the children.
Father has not demonstrated any desire after the adjudicatory date to place himself in a position to assume a useful role in the lives of Isabella and Annabella. To the contrary, he has stated that he is not fighting to get them back and that he would like to "start over" and move on as a unit with just the baby.
The court is mindful that parents are not required to be "able to assume full responsibility for a child, without the use of available support programs." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984); In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986). The fact that mother requires continued counseling and treatment is not the basis of the court's determination that she has not sufficiently achieved rehabilitation. See In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 564, 718 A.2d 997 (1998) (trial court's finding that respondent had failed to achieve rehabilitation was properly based on her inability to meet court-approved expectations, and not on her mental retardation); In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 672-74, 723 A.2d 356 (1999) (trial court properly found a failure to rehabilitate); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. at 606 (trial court terminated parental rights not because of mental condition, but because of an inability to function as a parent). At the time of trial, mother was not in a position to begin reunification, even with supports in place.
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. at 292; In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. at 448. Isabella and Annabella are active three- and two-year-olds who require constant care and attention. Mother is currently caring for her four-month-old son. Meeting the needs of two young children in addition to her son would be overwhelming to mother particularly in view of Dr. Randall's observation that mother has done well only in highly structured settings. Isabella and Annabella are in need of permanency and stability and require a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time. The children now have a wonderful foster family with whom they have thoroughly bonded. The family is committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and father remain unable to successfully parent the children and lack the ability to assume responsible positions in the children's lives within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, the court finds that the petitioner has proven both respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
C. No Ongoing Parent-child Relationship § 17A-112(j)(3)(D)
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.
No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or that no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. at 22. In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative. In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 (2000).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the children Isabella and Annabella and either respondent mother or father. Mother acknowledged during the psychological evaluation that the girls do not know her. Indeed the interactional evaluation had to be terminated after fifteen minutes because both girls were crying and mother did not know how to console or comfort them. The children do not look to mother to have their needs met. Indeed, mother has never provided day-to-day care for the children. Thus, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship.
With regard to respondent father, the children would not look to him to have their needs met. He has never provided day-to-day care for them. He has not visited with them on a regular basis and they would not recognize him as a parent.
Although respondent mother is well-intentioned to the extent that she expresses her love for the children and a desire to care for them, the fact remains that she has not been in a position to care for them since their birth. As a result of mother's own conduct, including involvement in criminal conduct and an inability or unwillingness to benefit from services, mother has rendered herself unavailable to serve as a parent for Isabella and Annabella. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. at 241. Respondent mother has not been able to meet on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of her children since their birth. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 525.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow either parent further time for the reestablishment of a parent-child relationship with children who are in a stable, nurturing foster home would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. Isabella and Annabella are now three and two years old. They have been in an exceptional foster home together since June 2004 and have thoroughly bonded with their foster parents. According to the testimony of Dr. Randall, mother will be unable to assume a responsible parental role for the children until she has at least experienced six to eight months of stability and sobriety after leaving Mother's Retreat, under the best of circumstances. In view of the children's needs, it would be detrimental to them to allow this substantial amount of time in which respondent mother could attempt to establish a parent-child relationship where one has never existed.
Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground for termination as to respondent Minera J. and Jesse C. by clear and convincing evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including January 26, 2006, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [ In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered many services to address substance abuse, mental health, anger management and housing issues. Parents were also offered parenting education, visitation and transportation services. Parents participated in some services, but did not participate in many of the services offered and did not benefit from the services provided.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondents. As set forth above, there was compliance by respondents as to some steps, but failure to comply with many others. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do not have an emotional bond with their biological mother or father. The children do have a strong emotional bond with each other and with the foster parents with whom they have lived together since June 2004. The children have adjusted very well in their foster family and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the children need. The foster parents are committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
(5) As to the ages of the children, the court finds that Isabella C., born December 20, 2002, is three years old and Annabella C., born November 25, 2003, is two. The court further finds that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney recommends termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that respondent mother has maintained contact with the children and DCF and has attended visitation and father has not maintained regular and consistent contact with the children or DCF. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the children's lives. Giving the parents additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. DCF took many steps to facilitate reunification. Further, while the respondents' financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Minera J. and Jesse C. to the children Isabella and Annabella C. is in the best interest of the children. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Isabella and Annabella. Although mother has made significant progress since entering Mother's Retreat, she is not in a position to care for the children today and has no real relationship with them. Although father has taken the position that mother is able to care for the children, he has stated that he wished to "start over" with mother and Jesse as a family. Even mother, while contesting the TPR, indicated to Dr. Randall that she was contesting the TPR not because she believed her children would be returned to her, but because she wanted them to know when they grew up that she had fought for them. Isabella and Annabella are now in a foster home where they are very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to them. While mother loves her children and states that she desires to care for them, she and father have been consistently unable to assume a responsible parental role. Neither parent is in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children. Throughout the children's stay in foster care, parents have not modified their behavior to make it appropriate for the children to be reunified with them.
In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the children's best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers that Isabella and Annabella are entitled to a resolution of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as their parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the children recommends termination.
After considering the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and father is in the children's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Minera J. and Jesse C. are hereby terminated as to the children Isabella C. and Annabella C. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the permanency plans for the children, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as to both children and finds that such plans are in the best interest of the children. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans. Permanency plans shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.