Opinion
No. 300 EDA 2014 J-S31031-14
05-09-2014
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO Q.C.V ., JR., a Minor APPEAL OF: C.L.D., Mother, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree entered December 17, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
Orphans' Court, at No(s): A2013-0022
BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN and , JJ. MEMORANDUM BY , J.:
C.L.D. ("Mother") appeals from the December 17, 2013 Decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, Q.C.V., Jr. ("Child"), pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). We affirm.
The trial court set forth the findings of fact in its Opinion, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/13, at 1-11.
On February 26, 2013, the Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services ("LCOCYS" or the "Agency") filed a Petition seeking to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. On June 18, 2013, the trial court held the first day of hearings on the Petition for the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father. At the June 18, 2013 hearing, LCOCYS presented the testimony of Jason Weiland ("caseworker Weiland"), the LCOCYS caseworker assigned to the case, and Adam Carbone, the general manager of Substance Abuse Screening Services, Inc. N.T., 6/18/13, at 5, 87-88. At that hearing, Father presented his case, and both Father and Mother, who were both incarcerated, testified on behalf of Father. Father also presented the testimony of his mother, M.Z. ("Paternal Grandmother").
The Agency also sought to terminate the parental rights of Child's father, Q.C.V. ("Father").
The trial court held an additional day of hearings on August 5, 2013 to address Mother's case. At the August 5, 2013 hearing, Father, who remained incarcerated, was present, but Mother, who had been released from prison, was not present to testify on her own behalf. Mother's counsel rested Mother's case on the testimony from the June 18, 2013 hearing. N.T., 8/5/13, at 5.
On December 17, 2013, the trial court entered a Decree terminating the parental rights of Mother, pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On that same date, the trial court entered an Order maintaining custody of Child with LCOCYS. On January 13, 2014, Mother filed a timely Notice of Appeal, along with a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
The trial court denied the Petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child, and Father is not a party to the present appeal.
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On appeal, Mother raises the following questions for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in its determination that the Agency sustained its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory standards set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) had been met?Mother's Brief at 4 (capitalization omitted).
II. Did the trial court err in its determination that the Agency sustained its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory standards set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) had been met when the basis for the terminaiton [sic] was addiction[,] and her addiction problems were no worse than Father's[,] and his parental rights were not terminated?
III. Did the trial court err in its determination that the Agency sustained its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of parental rights best meets the needs and welfare of the Child as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) when[:] (A) the evidence re[garding] the bond between Mother and Child and the effect of severing any bond was insufficient; (B) Mother was prevented from bonding further with the Child by the policy of the Agency refusing any visits unless she tested clean from drugs, a policy they did not apply to Father; and (C) there was no evidence to show how termination of Mother's parental rights would benefit the Child given that Father's parental rights were not terminated, in that termination of Mother's rights would not free up the child for adoption or permanency, and no other benefit to the child was suggested?
Our standard of review is as follows:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of theIn re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
... [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). "[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Satisfaction of any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with consideration of Section 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In this case, we will review the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights based upon section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), which state the following:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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We have explained this Court's review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the involuntary termination of a parent's rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties.In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent's
explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this question.In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).
Further, regarding the definition of "parental duties," this Court has stated as follows:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with . . . [his] physical and emotional needs.
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2),
the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
With regard to section 2511(a)(5), we have stated the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [s]ection 2511(a)(5), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions which led to the child's removal or placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable period time; (4) the services reasonably available to the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the childIn the Interest of B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
"Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the court." In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of LCOCYS supplied over a realistic time period. Id. The "relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing." In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Further,
the application of [s]ection (a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care.Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).
With respect to the "needs and welfare" analysis pertinent to section 2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:
[I]nitially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the "needs and welfare of the child" prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the "developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section 2511(a), does a court "engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child." Accordingly, while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the "needs and welfare of the child," we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the "needs and welfare" of [the child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009 (citations omitted).
Regarding section 2511(b), the court inquires whether the termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child." Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id.; see also In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (stating that "the court must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship."); In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining that, in cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists). Additionally, "the strength of emotional bond between a child and a potential adoptive parent is an important consideration in a 'best interests' analysis." In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 13; see also In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (stating that "courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents."). Moreover, courts are not required to use expert testimony when conducting a bonding analysis and may utilize evaluations by social workers and caseworkers to show the bond between parents and their children. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Finally, the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008.
In her first claim, Mother contends that "[t]here is no significant evidence that she was an abusive parent[,]" and "[t]here is evidence she is a caring [] parent who interacts appropriately when with [C]hild at visits." Brief for Mother at 12-13. Mother asserts that, at the June 18, 2013 termination hearing, she was sober, but remained incarcerated for relatively minor crimes related to her addiction. Id. at 13. Mother also points out that she appeared at the last juvenile dependency hearing on March 14, 2013. Id. Mother asserts that she did not have the opportunity to give parental care to Child because her custody of Child was removed by the court. Id. Additionally, Mother contends that it is unfair to conclude that she abandoned Child by failing to visit him because the Agency told her that she could not visit Child unless she tested clean for drugs, and it is known that she has a significant addiction problem. Id. Mother asserts that the Agency's refusal to let her visit with Child in May of 2013, when she was in prison and sober, on the basis that Mother had not visited with Child in ten months and a visit would be upsetting to Child, does not reflect a settled purpose to relinquish her parental rights. Id. at 14. Mother contends that there is no evidence that she caused Child to be without essential parental care, noting that Child has been placed with Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 15. Mother also asserts that, because she was sober while in prison, there is no evidence to suggest that she is beyond successful treatment. Id. Finally, Mother claims that, because Father's parental rights were not terminated and there is no plan for the adoption of Child, the termination of Mother's parental rights does not serve the needs and welfare of Child, and serves only to punish her. Id. at 21.
The trial court concluded that LCOCYS had met its burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination of Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interest, and that the termination was warranted under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8). See Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/13, at 11, 15-18. We find competent evidence in the record that supports the trial court's credibility and weight assessments. See id. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27 (stating that this Court must defer to the trial court's termination decision as long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court has not erred or abused its discretion in making its legal conclusions); see also In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 11-12.
In her second claim, Mother contends that the trial court erred by determining that the Agency met its burden of proof under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) because the Agency unfairly prevented Mother from visiting with Child on the basis of her positive drug screens, but did not impose the same restriction on Father. Brief for Mother at 14. Mother claims that terminating her parental rights appears especially unfair because her addiction was no worse than Father's addiction, yet his parental rights were not terminated. Id. at 17. Mother contends that, other than while he was in prison or rehabilitation, Father was not sober for any substantial length of time during the ten to twelve months preceding the August 5, 2013 termination hearing. Id. at 19. Mother contends that "it is reversible error to terminate Father's [sic] rights and not Mother's [sic] when there is no discussion of the effect of such a decision on the [C]hild and whether it benefits the [C]hild's development, physical and emotional needs, especially when adoption is not being considered." Id. at 20.
Although Mother attempts to equate her conduct with Father's, the record indicates otherwise. The trial court addressed the bases for its decision not to terminate Father's parental rights in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/13, at 19-20. Specifically, the trial court identified Father's efforts to overcome his addictions and his consistent visitation with Child. See id. Mother's lack of effort and noncompliance cannot be equated with Father's efforts. See id. at 15-18. Thus, we conclude that Mother's second claim is without merit.
In her third claim, Mother contends that "[t]here was almost no evidence on the issue of whether the [C]hild has a bond with his Mother or the strength of that bond, if any." Brief for Mother at 21. Mother points to the testimony of caseworker Weiland that he did not know if Child knew Mother, which he based on Child not having seen Mother in almost one year. Id. at 22. Mother asserts that she attended nine out of ten visits with Child prior to July 2012, without issue. Id. Mother also asserts that caseworker Weiland told her that she could not visit Child unless she tested clean for drugs. Id. Mother claims that there is no evidence as to whether a bond would have developed if Mother had been permitted to visit Child when testing positive for illegal substances. Id. Mother notes that she was denied visits with Child while she was sober in prison because there was too long a gap from her last visit. Id. Mother asserts that she should not be penalized for the gap in her visitations with Child because she was following Agency instructions. Id. at 23. Mother also contends that there is no evidence as to how the termination of her parental rights, but not Father's parental rights, will benefit the developmental, physical and emotional needs of Child. Id.
With regard to the section 2511(b) inquiry, the trial court found as follows:
We find that no bond exists between Mother and the Child because of the minimum contact Mother has had with the Child. From October 6, 2011[,] through July 7, 2012, Mother visited the Child 14 times, averaging less than 2 times per month. Mother has had no contact with the Child since July 7, 2012, a period over a year from the second termination hearing. At the time of the last visit, the Child was one year, seven months old. The Child does not ask for Mother[,] and it is unlikely that the Child knows who Mother is. Mother is not providing any benefit to the Child: no physical, emotional, or mental support whatsoever. Accordingly, we find that no bond can exist between Mother and the Child, and the termination of Mother's parental rights would not destroy a beneficial relationship to [Child]. It is in [Child's] best interest to be given the opportunity to be brought up in a stable, loving and permanent home; Mother is not in a position to provide that to him. The needs and welfare of [Child] dictate termination of Mother's parental rights in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/13, at 18-19 (citations omitted); see also id. at 12.
Here, the record includes clear and convincing evidence that Child has not developed a parental, bonded relationship with Mother, who does not provide for any of Child's needs. See In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 535-36 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that where no clear bond between the parent and the subject child was apparent, the county children and youth agency was not required to prove the absence of a positive bond); In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764 (concluding that competent evidence supported trial court's termination of mother's parental rights despite the absence of a bonding evaluation where evidence demonstrated a strong relationship between child and his foster mother, the child's young age, and his very limited contact with his mother). While Mother may love Child, a parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. Indeed, a child's life "simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1125; see also In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating that parents must put themselves in a position to assume daily parenting responsibilities so that they can develop a bond with child). Based upon the foregoing, competent evidence supports the trial court's determination that the termination of Mother's parental rights would serve Child's best interests. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered. __________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISION
In re: Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights to Q.C.V., Jr., A Minor
No.: A2013-0022
APPEARANCES:
Glenn R. Smith, Esquire
On behalf of Lehigh County Office of Children &
Youth Services
Michael E. Moyer, Esquire
On behalf of the Minor
Jane Detra Davenport, Esquire
On behalf of Mother of Minor
Richard P. Focht, Esquire
On behalf of Father of Minor
ADJUDICATION
CAROL K. McGINLEY, P.J.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Q.C.V., Jr. (the Child) was born on December 18, 2010. Notes of Testimony June 18, 2013, p. 7.
2. Q.C.V., Jr.'s biological mother is (Mother). N.T. June 18, 2013, p.4.
3 Q.C.V., Jr.'s biological father is (Father). N.T. June 18, 2013, p.4.
4. Mother tested positive for marijuana at the time of Q.C.V., Jr.'s birth; Q.C.V., Jr. went home with Mother and Father with monitoring by Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services (LCOCYS). N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 55-56.
5. Following Q.C.V., Jr.'s birth, Mother submitted urine screens for one to two months at the request of LCOCYS. The samples were negative and LCOCYS discontinued monitoring the case. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 56-58, 67.
6. A referral to LCOCYS was made in June of 2011 when the Bethlehem Police were called to a scene in a parking lot where Mother and Father appeared under the influence and were arguing with Q.C.V., Jr. present. (Paternal Grandmother) was called to remove Child from the scene. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 5-6.
7. The next referral was received on October 5, 2011, after the Lancaster County Police removed the Child from the custody of his parents based on allegations that the parents were under the influence of bath salts, the child appeared dirty, and the parents had no money to buy gas for their car or food for the Child. Lancaster County Children and Youth took custody from the police. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 7.
8. On October 6, 2011, LCOCYS travelled to Lancaster County and took physical custody of the Child. A shelter hearing was held that date and the Child was placed in the temporary legal and physical custody of LCOCYS. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 6-7.
9. LCOCYS placed the Child in the physical custody of Paternal Grandmother where the child had resided since birth; the child has remained in the home and care of Paternal Grandmother since that date. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 7, 182.
10. The Child was adjudicated dependent on October 13, 2011. Mother and Father failed to attend the adjudication hearing; their whereabouts were unknown and Father had pending criminal charges against him. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 8-9.
11. On October 13, 2011, both Mother and Father were ordered to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow through with all recommendations; provide urine screens three times per week; cooperate with all reunification services; maintain legal employment; maintain stable housing; and follow through with any other recommendations of LCOCYS. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 8.
12. On December 13, 2011, both parents were arrested on possession of controlled substance charges; neither parent was incarcerated as a result of the arrest. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 10-19.
13. The first Permanency Review Hearing was held on January 12, 2012; both parents attended. Mother and Father were found to be in minimal compliance regarding participation and cooperation with services. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 9-10.
14. Mother and Father underwent a drug and alcohol evaluation as ordered. Father did not follow up with any of the recommendations. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 10.
15. Although ordered to submit to drug screens three times a week, both Mother and Father completed only one drug screening during the review period. Id.
16. Out of 13 possible weekly visits with the Child, Father attended 7 visits and Mother attended 5 visits. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 10.
17. At the January 12, 2012 hearing, as a result of the parents' failure to comply with visitation, the visitation schedule was reduced to two visits per month to be supervised at the Government Center. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 11-12.
18. The second Permanency Review Hearing was held on July 12, 2012. Father and Mother attended the hearing and both were found substantially compliant with the permanency plan. Moderate progress was made toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the placement. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 12; Petitioner's Exhibit 1.
19. At the time of the July 12, 2012, hearing, both parents were in outpatient drug and alcohol treatment having already completed inpatient treatment programs. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 12.
20. Father and Mother were residing in a stable residence and Father was employed. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 13.
21. Father attended 8 out of the 10 scheduled visits. Mother attended 9 out of the 10 scheduled visits. Both parents presented as caring parents, attentive to the Child during visits. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 12; Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 7.
22. Father improved his drug testing compliance: he had 29 clean results, 2 diluted results, 1 positive result for alcohol and 1 positive result for PCP; in addition, he had 17 no-shows. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 12.
23. Mother also improved her drug testing compliance: she had 33 clean results, 1 diluted result, 1 positive result for alcohol, and 10 no-shows. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 13.
24. The third Permanency Review Hearing was held on October 11, 2012; Father was present. Mother did not attend the hearing and her whereabouts were unknown. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 14.
25. Father was found to be in substantial compliance with the permanency plan and had substantial progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the original placement. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 15; Petitioner's Exhibit 1.
26. In August 2012, Father was discharged from the Pyramid Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program due to noncompliance. In addition, Father had admitted to his probation officer and his caseworker that he used marijuana during this review period. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 15-16.
27. On September 20, 2012, Father was committed by the Court to the Work Release Program as an "out mate". N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 14.
28. Father was released from the work release program in late December of 2012 and was permitted to visit the Child at Paternal Grandmother's home while she supervised. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 18-19.
29. Father submitted to drug testing with the following results during this review period: 29 clean results, 8 no-shows, 1 diluted result, 1 rejected result, and 2 positive results for alcohol. Petitioner's Exhibit 7.
30. Mother had no compliance with the permanency plan during this review period. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 14-15.
31. Mother had been arrested on July 19, 2012, for possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 15.
32. She had little contact with LCOCYS and had stopped visiting the Child. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 14-15.
33. Mother's last visit with the Child was on July 7, 2012. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 16.
34. Mother was advised that she could not visit the Child unless she provided regular urine screens testing negative for illegal substances. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 61-62.
35. Mother did not comply with drug testing except for a test on August 9, 2012. She was positive for cocaine and alcohol. Mother has not submitted for drug testing subsequent to that date. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 16; Petitioner's Exhibit 7.
36. LCOCYS filed involuntary petitions for termination of parental rights regarding both parents on February 26, 2013. The Child had been in the care of LCOCYS and the Paternal Grandmother for 16 months at that time. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 26.
37. The next Permanency Review Hearing was held on March 14, 2013; both parents attended. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 17.
38. Father was incarcerated at the time of the Permanency Review Hearing facing charges of possession of a controlled substance arising from a March 7, 2013 arrest.
39. Father was found to have moderate compliance with the permanency plan and moderate progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the original placement. Petitioner's Exhibit 1.
40. Father tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids on January 3, 2013, January 9, 2013 and January 11, 2013. On January 30, 2013, Father checked himself into an inpatient rehabilitation facility; he successfully completed the program. Father complied with intensive outpatient treatment three times a week through Pyramid Healthcare. He also attends Narcotics Anonymous meetings 3-4 times per week and has a sponsor. Petitioner's Exhibit 7.
41. Father has consistently attended visits with his son and the visits have all gone well; he is caring and attentive to Child. Petitioner's Exhibit 7.
42. At the time of the March 14, 2013 hearing, Father had been employed for approximately eight months. Father has remained employed for most of the time the case has been open, even while incarcerated. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 31; Petitioner's Exhibit 7.
43. Mother was found to be minimally compliant with the permanency plan and had minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the original placement. Petitioner's Exhibit 1.
44. Mother had no compliance with drug testing during this review period. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 18.
45. Mother attended two weeks of inpatient rehabilitation at White Deer Run in February 2013, but had to leave due to lack of funding. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 166.
46. Mother admitted to being high on heroin on March 7, 2013. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 153.
47. Mother testified that she had been using heroin for a couple of weeks prior to March 7, 2013. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 161.
48. Mother requested visits with the Child at the March 14, 2013 review hearing. She was advised that she needed to cooperate with services before visits would resume because she had only had one visit in the past eight months. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 22; Petitioner's Exhibit 1.
49. On March 28, 2013, Mother was charged with driving under the influence (cocaine), disregard for traffic lanes, careless driving, and failure to use a safety belt. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 18, 171.
50. On April 17, 2013, Mother was charged with driving without a license. Id.
51. On April 22, 2013, Mother was charged with theft by unlawful taking - movable property; receiving stolen property; access device issued to another who did not authorize use; unauthorized use of motor vehicle and driving without, a license. Id.
52. Mother was incarcerated at Lehigh County Prison (LCP) in early May 2013. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 20, 63.
53. Mother requested visits with the Child after she was incarcerated but was denied visits because she had not visited with the Child in approximately 11 months and LCOCYS did not feel it was appropriate for the Child. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 21-22.
54. The date of the first termination hearing was June 18, 2013. Both Mother and Father were incarcerated on that date, and both attended the hearing. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 20.
55. The termination hearing continued to a second day, August 5, 2013. Mother failed to appear to testify on her own behalf on the second day of trial. Notes of Trial, August 5, 2013, p. 3.
56. At the time of the August 5, 2013, hearing, Mother had been released from Lehigh County Prison for about a week; she had not contacted LCOCYS or her attorney. N.T., August 5, 2013, p. 3.
57. As a result of the Child's age and the amount of time since the Child last saw Mother, it is unclear if the Child knows who Mother is. He does not ask for her. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 23-24.
58. The Child knows his Father. Father has maintained consistent visitation while the Child has been in care, and attending visitation has been Father's "strong point" according to the caseworker. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 23.
59. There are no parenting concerns regarding Father's visits with the Child. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 26, 33.
60. While Father was incarcerated, the Child had difficulty leaving visits. The Child thinks Father hates him and does not want to be with him. The Child appeared confused and troubled as to Father's incarceration and why Father was not able to be with Child. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 21, 81, 85.
61. The caseworker testified that there was some degree of closeness between Father and the Child, but was unable to determine the extent of their closeness. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 81-82.
62. Father testified that he loves his son and his son loves him. The Child's eyes light up when he sees Father. At the beginning of visits, the Child yells "Daddy!" and runs across the room toward Father. Father picks him up and they hug each other for an extended period of time. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 24, 127-128.
63. During visits, Father and the Child talk, Father reads to the Child, and they play together. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 124.
64. Father and the Child have a difficult and emotional time when the visits conclude. In the beginning, they both cried when the visit would end; now Father waits until the Child leaves before he cries, and the case aide distracts the Child after Father says goodbye and hugs the Child. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 128.
65. Before the Child was taken into custody, Father would feed the Child, bathe him, put him to bed, wake him up, hold him, burp him, and care for him. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 125, 157.
66. Mother testified that Father is a great father when he is clean. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 157.
67. Paternal Grandmother has had physical custody of the Child since placement when the Child was 10 months old. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 182, 192.
68. Paternal Grandmother testified that there is a strong bond between the Child and Father; she described their relationship as wonderful and that they love each other very much. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 183, 190-193.
69. Paternal Grandmother testified that the Child misses Father, in between visits and asks when Father is coming home. The Child is confused why Father is unable to be with the Child more often. The Child looks forward to seeing Father because he is very attached to Father. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 183-185, 191.
70. Paternal Grandmother described Father as a good father and described a visit at her house when Father played with the Child all day, fed him and gave him a bath. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 185.
71. Paternal Grandmother testified it would not be in the Child's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights and the Child would have a very hard time with that outcome. N.T.June 18, 2013, p. 192.
72. The Child is developmentally on target; he is smart and healthy and doing very well, without special needs. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 13-14.
73. At the time of the hearing, the Child was 30 months old and had been with Paternal Grandmother for 19 months. He was receiving excellent care, was well-loved and in a stable and nurturing environment. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 22-25.
74. Paternal Grandmother opined that the Child would not suffer in her care if he waited additional time for either or both parents to resolve their issues. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 191.
75. The Paternal Grandmother is an adoptive resource for the Child. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 25.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish her parental claim to Q.C.V., Jr. and that she has refused and failed to perform parental duties.
2. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Mother showed a repeated and continued refusal to provide Q.C.V., Jr. with the proper parental care and control and that Mother cannot or will not remedy this situation in a reasonable period of time.
3. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Q.C.V., Jr. has been removed from the physical and legal custody of Mother for a period in excess of six months and the conditions that led to the child remaining in custody continue to exist. Furthermore, Mother cannot or will not remedy these conditions within a reasonable period of time.
4. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Q.C.V., Jr. has been removed from the physical and legal custody of Mother for a period in excess of twelve months and the conditions that led to the child remaining in custody continue to exist. Furthermore, termination of Mother's parental rights to Q.C.V., Jr. best meets the needs and welfare of the Child and best provides for his developmental, physical and emotional needs.
5. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that there is no bond or attachment between Mother and Q.C.V., Jr.
6. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Mother's parental rights to Q.C.V., Jr. best meets the needs and welfare of the child and best provides for his developmental, physical and emotional needs.
7. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of the parental rights of Mother is appropriate in this case.
8. Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father has evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental claim to Q.C.V., Jr. or that he has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
9. Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father showed a repeated and continued incapacity or refusal to provide Q.C.V., Jr. with essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.
10. Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Father's condition that led to the placement of Q.C.V., Jr. continues to exist, that the condition will not be remedied within a reasonable period of time, that the services or assistance reasonably available to Father are not likely to remedy the condition which led to the removal or placement of Q.C.V., Jr. within a reasonable amount of time and that the termination of Father's rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Q.C.V., Jr.
11. Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there is no positive bond or attachment between Q.C.V., Jr. and Father.
12. Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights to Q.C.V., Jr. would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Child.
DISCUSSION
On February 26, 2013, LCOCYS filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to Q.C.V., Jr. The grounds for involuntary termination are set forth in 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511. Petitioner only needs to establish one ground for termination. LCOCYS petitioned to terminate Mother and Father's parental rights on the grounds of 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a),(1), (2), (5) and (8) and § 2511(b).
The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511.
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.(b) Other considerations. - The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child... With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein, which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of petition.
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
The issue before us is whether LCOCYS satisfied its burden of showing that termination of parental rights is appropriate based on Pennsylvania law. The Court's inquiry in a termination of parental rights case is two-fold. In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. Super. 2006). First, the Court looks at the parent's conduct. Id. The petitioner has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory reason for termination exists. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Second, once the court has determined a statutory ground for termination has been established, the court focuses on the child's needs and welfare. In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra.
All children are entitled to certain irreducible minimum requirements from their parents, including adequate housing, clothing, food, love, and supervision. In Re: J.W., 578 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. 1990). In addition, a parent must exhibit reasonable firmness in attempting to overcome any barriers or obstructive behavior of others and affirmatively demonstrate love, protection and concern for the child. In Re: C.M.S., 832 A.2d 464 (Pa. Super. 2003).
The Court must examine the circumstances of the case and also consider all explanations offered to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants involuntary termination. Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). The petitioner has the burden of producing evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing so as to enable the court to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation of the truth of the precise facts at issue. In re: Child M, 681 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super. 1996).
MOTHER
In this case, Mother's conduct has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to Q.C.V., Jr. for more than six months prior to LCOCYS filing the petition to terminate. First, Mother has not visited with Q.C.V., Jr. since their last visit on July 7, 2012. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 15. Although Mother subsequently requested visits with Q.C.V., Jr., she did not pursue the request because she was not able to first fulfill the condition of providing a drug-free urine sample. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 61-62. Her subsequent requests for visits were also denied because she had not seen the Child for eight and eleven months respectively, and LCOCYS believed it would not be in the Child's interest to have visits with Mother prior to her cooperating with services. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 21-22; Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Mother failed to cooperate with services and was not afforded visits.
Mother stopped complying with the permanency plan in July of 2012: she was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia on July 19, 2012; she had little contact with LCOCYS; she attended one drug screen, although required to attend three times per week, and the day she attended she was found positive for cocaine and alcohol. She did not maintain legal employment. Mother did not have adequate compliance to reinstate visitation and did next to nothing to regain custody of her son.
Mother's actions clearly evidence a relinquishment to her parental claim to Q.C.V., Jr. She demonstrated no parental connection to Q.C.V., Jr.: she had no contact with him and has not provided for him in any manner. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) have been met.
We also find that Mother's refusal to comply with the required services has caused Q.C.V., Jr. to be without essential parental care, control and subsistence necessary for his physical and mental well-being. Q.C.V., Jr. has been in his paternal grandmother's care for two-thirds of his life. His physical, mental, and emotional needs have been met by his paternal grandmother with some help from Father.
The drug addiction that has caused Mother's refusal to provide essential parental care for her son cannot or will not be remedied by Mother. Mother tested positive for marijuana at the time of Q.C.V., Jr.'s birth. N.T. June 18,2013, pp. 55-56. A referral to LCOCYS was made when Q.C.V., Jr. was six months old because Mother and Father were arguing and appeared under the influence. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 5-6. Four months later, the Child was removed from Mother and Father's care as a result of, among other things, drug use. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 7. On December 13, 2011 both parents were arrested for possession of controlled substances. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 10-19. Mother completed an inpatient program prior to July of 2012, and, as of July 2012, was in an outpatient program. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 12.
From July 2012 to March 14, 2013, Mother only submitted to one drug screen through Substance Abuse Screening Services, Inc. (S.A.S.S.I.), and that test was positive for cocaine and alcohol. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 16, 18. Mother did attend a two-week inpatient rehabilitation program in February 2013, but did not comply with her three times weekly drug testing at S.A.S.S.I. after she attended that program to demonstrate sobriety. She admitted using heroin on March 7, 2013, and testified that she had been using heroin for a couple of weeks prior to that date. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 153, 161. On March 28, 2013, Mother was charged with driving under the influence of cocaine. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 171. Mother was incarcerated in May of 2013, and upon her release, she did not contact LCOCYS or her attorney. She failed to attend the second hearing date in this case. N.T. August 5, 2013, pp. 3.
Mother has never had an extended period of sobriety. She has attended some treatment programs and has perhaps been sober while incarcerated, but Mother has never proven her willingness to take the steps necessary to get the help that she needs in order to remain permanently sober. As such, we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary termination set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) have been met.
Q.C.V., Jr. was removed from Mother's care by court order on October 13, 2011, and has not been returned to her care since that time, a period in excess of two years. As previously discussed, Mother's drug addiction led to Q.C.V., Jr.'s removal, and Mother cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time. Mother has failed to take the steps necessary to demonstrate to the court that she is sober, there is nothing to suggest that Mother would benefit from any additional services, and even if such service would be reasonably available, it would not remedy her drug addiction within a reasonable period of time. In addition, as more fully discussed below, termination of Mother's parental rights to Q.C.V., Jr. would best serve Q.C.V., Jr.'s needs and welfare. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (8) have been met.
Finding that LCOCYS has established statutory grounds for terminating Mother's parental rights, we turn now to our primary consideration: the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). In addressing the needs and welfare of the child, it is necessary to consider the emotional bond between the parent and the child. In Re: E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). "A court, in considering what situation would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents' rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial." In Re: P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. 1990). Further, parents cannot solely rely on their natural ties to their child. In Re: Stickler, 356 Pa. Super. 56, 60, 514 A.2d 140, 142 (1986).
We find that no bond exists between Mother and the Child because of the minimum contact Mother has had with the Child. From October 6, 2011 through July 7, 2012, Mother visited the Child 14 times, averaging less than 2 times per month. See N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 10, 12, 14-16. Mother has had no contact with the Child since July 7, 2012, a period over a year from the second termination hearing. At the time of the last visit, the Child was one year, seven months old. The Child does not ask for Mother and it is unlikely that the Child knows who Mother is. Mother is not providing any benefit to the Child: no physical, emotional, or mental support whatsoever. Accordingly, we find that no bond can exist between Mother and the Child, and the termination of Mother's parental rights would not destroy a beneficial relationship to Q.C.V., Jr. It is in Q.C.V., Jr.'s best interest to be given the opportunity to be brought up in a stable, loving and permanent home; Mother is not in a position to provide that to him. The needs and welfare of Q.C.V., Jr. dictate termination of Mother's parental rights in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
FATHER
As to Father, we do not find that LCOCYS has met its burden as to any of the statutorily required grounds for termination. Although not in perfect compliance with the permanency plan requirements, especially as a result of setbacks related to his substance abuse, we find that LCOCYS was not able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental claim to the Child or refused or failed to perform parental duties. Father maintained gainful employment and stable housing when possible, i.e., not in a rehabilitation program or prohibited due to incarceration. N.T. June 18, 2013. In addition, he sought help with his drug addiction and willingly participated in programs. Most recently he completed an inpatient program at the end of January 2013, followed by intensive outpatient treatment three times a week. He also has a sponsor and attends Narcotics Anonymous meetings 3-4 times per week. Petitioner's Exhibit 7.
Most importantly, Father maintained consistent visitation with Q.C.V., Jr. during which he parents appropriately: he acts lovingly and playfully interacts with Q.C.V., Jr. Id. He is affectionate with Q.C.V., Jr. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 24, 127-128. He also maintains phone contact with Q.C.V., Jr. between visits. N.T. June 18, 2013, p. 124. Such behavior does not demonstrate the necessary conduct to satisfy 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).
With regard to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), LCOCYS has not established that Father showed a repeated and continued incapacity or refusal to provide the Child with the essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being. Father has not refused to provide parental care to the Child and has performed as much parental care as permitted under his circumstances, whether he was incarcerated or prohibited from living with the Child. He maintained contact with Q.C.V., Jr. and maintained the relationship that they have built. When permitted, Father did take care of Q.C.V., Jr.'s physical and mental needs.
Regarding 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (8), the Child has been removed from Father's care for a period in excess of twelve months. It is not clear whether Father will be able to permanently maintain his direction on the road to recovery, but it has not been clearly proven that he cannot demonstrate sobriety within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, at this point, it is the close relationship between Father and Q.C.V., Jr. that prevents LCOCYS from proving the last two asserted grounds for termination. Q.C.V., Jr. knows Father and knows him to be his father. He misses him and wants to see him more often. He lights up when he visits Father and has a difficult time understanding why Father is not around more often. N.T. June 18, 2013, pp. 23-24, 127-128. Although his disappointment and anger, are negative emotions, they stem from the bond and love he has with and for Father and demonstrate a small fraction of what Q.C.V., Jr. would feel and exhibit should the Father's parental rights be terminated. Termination of Father's parental rights is not in the best interest of Q.C.V., Jr., and we find it would better serve Q.C.V., Jr.'s needs and welfare for Father's parental rights to remain intact.
BY THE COURT:
__________
CAROL K. McGINLEY, P.J.
DRAFT OPINION CIRCULATION MEMO
FROM: Meg TO: Ann ___ Amit ___ Jeff ___ RE: In re Q.V.C., Jr. JOURNAL NO.: J-S31031-14 (Children's Fast-track) FINAL: ___ TRIAL COURT OPINION ATTACHED