Opinion
No. COA09-1201.
Filed February 2, 2010.
Perquimans County No. 09JT1.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 4 June 2009 by Judge C. Christopher Bean in District Court, Perquimans County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 December 2009.
Jeanine C. Evans for petitioner-appellee father. Wyrick Robbins Yates Ponton LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson, for respondent-appellant mother.
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights as mother to the minor child H.R.S.("Hanna"). After careful review, we uphold the termination of respondent-mother's parental rights.
We will refer to the minor child H.R.S. by the pseudonym Hanna to protect the child's identity and for ease of reading.
Petitioner-father and respondent-mother, married in September 2000, are the parents of Hanna, born in April 2002. After the couple separated in October 2003, Hanna lived with respondent-mother. Petitioner-father and Linda S. lived together. On 3 October 2006, petitioner-father and respondent-mother were granted a divorce and, on 21 October 2006, petitioner-father married Linda S., with whom he later had two other children. Respondent-mother and Hanna lived with Mr. Fox, with whom respondent-mother had a son. On 24 January 2007, petitioner-father filed a complaint against respondent-mother seeking primary legal and physical custody of Hanna. Respondent-mother filed an answer to the complaint and counterclaims seeking custody and child support on 21 March 2007.
By temporary custody order entered in March 2007, the trial court granted temporary custody of Hanna to petitioner-father and limited supervised visitation to respondent-mother. The trial court found that Mr. Fox was involved in an automobile accident which occurred in December 2006; respondent-mother, Hanna, and Hanna's two-year-old half brother were riding in the automobile at the time of the accident. As a result of the accident, Mr. Fox was charged with driving while impaired, revoked tags and no insurance, and Mr. Fox died of a drug overdose in February 2007. The court also found that since October 2003, Hanna had lived with respondent-mother at approximately eight different locations; and that at certain times after the separation, petitioner-father did not know where Hanna was living.
The trial court entered a permanent custody order on 23 July 2007. The trial court found that Hanna was integrating well into petitioner-father's home with his current wife, step-daughter and two biological daughters. As to respondent-mother, the trial court found that she was unemployed; she was on public assistance; she was receiving social security benefits for her son as a result of Mr. Fox's death; she had no driver's license or vehicle; and she was under investigation by the Perquimans County Department of Social Services regarding reports of unclean living conditions and her failure to care for her son. The trial court found petitioner-father to be a fit and proper person to have primary legal and physical care, custody and control of Hanna. The trial court found respondent-mother to be an unfit person to have unsupervised visitation with Hanna and granted respondent-mother supervised visitation with Hanna every other Sunday and Friday from 3:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. The trial court also allowed respondent-mother to speak to Hanna by telephone at reasonable times and intervals up until 9:00 p.m. In addition, respondent-mother was allowed to visit Hanna at the daycare center provided that the center permitted and could accommodate respondent-mother. The custody order further ordered petitioner-father and respondent-mother to consult one another periodically in an effort to agree concerning the welfare and education of Hanna and ordered each to be entitled to access records and information pertaining to Hanna. The trial court dismissed respondent-mother's counterclaim for child support. Respondent-mother did not appeal from the permanent custody order.
Petitioner-father filed a petition for termination of parental rights on 28 January 2009. The petition alleged the following grounds for terminating respondent-mother's parental rights: (1) neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1); and (2) willful abandonment of Hanna for at least six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). A termination of parental rights hearing was held on 4 May 2009.
At the termination hearing, petitioner-father testified that respondent-mother had provided him with at least thirteen different phone numbers since June 2007; respondent-mother exercised visitation regularly between June 2007 and October 2007; respondent-mother's visits with Hanna became sporadic between June 2007 and June 2008; respondent-mother visited Hanna once in April 2008 and once in June 2008; he and his wife took notes regarding respondent-mother's visits with Hanna; and respondent-mother had not informed him of her whereabouts since January 2009. Petitioner-father testified that when respondent-mother's visits became sporadic, Hanna began exhibiting behavioral problems at school. Petitioner-father further testified that during the June 2008 visit, he informed respondent-mother that Hanna was seeing a counselor, and gave respondent-mother the counselor's business card, so she could contact the counselor. Petitioner-father testified that respondent-mother did not contact the counselor until December 2008 when he told respondent-mother that Hanna's counselor wanted to meet her to gain a better understanding of Hanna's situation. Petitioner-father also testified that he was not aware that the daycare center denied respondent-mother visits with Hanna at the center.
Petitioner-father's wife testified that respondent-mother stopped consistently visiting Hanna in October 2007; respondent-mother visited Hanna for an hour the Friday before Christmas 2007; and respondent-mother's last visit with Hanna was June 2008. Petitioner-father's wife further testified that Hanna calls her "momma Linda."
Respondent-mother testified she did not visit Hanna from October 2007 until December 2007 when she visited Hanna for an hour on the Friday before Christmas; the next time she visited Hanna was in April 2008 and she also saw Hanna in June 2008; and she last visited Hanna in July 2008. Respondent-mother also testified that she visited Hanna at the daycare center only twice because the daycare would not allow her to visit. Respondent-mother testified that she was unaware that Hanna was in counseling until December 2008, when petitioner-father asked her to contact the counselor. Respondent-mother testified that she was currently working as a babysitter, but did not "get paid for that[;]" her only source of support for her son was the Social Security benefit she received as a result of Mr. Fox's death; and she had been employed between May 2008 and September 2008. Respondent-mother further testified that she gave Hanna clothing for Christmas and money at her birthday.
By order filed 4 June 2009, the trial court found sufficient grounds for termination of respondent-mother's parental rights due to neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and willful abandonment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). The trial court then determined that termination was in the best interests of Hanna and ordered that respondent-mother's parental rights be terminated. From the order entered, respondent-mother appeals.
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that sufficient grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights; and (2) determining that it was in the best interests of Hanna to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights.
Termination of parental rights involves a two-stage process. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). At the adjudicatory stage, "the petitioner has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists." In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted). "If the trial court determines that grounds for termination exist, it proceeds to the dispositional stage, and must consider whether terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the child." Id. at 98, 564 S.E.2d at 602 (citation omitted). The trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.
Respondent-mother first contends the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights based upon her willful abandonment of Hanna pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). She specifically argues the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusion that her abandonment was "willful." We disagree.
To show willful abandonment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7), petitioner-father must present evidence that respondent-mother willfully abandoned Hanna for at least six consecutive months prior to the filing of the termination petition. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2009).
This Court has defined abandonment as:
wilful neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support. . . . [I]f a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.
In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 427 (2003) (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962)).
To support its conclusion that respondent-mother willfully abandoned Hanna at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact:
14. The July 23, 2007 order permitted respondent supervised visitation with the juvenile at petitioner's home every other Friday and Sunday from 3:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. in addition to visitation at the juvenile's daycare facility at least twice a week. Respondent was further permitted direct access to the juvenile's records concerning medical, dental, health, school or educational status as well as telephone contact at reasonable times and intervals up until 9:00 p.m.
15. Petitioner has maintained the same land line number, cell phone number and answering machine for the last four years.
16. Since June 2007 respondent has provided petitioner at least thirteen different phone numbers and failed to provide him any notice of her current address or whereabouts after January 2009 "because they weren't speaking."
17. Although respondent exercised visitation fairly regularly with the juvenile at petitioner's home between June 2007 and some point in October 2007, she failed to visit with the juvenile at all from October 2007 until December 2007 when she came the Friday before Christmas when she visited with the juvenile for one hour. The next time respondent visited with the juvenile was once in April 2008, once in May 2008 and once on June 8, 2008 which was the last time she saw the juvenile.
18. Respondent only visited with the juvenile at her daycare provider twice.
19. Since the hearing regarding custody in June 2007 respondent has lived at eight different locations and currently plans to move to a ninth location with her fiancé, Dan Preston.
. . .
22. Respondent's current employment is as a babysitter and her only other source of income is the social security benefit she receives for her minor child, W.F. as a result of his father's death.
. . .
24. While respondent resided with Chris Mizelle in Maysville, North Carolina she had a job as an office manager from May 2008 until September 2008 earning $7.25 an hour for 32-40 hours each week.
25. Since the time petitioner received physical custody of the juvenile in February 2007 respondent has not provided any financial support to petitioner for the juveniles's needs, she has not contributed to any daycare expense, she has not contributed [to] any of the juvenile's medical needs, she has not attended any of the juvenile's medical or dental appointments, she has not assisted with the juvenile's counseling expense, and other than at Christmas in 2007 and 2008 she has not provided any clothing for the juvenile.
26. Respondent did not participate in the juvenile's Halloween, Thanksgiving, Valentine's, or Easter activities in 2007 or 2008, nor has she participated in the juvenile's birthdays, school activities or met her teachers.
27. At no time after the June 2007 hearing has respondent filed any action to modify or enforce her right of visitation or contact with the juvenile.
28. The juvenile began seeing Rebecca Taylor Stroup, MSW, LCSW of Teddy Bear Children's Advocacy Center in Greenville, North Carolina in May 2008 as she began having a difficult time emotionally and exhibited mood swings, crying, angry outbursts, and difficulties in school and at home. Ms. Stroup is continuing therapy with the juvenile through the date of this hearing, but currently on a bi-monthly basis.
29. In June 2008 petitioner gave respondent Ms. Stroup's business card and asked that she contact Ms. Stroup, however respondent did not contact Ms. Stroup until December 18, 2008 when she met with Ms. Stroup. At this meeting respondent admitted she had personal issues and an unstable living arrangement. Respondent admitted that Ms. Stroup advised her to take an active, consistent role in the juvenile's life and suggested that she seek mental health therapy. Ms. Stroup provided respondent the names of some therapists to contact and respondent met with Lorri Meads approximately twice, but did not see the need for therapy. In addition, Ms. Stroup encouraged respondent to stay in contact with her on a regular basis, but respondent never contacted Ms. Stroup again.
. . .
31. Since February 2007, when the juvenile was placed in petitioner's physical custody, and continuing through the date of this hearing, respondent has demonstrated an extraordinary lack of stability with respect to housing, employment, transportation, family support and relationships. Respondent has continued the unstable, inconsistent lifestyle and living arrangements she was found to have in the July 23, 2007 custody Order.
32. Respondent admits that although she loves her daughter very much, at this time she really has no relationship with her.
33. Between October 2007 and December 2008 respondent's conduct was willful in that she failed to visit with or communicate with the juvenile on any regular basis in spite of the fact she was clearly entitled to contact with the juvenile pursuant to the July 23, 2007 custody Order.
34. Although respondent did not consciously form the intent to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the juvenile, her conduct since October 2007 evidences a clear willfulness and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support.
35. Respondent, while she may have sincere love, affection and concern for her daughter, willfully neglected to perform the natural and legal obligations of sharing that love and concern with the juvenile for months at a time in that since October 2007, respondent drifted in and out of the juvenile's life when convenient to respondent and abdicated her role as a mother to the juvenile on any regular, consistent basis.
36. Respondent willfully failed to make any financial, emotional or other significant tangible contribution to the care of the juvenile even though she was employed for a period of time in 2008 and legally entitled to visitation and/or contact.
37. Respondent willfully failed to inquire as to the juvenile's well-being whether medical, academic, or emotional for months at a time.
38. The conduct of respondent is such as to demonstrate that she will not promote the juvenile's healthy and orderly physical and emotional well-being.
Respondent-mother challenges findings of fact 17, 18, 25 and 26. Respondent-mother first argues the trial court erred in finding that she last visited Hanna on 8 June 2008. To support her contention, respondent-mother points to her testimony that she visited Hanna on 13 July 2008 and a photograph of Hanna electronically dated 13 July 2008. Petitioner-father, however, contradicted respondent-mother's testimony. Petitioner-father testified that he and his wife kept records of all visits and phone calls respondent had with Hanna; that all visits occurred at his home; he had no recollection of respondent-mother visiting Hanna in July 2008; and there was no entry in his records for a visitation in July 2008. The wife of petitioner-father also testified that respondent-mother did not visit Hanna after the June 2008 visit. Here, the trial court weighed and considered all the competent evidence and made findings accordingly. See In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000) ("In a nonjury trial it is the duty of the trial judge to consider and weigh all of the competent evidence, and to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.").
Respondent-mother next argues the trial court's finding that she visited Hanna only twice at the daycare center, while true, is misleading because the daycare center "decided" it was not best for respondent-mother to see Hanna at the center. Petitioner-father, however, testified that the daycare center did not inform him that there was a problem for respondent-mother to visit Hanna at the center. In addition, respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court's finding that "[a]t no time after the June 2007 hearing has respondent filed any action to modify or enforce her right of visitation or contact with the juvenile[,]" so even if respondent-mother was having difficulty with visitation at the daycare center, she never attempted to address this problem by seeking modification of her visitation schedule. Again, the trial court weighed and considered all the competent evidence and made findings accordingly. Id.
Respondent-mother also argues the trial court erred in finding that she had not provided any financial support for Hanna's needs. Respondent-mother, however, concedes "[p]etitioner presented evidence to support this finding." Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Respondent-mother further argues the trial court erred in finding that she did not participate in holiday activities, or school activities, or medical appointments. This finding is supported by respondent-mother's own testimony that she did not see Hanna for Halloween, Thanksgiving or Easter in 2007 and 2008; that she relied on petitioner-father for information regarding Hanna's school progress and health instead of contacting the school or attending medical appointments. Petitioner-father also testified that respondent-mother never asked to attend any of Hanna's doctor's appointments and that he had to ask respondent-mother twice to contact Hanna's counselor before she did so. Respondent-mother's argument is without merit.
Respondent-mother also challenges the trial court's determination that she willfully abandoned Hanna. Respondent-mother argues that she could not have willfully abandoned Hanna because her conduct shows that she was struggling with employment, housing and relationships. We disagree.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7), petitioner-father must present evidence that respondent-mother willfully abandoned Hanna for "at least" six consecutive months prior to the filing of the termination petition. Since the termination petition was filed on 28 January 2009, the determinative period in this case is 28 July 2008 to 28 January 2009. "Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986) (citing Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 503, 126 S.E.2d 597, 609 (1962)). "The word `willful' encompasses more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and deliberation." Id. (citation omitted). "Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence." Id. at 276, 346 S.E.2d at 514.
Here, respondent-mother failed to have contact with Hanna within the determinative period in the case even though she could have made contact with Hanna had she wished to do so. Petitioner-father testified that he and his wife kept records of all visits and respondent-mother did not visit Hanna after the June 2008 visit. Even if respondent-mother's assertion that she last visited Hanna on 13 July 2008 were taken as true, respondent-mother concedes more than six months had passed during which she did not see Hanna between 13 July 2008 and 28 January 2009, when petitioner-father filed his petition for termination of respondent-mother's parental rights. Further, respondent-mother did not contact Hanna's counselor until 18 December 2008 and failed to keep in contact with her daughter's counselor.
Respondent-mother also claims that in finding of fact 34 the trial court was "forced to admit" that respondent-mother's lack of regular contact and "restricted visitation schedule was not out of any intent to relinquish" her parental duties but was from her instability caused by her struggles with employment, housing, and relationships. However, contrary to respondent-mother's assertion, finding of fact 34 does not preclude the determination of abandonment as a ground to terminate her parental rights. Although the beginning of finding of fact 34 states that "respondent[-mother] did not consciously form the intent to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the juvenile[,]" the trial court went on to state that respondent-mother's "conduct since October 2007 evidences a clear willfulness and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support." Here, the trial court determined from the evidence that respondent-mother's behavior and conduct "evince[d] a settled purpose and a willful intent to forgo all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish all parental claims to the child. . . ." Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 503, 126 S.E.2d 597, 609 (1962). Finally, the remaining findings of fact made by the trial court establish that respondent-mother has "wil[l]fully refused to perform her obligations as a parent and has withheld her presence, love, care, and [the] opportunity to display filial affection from [Hanna][,]" and also willfully neglected to lend support and maintenance for [Hanna]. In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. at 540, 577 S.E.2d at 427. We hold that the trial court's findings of fact support the trial court's conclusion of law that respondent-mother "willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
Because the existence of one of the enumerated grounds under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 is sufficient to support termination, respondent-mother's remaining argument regarding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) need not be addressed. See In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004) ("Having concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the additional ground[s] . . . found by the trial court.").
Respondent-mother also contends the trial court erred in determinating it was in the best interest of Hanna to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110. In determining whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest, the court considers the following enumerated factors:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2009).
The trial court made the following findings of fact in support of its determination:
3. The juvenile was four years old when she came into petitioner's physical custody and is presently seven years old.
4. The juvenile's therapist since May 2008, Rebecca Taylor Stroup, MSW, LCSW of Teddy Bear Children's Advocacy Center in Greenville, North Carolina, continues to see the juvenile as of the date of this hearing, but on a bimonthly basis. A letter from Ms. Stroup was received into evidence as petitioner's exhibit
5. Ms. Stroup initially commenced therapy with the juvenile as she had began having a difficult time emotionally and exhibited mood swings, crying, angry outbursts, difficulties in school and at home in part because respondent had stopped visiting regularly. During therapy the juvenile clearly verbalized feeling sad and mad at respondent for her lack of involvement in her life in addition to feeling guilt[y] for not being able to protect her half brother. By September 2008 the juvenile had made sufficient progress in therapy to begin sessions on a monthly and/or as needed basis, however therapy resumed in January 2009 when the juvenile expressed being down-hearted over the holidays regarding her multiple perceived losses.
5. In Ms. Stroup's opinion the juvenile struggles with respondent's lack of active parenting and appears to thrive, but is more secure and happy when she is not faced with unplanned/surprise calls and/or visits from respondent. Furthermore, it is unlikely the juvenile will benefit from sporadic phone calls and/or visits with respondent, in fact it is more detrimental to have sporadic contact than no contact at all.
6. Ms. Stroup unequivocally informed respondent during their December 18, 2008 meeting that she needed to be an active and participatory part of the juvenile's life or back away completely; that remaining sporadically involved was unfair and promoted a sense of insecurity and confusion in the juvenile's mind. In addition, Ms. Stroup strongly encouraged the respondent to immediately obtain her own individual mental health therapy and stay in contact with Ms. Stroup on a regular basis.
7. Respondent is now moving to Jackson, North Carolina, about an hour and a half to two hours from Perquimans County, North Carolina to live with her fiancé and starting a job as a cashier.
8. The Guardian ad Litem met with the juvenile, petitioner and his family, respondent, and spoke to Ms. Stroup by telephone. The juvenile spontaneously told the Guardian ad Litem that she witnessed some violence in the home with respondent which kept her up at night thinking about it, that she cried a lot in the context of her half brother and not visiting with him, that she queried whether it was her fault that her mother did not maintain contact, and she recalled that respondent's former boyfriend was drunk and had a knife. In addition, it appeared the juvenile's bond with respondent was more of a memory rather than a current, consistent bond. The juvenile expressed love and closeness to her two younger half sisters and petitioner's wife. Petitioner's home environment was warm, inviting and comforting. It was apparent to the Guardian ad Litem that everyone enjoyed being together and have a warm, loving relationship. Petitioner and his wife are diligent in following the juvenile's therapist's advice and recommendations.
9. The Guardian ad Litem observed that the respondent seems oblivious to the effect that her failure to be a consistent part of the juvenile's life has on the juvenile. The Guardian ad Litem sees no likelihood respondent will achieve a position where she will be a stable, consistent and regularly active part of the juvenile's life.
10. The Guardian ad Litem's discussion with Ms. Stroup determined that respondent's inconsistent contact with the juvenile severely impacts the juvenile who feels guilty and seeing the respondent sets her back for weeks.
11. In the Guardian ad Litem's opinion it is in the best interest of the juvenile to terminate parental rights.
12. The juvenile is in need of a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age and this can be accomplished only by the severing of the relationship between the juvenile and respondent by the termination of [her] parental rights.
13. It is in the best interest of the juvenile that the parental rights of respondent be terminated.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court's determination is based upon a mere "recitation of testimony and wholesale incorporation of prior proceedings." However, the trial court's findings of fact indicate that the court considered the factors enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 and, based upon testimony from Hanna's therapist and guardian ad litem and the therapist's letter, came to its decision to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights through a rational reasoning process.
As to the factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110, the trial court found that Hanna was four years old when she came into petitioner-father's custody and was seven years old at the time of the hearing. Respondent-mother argues that the trial court did not make a finding as to the likelihood of adoption, but the trial court is not required to make findings as to all of the factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110. See In re S.C.H., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 682 S.E.2d 469, 475 (2009) (affirming the trial court's conclusion that it was in the juvenile's best interests that respondents' parental rights be terminated, when the trial court did not make "a specific finding addressing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a)(4) [the bond between the juvenile and the parent]," but did make "multiple findings regarding the other enumerated factors.")
As to the other enumerated factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a), the trial court found that "[t]he juvenile is in need of a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age and this can be accomplished only by the severing of the relationship between the juvenile and respondent by the termination of [her] parental rights[;]" respondent-mother's bond with Hanna "was more of a memory rather than a current consistent bond[;]" the "juvenile expressed love and closeness to . . . petitioner's wife[;]" "[p]etitioner's home environment was warm, inviting and comforting[,]" and "[i]t was apparent to the Guardian ad Litem that everyone enjoyed being together and have a warm, loving relationship[;]" Hanna's therapist opined that the "juvenile struggles with respondent's lack of active parenting and . . . is more secure and happy when she is not faced with unplanned/surprise calls and/or visits from the respondent[;]" and the Guardian ad Litem "sees no likelihood respondent will achieve a position where she will be a stable, consistent and regularly active part of the juvenile's life." Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the termination of respondent-mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Hanna.
We affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights to her daughter.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).