Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. J210287, A. Rex Victor, Judge.
Amy Z. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Ramona E. Verduzco, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
RICHLI J.
Defendant and Appellant T.D. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, two-year-old G.D. Mother contends (1) she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her counsel failed to request further reunification services; and (2) the juvenile court erred in denying her request to rescind her relinquishment of her parental rights. In the alternative, Mother claims this court should correct the minute order of April 2, 2008, to reflect that family reunification services were not provided to Mother and that she did not fail to reunify with G.D.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother was a dependent of the juvenile court when she gave birth at the age of 17 to G.D.. She had been a court dependent since 1995 and had had multiple placements. She had a history of leaving placements without permission, was emotionally immature, had difficulty controlling her anger and complying with directions, had demonstrated an inability to care properly for young relatives, and had demonstrated poor judgment. There were also concerns that Mother’s relative caretaker (her aunt) was physically and verbally abusive to Mother.
In August 2006, Mother had been involuntarily hospitalized in a mental institution following a physical altercation with her aunt. In 2004, she had been prescribed psychotropic medication for her diagnosed oppositional defiant disorder and depression. Other behaviors included abusing alcohol, setting fires, not accepting authority, fighting with adults and peers, and running away from placements. Additionally, while living with her aunt, it was reported that Mother had demonstrated significant difficulty tolerating and being patient with her three- and four year old relatives. She would get angry at the children, scream at them, and grab and squeeze their hands.
On September 13, 2006, the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s Services (DCS) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (whereabouts of father unknown) on behalf on then one-week-old G.D.
All future statutory references are to Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Mother had reported that the alleged father of G.D. was K.D. (Father), a 30 year old man living in Long Beach. Later, it was determined that he was in state prison. Father is not a party to this appeal.
Prior to filing of the petition, Mother had decided to relinquish G.D. for adoption. In fact, she had selected the adoptive parents before G.D. was born; the adoptive parents were involved with Mother throughout her pregnancy and were present at G.D.’s birth. Mother had been receiving prenatal care at St. Mary’s Hospital and was working with hospital staff and Holy Family Services for the purpose of relinquishing the child for adoption. However, over the course of several days, Mother had changed her mind several times, finally deciding she did not want to relinquish her child. The social worker expressed DCS’s concerns regarding Mother’s ability to care for an infant and informed Mother that should she not relinquish the child, the child would be taken into protective custody until Mother could demonstrate an ability to care for her. G.D. was taken into protective custody on September 11, 2006, and placed in a foster home. She was formally detained on September 14, 2006.
At the December 4, 2006, jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, after Mother waived her rights, the court sustained the petition as amended, finding G.D. came with the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The parties reached an agreement that G.D. would be returned to Mother on a family maintenance plan and that Mother was to comply with the plan and the rules of the group home where she was residing. Mother understood that she was not allowed to leave the group home, especially with G.D., or leave G.D. unsupervised with anyone unless she received permission from the social worker or group home.
From December 2006 to April 2007, Mother was participating and making progress in her family maintenance plan, though there had been several incident reports of Mother’s negative behavior. Mother’s services were therefore continued at the April 16, 2007, six-month status review hearing.
In June 2007, Mother turned 18 years old. About two months later, she and her daughter were placed together in a less restrictive foster home to allow Mother to transition to independent living, as Mother had been in foster care most of her life and did not have the necessary mature skills to parent a child. At that foster home, Mother exhibited serious immature behavior, such as throwing tantrums, using profanity at staff, refusing to do her school work and chores, lying and stealing from peers, and threatening to run away with her child, and it appeared she was still ambivalent about whether or not to keep G.D. Though it appeared there was a bond between Mother and child, the social worker opined it was not necessarily a loving, mother-daughter bond. Mother’s services were again continued on October 16, 2007.
On February 5, 2008, DCS filed a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, alleging that Mother had demonstrated emotional instability by leaving G.D. with the foster mother overnight without permission and without any explanation. G.D. was removed from the foster home and placed in protective custody.
Mother claimed that she had stayed with a girlfriend but did not know the address. She denied abandoning G.D., explaining the foster mother had her telephone number if G.D. was sick. Mother also stated that she wanted to be on her own and that she wanted to take care of G.D. but presently could not do so. Accordingly, Mother had tried to call the couple who had originally sought to adopt G.D. (Mr. and Mrs. O.). Mother wanted to stay with her friend and share living expenses and try to make it on her own without G.D. Sheriff Deputy John Hayes left a message on Mother’s cell phone regarding her intentions for her child and whether she would be willing to sign over her child to DCS rather than face possible criminal charges for abandonment. Mother advised DCS that she was not returning to her foster home but that she wanted G.D. to remain in the foster home until Mother became stable.
DCS initially recommended that Mother be offered services. However, it later changed its recommendation to a denial of services and a setting of a section 366.26 hearing, based on its belief that the 18-month legal time frame for services had expired on March 11, 2008. DCS was considering both a local family and Mr. and Mrs. O., who resided in Minnesota, as prospective adoptive parents for G.D. Mr. and Mrs. O, who were originally selected by Mother to adopt G.D. prior to her birth and who had maintained contact with Mother afterwards when Mother changed her mind, were Mother’s preference. The O.’s had been present at G.D.’s birth, Mr. O. had cut the umbilical cord, and they had named the baby. They were still interesting in adopting G.D. if Mother was unable to reunify and had stated they wanted an open adoption so Mother could be a part of G.D.’s life.
At the April 2, 2008, jurisdictional hearing, Mother, through her counsel, submitted on the social worker’s reports and recommendations. The court found the allegations in the section 387 petition true and continued G.D. as a dependent child of the court. The court also found that Mother had “failed to participate regularly [and] make substantive progress in the court-ordered case plan.” The court further found that there was no substantial probability that G.D. could be returned to Mother within the statutory time frame and therefore terminated services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. The court advised Mother of her appellate write rights, and authorized placement of G.D. in the home of Mr. and Mrs. O. upon approval.
On April 2, 2008, Mother informed DCS that she did not want her parental rights terminated but that she wanted to relinquish her rights as to G.D. Accordingly, on May 8, 2008, Mother met with licensed psychologist James B. Pace, Ph.D., who performed an updated mental status examination of Mother. Dr. Pace concluded there was no evidence to suggest Mother suffered from a psychotic thought disorder or mental retardation and that Mother was fully capable of understanding the nature, content, and effects of signing a binding document regarding relinquishment of parental rights.
Mother had weekly supervised visits with G.D. until May 2008. These visits were observed to be awkward, with little bonding between Mother and child. Mother seldom held or hugged G.D. and appeared to be more preoccupied with her cell phone. She “presented as distant and emotionally detached from [the] child....” The social worker noted, “There was no observed loving interaction between mother and child, normally seen by a parent and child.” On the other hand, G.D. sought out Mr. and Mrs. O. for hugs and affection, and they had completely bonded with G.D.
G.D. was placed with Mr. and Mrs. O. on May 12, 2008. On that same day, after having a casual, social meeting with Mr. and Mrs. O., G.D., and the social worker, Mother told the social worker that she wanted to sign the relinquishment of parental rights paperwork. Mother was given a telephone number to DCS’s adoption social worker, Laura Rosas, to discuss the relinquishment; they were scheduled to meet on May 14, 2008.
On May 21, 2008, Mother signed a document relinquishing her parental rights of G.D. to DCS before two witnesses and adoption social worker Rosas. The document was forwarded to the state and would become final and binding if Mother did not contact DCS by June 5, 2008. On June 20, 2008, the California Department of Social Services recognized and approved the voluntary relinquishment of G.D. by Mother.
Mother’s four-hour visit with G.D. on June 23, 2008, following her relinquishment of the child, did not go well. Mother arrived in her pajamas; was visibly irritable, argumentative, disrespectful; and had nothing pleasant to say to the adoptive parents or G.D. In fact, Mother did nothing but issue commands to G.D. and used profanity in front of her. G.D. was upset after the visit and could not easily be consoled by her adoptive parents, who were ready and willing to provide a permanent home for G.D.. They also continued to express their commitment to ongoing contact with Mother, as long as it was safe, appropriate, and in G.D.’s best interests.
On August 25, 2008, Mother filed a motion to rescind her voluntary relinquishment of G.D., alleging she was coerced into relinquishing her parental rights. A Request for Rescission of Relinquishment dated August 29, 2008, submitted to DCS by Mother was rejected.
An evidentiary hearing on Mother’s motion to rescind the relinquishment was held on October 8, 2008. Mother was present and represented by new counsel. The court heard testimony from DCS social workers Laura Rosas, Meri Vandom, and Jo Craig, as well as Dr. Pace and Mother. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Mother’s motion, finding Mother had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that DCS or any of its agents used coercion, fraud, or undue influence in any of its contracts or communications with Mother regarding the relinquishment of G.D.
Following the denial of Mother’s motion, the court immediately proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing. It found clear and convincing evidence that G.D. was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. This appeal followed.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mother contends her counsel’s failure to request reunification services violated her right to competent counsel, requiring that the relinquishment of parental rights be set aside and the order for adoption reversed.
DCS responds that Mother’s contentions are not appropriate for appellate review because (1) the order she is contesting is outside the scope of the notice of appeal; (2) Mother failed to timely file a notice of appeal from the order denying services and setting a section 366.26 hearing; and (3) Mother waived and/or forfeited her right to services when she submitted on DCS’s recommendation of terminating services. In the alternative, DCS argues Mother had exceeded the maximum statutory timeline for services and therefore was not entitled to services in any event.
We first determine whether Mother is precluded from raising this issue on appeal.
In an appeal from a judgment under section 366.26, we may not inquire into the merits of an earlier final appealable order from which appellate review was not sought. (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150, 1151.) This so-called “waiver rule” derives from section 395 making the dispositional order an appealable judgment and making each subsequent order, except the order setting a section 366.26 hearing, an appealable order after judgment. (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355; see also In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 666-667.)
Section 395 provides, in relevant part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment....”
In order to challenge findings or orders made at the hearing, or prior hearings, an appeal from the disposition must be filed within the jurisdictional time limit, namely 60 days after the order is made. (In re Daniel K., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 666-667; § 395; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.400(d) ; In re Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150.) “[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” (Meranda P., at p. 1150.)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise indicated.
“The rule serves vital policy considerations of promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and preventing late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’ through a parent’s attacks on earlier orders. [Citation.]” (In re Jesse W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) Late consideration of appealable claims “defeats a carefully balanced legislative scheme by allowing a back-door review of matters which must be brought for appellate review... before the point is reached where reunification efforts have ceased and the child’s need for permanence and stability become[s] paramount to the parent’s interest in the child’s care, custody and companionship [citation].” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208.)
Significant safeguards are built into the dependency statutes, which tend to prevent the wrongful termination of parental rights. (In re Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.) “Those safeguards include a focus on return of the child during the reunification period, independent judicial review every six months, and notice to a parent of all proceedings and the right to counsel at all stages. [Citation.] Thus in the usual case, application of the waiver rule will not offend due process.” (In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208, italics added.)
We acknowledge that “the waiver rule will be enforced unless due process forbids it.” (In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) However, due process is implicated only if Mother shows: (1) there was a defect in the proceedings that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so as to prevent her from availing herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole; and (2) the defect was not merely an error that might have been held reversible had it been timely reviewed. (Id. at pp. 208-209.)
Here, services for Mother were terminated on April 2, 2008, at the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the section 387 petition. At that time, the court found that Mother had failed to participate regularly or make substantive progress in her case plan and that there was no substantial probability that G.D. could be returned to Mother within the statutory time frame even if additional services were provided. The notice of appeal in this matter was filed on October 15, 2008. The notice of appeal reflects that Mother was appealing the October 15, 2008, order denying her motion to set aside her relinquishment. Hence, the notice of appeal in this case was filed over six months after the termination of services and only specified the court’s order denying her motion to set aside her relinquishment. The order denying additional services had become final.
Furthermore, Mother had failed to file a notice of intent to file a writ petition following the April 2, 2008, orders. The general rule is that a parent may not appeal from an order made at a hearing where a section 366.26 hearing was set unless the parent timely files a petition for extraordinary writ review (§ 366.26, subd. (l)), and the juvenile court must advise the parent of the right to file such a petition. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); rules 5.585(e), 5.600(b).) Where the juvenile court fails to advise a parent of the right to file a petition for writ relief, the parent appealing from the order terminating parental rights may challenge the predicate order setting the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722.)
Section 366.26 subdivision (l) provides, in pertinent part: “(1) An order by the court that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not appealable at any time unless all of the following apply: [¶] (A) A petition for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner. [¶] (B) The petition substantively addressed the specific issues to be challenged and supported that challenge by an adequate record. [¶] (C) The petition for extraordinary writ review was summarily denied or otherwise not decided on the merits. [¶] (2) Failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review within the period specified by rule, to substantively address the specific issues challenged, or to support that challenge by an adequate record shall preclude subsequent review by appeal of the findings and orders made pursuant to this section. [¶] (3) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules of court, effective January 1, 1995, to ensure all of the following: [¶] (A) A trial court, after issuance of an order directing a hearing pursuant to this section be held, shall advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues. This notice shall be made orally to a party if the party is present at the time of the making of the order or by first-class mail by the clerk of the court to the last known address of a party not present at the time of the making of the order.”
To ensure that a parent aggrieved by a setting order is made aware it may be attacked only by petition for extraordinary writ, section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3)(A) directs the juvenile court to give notice to the parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review in order to preserve any right to appeal issues raised in the setting order. “When the [dependency] court orders a hearing under section 366.26, the court must advise orally all parties present, and by first-class mail for parties not present, that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under section 366.26, the party must seek an extraordinary writ.... [¶]... Within 24 hours of the hearing, notice by first-class mail must be provided by the clerk of the court to the last known address of any party who is not present when the court orders the hearing under section 366.26.” (Rule 5.695(f)(18); see also § 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); rules 5.585(e), 5.600(d).)
Here, there is no question that the juvenile court orally advised Mother of her right to file an extraordinary writ at the April 2, 2008, dispositional hearing. However, she failed to file one or instruct her attorney to do so. Mother is therefore precluded from challenging the instant issue on appeal.
The waiver rule was first discussed at length in Meranda P. In that case, a section 300 petition was filed regarding a mother, who informed the juvenile court at the detention hearing that she did not want counsel appointed for her; subsequently, she was not represented during the first 12 months of the reunification period. (In re Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147.) Throughout much of this period, she failed to attend hearings and to comply with the reunification plan. (Id. at pp. 1147-1148.) After the 12 month review, she was represented by appointed counsel, and she appeared at the 18 month review, where she presented evidence that she was then willing to address the problems underlying the section 300 petition. (Meranda P., at p. 1148.) At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights and found her child adoptable. (Id. at p. 1149.)
On appeal, the mother contended that the termination order was infirm, arguing that she had been denied her rights to the representation of counsel and effective assistance of counsel at hearings prior to the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1150, 1151.) The court in concluded that the waiver rule generally applies to dependency proceedings, noting that “there are significant safeguards built into this state’s dependency statutes which tend to work against the wrongful termination of a parent’s right to a child even though a parent may be unrepresented or poorly represented.” (Id. at p. 1154.) Applying the waiver rule, the court in Meranda P. rejected the mother’s contention, reasoning that she had declined the appointment of counsel at the detention hearing, and she had squandered repeated opportunities to raise her contention by appeal from the orders issued at the hearings prior to the section 366.26 hearing. (Meranda P., at pp. 1157-1158.) The Meranda P. court also rejected the mother’s request to deem her challenge as a collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus, citing subdivision (i) of section 366.26, which “forbids alteration or revocation of an order terminating parental rights except by means of a direct appeal from the order.” (Meranda P., at p. 1161.)
In In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 198, the mother on appeal challenged numerous rulings made at hearings prior to the section 366.26 hearing and contended that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the dependency proceedings. (Janee J., at pp. 205-207.) After a careful discussion of Meranda P. and Cathina W., the court in Janee J. concluded that the waiver rule, as described in Meranda P., does not constitute an absolute bar to “ineffective assistance, right to counsel, or other claims tardily presented on a [section 366].26 hearing appeal.” (Janee J.,at p. 208.) The Janee J. court stated: “[T]his is the crux of Meranda P.: the waiver rule will be enforced unless due process forbids it.” (Ibid.)
The court in Janee J. proposed the following guidelines regarding relaxation of this rule: “First, there must be some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole. Lack of notice of rule 39.1B rights was one such example in Cathina W. Second, to fall outside the waiver rule, defects must go beyond mere errors that might have been held reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed. To allow an exception for mere ‘reversible error’ of that sort would abrogate the review scheme [citations] and turn the question of waiver into a review on the merits.” (In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208-209.) Applying these guidelines, the court examined the mother’s purported errors, and concluded that none rose to a “defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme,” thereby excusing them from the waiver rule. (Id. at p. 209.)
Here, in our view, Mother’s purported error does not constitute a “defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme....” (In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 209.) We believe this case exemplifies the “late-stage ‘sabotage of the process’” that is to be prevented. (In re Jesse W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 355.) Mother has not shown that the proceedings fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so as to keep her from availing herself of its protections as a whole. She had appointed counsel at all the stages in the proceedings, she was provided with adequate notices of the hearings and her appellate rights, and she was provided with sufficient reunification services.
Moreover, Mother waived her right to challenge this issue. At the April 2, 2008, contested dispositional hearing, Mother submitted on the social worker’s recommendation, and at no time did she argue that reasonable services were not provided to her or that services should be continued. “[B]y submitting on the recommendation without introducing any evidence or offering any argument, the parent waived her right to contest the juvenile court’s disposition since it coincided with the social worker’s recommendation.” (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589-590.)
Specifically, the following colloquy between Mother and her counsel occurred:
Mother’s belated claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to request additional reunification services on appeal is not excused from the waiver rule under the circumstances of this case. (In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 209.) Any other result “would ‘“‘permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412.) In the instant matter, any other result would have a detrimental impact in dependency cases. For example, if Mother were allowed a second opportunity to challenge the dispositional order made at the April 2, 2008, hearing, she could unravel the entire dependency and thereby negate the enormous amount of time and resources that the court, DCS, social workers, medical professionals, counsel, and adoptive parents have already expended throughout the dependency proceeding. Moreover, giving Mother such a second chance would come at the expense of the child, whose interest in securing a normal and stable home make the expeditious resolution of dependency cases all important. (See In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993; In re Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1152.)
Mother here had numerous opportunities to challenge the order terminating services. However, she never contested the order, either by objecting to it at the April 2, 2008, dispositional hearing, filing a writ petition, or challenging it at the section 366.26 hearing. Accordingly, we find Mother is precluded from raising this issue on appeal.
For these same reasons, we deny Mother’s request to modify the court’s April 2, 2008, minute order to reflect that family reunification services were not provided to Mother and that she did not fail to reunify with G.D.
Separately and alternatively, we find Mother has failed to show her counsel was incompetent for failing to request additional services. As the record demonstrates, Mother herself submitted on the social worker’s reports, including a submission of terminating services. There is no evidence that her counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law. (See In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.)
Additionally, Mother is mistaken in her assertion that she was not provided with services while G.D. was placed in her care on family maintenance services. In Carolyn R. v. Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, the Court of Appeal held that the various deadlines contained in section 361.5, subdivision (a) apply to all court-ordered services, including family maintenance services. Among other things, the court explained that section 361.5 “speaks in terms of ‘child welfare services’ (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) which consist of maintenance as well as reunification services (§ 16500 et seq.). Both reunification and maintenance services are part of the continuum of child welfare services. (§ 16501, subd. (a).)” (Carolyn R., at p. 165, fn. omitted.)
Thus, “[w]hen a juvenile court sustains a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, the case does not return to ‘“square one”’ with regard to reunification efforts. [Citation.] Instead, the question becomes whether reunification efforts should resume [i.e., whether, among other things, the parent is entitled to receive services for an additional time period].” (Carolyn R. v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 166, fn. omitted.)
Our case of In re N.M. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 845 is on point. In that case, an 18-month-old child was detained from the custody of both parents and the juvenile court upheld the detention. The court ordered the county’s child welfare services agency (the agency) to provide the parents with family reunification services. Later that same month, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition but placed the child with his mother, ordering the agency to provide the mother with family maintenance services (and to provide the other parent with reunification services). (Id. at p. 848.) Thus, the position of the mother in N.M. is comparable to that of Mother in our case.
A little over one year later, the agency filed a supplemental petition, which the juvenile court sustained. The child was removed from the parents’ custody (the father had been permitted to move back in with the mother and the child sometime earlier), and it ordered the agency to provide both parents with reunification services. (In re N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 849-850.) More than nine months later (i.e., 21 months after the child was first detained), the juvenile court conducted what it characterized as a six-month review hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered additional reunification services for both parents. (Id. at p. 851.) However, the child appealed, and this court reversed.
We explained: “The 18-month limitation set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (a) applies to all ‘court-ordered services.’ [Citation.] Nothing in the statute suggests the limitation period should be calculated separately for maintenance and reunification services.... [¶] The fact a parent had custody during part of the total period does not stop the limitation period in section 361.5 from continuing to run. Section 361.5 states: ‘Physical custody of the child by the parents or guardians during the applicable time period... shall not serve to interrupt the running of the period.’ [Citation.] ‘To construe the section’s language as requiring the court to start services anew simply because a parent succeeded in temporarily regaining physical custody “would scuttle the purpose of the statute merely to preserve its form.” [Citation.]’” (In re N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 853-854.)
We went on to explain that “if it were otherwise, a parent whose child was initially detained but who regained custody at the jurisdiction hearing could receive up to 12 months of family maintenance services [citation], lose custody again on a section 387 petition, and then receive up to 18 additional months of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (a) by arguing that the ‘original’ removal did not occur until the loss of custody pursuant to the section 387 petition. The resulting total hiatus of 30 months manifestly would not advance the legislative purpose of minimizing delay in dependency proceedings. ‘While [22 months] may not seem a long period of time to an adult, it can be a lifetime to a young child.’ [Citation.]” (In re N.M., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 855.)
The same reasoning applies in the instant case. Mother lost custody of G.D. in September 2006 when G.D. was one week old and when the juvenile court approved her initial detention. The fact that G.D. was placed with Mother on family maintenance did not alter the fact that the child was originally detained in September 2006. Therefore, when G.D. was redetained in February 2008, the clock continued to run. By the time the termination hearing took place in April 2008, Mother had received approximately 18 months of services. Therefore, it was not error to characterize the hearing as an 18 month review hearing. But as discussed above, even if it was, Mother may not complain about it at this time.
B. Motion to Rescind Relinquishment of Parental Rights
Mother next contends the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to rescind the relinquishment of her parental rights. We disagree.
A birth parent may relinquish his or her child to a licensed adoption agency “by a written statement signed before two subscribing witnesses and acknowledged before an authorized official of the... agency.” (Fam. Code, § 8700, subd. (a).) Once the relinquishment is filed with the State Department of Social Services (the Department), it is final and “may be rescinded only by the mutual consent of the... agency to which the child was relinquished and the birth... parents relinquishing the child.” (Id., subd. (e)(2).) Thus, the Legislature has expressed a strong policy in favor of giving effect to relinquishments: “Relinquishments, once executed, must be relied upon in order to insure that children will not be forced out of one home and into another at the whims and caprice of emotionally upset and perhaps ill-advised persons.... [T]o do otherwise would ‘open the door to practices which could conceivably discourage adopting parents from opening their hearts and homes to unwanted children....’ [Citation.]” (Hall v. Department of Adoptions (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 898, 903.)
Notwithstanding this strong policy, “a birth parent may bring an action in equity to set aside a relinquishment for cause, such as fraud or undue influence.” (Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 528; see also In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 598-602 [substantial evidence supported trial court’s finding of undue influence where adoption worker misrepresented duration of revocation rights and told the mother if she did not sign relinquishment the child might be given to the mother’s estranged husband].)
In Tyler, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 511, the birth parents sought rescission of the relinquishment of their child on the ground that the adoption agency failed to comply with the Department’s regulations formulated under the relinquishment statute. (Id. at p. 526.) The court found that the agency violated some provisions of the administrative regulations, but the birth parents failed to show these violations influenced their decision to relinquish their child. (Id. at p. 527.) The court stated, “[N]oncompliance with the regulations does not automatically vitiate a relinquishment. However, noncompliance will constitute a ground for rescission of a relinquishment, regardless of the lack of fraudulent intent, if the noncompliance rises to the level of constructive fraud, i.e., if the violation causes prejudice to the relinquishing parents by affecting their decision to relinquish.” (Ibid.) The parent “bears the burden of proving all aspects of constructive fraud, including prejudice.” (Id. at p. 551.)
“... When a finding of fact is attacked on grounds that it is not supported by substantial evidence, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the findings. [Citation.]” (In re Cheryl E., supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 598.) It is the function of the trial court to interpret and weigh the testimony and to draw inferences from the evidence; if the inferences are reasonable, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the trial court, even if the evidence lends itself to a contrary inference. (Ibid.)
In the court below, Mother claimed that she was not asserting a statutory right to rescission but instead was asserting that she was coerced into signing the relinquishment under a theory of fraud or constructive fraud. Her sole offer of proof was that she was told by social workers Jo Craig and Jeffrey Horn that if she did not relinquish G.D., DCS would remove any future children born to her. However, at the evidentiary hearing, both the social workers denied making such a statement to Mother. In fact, social worker Craig was not even a part of the process. She was not the person who had counseled Mother on the matter; it was social worker Rosas. In addition, social worker Craig was not even present when Mother signed the relinquishment documents. Moreover, after discovering a history of Mother’s emotional instability, social worker Rosas even went so far as to order a competency evaluation of Mother by Dr. Pace. Dr. Pace testified that Mother was competent to make the relinquishment decision and denied that there was any evidence that Mother was coerced into signing the relinquishment documents. Social worker Rosas had gone over the relinquishment documents in detail with Mother, and Mother had initialed each and every paragraph, confirming her understanding of the content of each statement, including that she understood she would no longer be her child’s parent once the document was filed with the Department.
Without belaboring this issue, the record clearly shows that Mother had voluntarily signed the relinquishment documents and that she was not coerced into signing the document by any person. Throughout the dependency proceedings, Mother had vacillated between relinquishing her parental rights to Mr. and Mrs. O. and trying to raise G.D. on her own. In fact, even after she had changed her mind about having the O.’s adopt G.D., Mother still kept in contact with them and had even contacted them when she left her foster home and abandoned G.D. Social worker Craig’s statements that if Mother had future children who came into the system, her entire history would be reviewed and that it could have an effect on any future children, although it was the court’s ultimate decision, and that a termination of parental rights tends to be viewed more negatively than a relinquishment do not support Mother’s theory of fraud, constructive fraud, or coercion. The juvenile court found Mother’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing to be incredible based on her inconsistent testimony.
After having thoroughly reviewed the record, we find there was more than substantial evidence here to support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother was not coerced or induced into signing the relinquishment documents and that Mother had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquished her parental rights. As the juvenile court characterized, Mother simply had a case of “buyer’s remorse.”
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., McKINSTER J.
“[Mother’s Counsel]: [Mother], you understand by submitting on the social worker’s recommendation, that the court is not terminating your parental rights today but setting a hearing in four months to determine what’s the best permanent plan. But service will be terminated to you. You understand that, right? Is that what you want to do? You have to answer out loud.
“THE MOTHER: Yes. I’m going with the social worker.
“[Mother’s Counsel]: You understand right now the judge is not terminating any parental rights. He’s just setting a hearing in four months to decide what the permanent plan would be, right?
“THE MOTHER: Um-hmm.
“Q: Is that right?
“THE MOTHER: Yes.
“Q: And, is it true right now you’re inclined to allow the people who are in court [Mr. and Mrs. O.] to possibly adopt [G.D.]?”
“THE MOTHER: Yes.”