Opinion
No. 13-06-00278-CV
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed August 24, 2006.
On Relator's Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑEZ, and CASTILLO.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On May 25, 2006, relator, Ricardo Garcia, filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct respondent, the Honorable Arnoldo Cantu, presiding judge of the County Court at Law No. 5 of Hidalgo County, Texas, to set aside his "judgment for permanent injunction" issued on July 13, 2004, in Cause No. 42,138-E. After reviewing the relator's petition, this Court requested that the real party in interest, Miguel A. Longoria, file a response no later than June 9, 2006. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4. To date, no such response has been filed.
This original proceeding arises from an opinion issued by this Court on May 18, 2006, denying relator's motion for rehearing in the appeal of Garcia v. Longoria, No. 13-04-639-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4359 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, May 18, 2006). On original submission, Garcia attempted to appeal the July 13, 2004 judgment for permanent injunction. See Garcia v. Longoria, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1292 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, Feb. 16, 2006, no pet.). However, having found that the trial court issued the judgment for permanent injunction after its plenary power had expired and thus the judgment was void, we dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and indicated that the proper remedy was a writ of mandamus. Id. at *12. In his motion for rehearing, Garcia pointed out that he had previously filed a petition for writ of mandamus related to the same matter, which was denied by this Court because of the pending appeal. We then advised Garcia to file a "new" petition for writ of mandamus. It is that petition for writ of mandamus that is now before us.
Mandamus relief is available only if the court clearly abused its discretion and the party has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re SW. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding). Mandamus is proper if a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction. Id. (citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998)). When a trial court's order is void, however, mandamus relief is available regardless of whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Id. Because this Court has already found that the trial court's July 13, 2004 "judgment for permanent injunction" is void, we conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate in this case.
We conditionally grant relator's petition for writ of mandamus, and order respondent to set aside his judgment for permanent injunction issued on July 13, 2004, in Cause No. 42,138-E. The writ will issue only if respondent fails to comply.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION
On original submission, we properly reviewed relator Ricardo Garcia's direct appeal and declared the complained-of "judgment for permanent injunction" void. We subsequently denied relator's motion for rehearing, again declaring the complained-of judgment void. Relator requests we order the trial court to vacate the complained-of judgment. The majority states that, on direct appeal, we have already found the complained-of judgment void. While I agree with the majority that we have found the complained-of judgment void, I disagree that mandamus relief is proper. I would hold that relator has not met the requirements for extraordinary relief. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
See Garcia v. Longoria, No. 13-04-639-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1292 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 16, 2006, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication).
See Garcia v. Longoria, No. 13-04-639-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4359 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi May 18, 2006, no pet. h.) (op. on reh'g) (not designated for publication).
In Texas, a person may obtain mandamus relief from a court action only if (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the party requesting mandamus has no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004); In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 180 (Tex. 2003); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992).
While it is wholly unnecessary to appeal from a void judgment, it is nevertheless settled that an appeal may be taken and the appellate court in such a proceeding may declare the judgment void. State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (citing Fulton v. Finch, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tex. 1961)). On original submission and rehearing, we declared the complained-of judgment void because it was signed after the district court's plenary jurisdiction expired. Our decision left intact the trial court's final judgment dated May 13, 2004, as the final judgment in the case. Although authorized to do so, on original submission and rehearing, we could have but did not set aside the trial court's "judgment for permanent injunction," the complained-of judgment. See id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d), (e). If our declarations that the complained-of judgment is void, as we held on original submission and rehearing in the direct appeal, were insufficient to compel the trial court to vacate the offending judgment, mandamus relief would then be proper because relator would have no adequate remedy by appeal. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839.
The current petition for extraordinary relief does not establish that the trial court has affirmatively refused to be bound by the "law of the case," with respect to, in particular, our declarations that the offending judgment is void. The petition for writ of mandamus must stand or fall on its own merits; relator has not met the standard requirements for mandamus relief. See id. Accordingly, I would deny the petition. Id.
The "law of the case" doctrine is defined as that principle under which questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages. Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986) (citing Trevino v. Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. 1978)). By narrowing the issues in successive stages of the litigation, the law of the case doctrine is intended to achieve uniformity of decision as well as judicial economy and efficiency. Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003). The doctrine is based on public policy and is aimed at putting an end to litigation. Id.