Opinion
No. 851 CA 22-01700
11-17-2023
IN THE MATTER OF JENNIFER L. FRIEDMAN, PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. TOWN OF DUNKIRK AND ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS FOR TOWN OF DUNKIRK, RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
LAW OFFICES OF JENNIFER L. FRIEDMAN, PLLC, LANCASTER (JENNIFER L. FRIEDMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (HENRY A. ZOMERFELD OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
LAW OFFICES OF JENNIFER L. FRIEDMAN, PLLC, LANCASTER (JENNIFER L. FRIEDMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (HENRY A. ZOMERFELD OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., LINDLEY, MONTOUR, GREENWOOD, AND NOWAK, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Grace Marie Hanlon, J.), entered October 17, 2022, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and declaratory judgment action. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, dismissed the petition-complaint.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the first cause of action in the petition-complaint is reinstated, the petition-complaint is granted insofar as it sought to annul the determination of respondent-defendant Zoning Board of Appeals for the Town of Dunkirk, and the determination is annulled.
Memorandum: Petitioner-plaintiff (petitioner) commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, to annul the determination of respondent-defendant Zoning Board of Appeals for the Town of Dunkirk (ZBA) that petitioner's use of her property as a short-term rental was not permitted under the Town of Dunkirk Zoning Ordinance. Supreme Court, inter alia, dismissed the petition-complaint (petition). Petitioner appeals from the judgment insofar as it dismissed the petition, and we reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from.
"[L]ocal zoning boards have broad discretion, and [a] determination of a zoning board should be sustained on judicial review if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence" (Matter of Fox v Town of Geneva Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 176 A.D.3d 1576, 1577 [4th Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]). So long as a zoning board's interpretation of its governing code "is neither 'irrational, unreasonable nor inconsistent with the governing [code],' it will be upheld" (Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 N.Y.2d 413, 419 [1998]). However, where, as here, the issue presented "is one of pure legal interpretation of [the code's] terms, deference to the zoning board is not required" (Fox, 176 A.D.3d at 1577 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Toys "R" Us v Silva, 89 N.Y.2d 411, 419 [1996]).
Here, the ZBA determined that short-term rentals are not a permitted use in the zoning district where petitioner's property is located inasmuch as "single family dwelling[s]" are the only permissible use in that district, and, according to the ZBA, a group of tenants that is transient or temporary does not meet the code's definition of a family. Where, as here, "the language of a[n ordinance] is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 N.Y.2d 86, 91 [2001]). Contrary to the ZBA's determination and the interpretation proposed by respondents-defendants, under the Zoning Ordinance, the transient or temporary nature of a group is but one factor that "may" be considered to determine whether four or more persons who are not related by blood, marriage, or adoption are the "functional equivalent" of a "traditional family." Indeed, if petitioner rented her property to three or fewer persons, or to four or more persons who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption, those groups would meet the Zoning Ordinance's definition of a "[f]amily" without regard to whether their tenancy was transient or temporary in nature. The ZBA's determination to the contrary lacked a rational basis (see Fox, 176 A.D.3d at 1577), and the court erred in sustaining the determination. We therefore reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from, reinstate the first cause of action in the petition, and grant the petition insofar as it sought to annul the ZBA's determination.
Petitioner's remaining contentions are academic in light of our determination.