Opinion
No. 6831-44979-1.
March 12, 1979.
[1] Infants — Juvenile Court — Commitment — Continuing Court Control. Under RCW 13.04, a juvenile court may not prescribe requirements that must be followed by the Department of Social and Health Services as to the treatment or placement of a juvenile dependent in its custody, but the court may require advance notice of the department's action in certain areas, and may revoke or modify its order of commitment or, upon proper petition and hearing, modify or set aside the department's proposed placement or transfer of the juvenile.
[2] Infants — Juvenile Court — Commitment — Dependent or Delinquent. The status of a juvenile as either dependent or delinquent does not affect the power of the court under RCW 13.04.095(5) to control his commitment by the Department of Social and Health Services.
Nature of Action: Two separate dependency proceedings resulted in orders for specific commitment and treatment. The director of the Department of Social and Health Services and a staff doctor were required to show cause for why they should not be held in contempt of the juvenile court for failing to carry out the commitment and treatment orders.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, David W. Soukup, J., in No. J-80797 on June 14, 1977, and in No. J-32546 on September 27, 1977, entered a judgment of dependency and ordered commitment and treatment. The director of the department was found to be in contempt for failing to carry out the orders or providing alternate treatment.
Court of Appeals: Holding that ordering specific commitment and treatment exceeded the power of the court, the finding of contempt is reversed.
Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and Stephen J. Hosch, Assistant, for appellant.
Rogovy Rogovy, Frederick D. Rogovy, Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay Reich, Deputy, for respondent.
Common issues led to the consolidation of these two proceedings for hearing on appeal. Dr. Harlan McNutt and Dr. Viola Van Patter were each charged with contempt for failing to obey an order of commitment. It is argued that the court exceeded its authority in requiring placement of Jonathan Kevin Brooks and Billy Joe Gakin, juveniles, in a specific mental health facility and erred in holding state officials in contempt for failure to comply with its orders.
Dr. Van Patter was charged with contempt only in Brooks.
After dependency hearings, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order declaring Brooks and Gakin dependent children and ordering them committed to the Child Study and Treatment Center, Western State Hospital, as voluntary patients. The Brooks order also provided that if Brooks was not received for treatment at the center, Dr. Harlan McNutt, secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, and Dr. Viola Van Patter, director of the center, should appear to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt. At subsequent contempt proceedings, it was shown that there presently was not any space in the center and the contempt charge against Dr. Van Patter was dismissed. The court found, however, that the Department had funds to pay for alternative treatment and because this had not been done, held Dr. McNutt in contempt. [1, 2] RCW 13.04.095(5) defines the power of the court to commit a delinquent or dependent child to the Department of Social and Health Services. The Supreme Court considered that statute (subsequent to the commencement of this action) in In re Lowe, 89 Wn.2d 824, 827, 576 P.2d 65 (1978) and held
The Brooks commitment occurred several weeks prior to the effective date of an amendment to RCW 13.04.095(5). When the order to place Brooks at the center was entered, the statute provided for commitment to the department of public assistance.
that when the juvenile court commits a juvenile to the care and custody of department, its authority over that juvenile is thereafter limited to the following: the juvenile court may (1) revoke or modify its order of commitment, RCW 13.04.095, .100,. 110, .150; or (2) upon proper petition and hearing, modify or set aside department's decision on placement or transfer of the juvenile, RCW 13.04.190,. 210 and .220. Inherent in these provisions is the power of the juvenile court to require notice in advance of department's action in areas the court deems important.
While Lowe arose from a delinquency proceeding, the opinion does not limit its application to delinquents. It applies to either a delinquent or a dependent child. We therefore conclude that the court exceeded its authority by ordering the Department to provide specific treatment at a specific facility.
The cause is remanded for reconsideration in light of In re Lowe, supra.
Reversed and remanded.
WILLIAMS and ANDERSEN, JJ., concur.