Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK72434, Marilyn Martinez, Juvenile Court Referee.
California Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director, and Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Melinda S. White-Svec, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
MOSK, Acting P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Christina C. (mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court denying visitation (the “no-contact orders”) and terminating reunification services with respect to three of her children, Iris H., Catherine C. and Moses C. Mother argues that no substantial evidence supported the no-contact orders because there was no evidence that mother was a threat to children’s physical safety. Mother also argues that no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that mother received reasonable reunification services because mother was never provided with court-ordered conjoint counseling with children.
Some references to “children” refer to all three children and others refer only to Catherine and Moses, depending on the context. A fourth child, Keith, also was the subject of proceedings in the juvenile court. Keith was returned to his father in Pennsylvania and is not a subject of this appeal.
We dismiss mother’s appeal as to Iris because the appeal is moot and, insofar as it concerns the no-contact order, untimely. We conclude that the no-contact order as to Catherine and Moses was supported by substantial evidence of detriment to children and was a reasonable exercise of the juvenile court’s discretion to regulate visitation. We further conclude that mother forfeited her argument regarding conjoint counseling by failing to raise it in the juvenile court, and, in any event, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that mother received reasonable reunification services. We therefore affirm the orders as to Catherine and Moses.
BACKGROUND
A. Detention
Shortly after 11 p.m. on Friday, March 28, 2008, two patrol officers of the Long Beach Police Department saw 15-year old Iris walking with a man later identified as her uncle. Iris and her uncle appeared to be arguing; the officers stopped to investigate. The officers discovered that the uncle had outstanding warrants and took him into custody. They transported Iris to her home in Signal Hill. There, they discovered that mother had left 11-year old Catherine, 9-year old Moses and 7-year old Keith home alone. Catherine told officers that mother had gone to the liquor store. The officers saw that the home was filthy; there was little furniture and no food; and children were sleeping on the floor. The officers contacted the Signal Hill police and reported that the residence was unfit for children to live in. The Signal Hill police responded to the family home and requested that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) take custody of children. Police took photographs to document the condition of the home. Mother arrived home while police were there and began cursing and yelling at them. Police took mother into custody on charges of child endangerment.
On April 2, 2008, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 with respect to children. The petition alleged, as relevant here, that mother’s alcohol abuse rendered her incapable of caring for children; mother had left children home alone for extended periods of time; and mother provided a filthy and unsanitary home environment. Mother remained in custody and did not appear at the detention hearing. The juvenile court ordered children detained.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
On April 9, 2008, mother was arraigned in the juvenile court. She denied the allegations in the petition. Counsel for children informed the juvenile court that Iris did not want visits with mother because mother made Iris feel bad about herself, yelled at her all the time, and used alcohol. Counsel for children stated that Iris would be distressed by visits with mother even if the visits were monitored. Counsel for mother stated that mother wanted visitation with Iris, and argued that if the juvenile court was not inclined to order regular monitored visitation then mother should at least receive visitation in a therapeutic setting. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that, based on Iris’s “fear” of mother and “the degree to which [Iris] is angry at her mother, ” visitation with mother would be detrimental to Iris. The juvenile court ordered that mother was to have no contact with Iris pending further order of the court.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
Prior to the jurisdictional hearing, Iris told DCFS that mother drank “until she gets drunk” every day, sometimes drinking 18 beers a day and sometimes drinking vodka, cognac, brandy or wine. Mother acted “crazy” when drunk. Mother got mad easily; she sometimes grabbed Iris or Catherine by the hair; she threw shoes at children; she yelled and cussed and had a “very foul mouth”; she talked about sex in front of children; she sometimes left children alone until four or five in the morning. Iris told DCFS that mother suffered from bipolar disorder, but she did not like the way her medication made her feel, so she self-medicated with alcohol. Iris told DCFS that she did not get along with mother because mother called her names all the time and got mad whenever Iris tried to say anything mother did not want to hear. Mother made Iris stay home all day and would not even let her look out the window. Iris said mother was a good actress who would act one way for DCFS, but Iris knew what mother was like, and Iris did not want ever to see her.
Catherine told DCFS that mother drank beer and liquor in the afternoon, and that mother got mad and weird when she drank. Catherine said that mother yelled at Iris and would “not stop messing” with her, and that Iris got mad at mother “all the time.” Catherine said she was afraid of mother because she never knew what was going to make mother mad. She wanted to live with mother, but only if mother got some help with her temper.
Moses told DCFS that mother could finish 18 beers in one day and that she acted crazy when she was drunk. Moses said that mother needed to “go to so some classes to lower her temper.”
Mother waived her right to a jurisdictional hearing and submitted to the petition on the basis of DCFS’s report. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition. Over mother’s objection, the juvenile court ordered children placed with their paternal grandmother in Santa Maria, Santa Barbara County, approximately 180 miles north of mother’s home in Signal Hill. The juvenile court reaffirmed the no-contact order with respect to Iris and ordered that mother was to have monitored visits with Catherine and Moses. Mother agreed to, and the juvenile court ordered, a case plan that included parenting education, an alcohol program with random testing, individual counseling to address case issues and anger management, and family conjoint counseling “when deemed appropriate.” The juvenile court also ordered children to “participate in... conjoint counseling with parents when deemed appropriate.”
C. Six Month Review
Prior to the six-month review hearing, DCFS detained children from paternal grandmother’s home and filed a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387 alleging that paternal grandmother had violated court orders and failed properly to supervise Iris. In the detention report, DCFS stated that mother had visited children only once since they were placed with paternal grandmother more than four months earlier. Paternal grandmother told the social worker that mother was drunk during her one visit, to which children stated, “‘yeah she was.’” Mother denied being drunk, but admitted that she had a “couple” of drinks before the visit. The juvenile court dismissed the petition without prejudice on the ground that it was unnecessary to permit DCFS to suitably place children, and ordered DCFS to make every effort to place children in Santa Maria where they could continue to attend the same schools.
A little more than a month later, Iris ran away from her foster home in Los Angeles. Iris was located a week later in the Santa Maria Juvenile Hall, where she was in custody on charges of felony commercial burglary, petty theft, and giving false identity information to police. Iris told DCFS that she had been staying in hotels with a friend and using methamphetamine.
DCFS reported that children’s foster mother had complained that mother had called her and angrily demanded to see children. Mother sounded very drunk and slurred her speech. Mother denied being drunk, but mother’s substance abuse program counselor told DCFS that mother had admitted to consuming 11 beers that day. The foster mother also reported that mother had shown up at two visits “totally drunk” and unable to walk. Mother had quit one treatment program at Tarzana Treatment because it was “too demanding” and, although unemployed, she did “not have the time for it.” Mother’s counselor at a second treatment program told DCFS that mother was drinking almost on a daily basis and that she had no desire to stop. Mother was discharged from her second treatment program due to her continued use of alcohol.
Prior to one scheduled visit, Catherine informed the social worker that she refused to see mother because she was afraid. Catherine had gotten her hair cut shorter than mother preferred, and Catherine believed that mother was “going to be mad” as a result. Moses attended the visit. Mother became very upset when informed that Catherine had refused to visit, and she terminated the visit with Moses after 15 minutes. Catherine and Moses cancelled the next scheduled visit with mother, and for the next six weeks either children or mother cancelled each scheduled visit. The social worker reported that there was a “weak bond” between children and mother, and that Catherine and Moses had expressed “feelings of worry and fear of their mother” and concerns that they would not be safe if they were returned to her.
At the six-month review hearing, counsel for children informed the juvenile court that Catherine and Moses did not want to visit mother, primarily because they wanted to determine their own hairstyles and were afraid of how mother would react. The juvenile court did not restrict mother’s visitation, but ordered mother to let Catherine and Moses determine their own hairstyles and not to discuss the matter with them. The hearing was continued to permit mother to retain private counsel.
In mid-December 2008, Iris was released from juvenile hall in Santa Maria and returned to a foster home in Los Angeles. She was replaced in another foster home two days later after a dispute with her foster parents. A week later, the new foster mother informed DCFS that Iris was out of control and requested that she be removed from the home. The next day, Iris ran away. Over the next five months, Iris exhibited serious substance abuse issues and repeatedly fled from her placements. In May 2009, Iris was taken into custody in Las Vegas and returned to juvenile hall in Los Angeles.
Prior to the continued six-month review hearing, DCFS reported mother was not in compliance with her case plan. Among other things, the social worker had scheduled two assessment appointments for mother with a fully funded substance abuse program, but mother missed both appointments. DCFS reported that mother’s visitation with Catherine and Moses was inconsistent, but three visits had taken place. Mother was sober for each visit, and the visits went “relatively well.” DCFS recommended continued reunification services for mother.
Mother failed to appear for the continued hearing, and no private attorney had filed a substitution of attorney to represent her. Mother’s appointed an attorney represented her at the hearing. The juvenile court found that DCFS had provided reasonable reunification services, but mother was “not making much progress.” The juvenile court ordered continued reunification services and set the matter for a 12-month review hearing.
D. Twelve Month Review
Prior to the 12-month review hearing, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 388 to modify the order for monitored visitation with Catherine and Moses. DCFS requested that Catherine and Moses be permitted to visit with mother at their discretion. DCFS alleged in the petition that children had expressed fear of visiting with mother and had refused to allow their caregiver to transport them to visits, even after being reassured that the visits would be monitored. Children threw uncontrollable tantrums and exhibited a high level of anxiety. DCFS asserted that children’s therapist supported the modification because the “continual emotional distress [was] not healthy for the [c]hildren, ” but no declaration from the therapist was submitted. The juvenile court denied the petition on the ground that to allow children to decide when to visit would be an improper delegation of the juvenile court’s authority.
DCFS reported that, in mid-January 2009-more than nine months after children were detained-mother had enrolled in a substance abuse program called Roy’s National Health Services. DCFS had not recommended the program; mother had found the program herself and deemed it acceptable because it required her to attend classes only twice per week for one hour. DCFS learned, however, that the program was not licensed by the State of California, and the social worker advised mother that she would have to enroll in a different program. Mother became angry. The social worker observed that mother “seemed to be only interested in completing an easy program rather than seriously receiving help with her alcohol issues.” When DCFS later tried to contact Roy’s Health Service, the phone number had been disconnected. Mother told DCFS that she had been drug testing through Roy’s National Health Services, but no progress reports were provided. DCFS referred mother to Tarzana Treatment Center for random testing, but mother missed the tests.
DCFS reported that, on several occasions during the reporting period, mother had left angry messages for the social worker complaining about unfair treatment by DCFS and the juvenile court and calling her appointed attorney “weak.” DCFS set up a meeting to address mother’s concerns, but mother failed to attend. Mother later called DCFS again and yelled at the social worker, complaining that DCFS had failed to control Iris and was not forcing Catherine and Moses to visit with mother despite their refusal to do so. Mother demanded that DCFS release children back into her care. DCFS again scheduled a meeting to address mother’s concerns, but mother again failed to attend.
Mother’s whereabouts were unknown for two months during April and May 2009, and DCFS was unable to contact her. Catherine spoke to mother during that period at a phone number provided by maternal grandmother, but children’s caretaker said the conversation “did not go well, ” and Catherine had not kept the phone number.
The social worker concluded that, one year after children were detained, mother still was in denial regarding her alcohol problem and its effect on children, and she had failed to take responsibility for any of the case issues. Mother blamed everyone else for what was going on, and had made no positive progress toward resolving her case issues. DCFS nevertheless continued to recommend that mother be provided with family reunification services.
DCFS reported that Catherine and Moses were doing well in their foster home. Both told the social worker, however, that they did not want to live with mother, and they feared that mother would retaliate against them. They had spoken with mother by telephone; mother yelled at them, and the conversations were brief and did not go well. Mother had threatened to take children out of state and away from their family if they were returned to her care. Children said that mother drank a lot and was angry most of the time, and they believed mother would seriously harm them if they were ever released back into mother’s custody.
As discussed ante, Iris was missing or in custody during much of this reporting period.
DCFS reported that mother had only two visits with children in December 2008. No visits occurred in January because either mother or children had cancelled each scheduled visit. One visit occurred in early February 2009; either children or mother had cancelled the other visits. In March 2009, children told the social worker that they were upset that DCFS continued to schedule visits. Children said they were not comfortable being around mother; mother had called them on the phone and was very rude and mean to them; and mother was always upset about something. Children appeared “very anxious, angry, and frustrated” about visitation. When mother was out of contact during April and May 2009, children appeared calmer, happier and more peaceful.
The 12-month review hearing commenced on June 1, 2009. The juvenile court indicated that it was not inclined to follow DCFS’s recommendation to provide mother additional reunification services, and counsel for children also favored termination of services. Mother objected, and the matter was set for a contested hearing. Counsel for children then requested a no-contact order with respect to Catherine and Moses and stated that children were “very scared of their mother.” Whenever children had telephone contact with mother, she was very angry and accusatory. Catherine had said that, during one call, mother had said bad things about paternal grandmother. Catherine also was upset with mother’s poor treatment of children’s caregiver. Children’s counsel believed that contact with mother was detrimental to children, especially given that mother had made no progress on her case plan. DCFS joined in the request. Mother objected to such an order, and requested that the issue be put over to the contested hearing.
The juvenile court granted the request for a no-contact order. The juvenile court found that mother had not complied with the court’s orders; mother continually displayed anger toward everyone; and mother denigrated children, their relatives, and the professionals involved in the case. Mother’s conduct, the juvenile court found, posed a threat to children’s “emotional safety.” The juvenile court further found that children were afraid that mother would physically harm them during an angry outburst, and that continued contact with mother was causing children emotional trauma. The juvenile court indicated that it would revisit the issue at the contested hearing, and that the no-contact order was effective until that hearing.
Prior to the contested hearing, DCFS reported that Iris had been released from juvenile hall on probation and placed in a group home. Iris told the social worker that she had been text messaging mother, and it appeared from mother’s messages that she was drinking and “not okay.” Iris said that she “knew that her mother would still be a threat to her” and that she did not want contact with mother. Approximately one week later, Iris again ran away from her placement. Her whereabouts were unknown at the time of the contested hearing.
DCFS further reported that mother missed several scheduled appointments with DCFS, was rude over the phone, and hung up on the social worker. Mother was not enrolled in any programs and was not drug testing. Because of mother’s complete failure to make any progress on her case plan, DCFS changed its recommendation and recommended termination of family reunification services.
The contested hearing was held on August 10, 2009. The juvenile court admitted into evidence without objection the DCFS reports and took judicial notice of the case file. Mother offered and the juvenile court admitted photocopies of attendance sheets for group Narcotics/Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
Mother testified that she had received referrals from DCFS and that she had enrolled in two alcohol treatment programs. The first program expelled her because mother refused to enter an in-patient program for depression. The second program, Roy’s National Service, was not one of the programs recommended by DCFS. At Roy’s, mother participated in random drug testing, counseling, parenting classes and anger management. The social worker, however, had told mother that the Roy’s program was not “legit.” After that, mother had a “random search” and went to A.A. meetings, but she had no record of doing so because her “cards got stolen.” In her parenting classes, mother had learned that children have their own feelings and personalities. In her alcohol counseling, mother learned that she needed “to stay focused on what matters and that’s it.” Mother testified that she had tested negative for alcohol for six months, but she had no verification because the program said it would fax everything to the social worker. Mother testified that she visited children every chance she got but “they” would cancel. Mother denied expressing anger toward children during the visits. Mother claimed that children’s foster mother’s phone was disconnected; that the social worker did not contact her; and that DCFS did not provide her with bus passes.
On cross-examination, mother denied that she had scheduled any appointments with or received any messages from the social worker. She denied that she had an alcohol problem. She said she had not been drug testing because Tarzana Treatment was too far from her home, and the social worker had not given her a bus pass.
The juvenile court found that mother “has not made any progress addressing” the case issues. The juvenile court found that returning children to mother posed a substantial risk of detriment and, because the 18-month date was only six weeks away, there was no reasonable likelihood that mother would reunify within that time. The juvenile court further found that DCFS had provided reasonable services. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and ordered the no-contact orders to remain in effect.
As the juvenile court announced its decision, mother walked out of the courtroom. Mother filed a notice of appeal from the no-contact orders and the order terminating her reunification services.
E. Other Proceedings
The day after the contested 12-month review hearing, DCFS informed the juvenile court that Iris had been arrested in Las Vegas and transported back to Los Angeles, where she remained in custody pending her next court date. Iris subsequently was declared a ward of the juvenile delinquency court pursuant to section 602. The juvenile dependency court thereafter terminated its jurisdiction with respect to Iris. In September 2009, the juvenile court returned Catherine and Moses to the home of their father and transferred the dependency proceedings to Santa Barbara County.
DISCUSSION
A. Appeal Dismissed as to Iris
1. Mother’s Appeal as to Iris is Moot
As discussed, subsequent to the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction as to Iris. As a general rule, termination of juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488) because, even if the appellate court were to find reversible error, it could afford no direct relief. (In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330.) Although DCFS raised mootness as an issue in its respondent’s brief, mother did not address the issue in her reply brief. Mother thus has advanced no argument that any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply in this case. (See, e.g., In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1488-1489 [appeal not moot if order appealed might prejudice parent in subsequent family law proceedings]; In re Christina A. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158-1159 [not moot if issue raised by appeal is one of continuing public importance and capable of repetition, evading review]; see generally 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent & Child, § 703, pp. 879-880.) We therefore dismiss as moot mother’s appeal insofar as it relates to Iris.
2. Mother’s Appeal of No-Contact Order as to Iris Untimely
As a separate and alternative basis for dismissing mother’s appeal of the no-contact order with respect to Iris, we conclude that mother failed timely to appeal that order. Section 395, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).) “The dispositional order is the ‘judgment’ referred to in section 395, and all subsequent orders are appealable. [Citation.] ‘“‘A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532; see also In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 [“‘An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed’”]; In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1151 [“an appellate court in a dependency proceeding may not inquire into the merits of a prior final appealable order on an appeal from a later appealable order”].)
The no-contact order with respect to Iris was part of the juvenile court’s disposition order entered on July 28, 2008. That order was appealable. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); In re S.B., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 532.) Mother was required to appeal the disposition order within 60 days after the order became final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.540(c), 8.400(d).) Mother did not file her notice of appeal until more than a year later, on September 23, 2009. Mother’s appeal of the no-contact order concerning Iris was thus untimely. Because the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, we must dismiss mother’s appeal of the no-contact order as to Iris. (Mauro B. v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 949, 953; see also Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666-667.)
B. Appeal as to Moses and Catherine
1. No-Contact Order
a. Relevant Principles and Standard of Review
“We start with the fundamental premise that the underlying purpose of dependency law is to protect the welfare and best interests of the dependent child. [Citations.] Accordingly, the purpose of any dependency hearing is to determine and protect the child’s best interests. [Citation.]” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1424-1425 (Luke M.).) “Although a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect. [Citations.]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.) “[T]he focus in dependency law [is] on the child, not the parent. [Citation.] That is, once dependency jurisdiction is acquired because of the custodial parent’s conduct, the court’s inquiry shifts to a focus on the child’s best interests, albeit with a preference towards parental reunification.” (Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.)
At the disposition stage, the juvenile court must permit a parent visitation with his or her dependent child, and such visitation must be “as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “Visitation between a dependent child and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome of the proceedings. [Citation.]” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580 (Mark L.)). Section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B), however, provides that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” Accordingly, in fashioning its disposition order, the juvenile court may deny a parent visitation if there is substantial evidence that visitation would threaten harm to the child. There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal regarding whether an order denying visitation must be based on a threat to the child’s physical safety (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492), or whether a threat to the child’s emotional well-being will suffice. (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317, fn. 9; see also Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 [denial of visitation supported by substantial evidence that visitation “may harm [child] emotionally”]; In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50 [evidence that children sustained “legitimate emotional damage” during visits “may serve as a basis for curtailing or limiting future visits”] [dictum]; In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [juvenile court may deny visitation if it “would be harmful to the child’s emotional well-being”].)
If the disposition order provides for visitation, the juvenile court retains broad discretion during the reunification period to regulate visitation to ensure it is “consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491; In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.) In exercising that discretion, the juvenile court may consider a child’s wishes regarding visitation-indeed, so long as the child is not given an effective veto over whether visitation occurs (see In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505), the child’s wishes may be a “dominant factor” in fashioning the visitation order. (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237; see also In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138-1139; In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 50-51.)
If the juvenile court terminates reunification services and sets a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26, then the juvenile court “shall continue to permit the parent... to visit the child... unless [the juvenile court] finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h), italics added; see also In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.) The standard for denying visitation after reunification services have been terminated is the familiar detriment standard, as distinct from the “safety of the child” standard set forth in section 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B). (See In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.) Accordingly, after reunification services are terminated, the juvenile court may find detriment and deny visitation based on evidence that visitation would be contrary to “the child’s overall well-being....” (Ibid.)
No permanency planning hearing was scheduled in this case. As discussed, after mother’s reunification services were terminated, Catherine and Moses were returned to their father’s care, and the dependency proceedings were transferred to Santa Barbara County.
We review for substantial evidence a juvenile court finding that visitation would jeopardize a child’s safety (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B)) or would be detrimental to the child’s well-being (§ 366.21, subd. (h)). (Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 & fn. 5.) Under the substantial evidence rule, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] The judgment will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) We review a juvenile court’s order regulating visitation for an abuse of discretion. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 699, fn. 6.) We will reverse only if the juvenile court’s order was arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
b. Suspension of Visitation During Reunification Period
Mother argues that the juvenile court’s termination of reunification services was erroneous because of the denial of visitation, for mother posed no threat to children’s physical safety. We disagree.
Mother’s argument is premised on her characterization of the no-contact order as a denial or termination of her visitation, which she contends was inconsistent with 362.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A). We reject mother’s characterization. The juvenile court’s disposition order provided for visitation between mother and Catherine and Moses. The juvenile court found that DCFS made reasonable efforts to facilitate that visitation through the 12-month review hearing.
At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court neither denied nor terminated mother’s visitation. Rather, at the request of counsel for children and after affording mother an opportunity to be heard, the juvenile court suspended visitation for the five-week period between the original 12-month review hearing on June 1, 2009, and the contested 12-month review hearing set for July 8, 2009. When mother’s contest came on for hearing on July 8, mother requested a further continuance, which the juvenile court granted through August 10, 2009. Accordingly, viewed in its proper context, the no-contact order was an exercise of the juvenile court’s broad discretion to regulate visitation, not a disposition order denying visitation governed by section 361.2, subdivision (a)(1).
Mother makes no procedural or due process challenge to the no-contact order.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. There was substantial evidence before the juvenile court that visitation with mother was having a detrimental effect on Catherine and Moses. That evidence included the following. DCFS had reported that mother had shown up to visits drunk, requiring DCFS to limit mother to visits monitored by the social worker at the DCFS office. Mother was rude and mean and yelled at Catherine and Moses during telephone calls; mother was always angry, accusatory and upset about something; and mother had threatened Catherine and Moses that she would take them out of the state and away from their other relatives if she regained custody. Catherine was upset about mother’s poor treatment of children’s caregiver. Both children reported that mother was still drinking excessively; they believed mother would seriously harm them if they were released back to mother’s care; and they were “very scared” of mother. Catherine and Moses exhibited such anxiety, anger and frustration at the prospect of visits with mother that they threw uncontrollable tantrums. DCFS noted that, when mother had been out of contact with children during April and May 2009, children had appeared calmer, happier and more peaceful.
The juvenile court’s order also was reasonable in scope. The original no-contact order was effective for only five weeks and expired on a date certain, when the juvenile court anticipated holding a full contested hearing. The order was then extended another four weeks-again, to a date certain-as the result of mother’s request for a continuance. As noted, mother’s visitation already had been restricted by the juvenile court due to mother’s conduct. Mother did not propose to the juvenile court, nor has she suggested on appeal, any reasonable alternative to suspending visitation pending a full hearing. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the no-contact order and subsequently terminating mother’s reunification services.
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the juvenile court had erred, any such error was harmless under any standard for determining prejudice. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 22 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reasonable probability of more favorable result]; Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1514-1515 [clear and convincing evidence of no prejudice]; see generally, Seiser et al., California Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2010) § 2.194.) The record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile court would have terminated mother’s reunification services even if it had never made the no-contact order. The juvenile court indicated at the June 1 hearing-before it issued the no-contact order-that it was inclined to reject DCFS’s recommendation to continue reunification services. Notwithstanding the no-contact order, mother had nine weeks between the June 1 hearing and the contested hearing on August 10 to demonstrate verifiable progress in an alcohol program, parenting classes or an anger management program. She failed to do so. After the contested hearing, the juvenile court found-and the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt-that in the entire reunification period, mother had made no verifiable progress whatsoever toward achieving the objectives of her case plan. The evidence compelled the conclusion that mother would be unable to achieve those objectives prior to the 18-month review date, which was then only six weeks away.
Moreover, mother had failed to maintain regular visitation with children prior to the no-contact order, and there is no reason to believe that mother’s conduct would have changed in this respect absent the no-contact order. In the seven months preceding the June 1, 2009 review hearing, mother had only three visits with children-two visits in December 2008, and one visit in February 2009. Although children cancelled a number of scheduled visits, mother bore equal or greater responsibility for her lack of visitation. Mother was out of the state and unavailable for visitation for much of December 2008; mother cancelled visits in January 2009 because she “had other things that she needed to do”; mother cancelled visits in February 2009, even though children had said they would attend the visits; in March 2009, mother cancelled at least one visit with children for no better reason than to retaliate against them for cancelling prior visits. Between March 24, 2009 and June 1, 2009-the two-month period immediately preceding the 12-month review hearing-mother simply disappeared, and her whereabouts were unknown. There is no basis in the record to believe that mother was in any way prejudiced by the no-contact order. Mother has failed to establish reversible error.
c. Post-Reunification Denial of Visitation
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her visitation with Catherine and Moses after the termination of her reunification services. There was no abuse of discretion. The evidence discussed above constituted substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that visitation with mother was detrimental to the emotional well-being of Catherine and Moses. Accordingly, the juvenile court was within its authority to deny mother visitation once her reunification services were terminated. (See In re Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 678-679; see also In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492; In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 953-956.) Mother may petition the juvenile court to modify its visitation order if circumstances change. (§ 388.)
2. Conjoint Counseling Issue
In its disposition order, the juvenile court ordered that mother was to receive conjoint counseling with children “when deemed appropriate.” Mother and children did not participate in conjoint counseling at any point during the reunification period. On appeal, mother argues that because DCFS failed to provide court-ordered conjoint counseling, the juvenile court erred in finding that DCFS provided reasonable reunification services.
Mother forfeited the issue relating to conjoint counseling by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. A “reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) “Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.” (Ibid.) The reason for this rule “‘“is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501.) “[A]ny other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable.” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.)
In this case, had mother raised concerns about the conjoint counseling in the juvenile court, the juvenile court could have decided whether further services were necessary or appropriate and could have ordered DCFS to provide them. In other words, if the services provided to mother were inadequate because of DCFS’s failure to provide conjoint counseling, the problem “could easily have been corrected” by the juvenile court. But, at the contested hearing on whether to terminate reunification services, mother argued only that she had made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to comply with her case plan, and that mother’s ability to reunify with children had been hampered by her lack of visitation. Mother did not argue that DCFS had failed to provide reasonable services because mother had not received conjoint counseling with children. Because mother failed to raise any issue regarding conjoint counseling, the juvenile court had no reason to know that there might be problem that needed to be corrected. It would be unfair to allow mother to challenge the adequacy of services on appeal when she stood by “in silence” at the contested hearing, knowing that she had not received conjoint counseling with children. Accordingly, mother forfeited the argument.
Even if mother had not forfeited the issue, she has failed to demonstrate error. We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS provided reasonable reunification services. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) We will affirm if there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the juvenile court’s findings. We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in support of the findings, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold those findings, and will not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039; In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.)
Reunification services should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. DCFS must make a good faith effort to develop and implement a reunification plan. (Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.) “‘[T]he record should show that [DCFS] identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult (such as helping to provide transportation and offering more intensive rehabilitation services where others have failed).’ [Citation.]” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793-794.) “The standard is not whether the services... were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Moreover, reunification services “are voluntary and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)
There was substantial evidence in this case that DCFS appropriately identified mother’s issues as alcohol abuse, parenting skills and anger management, and that DCFS referred mother to alcohol abuse programs, parenting courses, anger management courses and individual counseling. There was substantial evidence that DCFS made persistent efforts to facilitate mother’s enrollment and attendance in those programs and courses. There was thus substantial evidence that mother’s case plan was reasonably designed to address the problems that led to children’s removal from mother’s home, and that DCFS maintained contact with mother and provided in good faith the services called for by mother’s case plan. DCFS is not responsible for mother’s failure to take advantage of the services she was provided
That mother and children did not receive conjoint counseling does not compel a contrary conclusion. In the disposition order, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to provide conjoint counseling when appropriate. There is no indication in record that anyone involved with the case believed conjoint counseling had become appropriate. As the juvenile court found, over the entire reunification period, mother made no verifiable progresstoward resolving her alcohol abuse or anger management issues-the very issues that had caused mother’s relationships with children to deteriorate to the point that, as found by the juvenile court, merely visiting with mother was emotionally detrimental to children. Indeed, 16 months after children were detained, mother still refused to admit she had an alcohol problem. It would be unreasonable to require children to participate in conjoint counseling with mother when mother steadfastly refused to participate meaningfully in any individual efforts to address her alcohol and anger management issues. Mother has failed to demonstrate error.
DISPOSITION
Mother’s appeal is dismissed insofar as it concerns Iris. The orders with respect to Catherine and Moses are affirmed.
We concur: KRIEGLER, J., FERNS, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.